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# The President's Daily Brief

September 20, 1975

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PORTUGAL

*Anti-Communist military officers and representatives of the democratic parties dominate the new cabinet sworn in yesterday, Portugal's sixth government since the military coup of last year. The restructured Armed Forces Revolutionary Council is also controlled by anti-Communists.*

The division of portfolios among the major parties corresponds roughly to the results of the April elections. The new cabinet includes four Socialists, two Popular Democrats, and one Communist; military officers, mostly from the anti-Communist faction of Major Antunes, hold five positions and civilian technocrats have the remaining three. Despite Prime Minister Azevedo's effort to portray the new cabinet as a "government of unity," most Portuguese will probably hold the Socialists responsible for its actions.

The newly restructured Revolutionary Council, which was announced late Thursday night, has been reduced to 17 members. The majority are identified with the Antunes faction. Only two are considered Communist sympathizers. One of the first tests of the new Council will be to reestablish discipline in the armed forces. If the Council continues the former practice of weak compromises and consensus rule, however, it will be no more effective than its predecessors.

The Communists have [redacted] decided to present a facade of cooperating with the parties and the new government while creating disruptions across the country intended to complicate the new regime's problems and keep the pressure on it to maintain public order. In addition to demonstrations, the party will organize strikes against large landowners in the south and also will encourage homeless workers to begin occupying vacant houses.

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LEBANON

*Intense fighting continued in Beirut yesterday. The government has ordered a dusk-to-dawn curfew in the commercial areas of the city where damage has been extensive. The Lebanese army has not yet been brought into the conflict. The less radical fedayeen organizations, Fatah and Saiqa, continue to remain out of the fighting and to assist Lebanese security authorities.*

For the first time in the latest round of fighting, the Syrians have actively involved themselves in efforts to end the conflict. Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam arrived in Beirut yesterday to confer with President Franjiyah. In May and June, Khaddam helped negotiate both an end to that round of fighting and the appointment of Rashid Karami as prime minister.

[redacted] Syrian President Asad has approved joint intervention by the Lebanese army and the Palestine Liberation Organization to restore calm to Beirut. Under the plan, the army would police the Christian areas of the city, and the PLO would control the activities of the Lebanese Muslims and the leftists. Syrian military units posing as members of Saiqa would bolster the strength of the PLO. [redacted] the PLO leadership favors the Syrian proposal.

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Karami met yesterday with Franjiyah and Interior Minister Shamun to try to prolong his mandate for continued efforts at conciliation. Many Christian politicians and army officers distrust Karami, whom they consider needlessly conciliatory toward radical Muslim elements.



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## USSR

*The Soviets have reached the stage in their submarine construction program at which they must dismantle older ICBM launchers or submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers (SLBMs) in order to compensate for new submarine ballistic missile launchers as required by the Strategic Arms Limitation Interim Agreement.*

Recent missile firings indicate that the first lengthened D-class submarine has completed sea trials. It will be some time, however, before the new submarine makes its first patrol with missiles--perhaps as much as nine months. The lengthened D-class submarine carries 16 SS-N-8 missiles. Four of these submarines have now been launched, the second is on sea trials, and the third and fourth should begin trials in October and December. In addition, a standard D-class submarine carrying 12 SS-N-8 missiles probably will begin sea trials in mid-October.

The Interim Agreement stipulates that after the nuclear submarine containing the 741st submarine ballistic missile launch tube begins sea trials, the Soviets must dismantle older ICBM or SLBM launchers on a one-for-one basis. The dismantling must begin no later than the start of sea trials and must be completed within four months for ICBMs and six months for SLBMs.

The Soviets got an early start on dismantling by placing 17 above-ground SS-7 sites--34 launchers--at a reduced state of readiness several years ago. Most missiles, warheads, and missile-related equipment were removed, but the dismantling of permanent facilities has begun at only five sites.

The pace of the submarine construction program, however, requires that ICBM dismantling now begin in earnest. The second lengthened D-class submarine, which began sea trials in late August or early September, contains launch tubes 730 through 746, and thus by early January at least six SS-7 launchers will have to be fully dismantled under the Interim Agreement. By December, the submarine containing the 790th SLBM probably will enter sea trials, requiring that by March, 50 older ICBM launchers must be dismantled.

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CYPRUS

*Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash will request authority from the Turkish Cypriot Constituent Assembly on Monday to declare the Turkish Cypriots independent should the UN General Assembly take action that Denktash deems unfavorable. He cited two possible developments at the UN--refusal to permit him to address the Assembly as the spokesman for the Turkish Cypriots or passage of a resolution unduly critical of the Turkish position on Cyprus--as justifying a move for independence.*

Denktash will probably obtain the Assembly's support, although opposition leaders have expressed reservations about the wisdom of linking a declaration of independence to possible UN action. While the vote by the Constituent Assembly will indicate the extent of community backing for Denktash's proposed course of action, the Turkish Cypriot leader must look to Ankara for final approval.

Turkish Prime Minister Demirel has avoided taking a direct stand on the subject. He displayed considerable lack of enthusiasm for Turkish Cypriot independence last week, however, noting that it was not something envisioned in his government's program. Opposition leader Ecevit has indicated that he opposes independence.

The Turks probably view independence as fraught with uncertainties and potentially serious problems including:

--the negative impact it would have on efforts to lift the US arms embargo;

--the probability that only a handful of nations would recognize an independent Turkish Cypriot state;

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--the possibility that Greek Cypriots would then move for union with Greece, which the Turks fear would mean the buildup of Greek forces on Turkey's southern flank.

Denktash's threat appears to be chiefly a ploy aimed at forestalling UN action detrimental to the Turkish Cypriot cause. The Turks, moreover, will lobby extensively at the UN General Assembly to avoid the kind of resolution that might cause Demirel to commit himself on the issue of independence. The likelihood that the debate on Cyprus will be postponed until October, probably until after the Turkish senatorial elections on October 12, provides time for both Greeks and Turks to maneuver against a move both wish to avoid.

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PANAMA

*Canal treaty negotiations may encounter new difficulties despite the Panamanian government's apparent commitment to continue the talks.*

General Torrijos reportedly was angered by remarks made this week by Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Bunker, and General McAuliffe, commander in chief, US Southern Command. The controlled Panamanian press has attacked the statements, claiming that they indicate a hardened US position. Members of Panama's negotiating team are said to be discouraged and talking of an impasse.

The official foreign ministry communiqué issued Wednesday at the conclusion of the latest negotiating round cited "very little progress." It reflected a marked change from the considerable optimism expressed prior to Ambassador Bunker's arrival on September 7. Despite the US desire for secrecy, Torrijos has ordered, according to press reports, that a "public account of the talks" be published by today.

Panama will probably seek to continue negotiating and try to rally public opinion to the government's position. Torrijos almost certainly believes that a well-orchestrated show of domestic and international opinion favoring Panama will induce the US to make further concessions.

Student demonstrations protesting the statements of US officials have been peaceful so far. The gradual escalation of the Panamanian campaign, however, with official disclosures and a more lenient attitude toward student demonstrations, carries the danger not only of stalled talks but also of unplanned violence.

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NOTES

Libya may soon receive TU-22 medium bombers from the USSR.

Photography of early August showed two TU-22s at an aircraft plant in the USSR. Markings on both aircraft resembled insignia of the Libyan air force. Libya reportedly is to receive at least 12 TU-22s from the USSR, [redacted]

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[redacted] Libya will be only the second country to receive TU-22s from the USSR; Iraq received 14 of the bombers in 1973. Although the aircraft will eventually give Tripoli a medium-range bombing capability, the poor quality of Libyan pilots will be a limiting factor for some time.

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The C-130 transport aircraft Libya [redacted] has bought from Vietnam apparently will be loaned to Morocco.

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[redacted]

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Qadhafi offered to provide Morocco with C-130s he was acquiring [redacted]

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[redacted] Libya [redacted] purchased six to eight C-130s from Vietnam.

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