

*The President's Daily Brief*

*30 July 1971*



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY*

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

30 July 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Indian authorities are ordering all foreign nationals in the Pakistani refugee areas in West Bengal to leave as soon as possible. (Page 1)

In South Vietnam, the Communists appear to be increasing their combat strength around the northern coastal provinces (Page 2), and have extended the new road through the western end of the DMZ another two miles toward Route 9. (Page 3)

Lon Nol has established a new central economic committee to help counter criticism of the government's performance, and has named a potential rival to head it. (Page 4)

Soviet experts in the Sudan are about to leave as relations between Moscow and Khartoum show severe strain following last week's coup. (Page 5)



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**INDIA**

The West Bengal state government has notified British and West German relief organizations that foreign nationals serving in the Pakistani refugee areas in the state must leave as soon as possible--preferably "within two days." Similar messages are said to be going out to all foreign organizations working in the camp areas. The ban applies even to missionaries who were working in the area well before the outbreak of civil war in East Pakistan. Foreign "administrative" personnel allowed to remain in Calcutta will need special permission to visit the refugee camps.

*Taken in conjunction with India's refusal to permit the stationing of UN personnel along the border with East Pakistan, the ban may reflect New Delhi's extreme sensitivity to the presence of foreign observers in an area where sizable numbers of troops are stationed and where future military operations might be mounted.*

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*Any actual eviction of personnel from the refugee camps would increase international support for a Security Council meeting on the South Asian crisis.*



**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY****SOUTH VIETNAM**

The Communists appear to be increasing their combat strength around the northern coastal provinces. The 3rd Regiment of the North Vietnamese 2nd Division returned to southeastern Quang Nam Province this month from Laos, where it has operated for the past year. Intercepted radio signals indicate that other components of the 2nd Division involved in the fighting in Lam Son 719 earlier this year are also on the move, possibly to the same general area. Farther south, the headquarters of the North Vietnamese 3rd Division is on the way to rejoin two subordinate infantry regiments near the densely populated coast in northern Binh Dinh Province.


*The 3rd Division headquarters had been located some 35 miles away in a remote part of southwestern Quang Ngai Province. Early this year, a nearly identical move by this headquarters was followed by a sharp increase in Communist military activity in upper Binh Dinh.*

In the central highlands, the North Vietnamese 66th Regiment and some elements of the 95B Regiment have moved out of border redoubts and are heading toward the Ben Het and Pleiku areas, respectively. The Communists also seem to be sending more firepower through the infiltration system toward the central highlands. [redacted] a large enemy convoy with 36 pieces of artillery was en route to that area.

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### New Communist Road Construction



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**INDOCHINA**

Recent photography indicates that during the past month the new road through the western end of the DMZ has been extended southward two more miles. Another two miles remain to be completed to connect with Route 9, the main east-west road into Quang Tri Province.

*The road improves access to Quang Tri and will provide an alternate supply route in an area that is less affected by the rainy season that inundates the main supply routes in Laos. We have observed additional construction extending northeast from the new road and believe this is probably intended to link with Route 102 in North Vietnam.*

Farther south, work is continuing at a considerably slower pace on a road north from the A Shau Valley toward Route 9. Gaps totaling some seven miles remain to be completed to link the DMZ road to the valley.

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### CAMBODIA

Lon Nol on 28 July announced the creation of a "Central Committee for Economic Warfare" to help put the country's economic house in order. He named as head of the committee Son Ngoc Thanh, the ambitious former political exile. There has been no reference to Sirik Matak's role in the economic shake-up, and he was not present at the meeting in which Lon Nol announced the changes.

*Lon Nol's move is intended to help counter recently increased criticism of the government's performance. In giving Thanh the most prominent position the latter has yet held in the government, Lon Nol not only hopes to trade on Thanh's reputation for incorruptibility and high standing with the assembly, but to saddle a potential rival with responsibility for one of the government's thorniest problems, the unsatisfactory economic situation.*

*Recently Thanh attempted to sound out Chargé Enders about the possible US reaction to his assuming leadership of the government in the near future. When he received a negative response, Thanh backed off and said he would help the government with its economic reform program.*

*Although there is little evidence that discontent with the government has crystalized to the point that a direct challenge is likely, Thanh's approach may be symptomatic of the uneasiness in Phnom Penh about the future. The upcoming National Assembly interpellation of the government on its economic program and the impending absence of Sirik Matak on a visit to the US next month will provide tests of the strength of anti-government sentiment.*

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SUDAN-USSR


President Numayri announced yesterday that Soviet experts in the Sudan had completed their mission and were about to leave. Several of them, he said, had left before last week's coup. Numayri affirmed that he had no evidence of Soviet involvement in the coup and had no desire to have relations with Moscow deteriorate.

*None of the military or economic projects undertaken by an estimated 500 or more Soviet experts appears to be near enough to completion to warrant such an exodus.*



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
*The bitter tone of an authoritative Izvestiya article yesterday condemning the "mass terror" against Sudanese Communists nevertheless suggests that Moscow will take some concrete steps to demonstrate its dismay at developments in Khartoum. We do not believe the Soviets will completely write off their investment in the Sudan because of the execution of local party members, however; Moscow has often sacrificed local Communist parties for the sake of the USSR's national interests.*



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
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
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
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
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
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## CYPRUS

*The Cyprus problem is once again threatening to boil over. The intercommunal talks between Turkish and Greek Cypriot elements on the island are stalemated, and there is growing tension between the communities. A dialogue between Greek and Turkish representatives at the UN is scheduled for early September. Should this meeting fail to produce a formula which would reinvigorate the intercommunal talks, Ankara probably will press for an alternative solution which could result in a new crisis situation. Convinced that the Greek and Greek Cypriot long-range goal is enosis--union of Cyprus with Greece--the Erim government, under strong military influence, has now adopted a long-range goal of partition to be sought through protracted negotiations with Athens. The going is likely to become rough over the next few months and may call for US or UN involvement to head off a recurrence of the crisis of November 1967.*

*The intercommunal talks, now entering their fourth year, are hung up on the question of degree of local autonomy to be granted the Turkish Cypriot community. Athens and Ankara are hoping to keep the talks alive at least until the bilateral talks at the UN in September. Makarios has little interest in this coming dialogue, regarding it as potentially leading to some kind of separate Turkish status on Cyprus--anathema to him. He is playing on Greek Cypriot emotions as well as threatening to seek Moscow's support if "outside" powers move to intervene.*

*Last spring Makarios rejected a Turkish Cypriot proposal for a Turkish Cypriot Affairs Ministry in the government. He viewed the proposal as merely another ploy to obtain a separate entity at the top level of government. Greece, on the other hand, regarded this as a reasonable request and tried unsuccessfully to convince Makarios to accept it. The resulting strains in Greece-Cyprus relations were aggravated by the Archbishop's visit to Moscow at the beginning of June. Moscow successfully avoided taking a strong stand on the Cyprus issue during the visit, but Athens and Ankara regarded Makarios' trip as a threatening development.*

*With the advent of the Erim government last March, Ankara took a firmer line and now insists that if the talks do not show progress soon, other alternatives must be sought. Erim has been involved in the Cyprus problem for at least a decade and, on occasion, has seemed to associate himself with the concept of communal partitioning of the island. The Turkish military now has a greater voice in the government and,*

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having put Erim in power, intends to keep the Cypriot problem under active discussion. The military regards Cyprus as strategically important to Turkey--a potential "Mediterranean Cuba"--and is determined to maintain a Turkish presence there.

Athens is hesitant to face the Cypriot problem squarely but does not believe that Turkey fully appreciates the limits of Greek influence on Makarios. Even though Greece has made it clear to him that it has no intention of being provoked into a war with Turkey, Greek leaders remain fearful of his ability to dig in and cause a complete breakdown between Athens and Ankara. The Greeks probably are hopeful that if the Turks decide to move additional troops to Cyprus, they will first consult Athens. If they do consult, some arrangement may be worked out. If not, Athens probably would also have to make some military move, however reluctantly, as a demonstration of solidarity with the Greek Cypriots. Should the Cypriot problem come to this, Athens and Ankara each would almost certainly turn to the US and the UN for diplomatic pressure on the other.

At present, Ankara and Athens agree that it is in their mutual interest to allow the communal talks to continue. Turkey believes the Greeks should take a more active part in settling the problem, but the Turks will probably take no military action as long as there is no real danger of enosis or a major outbreak on the island. Athens' major concern is to avoid a confrontation with Turkey. If the Greek-Turkish meetings in New York in September do not fit with Makarios' ideas, however, the Cypriot President remains capable of creating a new crisis on the island--one which in turn could easily spill over to embroil Athens and Ankara directly.

Even before September, local incidents or maneuverings could set back the efforts of Greek and Turkish leaders to keep the problem manageable. Tensions on the island have in fact been rising in recent weeks. Makarios remains openly critical of Turkish Cypriot elements and has publicly encouraged Greek Cypriots to protect their "rights." In these circumstances, any incident could easily erupt in significant fighting. Aware of this danger, Ankara has informed the Turkish Cypriot community not to react too strongly to any Greek Cypriot provocation. Early this week the 3,100-man UN force went on an increased readiness alert; it is trying to prevent local incidents to the extent that it can without itself getting involved in military clashes.

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