



The President's Daily Brief

23 April 1971

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

23 April 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

[redacted] South Korean 50X1
[redacted] Vietnam. (Page 1) 50X1

[redacted] Cambodia [redacted] 50X1
[redacted] (Page 2) 50X1

The Soviets launched a Soyuz spacecraft which apparently will attempt a docking maneuver with the Salyut craft launched on 19 April. (Page 3)

The transfer of power in Haiti has been orderly thus far. (Page 4)


Jordan's successful campaign against the fedayeen is likely to end their threat to Husayn. (Page 5)

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
At Annex, we assess the situation in East Pakistan after four weeks of fighting.

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SOUTH VIETNAM - SOUTH KOREA




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
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CAMBODIA




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
USSR

The Soyuz spacecraft and its three-man crew that were orbited last night are apparently functioning normally. TASS announced the spacecraft as "Soyuz 10" and stated that it was manned by Cosmonauts Vladimir Shatalov, Aleksey Yeliseyev, and Nikolai Rukavishnikov.

Shatalov, the commander of Soyuz 10, and Yeliseyev have participated in two previous Soyuz missions together, including Soyuz 8 in October 1969 on which both were crew members. This is the first space flight for Rukavishnikov.

The TASS statement said Soyuz 10 is intended to conduct joint experiments with the Salyut spacecraft that was launched from Tyuratam on 19 April. Reports from Moscow earlier this week had indicated that the Salyut would be joined with a Soyuz spacecraft to form a prototype manned space station. The Soyuz spacecraft apparently is equipped for docking and probably would be the active partner in a docking attempt between the two vehicles.

One of the objectives of the Soyuz mission may be to perfect rendezvous and docking techniques. The last Soviet attempts to dock manned spacecraft involved Cosmonauts Shatalov and Yeliseyev aboard Soyuz 8 which failed in several attempts to dock with Soyuz 7. Another mission objective may be to investigate means of combating post-flight effects of prolonged weightlessness on Soviet space crews.



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HAITI

The public announcement yesterday morning of Francois Duvalier's death and the succession to the presidency of his son, Jean-Claude, have not provoked disorders so far. The military, including the National Security volunteers, are on full alert, but there is no sign of an increase of the security forces in Port-au-Prince.

One of Jean-Claude's first official acts was to name a new cabinet, including two men upon whom former president Duvalier is believed to have depended.

The new President's tenure is jeopardized by his youth, lack of preparation, and the probable development of factions involving people both within and outside the government. Personal ambition is almost certain to surface within the ranks of the supposedly faithful who are now freed of Papa Doc's restraining presence. For the present, the appearance is one of concentration on an orderly transfer of power.

Exiles and oppositionists within the country are believed to be too few, weak, and disorganized to act immediately. Further, there are no indications that a Cuban-supported exile invasion is contemplated.

Fear of an invasion from abroad, however unfounded, could serve to inhibit an immediate struggle for power within the government.

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JORDAN

The Jordanian Army sweep of hostile areas in Amman has proceeded successfully for the last ten days and is expected to be concluded by the end of next week. The clean-up, accompanied by the voluntary and generally peaceful evacuation of the city by the fedayeen, has resulted in seizures of considerable quantities of armament and military equipment. Large areas of the capital, occupied by Palestinians and generally denied to Jordanian authorities for more than a year, have now been taken over by the army with only minor and sporadic clashes. The Amman operation is scheduled to be followed by a series of sweeps through the towns in northern Jordan.

These tactics will almost certainly end the current fedayeen military threat to the Husayn regime, although with the quantity of weapons evacuated from Amman the commando forces still possess a considerable nuisance potential.

The fedayeen military threat was in fact severely crippled during the heavy fighting in September 1970. An attempted comeback after Christmas failed to rally widespread support, either within Jordan or among the vocal commando supporters in other Arab states. The Jordanian Government's decision to enforce the cease-fire agreements and its success in cleaning up Amman have shown that the fedayeen groups no longer have the unity, the resolve, and the resources to confront the army.



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PAKISTAN

It is now four weeks since the outbreak of fighting in East Pakistan, a period during which the army built up its strength and then moved out against the Bengalis. Government troops now control many of the major towns and are able to move, seemingly at will, along most major roads. Some large areas of East Pakistan are still controlled by the separatists, but the army--as soon as it can spare the men and the time--should be able to go into these areas as well.

In fighting so far, the badly led, ill-equipped, poorly trained, and disorganized East Pakistanis have tried to hold some towns and strategic points, or in a few cases attack government positions. In some places they fled when fighting began, and even in those engagements in which they did not panic, Bengali forces have been routed.

The army is able to raid into the countryside, but it has insufficient strength to exert effective control over the 62,000 villages in which most of the province's 75 million people live. For the time being, the army will have to rely on its control of transportation--and hence food distribution--and on fear of reprisals to deter antigovernment activities in the countryside.

To control the cities, Pakistan will require a military force at least as large as the 42,000 to 49,000 we currently estimate to be in the eastern wing. Far more would be required in the event of more than minimal resistance.

Bengali forces who had intended to contest the Western army have largely faded into the villages or fled to India. Most have decided they have had enough of war for a while; many had no idea what it meant to come up against well-armed professional troops.

Looking ahead through the summer, the government can count on several important advantages:

--The army has the training, the organization, and the equipment--including tactical air support--to win any direct firefight.

--Army morale is high and the troops are confident that they can defeat any Bengali resistance.

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--The government controls the towns, ports, transport facilities, local press, and radio and is working to organize some semblance of local political support.

--It will control the distribution of food, employment in government, industry, and major businesses, and all economic development activity in the province.

Countering these favorable factors are certain disadvantages:

--Small bands of insurgents will be able to attack when and where they wish, taking refuge among the rural civilian population, which is overwhelmingly hostile to the government.

--Most West Pakistani troops have had no training in counterinsurgency operations.

--With the monsoon, logistics will become difficult. The army should have no trouble keeping itself well supplied, but could face urban disorder if it is unable to feed those Bengalis under its control.

--Preventing clandestine Indian shipments to insurgents across the 2,500-mile border will be almost impossible.

--There may well be international pressure limiting the government's ability to use its economic leverage and control of food supply to full advantage.

--Military priority must still go to the India - West Pakistan border, thus limiting the number of troops the West can send to the East.

--President Yahya promised civilian government to the West Pakistanis, and some politicians--such as Bhutto--are already hinting that a rebellion in the East is no excuse for leaving the army indefinitely in charge in the West. Agitation will build up slowly, but the army, nevertheless, may have to worry increasingly about unrest in West Pakistan.

--The loss of foreign exchange from East Pakistani exports and the cost of the military operation have put further strains on a West Pakistani economy that was already stagnating.

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A key factor, of course, in anticipating East Pakistan's immediate future is the will of the Bengalis to continue to resist. Given the limits on army control and assuming some help from India, the Bengalis could stage a large-scale guerrilla war which the army would find very hard to suppress. On the other hand, the terrain generally is not well suited to guerrilla warfare and the Bengalis have a reputation for talk rather than action. Guerrilla operations, if mounted, are likely to be small-scale. It is not in the cards for the Bengalis to resort to guerrilla warfare along lines of the Algerian or Viet Cong models.

One danger inherent in a prolonged insurrection is that it may well strengthen the radical leftists in the East. The moderate, pro-Western Awami League politicians now in command are not well suited to lead a guerrilla movement. Failure of the moderates to show early progress may well turn the people toward more radical leaders.

Concern over preventing a leftist (pro-Chinese) takeover of the separatist movement is a primary reason for Indian assistance to the Bengalis, and Indian help will probably continue as long as the movement remains viable.

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