

## The President's Daily Brief

January 26, 1976

2 Top Secret 25X1

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### LEBANON

The cease-fire was marred only by minor skirmishes over the weekend that were easily contained by the Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian peace commission. Syria's role in the truce agreement has drawn sharp accusations from the Egyptian media that almost certainly reflect Cairo's suspicion of Damascus' motives.

The commission was granted policing authority on Saturday as a result of an agreement between Muslim and Christian leaders worked out by Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. Subcommittees of the commission, which are to be established throughout the country, will include a Syrian and a Lebanese officer and either a Palestinian or Christian representative, depending on the dominant faction in each subcommittee's jurisdiction.

In an apparent effort to ease Christian concern that this arrangement could favor the Muslims, half of the 60 Syrian officers sent to serve on the subcommittees are Christians.


The most explicit expression of Egypt's unease over Syria's role in Lebanon appeared in the authoritative newspaper Al-Ahram, which charged that Damascus, prodded by the Soviets, had prolonged the Lebanese crisis in order to gain greater control over both Lebanon and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Syria's quick success in gaining a settlement that only recently seemed nearly impossible clearly nettles Egypt.

Suspicion of Damascus' role apparently figured in Cairo's recent decision to send a battalion of the Ain Jallut brigade--a contingent of the Palestine Liberation Army normally based in Egypt--to Lebanon. Yasir Arafat reportedly plans to use the battalion as a counterweight to Syrian-controlled PLA units in Lebanon.

USSR-ANGOLA

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY.



Kenyan President Kenyatta tried twice last year to bring Angola's rival groups together. Whatever his response, there are no indications that Agostinho Neto, president of the Popular Movement, would be receptive to an approach from Savimbi.

Savimbi requested Kenya's mediation the day after he met Zairian President Mobutu in Kinshasa.

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On the military front, Cuban-led Popular Movement forces have reportedly driven the National Union out of the port of Novo Redondo, some 100 miles north of the National Union's key rail and port complex at Lobito. The Popular Movement also claims its forces have crossed the Cuvo River and are moving toward Alto Hama, an important road junction some 50 miles from Huambo.

Fighting continued over the weekend around the eastern city of Teixeira de Sousa, with neither the National Union nor the Popular Movement making significant gains. In northern Angola, the Popular Movement still has not begun a determined drive on the National Front's remaining strongpoints at San Antonio do Zaire and Sao Salvador.

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### USSR-CUBA-ANGOLA

We present the key points of an Inter-Agency Intelligence Memorandum--"Soviet and Cuban Aid to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola from March through December 1975"--issued on January 24.

The intelligence community estimates that the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Cuba shipped about 20,000 tons of military equipment to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola from March through December 1975.

--Soviet and East European sea shipments totaled some 12,500 tons, and a Soviet airlift added another 2,000 tons.

--Cuban merchant ships delivered about 5,500 tons of military equipment.

Cuba also sent to Angola in this period some 7,500 Cuban military personnel, and the USSR sent about 400 military advisers.

(A Soviet-Cuban airlift has continued to move Cuban troops into Angola since the end of 1975. As of January 22, 1976, a total of about 11,000 Cuban military personnel had been sent to Angola. On that date, this troop airlift came to an end, at least temporarily, although additional Cuban troops may still be moving into Angola by ship.)

Valued in equivalent US prices, this Soviet and Cuban support from March through December 1975 would be on the order of \$200 million. With the evidence available to us, we can calculate an estimate of \$179 million. Since this figure has been deliberately based on conservative judgments, however, and taking into account some evidence which cannot yet be quantified, we believe that this may understate the total by some \$20 million.

(Since January 1, 1976, the Soviet and Cuban sealift/airlift in support of the Popular Movement has continued. Between January 1 and 22, the cutoff date of this report, there have been two voyages by Soviet ships carrying military equipment to the Angolan region; two additional Soviet arms carriers are probably en route.

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(There have also been four voyages by Cubanowned or controlled ships carrying Cuban troops and/or military equipment, and six additional ships with similar cargo mixes are probably en route to the Angolan region.

(In addition, three Cubana Bristol Brittania aircraft flights have been made to West Africa with Cuban troops, and 14 Soviet-piloted long-range IL-62 flights have ferried Cuban troops to the Angolan region.

(There were no Soviet flights originating in the USSR to the Angola region between January 1 and 20, but several flights to Angola left the USSR on January 21-22. We cannot estimate the monetary value of these additional deliveries until further information becomes available.)

--Military equipment delivered to Angola from March through December 1975 accounts for \$144 million of the estimated \$179 million.

-- The cost (wages, maintenance, etc.) of Soviet and Cuban personnel in Angola accounts for \$22 million.

--The cost of transporting Soviet and Cuban equipment and personnel to Angola accounts for \$13 million.

(Some reports indicate that the Popular Movement may have MIG-type jets. We have no confirmation of this. If the Soviets have sent MIGs to Angola, however, they would probably be either MIG-17 or MIG-21s. The US equivalent price for a single MIG-17 is \$750,000, and the US equivalent price for a single MIG-21 is \$1.7 million.

(In addition, we believe that the Popular Movement possesses surface-to-air misslies, but we are unable to determine how many. Thus, we have not included them in our estimates on the value of the military equipment sent to Angola.

(Assuming that the Soviet missiles are roughly comparable to the US Redeye missile, each Soviet surface-to-air missile sent to Angola would raise the total by about \$14,300 in equivalent US prices.)

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With this Soviet and Cuban assistance--both materiel and trained manpower--the Popular Movement has become by far the best equipped and militarily the strongest of the contending factions in Angola. The equipment provided to the Popular Movement has included:

- --T-34 medium tanks and PT-76 light tanks.
- --BRDM armored cars and armored personnel carriers.
- --122-mm. long-range rockets and truck-mounted rocket launchers.
- -- Antiaircraft guns.
- --Sagger antitank missiles.
- -- Recoilless rifles.

### NOTE

The Soviet Kresta II guided-missile cruiser that has been stationed near Conakry since January 11 has left port and is moving south.

The cruiser probably will rendezvous with the landing ship now in the Gulf of Guinea and could arrive there by Tuesday or Wednesday. Four Soviet ships—a Kotlin-class destroyer and three oilers—apparently remain at Conakry.