

**Page Denied**

**THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST--2 JULY 1963**

**1. CUBA:**

- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1

**2. USSR-INDONESIA:**

**A. MOSCOW HAS APPARENTLY AGREED TO A THREE-YEAR MORATORIUM ON THE INDONESIAN DEBT OF \$725 MILLION.**

- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1
- [REDACTED] 50X1

**3. BRITISH GUIANA - CUBA:**

**A. THE JAGAN GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN STRENGTHENING ITS TIES WITH CUBA WHILE STEPPING UP ITS ATTACKS ON THE US.**

**(CONT'D)**

[REDACTED] 50X1

B. GEORGETOWN RECENTLY CONTRACTED FOR THE 1964 SALE TO CUBA OF 45,000 TONS OF RICE--THREE TIMES THIS YEAR'S CONTRACT-- AND A LARGE ORDER OF RAILROAD TIES. TOTAL VALUE APPROXIMATES SOME 5 MILLION DOLLARS.

[REDACTED]

50X1

[REDACTED]

50X1

[REDACTED]

50X1

[REDACTED]

50X1

[REDACTED]

50X1

D. GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN AND JAGAN'S NEWSPAPER ARE CHARGING THE US WITH TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE REGIME. THEY SAY THAT OFFICIAL US ACTION PREVENTS THE USE OF AMERICAN-OWNED FACILITIES TO STORE FUEL OBTAINED FROM CUBA. JAGAN'S NEWSPAPER SUGGESTED THAT US DIPLOMATS BE RECALLED FROM GEORGETOWN.

4. COMMON MARKET:

A. BONN AND PARIS MAY SOON AGREE TO SET EEC GRAIN PRICES AT A LEVEL WHICH WOULD PROBABLY STIMULATE FRENCH PRODUCTION AND REDUCE EEC IMPORTS FROM THE US.

B. ACCORDING TO WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS, THESE TWO MEMBERS HAVE AGREED TO WORK TOWARD A DECISION ON THIS MATTER IN THE LATE FALL, WITH INITIAL PRICE ADJUSTMENTS TO BE MADE IN MID-1964.

C. PARIS HAS BEEN PRESSING BONN FOR A COMPROMISE AND ERHARD IS EVIDENTLY WILLING TO GO ALONG ONCE HE BECOMES CHANCELLOR.

(CONT'D)

[REDACTED]

50X1

D. WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS SAY THAT NO CONSIDERATION WILL BE GIVEN TO A PRICE LEVEL LOWER THAN MIDWAY BETWEEN THE GERMAN PRICE AND THE FRENCH PRICE. THEY CLAIM THE FRENCH SUPPORT THIS LEVEL.

5. SOUTH VIETNAM:

A. CHARGE TRUEHART IN SAIGON, RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS REGARDING A POSSIBLE DEMARCHE TO DIEM ON THE BUDDHIST PROBLEM, EXPRESSES HIS VIEW THAT FURTHER DEMONSTRATIONS OR SELF-SACRIFICES BY BONZES MAY WELL OCCUR, NO MATTER WHAT MEASURES DIEM TAKES.

B. TRUEHART SUGGESTS THAT THE BUDDHISTS MAY INTEND TO PUSH THEIR PRESENT ADVANTAGE UNTIL THE REGIME FALLS. HE SAYS THEY MAY BE ACTING ON A BASIS OF SELF-PRESERVATION OR POLITICAL AMBITION, OR BOTH.

C. HE ALSO SUGGESTS THAT DIEM MAY HAVE MADE UP HIS MIND TO DEAL HARSHLY WITH ANY FURTHER BUDDHIST ACTIONS DESPITE THE RISK OF A STRONG US REACTION.

D. TRUEHART SEES NO REAL DIFFERENCE IN OUTLOOK BETWEEN DIEM AND THE TWO NHUS. DIEM SEEMS MORE AND MORE RELIANT ON NHU AND DOUBTS HE WOULD BE WILLING TO SEND HIM ABROAD.

6. NOTE:

A. NATIONALIST CHINA - COMMUNIST CHINA:

[Redacted]

50X1

[Redacted]

50X1

[Redacted]

50X1

[Redacted]

50X1

[Redacted]

50X1

[Redacted]

50X1

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**