



# The President's Daily Brief

October 4, 1975

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)  
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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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TURKEY-GREECE-CYPRUS

*Reaction to the partial lifting of the US arms embargo against Turkey has been relatively subdued among both Greeks and Turks. Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayangil termed the action on the embargo a positive development but ruled out any immediate change in the status of the deactivated US installations. Any such move will apparently hinge on negotiations--as yet unscheduled--for a new US-Turkish defense cooperation agreement.*

The Turks undoubtedly still hope for a complete lifting of the embargo. The Demirel government's cautious reaction yesterday probably reflected not only a desire to avoid overplaying its hand prior to negotiations for a new defense agreement but also its reading of the political mood as the senatorial elections on October 12 draw near.

Demirel presumably hopes that even a partial lifting of the embargo will be viewed as a foreign policy success for his government. He apparently remains wary, however, of appearing to kowtow to the Americans. Speaking at a campaign rally, opposition leader Ecevit severely criticized the US action, especially the provision for consultation on opium-poppy controls.

Reaction in Greece and Cyprus was also restrained. Significant anti-US demonstrations failed to materialize in either Athens or Nicosia. Both the Greek and Greek Cypriot media presented essentially factual reports of the voting in the US Senate and the bill. Greek and Greek Cypriot government officials expressed regrets over the resumption of arms shipments to Turkey, but said they understood that those who supported the move believed it would lead to progress toward a settlement of the Cyprus issue.

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Although action on the embargo removes a major impediment to progress on the Cyprus problem, no movement is likely until the Turks can assess the results of their elections. Should Demirel's party do well or hold its own as compared with its 1973 performance, chances for movement toward a Cyprus settlement would improve. Even then, however, progress would probably be slow, given the difficulties in getting meaningful negotiations under way and Turkish problems of coordinating policy with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash. Should Demirel's party falter in the elections, his capacity to promote a Cyprus settlement would be severely limited.



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ANGOLA

*With about six weeks to go before the scheduled date for independence, there has been a lull in the civil war among the territory's three rival liberation groups.*

[redacted]

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[redacted] the National Front for the Liberation of Angola [redacted]

[redacted] Front forces in the north have not moved forward significantly since mid-September when they retook the important junction town of Caxito, some 40 miles northeast of Luanda. They are, however, probing outlying defenses of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

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In central Angola, forces of the Popular Movement reportedly are moving toward Nova Lisboa, the headquarters of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. [redacted]

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[redacted] a combined force of the National Front and the National Union has set out to meet the advance, and some clashes reportedly have taken place west of Nova Lisboa and in southern Angola as well.

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The liberation groups have been waiting to launch military operations in the Nova Lisboa area until refugees in the city could be evacuated. The airlift from Nova Lisboa ends today.

Portuguese evacuation efforts will now be concentrated in Luanda and several small ports along the southern and central coast. Officials in Lisbon estimate that 140,000 whites have been airlifted from the territory since early August, and that another 140,000 refugees are still waiting to leave.

Lisbon apparently will soon accelerate the withdrawal of its troops from Angola. The Portuguese high commissioner states that 20,000 troops are still in the territory, although most of them are support rather than combat forces. The Portuguese intend to have all troops out of Angola by independence day, November 11.

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
The high commissioner professes to be optimistic that the Popular Movement and the National Union will come to a political accommodation, perhaps by late October. So far, however, the Portuguese have been unsuccessful in their efforts to promote such an arrangement. The Popular Movement still holds the advantage both politically and militarily and shows no willingness to make concessions to anyone. Leaders of the Movement expect that on November 11 Lisbon will have no alternative but to turn over sovereignty to them.

At this stage, probably only a major military effort by the National Front and the National Union that would subject the Popular Movement to intense and sustained pressure could make the Movement accept a coalition government. Current military operations of the Front and Union do not indicate the likelihood of such an effort.



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
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*The security situation in Lebanon improved further yesterday, although minor clashes continued in and around Beirut and in the Tripoli area. Four unidentified men fired indiscriminately into the main lobby of Beirut airport early this morning, reportedly killing or wounding a number of people. Beirut radio claims security forces have "contained the operation."*

The five-day Muslim holiday, which begins this weekend, may help ease the security problem. Because of the holiday, the national reconciliation committee will not meet again until October 9.

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*Uncertainty over future price increases and continuing shortages of consumer goods in Poland are continuing to generate serious problems for the Gierek regime.*

An official of the planning commission recently stated that food prices will be raised "considerably" as of January 1, 1976. Stories about the price increases and about strikes are rapidly spreading both in the bureaucracy and among the people. The Gierek regime is aware of the popular discontent and is working hard to keep the situation within bounds, but tensions are running high, both in the leadership and among the people, and our embassy in Warsaw believes "a spark in the right place" could have serious consequences.

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*Independence movements remain active in both the Azores and the Madeiras, but the replacement of the pro-Communist Goncalves regime in Lisbon has sapped much of their momentum.*

Having gained some concessions from Lisbon, Azoreans now appear to be turning their attention to more traditional partisan political activity. Public debate among political parties has increased, and the press has given broad coverage to a dispute among the three principal parties over proposals for autonomy. In the Madeiras, most islanders seem to prefer autonomy; independence sentiment has been exaggerated by the mainland press. Madeirans would apparently move for independence only if there should be a resurgence of Communist influence in Portugal or the denial of a satisfactory arrangement for autonomy.

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*On Wednesday evening, Soviet TV viewers were treated to a "prime-time" telecast of the Ali-Frazier heavyweight match.*

The fight was presented purely as a sporting event, totally and refreshingly devoid of propaganda content, reflecting a relaxed attitude toward a Western "happening" that was rare just a few years ago.



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MOROCCO - SPANISH SAHARA

*The following memorandum on reported Moroccan plans to launch military operations against Spanish Sahara was approved by the intelligence community yesterday.*

[redacted] King Hassan, under pressure from the military, has decided to invade Spanish Sahara [redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted] The King is reportedly confident the invasion will succeed because he believes that most of Spain's troops are poorly trained and will not fight.

King Hassan has pursued a high-risk policy on Spanish Sahara for some time. Last August, he reiterated his intention to acquire Spanish Sahara before the end of the year, with force if necessary. Although he promised then to await an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on Moroccan-Mauritanian claims to the territory, he may now have decided to act in a moment of what he perceives as Spanish weakness. There is also increasing anxiety in Rabat that the Court's decision may be ambiguous or unfavorable to Morocco and that the report of a fact-finding mission of the UN Committee on Decolonization will favor independence for the territory. Finally, it is possible that Hassan has concluded that armed intervention will provoke favorable international mediation. To date most Moroccans have supported Hassan's position on Spanish Sahara, but if a military gamble fails he could be in serious trouble and vulnerable to a coup.

Rabat expects effective resistance only from some 5,000 Spanish legionnaires in the Sahara and Spanish air force units stationed in the Canary Islands and possibly from Algerian ground forces. The Moroccans are skeptical that Algeria will intervene militarily, but Morocco reportedly is arranging for a token presence in Rabat of troops from Syria, Egypt, the PLO, and possibly Saudi Arabia as a psychological deterrent to an Algerian military reaction. We have no evidence, however, that other Arab troops are arriving in Morocco,

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
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although small contingents could arrive quickly by air without being detected. We doubt that most eastern Arabs would involve themselves in a potential inter-Arab conflict except in a mediating role, although the PLO may be an exception.

Morocco has kept approximately one fourth of its more than 55,000-man army in southern Morocco since mid-1974, despite considerable supply problems and low troop morale because of the primitive conditions. We estimate that most of the 12,000 to 15,000 Moroccan troops in the southern zone have been tactical infantry, with some armor, artillery, and air defense units. Although the army has established a command-and-support structure in the south, the Moroccans would nonetheless face considerable obstacles in launching and sustaining a major offensive against either Spanish or Algerian forces.

Madrid could muster sufficient strength from its own forces to defeat a Moroccan invasion. The Spanish have some 16,000 army and air force personnel in the Sahara, with an additional 20,000 located nearby in the Canary Islands. The Spanish have 51 medium tanks and 35 armored cars that could provide immediate armored support. Spanish forces are well-equipped and trained, compared to the Moroccan army. In terms of air power, Madrid has more than 60 subsonic fighter-bombers immediately available; two squadrons of F-5 tactical fighter-bombers and a total of four squadrons of air defense command Mirage III and F-4C interceptors are in reserve in Spain.




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
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


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Algeria, which favors independence for Spanish Sahara, will probably stop short of direct military intervention. It would, however, create as many problems for Morocco as possible. We would expect Algiers to support the POLISARIO Front, a pro-independence Saharan group, in waging a sustained insurgency effort. Algiers might also move troops to Morocco's northern border to exert pressure on King Hassan and renew its support of Moroccan dissidents. The Algerians would almost certainly mount an intensive international diplomatic effort to denounce Moroccan aggression.

In the less likely event that Algiers did intervene with direct military force, the Moroccans might achieve some initial success because they outnumber the 4,000 to 6,000 troops estimated to be in southwestern Algeria. The Algerian air force of some 200 combat aircraft could, however, turn the tide against Morocco's 40 combat aircraft, and play a decisive role in support of Algeria's ground forces, which are about the same size as Morocco's, but better trained and equipped.

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