
THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

(SECDEF HAS SEFN)

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22 FEB. 1962 TOP SECRET




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1. Berlin Air Corridors

Two Soviet transports flew as scheduled in the northern corridor from Berlin at 2500 and 4500 feet. No incidents were reported. The Attorney General's flight to Berlin in the southern corridor was completed at 0757 EST. (For USIB conclusions on Berlin, see Documents of Interest.)

2. Katanga troops move against central government forces

They have retaken Kongolo and were last reported approaching Albertville where UN troops are stationed. Tshombe apparently wishes to forestall formation in northern Katanga of a government responsive to Leopoldville. command intends to send a "mission" to the area. Although Tshombe has told UN officials that he is anxious to meet with Adoula, his military moves have reportedly angered Adoula and may have created another obstacle to early or fruitful negotiations between the two.



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3. Laos

a. Results of Souvanna's first day in Vientiane were not encouraging. 50X1 He has not yet drawn up a cabinet list but hopes to have one shortly.

Ambassador Brown reports
Souvanna appears tired and discouraged
and the Prince has stated that if he
fails on this trip he will retire to
Paris. Today he is due for a round of
talks with Vientiane officials.

- b. The Soviet charge has asked Ambassador Brown whether American policy has changed, referring to reports he had that such was the case. Ambassador Brown thinks he allayed his fears.
- c. There is increasing friction between Pathet-Lao and pro-Souvanna forces in south-central Laos. The Souvanna forces are being pressured out of towns where they were stationed. The Souvanna commander has urgently requested instructions.

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4. Hanoi protests to the Geneva co-chairmen

On Tuesday, two days after its blast against the new US command in South Vietnam, Hanoi sent Britain and the USSR a note demanding "urgent measures to halt US armed agression in South Vietnam." Hanoi may seek to reconvene the 1954 Geneva Conference. Increased Soviet propaganda support of the North Vietnam position indicates that the USSR may give this appeal more than the perfunctory attention accorded past complaints from Hanoi. The Polish ICC member has been recalled to Warsaw, ostensibly for consultations.

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5. Turkish coup plotting

Dissident military elements, galvanized into action by the arrest yesterday of some fifteen to twenty officers in Ankara, may move against Inonu's government at any time.

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6. Syrian instability

Trouble is brewing in Syria, with political jockeying for power among the military and unsatisfactory handling of land reform and nationalization of industry contributing to the instability. The government is aware of scheduled pro-Nasir demonstrations (there may also be a general strike) and believes it can contain them. We think, however, that they may well get out of control.

7. Latin American Roundup

b. Officials in the underdeveloped northeastern area of Brazil fear a diversion of Alliance for Progress funds to the industrial South.

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- c. The delayed deportation of subversive elements from the Dominican Republic is expected to be carried out under a new law.
- d. The Honduran government has been alerted to a planned Communist demonstration and uprising.
- e. Military activity in Ecuador, reported on Tuesday, has subsided.
- a. Sukarno, in a speech yesterday, again stated, "We do not want negotia-tions without prior conditions."

b. In a luncheon meeting with Khrushchev and Mikoyan, the Indonesian ambassador completed an agreement concerning assistance to the air force.

c. Indonesia suspects that the Panama Canal may be used to ship Dutch troops to West New Guinea. 50X1

8. Indonesia

NOTES

A. With government at a standstill there is a rising note of urgency in the pleas for Saud's return home.

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- B. The previously reported Thai reinforcement of the Laotian border is comprised of three infantry companies and one cavalry troop. This limited force appears designed primarily to boost the morale of border villages and to give notice of Thailand's concern over developments in Laos.
- C. Noting that previous major Soviet internal power struggle developments have been preceded by press articles on the monolithic character of the Soviet Communist Party, Ambassador Thompson suggests that editorials emphasizing Bloc unity now appearing in Pravda may mean an approaching crisis in Sino-Soviet relations.
- D. Many disillusioned African students in the USSR are leaving school and going home. A number have expressed interest in American or other western schools.
- E. A new wave of OAS terrorist attacks hit Algiers this morning as the rebels' National Council met in Tripoli to consider the cease fire agreement.

WATCH COMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS--21 FEBRUARY 1962

No Sino-Soviet Bloc country intends deliberately to initiate direct military action in the immediate future.

BERLIN: The Soviet program of harassments in the air corridors will probably continue, but Soviet air operations to date indicate a desire to avoid precipitating serious incidents. In recent weeks, the Communists have improved their capabilities for obstructing road and rail access to Berlin. Bloc military activity in general, however, suggests that the Communists do not expect their actions to provoke military confrontation in the immediate future.

LAOS: Current indications do not point to an all-out Communist offensive. The available evidence indicates that the Communists will continue their limited military pressures on Phoumi toward formation of a coalition government on Communist terms.

SOUTH VIETNAM: The pattern of Viet Cong military activity remains unchanged. The Viet Cong also appear to be meeting with some success in their political and propaganda activities aimed at extending their control in the countryside and gaining support in urban areas.

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	DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST	
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II.		50X1

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE