



The President's Daily Brief

28 October 1971

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

There is new evidence of Hanoi's concern over the impact of big-power summitry on its relations with Peking and Moscow. (*Page 1*)

Egyptian President Sadat is watering down his assertion that 1971 is "the year of decision" in the battle with Israel. (*Page 3*)

In her foreign tour, Prime Minister Gandhi is warning world leaders that war in the subcontinent is a distinct possibility unless they use their influence to help resolve the refugee problem. (*Page 4*)

Some Eastern European leaders are said to be concerned over Gierek's reforms in Poland. (*Page 5*)

The plane incident in New Orleans appears to be a deliberate Cuban attempt to embarrass the US. (*Page 6*)

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NORTH VIETNAM

There are additional indications that the North Vietnamese are concerned over their ability to steer an independent course in a period of negotiations between their major Communist patrons and the US. Foreign Minister Trinh has published an article in the October issue of Hanoi's theoretical journal Hoc Tap designed to pass the current foreign policy line to key cadre. On the whole its message is bleak. Trinh reflects the concern over big-power summitry that gave rise to Hanoi's anti-Chinese polemics last summer. In doing so, he clearly implies that the Vietnamese have not been fully reassured by Moscow's and Peking's continued protestations of support nor by the visits to Hanoi of President Podgorny and Chinese Vice-Premier Li Hsien-nien. Trinh condemns US "tricks" aimed at sowing discord between Hanoi and brotherly socialist countries.

Trinh seems particularly concerned over the possibility of a future reduction in Soviet and Chinese military aid. Although lavish in his praise of the economic assistance from Peking and Moscow, he conspicuously omits expressions of satisfaction with military support. (For our part, we have seen no evidence that Hanoi has reason to be unhappy with the current level of military support.) Trinh seems to be echoing the uneasiness apparent in party chief Le Duan's remarks to Japanese Communists last month when he told them that Hanoi "could not continue to fight without the aid" supplied by Peking and Moscow. Le Duan said he would like to be more critical of both allies, but that he feared jeopardizing the "vital" aid each supplied.

Trinh also displays sensitivity over Hanoi's loss of initiative in its negotiations with the US, and promises to "step up" Hanoi's diplomatic activities in support of its war effort. He goes so far as to describe diplomacy as a "front of strategic importance...with its own positive role." Hanoi has never before ascribed such significance to diplomatic action. Although Trinh does not go into what specific action Hanoi would take on the diplomatic front, this could presage some reformulation or change in Hanoi's terms for a war settlement. There is nothing in the text of the article, however, which clearly indicates that this is in offing.

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
Trinh's article in effect lays it on the line to the cadre that Hanoi must in the future rely more heavily on diplomatic and political efforts to achieve its objectives in Indochina. Although Trinh mentions the importance of military action and pledges a continuation of protracted warfare, he does not cite the importance of military action in reinforcing diplomacy. This suggests that Hanoi believes the conflict is entering a new phase involving greater political maneuvering on both sides.

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EGYPT

President Sadat is watering down his assertion in July that 1971 is "the year of decision" vis-a-vis Israel and that Egypt would not allow 1971 to pass without the battle being "decided." His recent speeches have played down this suggestion that Egypt may be planning to renew hostilities this year.



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Chances are slim that Egypt might alone be able to take and hold the Sinai, and this too no doubt has influenced Sadat. Although there are hawks in Cairo, responsible military leaders are said to believe that such a venture would be suicidal.



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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**INDIA**

Prime Minister Gandhi is embarking on her foreign tour to warn world leaders that war in the subcontinent is a distinct possibility unless they use their influence with Pakistan to bring about a return of the refugees. Outlining these plans to President Tito last week, she stressed that a decision to go to war was hers alone to make. Tito is reported to have warned Mrs. Gandhi that if India initiated hostilities, the world--including Yugoslavia--would not understand or support the action.


Mrs. Gandhi's efforts to bring international pressures to bear on the Pakistani Government to negotiate a settlement with the East Pakistanis may be complicated by the intransigence of the Bangla Desh leaders. Although the Indians continue to support the East Pakistani guerrillas, New Delhi is attempting--so far unsuccessfully--to moderate Bengali demands for independence. Bangla Desh representatives continue to take a firm public position against any compromise with the West Pakistanis. Earlier this month the Bangla Desh acting president took strong exception to the suggestion by Indian Foreign Minister Singh that a solution involving less than full independence for East Pakistan might be possible.

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POLAND


Some of party leader Gierek's counterparts in Eastern Europe have expressed concern that his reform programs are drifting away from orthodox Communism.



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East

German party boss Erich Honecker is also said to have called Poland's uncollectivized agricultural system a contradiction of Communist ideology when he visited Poland last month.



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NOTE

Cuba: Havana's dispatch of a delegation to a privately sponsored international conference in Baton Rouge without proper clearances appears to be a deliberate attempt to embarrass the US. The pilot is a former chief of Cuba's Civil Aeronautics Institute, was once Castro's private pilot, and has headed Cuban delegations to air safety conferences. His assignment to the New Orleans flight indicates that Havana expected an imbroglio and wanted a trustworthy spokesman on hand to make the most of an opportunity for anti-US propaganda.

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