

# **THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST**

ISSUED BY THE  
**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

3 JULY 1963  
~~TOP SECRET~~

1. Test Ban Treaty

a. At the end of his speech in East Berlin yesterday, Khrushchev dropped his long-standing insistence that an indefinite moratorium on underground testing accompany any agreement to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space and under water.

b. With this abrupt shift and another favorable comment on the President's 10 June speech, Khrushchev gives forthcoming Moscow talks the appearance of greater promise.

c. The new proposal, however, calls for a NATO - Warsaw Pact non-aggression treaty to be signed "simultaneously" with the partial test ban agreement. This we are inclined to view as a bargaining tactic which Khrushchev eventually may modify or drop.

d. Khrushchev, it would seem, wants to hold the door open to the West against the prospect of an even sharper deterioration of intra-bloc relations following the upcoming Sino-Soviet talks.

2. Cuba-USSR

a. Subsequent events have shown us wrong on two points relating to Soviet commercial flights to Cuba.

b. Sekou Toure has assured us that last week's TU-114 flight from Moscow via Conakry was "exceptional" and that it did not represent the inauguration of a regular Aeroflot schedule using this route. We note that a TU-114 from Moscow to Havana today is taking the usual northern route.

c. Apparently the Soviets have not inaugurated regular twice-weekly flights to Havana. There is still only one regular flight (on Mondays), but there have been a large number of special flights recently.

3. Cuba

a. 



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50X1

(Cont 'd)

b.

[Redacted]

50X1

50X1

c.

[Redacted]

50X1  
50X1

d.

[Redacted]

50X1  
50X1

50X1

**4. South Korea**

a. Reports of coup plotting persist.

b. We now have word that security chief Kim Chae-chun plans to give it a try, possibly this weekend.

(Cont'd)

c. He has been slipping lately in his contest with the clique of former security chief Kim Chong-pil for control of the government's political apparatus. [REDACTED]

50X1  
50X1  
50X1  
50X1

d. Kim Chong-pil has been known to fabricate charges of coup plots in order to remove rivals, and he may be putting out this word himself to justify removal of Kim Chae-chun.

e. Either way, however, revelation of the plot might be used to justify an extension of military rule beyond late this year, when Korea is supposed to return to civil administration.

NOTES

- A. Italy The Socialist Party's decision yesterday to abstain in the confidence vote, expected Friday, assures the survival of Leone's minority government, but only for the time being.
- B. Yugoslavia The election yesterday of Rankovic as Vice President under the new Yugoslav constitution seems to settle the question of Tito's succession. The somewhat more pro-Western Kardelj is no longer in the running. Ambassador Kennan expects Tito to take longer and more frequent leaves, allowing Rankovic greater control over day-to-day affairs, but does not anticipate substantial changes in policy.
- C. Argentina With general elections four days off, tension is running high. Several groups, mostly Peronists, are reportedly plotting to disrupt the elections, but still lack cohesion. The armed forces, taking no chances, are implementing a comprehensive security plan which is to be kept in effect until the critical period has passed.
- D. Venezuela [REDACTED]

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REVIEW ITEM

World Commentary on the President's Trip

1. Soviet coverage of the President's trip this past week has been moderate both in scope and tone. Attention is concentrated on the West German visit and commentary keyed to the stock theme of disarray in the Western camp.
2. Much is made of the contention that the President failed in his "main aim" of creating a NATO nuclear force.
3. Moscow concludes "regretfully" that the visit left no ground for optimism over prospects of a German settlement, but its comment on the German question was routine and displayed no sense of urgency.
4. East European media toed the line, with East Germany, as might be expected, providing the most comprehensive coverage and most vehement censure of the West Berlin stop.
5. China and the Asian satellites paid much less attention to the trip, but what they had to say was characteristically more virulent in picturing the President's "provocative and aggressive" speeches.
6. Cuban media, too, picture the speeches as "aggressive and warmongering." Again, NATO disunity is stressed.

(Cont'd)


7. In Europe, noncommunist commentators generally agree that the President succeeded in strengthening NATO unity and gained popular support for the US. The reaffirmation of US obligations for the defense of Europe is stressed.
8. This concensus is shared by most noncommunist commentators in Asia and the Far East and by the few commentators dealing with the subject in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.
9. Questions are raised by most, however, over the extent to which differences in attitude toward the multilateral nuclear force were overcome.
10. West German media are unanimous in their praise and express the view that reassurances of US support show that the US, in dealing with the Soviets, will not do so at the expense of Western Europe.
11. British papers generally express gratification that a decision on multilateral nuclear force has been postponed, at least for Britain, while other means are examined.
12. The French are inclined to picture the trip in terms of a contest with France for influence in Europe. They concede the President's success in Germany and will be measuring De Gaulle's visit against it.



**DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST**

1.

II.



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