



*The President's Daily Brief*

5 October 1972

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

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South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak states that the increasingly negative North Korean attitude bodes ill for the future of the North-South talks. (Page 4)

Communist sappers and gunners are becoming more active in the southern half of South Vietnam. Preparations for the coming dry season supply push through the Laotian panhandle appear well under way. (Page 5)

Bonn's Egon Bahr plans to fly to Moscow on Sunday to seek Soviet aid in concluding the inter-German treaty negotiations. (Page 6)

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JAPAN-CHINA

Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira has provided Ambassador Ingersoll with impressions and background details on the Sino-Japanese discussions in Peking last week. The Japanese found the Chinese leadership more open than they had expected. Ohira termed the Chinese "more democratic, disarming, and soft" than anticipated and noted that they did not give the Japanese side "a feeling that there is a great gap to bridge."

--Ohira said the Chinese made no effort to undermine or affect the US-Japan Security Treaty, noting merely that China "neither agrees nor objects to it." The Chinese also agreed with the Japanese statement that normalization of relations between Japan and China might benefit Sino-US relations.

--The Chinese did not make an issue of Japanese-Taiwanese trade and did not disagree with the Japanese view that normalization of relations with Peking should not affect Tokyo's economic ties to Taiwan. In further discussion the Chinese stated explicitly that it was "inconceivable that armed conflict would arise" over the Taiwan problem. They stated that for the time being "Japan and China should let the US take care of Taiwan" and agreed with a Japanese suggestion that a total US withdrawal might lead the Soviets to attempt to fill the vacuum. The Chinese also implied that they felt there might be a change in US policy toward Taiwan after the Indochina war had been ended.

--The Chinese took aboard with evident satisfaction the Japanese statement that there would be no peace treaty with Moscow unless all four northern islands were returned, commenting that Tokyo was in for "an arduous and strenuous time" in economic and diplomatic negotiations with the Soviets. They did not object, however, to Japanese statements on future economic cooperation with the USSR. They made the usual noises about the bad state of their own relations with the USSR.

(continued)

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--The Chinese also made standard remarks about non-export of revolution (stating explicitly that Japan need not worry about revolution), about their support for the North/South Korean communiqué, and about China's backwardness. Such subjects as the Indochina war and insurgent movements in Southeast Asia were left virtually uncovered.

Ohira stated that he expected ambassadors to be exchanged between the two countries soon, adding that conclusion of a peace treaty was a long-term matter. He wished to visit the United States for top-level debriefings around 17 and 18 October, adding that he might then visit the USSR for the same purpose.

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
USSR-EGYPT




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
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**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY****KOREA**

South Korean CIA Director Yi Hu-rak told Ambassador Habib late last week that the increasingly negative North Korean statements and propaganda bode ill for the future of the North-South talks. Yi attributed this change of mood to Pyongyang's frustration over its recent failure to get the Korean question onto the agenda of the UN General Assembly, to the North's inability to make political inroads in the South, and to the hostile tone in the South Korean press during the visit of the North Korean Red Cross delegation to Seoul last month.

Yi's arguments have some foundation. Since the UN vote, Pyongyang has castigated Seoul in a manner it had avoided after the announcement of the joint communiqué on unification last July. In a recent interview with a Japanese paper, Premier Kim Il-sung accused the South of deliberately violating agreements to work toward unification and suggested that unless Seoul changed its policies, the talks could be in jeopardy.


*We doubt that Kim is prepared to precipitate a breakdown in negotiations. The Red Cross talks have not yet reached substantive matters, and the membership of the higher level coordinating committee is still being negotiated, so he may simply be intensifying pressure on Seoul to bend to his various demands.*

Yi told Habib that Seoul is willing to make some small compromises to keep the talks on the track, but emphasized that his government needs to maintain a tight grip on domestic affairs as the talks proceed. He claimed that Pyongyang hopes to establish contact with opposition political forces, with an eye to their greater prospects as President Pak approaches the end of his third term in 1975.

*In taking this line, Yi is signaling that Pak will use the issue of negotiations with the North as one more reason for taking steps to prolong his rule beyond 1975.*

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### LAOS: Central Panhandle



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## VIETNAM

Communist sappers and gunners are becoming more active in the southern half of South Vietnam. Harassing attacks in the provinces around Saigon and in the delta have been directed largely against major highways, remote outposts, and other lightly defended government positions. Several main roads leading to the capital city were temporarily cut.

Communications patterns and an apparent relocation of the headquarters of the North Vietnamese 325th Division north of the DMZ suggest that this may be the first combat unit to pull out of the Quang Tri area since the fighting began there early this year. We do not yet have any indications that the division's subordinate regiments are withdrawing.

\* \* \*

The Communists appear to be preparing for the coming dry season supply push. An intercept of 29 September stated that 60 vehicles had recently been delivered to southern North Vietnam. The vehicles arrived loaded with cargo and were to be moved to transportation battalions both west of the DMZ and in the Ban Karai Pass area. Three additional transportation battalions also have recently been identified in the DMZ - Laos panhandle area. They came from the interior of Laos.

*These developments suggest that when the dry season starts in November, emphasis will be placed on the supply corridors in the DMZ and Ban Karai areas. Some key routes crossing the Laotian border evidently have remained in good condition over the wet season, and moderate traffic has been observed on some of them. Communist resupply efforts in southern North Vietnam have continued at a high pace through the summer, and we believe that significant quantities of supplies are available there for shipment down the trail.*


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NOTES

West Germany - USSR: State Secretary Egon Bahr plans to visit Moscow from 8 to 10 October in an effort to enlist Soviet aid in concluding the inter-German treaty negotiations before the West German elections next month. Bahr told Allied ambassadors yesterday that the negotiations had reached a "crisis" stage because of the lack of movement on major political issues, notably Bonn's need for some reference to the goal of national unification. He added that Chancellor Brandt may write to party leader Brezhnev stating Bonn's requirements for a general treaty.

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