



# The President's Daily Brief

*4 August 1973*

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Exempt from general  
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652  
exemption category 5B(1)(2), (3)  
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

4 August 1973

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

George Papadopoulos' position has been strengthened by the plebiscite last month that made him president of Greece until June 1981, but criticism of his personal role will continue and could eventually develop into a move by his colleagues to unseat him. (Page 1)

The North Vietnamese still seem reasonably satisfied with the implementation of the cease-fire agreement. (Page 3)

The composition of the new cabinet in Afghanistan apparently represents a compromise between Daud and the young officers who seized power in his name. (Page 4)

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Notes on Chinese grain purchases, the latest Sino-Soviet trade agreement, Soviet [redacted] Libya, and the health of [redacted] North Vietnamese party boss Le Duan appear on Page 5.

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## GREECE

*George Papadopoulos' position has been strengthened, at least for a time, by the vote on July 29 that confirmed the new republic and made him president until June 1981. Criticism of his personal role will continue, however, and could develop into a move by one or another of his colleagues to unseat him.*

*Papadopoulos worries about three categories of opposition forces. The least worrisome are the pre-revolutionary political leaders. The most vocal of these are in exile and are more of a nuisance than a threat. Many of them represent the extreme right or left in pre-revolutionary politics and have little or no following at home. More moderate politicians in this group, exemplified by former premier Karamanlis, are beginning to stir again, and there are signs that they are cooperating with each other. They have no leverage on the present government, and it will be a long time before they can hope to rally popular support in Greece.*

*The second group is an amorphous band of "super-revolutionaries" made up of younger officers of the Greek armed forces, who want to "purify" the revolution and carry it even further than their superiors.*

*It is those who comprise the third category, his comrades of the 1967 coup, that Papadopoulos must persuade or, more typically, outmaneuver if he is to stay in power. The big four--Pattakos, Makarezos, Angelis, and Ioannides--control either directly or through their subordinates most of the units in the armed forces. Ioannides alone could make or break a coup through his control of the military's internal security apparatus and his personal following among second-rank officers. Papadopoulos has been able to play his colleagues off against each other, and most of them would rather have him out in front anyway. They know, however, that he would prefer to rule without them, and they rankle at the inroads he is making into their individual and collective authority.*

*Most of the trouble Papadopoulos encountered during the pre-plebiscite period came from these leaders. Although most of them favored the switch from monarchy to republic, there was consternation among them when Papadopoulos moved so swiftly, leaving them no time to object to the details of his plans. They dislike the idea that Papadopoulos gains even more power under the new republic, while theirs may*

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be substantially diminished. Some senior military people--like Ioannides--fear that parliamentary elections would open the door to the influences their 1967 move was intended to suppress.

They chafe most of all, however, over Papadopoulos' secrecy, which has separated them from policy-making.



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During the next month or so, Papadopoulos and his senior colleagues will be testing each other's strength. They will also be establishing the government apparatus for the new republic. There will be minor institutional changes; for example, a constitutional court may soon be set up to oversee the eventual formation of political parties. Some cabinet members may be installed in office, but the important posts will not be filled until fall. That should give Papadopoulos time to decide which of his military associates he can safely fire and which must be kept on.

Later in the fall, Papadopoulos will face renewed criticism from outside the regime. The students have promised to resume their agitation for educational reform. Their demonstrations last spring turned into an attack on the regime, and Papadopoulos' heavy-handed tactics were an embarrassment to many government leaders, including key military officers. Inflation, an even more serious problem, could lead to protest strikes in the big cities.

These and other problems may significantly weaken Papadopoulos' position. Having committed himself to parliamentary elections in 1974, Papadopoulos will be under international pressure to meet that deadline. During the same period, military resistance to elections is likely to rise, and some time before the voting actually occurs, Papadopoulos could face a concerted effort by his associates to bring him down.

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### VIETNAM

North Vietnam's propaganda on the first six months of the cease-fire suggests that Hanoi is reasonably satisfied with the implementation of the agreement so far. The assessments, which include a Foreign Ministry statement and an interview with Le Duc Tho, are relatively balanced between what Hanoi views as "positive" and "negative" aspects of the agreement.

On the positive side, Hanoi touts the "victories" achieved in the withdrawal of US military forces, the return of Communist POWs, and the consolidation of the Communist hold on the "liberated" areas of the South. Continued fighting in the South is given as a negative factor and is of course blamed on Saigon and the US. The negative aspects, however, are treated in a relatively low key, suggesting that Hanoi is not trying to manufacture an excuse for a return to large-scale military operations.

In contrast to the tone set by Hanoi, there have been reports that key cadre in the South are disappointed with the gains made by the Communist side since the cease-fire and hope that Hanoi will return to a more militant policy.

*These cadre will find little comfort in Hanoi's current propaganda, which seems designed to inform the rank and file that North Vietnam is willing to live with the cease-fire accord for the time being.*

*The propaganda makes it clear that Hanoi is sensitive to the US position that the North Vietnamese must stop the fighting in the South and withdraw their forces from Laos and Cambodia before any agreement on US aid to North Vietnam can be reached. Le Duc Tho claims that these "preconditions" are a delaying tactic on the part of the US. Tho's relatively moderate language on this point suggests that Hanoi may eventually be willing to make concessions to the US stand.*

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AFGHANISTAN

*The composition of the new cabinet appears to be a compromise between Daud and the junior officers who staged the coup in his name.*

Daud has taken the top posts of prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister and is expected to keep economic planning as well. The deputy prime minister and several lesser ministers are close to Daud. Three of the young officers involved in the coup and two civilians allied to them have been given portfolios, including finance and interior.

*Ambassador Neumann has termed the cabinet a "peculiar hodgepodge" and doubts that it will be effective. Daud may be able to exploit the inexperience and disunity of the cabinet to increase his personal control, but in the long run his ability to stay on top may depend more on how effectively he deals with the country's many problems. The cabinet is unlikely to be of much help in this regard.*

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NOTES

China: Chinese grain purchases for delivery in fiscal year 1974 now total nearly 6.7 million tons, of which about 5.6 million tons will come from the US. Last fiscal year, Peking imported about 6.3 million tons of grain including 1.4 million tons from the US.

China-USSR: The Sino-Soviet trade agreement, signed in Moscow on 1 August, calls for the same level of trade as in 1972--\$250 million. The agreement covers Chinese purchases of 11 AN-24 aircraft and electric power equipment.

USSR:

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North Vietnam - USSR: The Soviet press announced on 3 August that North Vietnamese party boss Le Duan had left Moscow for the Crimea, suggesting that he has recovered from the pneumonia he caught in Moscow about two weeks ago. Soviet party leader Brezhnev also is believed to be vacationing in the Crimea, and the two may get together to discuss unresolved issues such as economic aid for 1974.



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