

# The President's Daily Brief

26 August 1970

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## THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

26 August 1970

### PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS


| Egypt Israel  | Page 1.   | 50X1 |
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| In Cambodia, the enemy is maintaining pres                                      |           |      |
| North Vietnam leaders are calling for great power mobilization. (Page 3)        | iter man- |      |
| The Soviets are building a new deep water Egypt's Mediterranean coast. (Page 4) | port on   |      |
| Japan is leaning toward a more liberal trawith Cuba. $(Page 5)$                 | de policy |      |
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#### CAMBODIA

The second enemy attack in the past week against the village of Prek Tameak, some 12 miles northeast of Phnom Penh, was repelled by government forces during heavy fighting on 24-25 August. Late press reports indicate that scattered clashes occurred again today around the village, but according to a Cambodian Army spokesman, the fighting was on a smaller scale.

The recurring attacks on Prek Tameak underscore the importance the Communists attach to disrupting the government presence on the east bank of the Mekong across from the capital. The enemy's strategy appears to call for the piecemeal reduction of Phnom Penh's eastern defensive perimeter. At the same time they were hitting Prek Tameak, for example, other Communist units were attacking two government battalions dug-in along the Mekong River some 15 miles south of the capital. Large numbers of enemy troops have been reported in this area for the past several days.

The military situation elsewhere in Cambodia continues to be relatively quiet. Government positions at Tonle Bet, across the Mekong from Kompong Cham city, came under mortar fire yesterday, but no losses were reported. The Cambodians have been anticipating a major attack on Kompong Cham for several weeks, but so far the only significant enemy actions have been at Skoun and Prey Totung, west of the city on Route 7.

#### NORTH VIETNAM

Regime leaders are calling for greater manpower mobilization. Party First Secretary Le Duan told high-ranking army officers early this month to go "all out" to strengthen the armed forces in order to carry on and intensify the Indochina war, according to a Radio Hanoi report. In mid-August, Defense Minister Giap reminded party leaders at a conference on local military affairs that Hanoi's "people's war" strategy implies universal mobilization, i.e. that "all of the people" should belong to some kind of military organization. The conference report urged that the militia and reserves be enlarged and maintained in readiness even while their personnel continue to carry on their day-to-day civilian tasks. We have also noted increased propaganda in recent weeks urging young North Vietnamese from the provinces to join the regular army.

Recruitment drives of this kind are not new, but this one is receiving greater than usual attention. Although the North Vietnamese could be expanding their military manpower base in anticipation of a more intense level of fighting over the short run, it seems more likely that their concerns are longer-range. They probably expect that the personnel needs implicit in their commitment to a protracted struggle could become quite heavy at some point. By bringing more people into reserve organizations and the militia, they help insure the availability of suitable manpower for the military over the long haul without significantly reducing the present size of the civilian labor force.

The regime may also be counting on increased mobilization to benefit the civilian sector by producing a tighter and perhaps more efficient organization of the labor force. Hanoi frequently uses various military organizations to assist in economic projects, particularly in agriculture and public works. In July, the government called for more activity of this kind.

## **USSR-EGYPT**

| A deep water port for Soviet use is under con-       |
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| struction at Mersa Matruh west of Alexandria. Sat-   |
| ellite photography since 1968 shows that gradual im- |
| provements have been made in the port, including     |
| dredging to permit the handling of deep draft ships. |
| Since 17 August, ships of the Soviet Mediterranean   |
| squadronincluding a missile supply shiphave been     |
| using the port.                                      |
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The development of this harbor into a naval port capable of supporting cruisersized ships will permit the Soviets to carry out sensitive naval support functions away from the congested and more vulnerable facilities at Port Said and Alexandria.

#### JAPAN-CUBA

The Japanese Government has approved an export license and deferred payments for a substantial sale of buses to Cuba.

Tokyo may soon permit major sales of other commodities under similar terms. It has been interested in liberalizing trade with Cuba in nonstrategic goods for some time, but had avoided such a move out of deference to the US. Japan recently polled its ambassadors in Latin America on the issue and they apparently recommended that these restrictions be lifted.

Current US-Japan trade problems have strengthened Tokyo's desire to diversify its export markets. In addition, Tokyo probably was influenced by the belief that sanctions against Cuba have lost support in some Latin American countries. Increased sales to Cuba will also offset large Japanese purchases of Cuban sugar.

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## NOTE

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