

*The President's Daily Brief*

*14 October 1970*

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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

14 October 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The agreement between the Jordanian Government and the fedayeen is discussed on Page 1.

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viets [redacted] Singapore [redacted]  
[redacted] (Page 3)

The French-Soviet communiqué, issued at the conclusion of Pompidou's visit, is discussed on Page 4.

Brandt appears to have recovered from his disappointment last week over the Soviet hard line on Berlin. (Page 5)

[redacted] North Vietnam. (Page 6) 50X1

[redacted] Chile [redacted] 50X1  
[redacted] (Page 6)

**FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY****JORDAN**

The Jordanian Government and fedayeen signed a detailed agreement late yesterday as a follow-up to the Cairo cease-fire accord of 27 September. A three-man committee, consisting of Tunisian Prime Minister Bahi Ladgham or his representative and members from the government and fedayeen, is charged with implementing the new agreement. A military subcommittee, including observers from Arab countries with forces in Jordan, has also been set up, presumably to help prevent a renewal of fighting.

*The government has made some gains in the new agreement. Although the actual location of fedayeen bases has not been made public, the government has been promised that they will not be near cities and villages. The Palestinian Liberation Organization's central committee has been made fully responsible for enforcing its obligations on all fedayeen groups.*

*Other government objectives have also been realized, but they are somewhat weakened by vaguely worded exceptions. One article, for example, subordinates freedom of fedayeen action to Jordanian law but then waters down the point by speaking of unspecified exceptions. The fedayeen are barred from carrying weapons in towns, but again, provision is made for "certain exceptional cases." Commandos are apparently answerable to the civil courts for ordinary crimes, but the fedayeen command seems to have been made responsible for general discipline.*

*The fedayeen, however, have obtained concessions that the government earlier seemed determined not to grant. The Amman headquarters of the central committee will be protected by fedayeen guards and is apparently free to conduct a full range of activities, including military. No one is to be detained or suspended because of the recent incidents, although the government had earlier intended to exempt from amnesty those holding official government positions.*

(continued)

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*The fedayeen have also been promised that the government will not establish or operate organizations "contrary to the interests of the Palestine revolution."*

*As with the earlier cease-fire accord, much may depend on the effectiveness of the three-member committee. Neither the government nor fedayeen can claim a victory from this agreement and maneuvering by both sides will continue. Husayn and the moderate fedayeen have had the upper hand since the end of the fighting, but as disputes inevitably develop over the agreement they will be under pressure again from the hard-liners in the two camps.*


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SINGAPORE




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FRANCE-USSR

Pompidou's week-long visit ended yesterday with an official communiqué endorsing a "properly prepared" all-European conference aimed at East-West detente. The two countries also signed a protocol calling for regular political consultations, and emergency consultations when there is a threat to peace.

*The French have been skeptical about a Conference on European Security and have been adamant in reserving support until the Soviets made positive concessions on Berlin. There were indications in July that Paris was changing its attitude, but Pompidou's endorsement in the communiqué is the first public--and most positive--affirmation of French support to date.*

*Both the French and Soviets probably see the protocol on consultations as largely symbolic. For the French, it symbolizes closer links with Moscow and demonstrates Pompidou's ability to strengthen the ties established in 1966 by De Gaulle. Moscow has accomplished one of its main objectives in the visit--preventing deterioration in Franco-Soviet relations because of its closer contacts with West Germany.*

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WEST GERMANY - BERLIN

Brandt has told Ambassador Rush that he sees no reason for "great discouragement," despite the hard line taken again by the Soviets at the ambassadors' meeting on 9 October. He thought the Soviets were engaging in standard pressure tactics and he appeared to attach little significance to the details of Soviet positions at this stage. Brandt said he was in no hurry; the talks could go on as long as next April. Brandt also said--going a step further than Foreign Minister Scheel--that he believed there could be no movement on a Conference on European Security until there was not only a Berlin settlement but also an agreement with East Germany.

*Brandt was less negative than after the four-power working-level meeting last week. (See The President's Daily Brief, 10 October 1970.) He probably believes that it is too early to judge the reasons for the Soviets' present hard line, and that at any rate there will be little movement for a few weeks while Gromyko is talking in New York and London.*

*It is unlikely, however, that Brandt wants negotiations to drag out to next April. The momentum of Ostpolitik could suffer from such a delay. Brandt needs further progress on this front soon in order to ease his increasing domestic problems.*

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
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North Vietnam:



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Chile:



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