




The President's Daily Brief

March 14, 1975

5

~~*Top Secret*~~ 25X1



Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

March 14, 1975

Table of Contents

Cambodia: A government task force has begun moving into position for a renewed effort to retake Tuol Leap. (Page 1)

China-Cambodia: The Chinese appear to be moving to gain maximum influence over postwar developments in Cambodia. (Page 2)

USSR: A Soviet strategic specialist has suggested some new propositions about reducing strategic weapons. (Page 3)

USSR: A lengthened variant of the D-class ballistic missile submarine was launched early this year. (Page 5)


USSR-CSCE: The Soviets' push for a speedy conclusion to the European Security Conference appears to be having an effect on the West Europeans. (Page 6)

Portugal: Leftist attacks have left conservative political parties near total disarray. (Page 7)

Notes: South Vietnam; Iraq; Saudi Arabia; Turkey (Pages 8 and 9)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Cambodia: Lower Mekong



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

A 12-battalion government task force began moving into position yesterday for a renewed effort to retake Tuol Leap. Initial reports this morning indicate it is making limited progress.

Government aircraft and artillery have been softening up the area for the past two days. Thus far, however, the government ground thrust and the increased air and artillery strikes have failed to halt insurgent shelling of Pochentong Airport. The destruction of a small ammunition dump on the civilian side of the airfield yesterday slightly damaged the airport tower and halted the airlift. Flights from Saigon resumed this morning.

The Australian government yesterday announced that it will close its embassy in Phnom Penh. Australian aircraft will evacuate all diplomatic personnel and some Australian civilians to Bangkok on Saturday. Singapore yesterday ordered its diplomats to evacuate. Israel is the only other nation thus far to have pulled out of Phnom Penh. A number of embassies are operating with skeleton staffs.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CHINA-CAMBODIA

Chinese propaganda on the Cambodian fighting this year, although not voluminous, shows that Peking is trying to retain all possible points of leverage in a postwar Cambodia, almost certainly in order to counter both North Vietnamese influence and the possibility of a future Soviet position there.

The Chinese may still be trying to catch up with a situation that has moved considerably faster over the past few months than they had anticipated. During the first years of the war, the Chinese viewed Prince Sihanouk as the most promising channel of influence in Cambodia after the fighting ended. They clearly recognize now, however, that Sihanouk's influence over developments there has sharply diminished along with the chances for a compromise settlement in which Sihanouk would play a key balancing role.

Chinese unwillingness to abandon Sihanouk completely suggests, however, that Peking is not fully confident of the strength and reliability of its relatively new links with the Khmer communists. In a step aimed at improving these ties, Peking signed a military aid agreement with insurgent leader Khieu Samphan last year. Efforts toward this end will undoubtedly continue.

Peking's sensitivities to the question of its influence in Cambodia may also explain--at least in part--the current visit of a high-level military delegation to Hanoi. Although purely bilateral Sino-Vietnamese issues are being discussed, the situation in Cambodia almost certainly has been included on the agenda.

The Chinese may have urged on the North Vietnamese a postwar role for Sihanouk more substantial than that of a titular head of state. Neither the North Vietnamese nor the Khmer Communists would welcome such suggestions.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

L. S. Semeyko, specialist in strategy at Moscow's USA Institute, has suggested to US officials that the USSR could reduce the aggregate ceilings on its strategic weapons by as much as 30 percent in the aftermath of a SALT II agreement.

The Soviet specialist went on to say, however, that reductions beyond this could not be made without reference to the nuclear forces of China, the UK, and France and that negotiations on the reductions could begin immediately following signing of a SALT II agreement.

Semeyko's propositions go far beyond the official Soviet position, which makes no reference to percentage of reductions, envisions reductions only after 1980, and is heavily hedged with statements about the need for reducing nuclear weapons in third countries, as well as in US forward-based systems.

Members of the USA Institute do not hold policy-making positions, nor do their views necessarily reflect those of the leadership. In the past, opinions offered by institute members have not become official Soviet positions. The institute does appear to have a significant advisory role, however, and the ideas of its members may be representative of at least one school of informed opinion.

Semeyko made his comments last week in two conversations with US officials involved in arms limitation negotiations. On the second occasion, two other members of the USA Institute were present. All three seemed to be making a special effort to demonstrate Soviet interest in additional progress on arms control. For example, Semeyko observed that the USSR would not reach its allowed MIRV ceiling of 1,320 until well into the ten-year SALT II treaty, and could therefore accept a reduction in the MIRV ceiling without having to dismantle existing systems.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

The Soviet specialist also raised the subject of mobile ICBMs, asserting that the USSR is less interested in them than the US. He quoted the commander of the strategic rocket forces to the effect that the USSR does not intend to build mobile ICBMs. When pressed on the discrepancy between this position and the Soviet stance at SALT I, Semeyko replied, "Maybe our position has changed."

We have evidence that the Soviets are developing a mobile ICBM.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR

A lengthened variant of the D-class ballistic-missile submarine was launched at the Severodvinsk shipyard early this year.

[redacted]
[redacted] the submarine, which is now being fitted out, is [redacted] about 50 feet longer than the standard D-class. The extra length was added in the missile bay area.

25X1

25X1

25X1

[redacted] the submarine is believed to be designed to carry at least 16 SS-N-8 missiles. The standard D-class carries 12 of these missiles, which have a 4,200-mile range.

25X1

Based on the number of hull sections seen at the construction hall [redacted] we estimate the Soviets will build another eight or nine of the lengthened submarines.

25X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-CSCE

The Soviets' push for a speedy conclusion to the European security conference appears to be having an effect on the West Europeans.

General Secretary Brezhnev has sent letters to leaders of major Western countries proposing a summit-level meeting on June 30 as a finale to the conference. This is the first time the Soviets have suggested a specific date, and the timing suggests that they would like to have the security conference out of the way before Brezhnev visits the US.

Several of the participants at the EC summit meeting in Dublin this week expressed the view that the West should take advantage of Brezhnev's personal commitment to detente.

The West Europeans are not prepared at this time, however, to pay an exorbitant price to bring the conference to an end. While they are willing to study where further concessions might be made, the statement approved by the Nine favors a conclusion of the conference "at an early date and at the highest level" only if "balanced and satisfactory results" on all agenda items are achieved.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

PORTUGAL

Attacks by extreme leftists have brought conservative political parties to near total disarray. Non-communist parties of the left are also increasingly discouraged by the actions of the military and the extremist violence.

While the roundup of military officers and civilians alleged to have been involved in the coup attempt continued yesterday, President Costa Gomes told the nation in a televised speech that the core of opposition to the new political-social conditions still exists. He said that a thorough investigation is under way which would uncover "the enemy of the people and the Armed Forces Movement."

The conservative Social Democratic Center and the Christian Democratic parties may be outlawed. Yesterday, a Christian Democratic leader was accused of complicity in the coup attempt on Tuesday; many of the party's leaders are reported to have fled to Spain. The hopes of the moderate leftist parties of recouping some of their losses by taking part in the constituent assembly election next month appear increasingly futile in view of the increasing dominance of leftists in the government and the growing extremist violence.

Socialist Foreign Minister Soares has confided to Ambassador Carlucci that the effect of giving broader powers to the military is to push the political parties outside the power spectrum. He said the parties now had to determine whether it was worthwhile participating in the political process.

[redacted]
[redacted] the Portuguese Democratic Movement, a communist front, will join the government when the cabinet is reshuffled.

25X1
25X1

Several members of Portugal's leading banking and industrial families have been arrested. Prominent businessmen in recent months have been detained for short periods, but the arrests this time may presage more serious intervention in the private sector. The most extreme of the far left parties is [redacted] planning terrorist actions against wealthy Portuguese [redacted]

25X1
25X1

Spain, anticipating a request from the Portuguese government for the extradition of former president Spínola, is increasingly embarrassed by Spínola's presence. Spain would welcome an offer from a third country to grant asylum to the former general. The Brazilian foreign ministry has denied reports that Spínola had requested asylum there.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

Heavy fighting continues in all four military regions of South Vietnam.

Government counterattacks are spurring sharp fighting in the northernmost provinces; the most severe battles are near Hue. Reinforcements are continuing to arrive around Ban Me Thuot, in preparation for an attempt to force the communists out of the provincial capital. Government forces have made little progress in reopening the roads linking the highlands with the coast.

* * *

The Iraqi government and the rebel Kurds apparently agreed to a cease-fire yesterday morning.

According to Baghdad radio, the truce will lapse at the end of the month and Iraqi forces will resume their offensive, presumably against any remaining Kurds who have not surrendered or sought refuge in Iran. The Iraqis had earlier offered amnesty to those Kurdish tribesmen who would surrender before April 1. On Wednesday, however, the Iraqi Baath Party newspaper stated that the only solution to the Kurdish rebellion was "final liquidation."

* * *

In a possible prelude to revaluation, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency yesterday sharply limited trading in the riyal.

Bankers generally believe the government will revalue the riyal, which is tied to the dollar, to alleviate inflationary pressures at home. A revalued riyal would have no direct bearing on oil prices, since those prices are primarily quoted in dollars rather than the currency of the exporting country. A decision to revalue, particularly if the riyal were linked with the special drawing rights of the International Monetary Fund, could provide support for those OPEC members who wish to quote oil prices in terms of a "basket" of currencies.

(continued)

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

* * *

Turkish President Koruturk has asked Bulent Ecevit, chairman of the Republican People's Party, to return home from a European tour, rousing speculation that Ecevit will be asked to form a government.

Koruturk's summons to Ecevit follows Prime Minister Irmak's decision to abandon his effort to form a coalition government. Koruturk will meet today with senior politicians. Ecevit returns home tomorrow.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Top Secret