

✓



# The President's Daily Brief

*February 6, 1976*

[Redacted]

2  
~~Top Secret~~<sup>25X1</sup>

Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1)(2)(3)  
declassified only on approval of  
the Director of Central Intelligence

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

February 6, 1976

Table of Contents

Lebanon-Syria: The government has announced that President Franjyah will make his long-planned trip to Syria tomorrow. (Page 1)

Morocco-Algeria: The silence following the close of Egypt's effort to mediate the dispute suggests little progress was achieved. (Page 2)

Nigeria-Angola: Nigeria reportedly plans to give the Angolan Popular Movement some limited military aid for the first time as well as substantial new economic assistance. (Page 4)

Thailand: We present a condensation of an Inter-agency Intelligence Memorandum on the Thai Election and Its Implications for the US. (Page 6)

Notes: Italy; France-Somalia (Page 9)

At Annex [redacted] Sino-Soviet  
[redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY


LEBANON-SYRIA

*The Lebanese government has announced that President Franjiah will make his long-planned trip to Syria tomorrow. Franjiah and Syrian President Asad presumably will work out the remaining details of a political settlement for Lebanon.*

The political agreement probably will be made public soon after it is approved by the two presidents. Announcement of an agreement should lead to a general relaxation of tensions in Lebanon. Prime Minister Karami has stated that it will open the way for an expansion of the Lebanese cabinet to include representatives of all political factions.

Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasir Arafat has announced that he will go to Damascus today. Arafat almost certainly will seek assurances that Damascus will refuse the expected request from Franjiah that Syria tighten controls on fedayeen movements in Lebanon.

One battalion of Palestine Liberation Army forces was withdrawn from northern Lebanon to Syria yesterday. This is the first significant indication that Syria may be confident that negotiations will succeed and is willing to relax its control over events in Lebanon.



MOROCCO-ALGERIA

*Moroccan and Algerian officials kept silent yesterday at the close of Egyptian Vice President Mubarak's week-long effort to mediate their dispute over Spanish Sahara. This suggests little progress was achieved.*

In a press conference on his return to Cairo yesterday, Mubarak sounded a note of optimism but offered few details about his talks in Rabat and Algiers. Mubarak said that the explosive nature of the situation had been defused and implied further diplomatic efforts will be made in the next few days.

The Egyptian's public statements are not worth very much in this case. The Egyptians sought to mediate in the Algerian-Moroccan crisis because they wanted to look like international Arab leaders after they had failed to influence the Lebanese situation.

The Moroccans, meanwhile, are continuing to strengthen their military forces in the south.

10 Boeing  
727 flights have carried munitions to El Aaiun since January 27. According to a source of the defense attaché in Rabat, there are 9 F-5 fighters now flying operations from El Aaiun. The air force group there has requested additional pilots for its 13 helicopters. The defense attaché also reports that many army reservists have been called up recently.

25X1

A Foreign Ministry official in Rabat said that Moroccan forces occupied Tifariti, some 65 miles east of Angala, without opposition on February 4. Our embassy in Rabat reports that a Moroccan official said on Tuesday the military sweep in Spanish Sahara is being conducted in a deliberate manner to give mediation efforts a chance. The official indicated Mahbes, a Polisario stronghold near the Algerian border, would be the final objective.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

\* \* \*

*The Algerians are also rapidly building up their forces*

25X1  
25X1



25X1

Satellite photography of early January confirms an increase in Algerian troop strength at Tindouf. Armored strength has been increased from a company to two battalions of tanks in less than a month, and the number of personnel tents has grown five-fold since December to over 300. We estimate that Algeria may now have up to two brigades garrisoned in the Tindouf area.

Six SU-7 fighter-bombers at Bechar and nine MIG 15 or 17 fighters that were seen in photography at Bou Ladham for the first time in late December were not there in the January photography. MIG squadrons do remain at Bechar and Tindouf, and a new warning radar also has been erected near the Tindouf airfield.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NIGERIA-ANGOLA


*Nigeria reportedly plans to give the Angolan Popular Movement some limited military aid for the first time as well as substantial new economic assistance.*

25X1

A Nigerian delegation visited Luanda late last month and worked out a tentative agreement [redacted]

25X1

25X1



25X1

The impending agreement underscores Nigeria's strong commitment to the Popular Movement to which it has already extended some \$20 million in assistance. With its projected new aid, Lagos also may be trying to show the Popular Movement that it does not have to look exclusively to the Soviet Union and Cuba for assistance. The Nigerians view the extensive Soviet and Cuban role in Angola as a necessary expedient, but are deeply concerned that the Luanda regime may find itself irretrievably wedded to Moscow and Havana.

\* \* \*

*Soviet and Cuban military support to the MPLA increased markedly during January.*

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



~~FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY~~

The value of this support is estimated to be at least \$88 million--almost half of the total amount provided during the entire March-December 1975 period. This raises the total value of Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA since March 1975 to an estimated \$267 million. The bulk of the increased assistance in January stems from the vastly expanded Cuban effort to support the 12,000 Cuban troops now estimated to be in Angola. The expanded levels of Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA appear designed to enable the MPLA and Cuban troops to win a quick military victory.

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THAILAND

*We present below a condensation of an Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on the Thai Election and Its Implications for the US.*

With elections scheduled for April, Thailand is experiencing a growing sense of malaise concerning the country's experiment with parliamentary democracy.

--This sentiment is expressed by King Phumiphon, the military, and many prominent civilian figures.

In these circumstances, there is a strong possibility that the military might decide to assume control. For the moment, the King appears to be against such a course, and many military leaders would be loath to act against the King's wishes. The situation is fragile, however, and subject to quick change.

--Some younger officers are maneuvering to force their superiors to take a stand on the question of a military takeover.

--Given the rivalries within the military, it is also possible that one or another military leader might attempt a preemptive coup.

Other developments which would increase the likelihood of a coup are:

--A sharp deterioration of the security situation.

--A breakdown in public order caused by widespread strikes or anti-government disorders.

--The prospect of a left-of-center coalition coming to power which would threaten the vested interests of the military and conservative elements in Thailand.

Short of a coup, there is also a possibility that the elections may be postponed, leaving Khu-krit, the present caretaker prime minister, to rule through emergency decree.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

--Khukrit, the military, and the King may well come to prefer this alternative over going through with the elections.

Implications for the US During the Election Campaign

--By the March 20 deadline on removal of US combat forces, the US will probably be able to complete the negotiations now in train with the Khukrit government regarding the residual US military presence.

--But there is no assurance that an agreement signed by Khukrit will be honored by a new government.

--The election campaign probably will complicate Thai-US relations. The US presence is likely to become an issue in the campaign, and campaign pressures may force some candidates to insist on a total US military withdrawal.

--The recent appointment of Anan Panyarachun, former ambassador to the US, as the Foreign Ministry's Undersecretary adds another element of uncertainty to Thai-US relations. Anan, who takes office at a time when Foreign Minister Chatchai will be concentrating most of his attention on the election, may try to take advantage of the situation to give Thai foreign policy a more neutralist cast.

25X1

25X1

Implications for the US After an Election

--If an election is held, it would be likely to bring another centrist-conservative government into power.

--Such a government would probably be as fragmented and contentious as the present government, but it would keep Thai policy toward the US more or less along present lines.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

--A less likely possibility is either a coalition based exclusively on rightist elements, or one which included the Socialists.

--A rightist government would be cooperative with US interests, but would still be restrained by political considerations on how far it could go, or appear to go, in accommodating the US.

--A government in which the Socialists had a strong voice would make it difficult, if not impossible, for the US to maintain any military presence in Thailand. Such a government, however, could prompt the military either to force the government to resign or to overthrow it.

In the event of a military takeover, the resultant government would be sympathetic to US interests.

--It would be unlikely, however, to reverse the long-term trend toward a more nonaligned Thai foreign policy. Nevertheless, a military government might call for a substantial increase in US assistance if faced with a greatly expanded insurgency or a breakdown of civil order in the country.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

*The way has been cleared for Aldo Moro to form a Christian Democratic minority government in Italy, although his party colleagues still have misgivings about doing so.*

The Socialists and Republicans agreed yesterday to abstain on Moro's package of emergency economic measures, enabling the Christian Democrats to win a confidence vote and secure approval of their economic legislation. This falls short of the "majority support" on economic policy the Christian Democrats wanted. The new Moro government would have a narrower parliamentary base than any formed in recent years and would be open to criticism by all parties if the economy continued to deteriorate. Such a government would probably last only a few months, but it would give the Socialists and Christian Democrats time to hold scheduled party congresses and to debate the pros and cons of a parliamentary election.

\* \* \*

*The border between Somalia and the French Territory of Afars and Issas remained quiet yesterday following a clash between French and Somali forces on Wednesday.*

France has flown some two hundred gendarmes to the territory as reinforcements; local French officials fear pro-Somali forces might stir up trouble. Wednesday's shooting incident occurred when French troops stormed a school bus near the border to free 30 French school children held hostage by guerrillas of the Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast, a paper organization run by Somalia. One of the children is still being held in Somalia. France and Somalia were already at odds over French plans for the territory's eventual independence. President Siad has refused to abandon Somalia's historical claim to the territory, and he reportedly is prepared to support an insurgency there if France does not make independence arrangements acceptable to Somalia.

25X1



25X1

CHINA-USSR

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
X

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1  
25X1

25X1

(continued)

A1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

A  
Z  
Z  
Z  
X  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

(continued)



[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

(continued)

A3

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1  
25X1

(continued)

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

A5

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

*Top Secret*