



*The President's Daily Brief*

*30 June 1972*



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

30 June 1972

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The South Vietnamese counteroffensive into Quang Tri Province is encountering only moderate resistance; two government marine brigades have advanced to a point northeast of Quang Tri City, and two marine battalions have been airlifted into positions east of the city. (Page 1)

Hanoi's propagandists are giving unusually heavy coverage to the need for strengthening North Vietnam's military structure and the party's control over it. (Page 2)

The EC summit and monetary policies will be the key topics when Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou confer in Bonn next week. (Page 3)

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
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

VIETNAM

The government's counteroffensive into Quang Tri Province is encountering only moderate enemy resistance. Two South Vietnamese Marine brigades have advanced from the My Chanh defense line to a point northeast of Quang Tri City, while two marine battalions have been airlifted into positions east of the city. The airborne units operating west of Route 1 have made less progress, but are reported to have killed several hundred enemy troops.

Intercepted Communist messages indicate the enemy is uncertain about the objectives of the government drive but call for a variety of measures to counter it. Subordinate units were ordered to "prepare for battle," and one North Vietnamese artillery regiment directed its units to shell the invading forces. The 304th Division, moreover, noted that it had already begun to engage the government troops. One element of the division reported, however, that the "enemy has the capability to attack and occupy Quang Tri," and this unit indicated that it might even receive orders for a "partial" withdrawal.

*Communist units have often been slow to react to South Vietnamese offensive thrusts, but, as in the past, their resistance is expected to stiffen once they have determined the best way to counter the current drive. In spite of heavy losses in recent months, the Communists still have a substantial force of infantry, along with artillery and armor, in the area.*

Farther south, there are signs that the North Vietnamese 2nd Division may be returning from Kontum Province to its former base area in Quang Ngai after an absence of nearly two years. The division headquarters has been tentatively located by recent radio direction-finding in an area some 15 miles southwest of Quang Ngai City. Such a move would indicate that the 2nd Division has been retargeted and will soon operate in the coastal lowlands of Military Region 1.

The withdrawal of the 2nd Division from the Kontum City area suggests that the Communists do not intend to launch another large-scale attack against the city in the near future.

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Communist forces in this area sustained heavy casualties in fighting near the city and have withdrawn to refit and resupply.

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## FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

## NORTH VIETNAM

Propagandists in Hanoi are giving unusually heavy coverage to the need for strengthening the country's military structure and the party's control over it. Recent articles in the army newspaper have stressed that the party network must be developed within the army even under combat conditions. Strengthening the party's leadership in every field--particularly in the armed forces--is "a decisive factor for victory." Hanoi's domestic radio service has broadcast a long directive in the same vein prepared by the army's political department.

*The regime's sudden preoccupation with such organizational problems is almost certainly related to the current military situation both in the north and the south. The toll on the manpower and morale of Communist units, and the resulting pressure on the party's lines of command and control have given new urgency to the recruitment of party cadres who can fill positions of authority in the army. The regime's current emphasis on the need for such cadres reinforces other evidence from the Communists themselves--such as intercepted messages from units in combat--that they are concerned over attrition of their battlefield strength.*

*The heavy propaganda play on this point may also reflect new official efforts to shore up discipline within the army. Recurring rumors of a cease-fire or some change on the political front could be causing confusion and ferment within the military, and a reassertion of the party's control would be useful in keeping soldiers' and cadres' reaction in check.*

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WEST GERMANY - FRANCE

*The EC summit and monetary policies will be the key topics when Chancellor Brandt and President Pompidou confer in Bonn on 3-4 July. National elections are approaching in both West Germany and France, and both leaders appear eager to assure a successful European summit this fall. To this end, they now appear willing to postpone a decision on the creation of an EC political secretariat, an issue that has been clouding summit prospects.*

*Brandt and Pompidou may have greater difficulty agreeing on what to do about the problems generated by the weakness of the dollar in European money markets and by the British pound float. The French want more monetary policy coordination and see an urgent need for a European monetary union as a way of enabling Europe to fend off the encroachment of American economic power. Brandt, however, is expected to resist French demands for establishment of a European monetary zone, and to insist that any agreement on monetary matters not be harmful to the EC's relations with the US.*

*Some of the German-French differences in the monetary field may well have been narrowed by Bonn's decision yesterday to tighten controls over the inflow of capital as Paris has been demanding.*

*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

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