



The President's Daily Brief

31 July 1970



27 50X1
~~Top Secret~~

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

31 July 1970

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

[Redacted] Egypt Soviets. (Page 1)

50X1

Recent developments in the Arab states are discussed on Page 2.

The Cambodian situation is discussed on Page 4.

The initial stages of the Allied study of defense problems of the 1970s have underlined European opposition to any substantial change in US force levels and in NATO strategy. (Page 6)

West Germany and Poland have reached tentative agreement on a reconciliation treaty. (Page 7)

India [Redacted] Sino (Page 8)

50X1

The recent angry exchange between Thieu and Ky has hurt both men and the unity of the government. (Page 9)

The Soviets are sending additional warships into the Mediterranean and probably will conduct naval exercises there in the next few weeks. (Page 9)

50X1



FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

USSR-ISRAEL-EGYPT

50X1



50X1




50X1


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

ARAB STATES



50X1



50X1

A fedayeen spokesman in Amman announced yesterday that Arafat will make an announcement today that will touch on Egypt's recent decision to cut off guerrilla broadcasts from Cairo. He will probably also set forth the fedayeen position on the US peace proposal.

Arafat's stand is likely to be negative on both subjects. He probably will not attack Nasir personally, however, because of the latter's great popularity among the Arab masses.


* * *

Egyptian and Jordanian acceptance of the peace proposal has produced some divergence between Syria and Iraq. Although not a party to the proposal at this stage, Syria has publicly attacked the US initiative. Its private position, however, may be less intransigent. For example, Nasir's personal representative announced after meeting with President Atasi on Tuesday that there was "full agreement on all matters discussed."



50X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY




50X1

Iraq's rejection, on the other hand, has been uncompromising, probably because it has not lost any territory and therefore has nothing to gain in a settlement. Baghdad is delighted to be able to portray Nasir and Husayn as traitors to the Arab cause, but it is unlikely to use its 20,000 troops in Jordan in a move against Husayn. The King, nevertheless, is aware of Iraq's potential for troublemaking and as a precautionary measure has moved a number of fighters away from fields close to Iraqi troops.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Cambodia: Current Situation



50X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

CAMBODIA

The government counteroffensive to retake Kirirom, spearheaded by five fresh battalions, is moving ahead slowly. Progress was checked yesterday when the Communists blocked the one access road to the town. A small enemy force also attacked a bridge on Route 4, east of Kirirom, on the night of 29-30 July, closing it to heavy traffic.


Most of the troops that retreated from Kirirom on 28 July apparently were too battered to participate in any more combat, and have been withdrawn.

The immediate purpose of the Communists' campaign around Kirirom may be more for psychological effect than for significant military advantage. The rugged terrain around the town and the restricted overland access to it make it an ideal site for prolonged combat, with government troops now forced literally to wage an uphill battle to retake it. The Communists may hope that with a minimum of effort they can demonstrate the Cambodian Army's existing tactical shortcomings and, at the same time, garner more headlines at Phnom Penh's expense.

The continuing presence of the North Vietnamese 101D Regiment in the area suggests, however, that the enemy campaign at Kirirom may have some longer range objectives. It may represent, for example, the beginning of an effort to establish a secure rear base of operations in the remote mountainous areas of southwestern Cambodia. Such a base could be used for launching frequent attacks on government positions and lines of communication, including Route 4, in the surrounding provinces.

* * *

Bangkok continues to debate the advisability of sending Thai troops into Cambodia.



50X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY



50X1

Foreign Minister Thanat told the press in Bangkok on 30 July that the government would send Thai troops to Cambodia only as "a last resort." He cited the "acrimonious" relations between the Cambodians and South Vietnamese forces operating in Cambodia as an example of the "friction" that can be avoided by keeping Thai troops at home.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY**NATO**

Reacting to a US presentation of the range of possible future US force postures, the European NATO Allies have strongly favored maintenance of present force deployments. There is general willingness, however, to consider in the Allied defense review how the US could make modest cuts in noncombat areas if some reduction were absolutely necessary. The West Germans, for example, have indicated that they could accept a reduction in the current NATO logistic objective: a capability to support a conventional war for 90 days. The Germans also would not be opposed to reductions in the support system and cutbacks of US troop strength in other European countries.

Strong Allied objections have been raised to any movement away from the current NATO doctrine of flexible response and toward greater reliance on either tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. The Germans have been particularly unequivocal in their opposition to any such change. When the concept of putting greater dependence on nuclear retaliation was discussed recently in the German Federal Security Council, those present, including Chancellor Brandt, reportedly were "horried." They felt that such a change would bring the Alliance back to a cold war psychology, and would conflict with the Federal Republic's current detente efforts.

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

WEST GERMANY - POLAND

At the fifth round of West German - Polish talks last week, the negotiators reached tentative agreement on a treaty text. The basic elements, in addition to a border settlement, are pledges to normalize relations and to abstain from the use of force. There may still be difficulties over precise wording; the text is to be regarded as a working document subject to revision by both governments.

After discussing the key Oder-Neisse issue at length, the negotiators settled on language stating that the existing border, the course of which was "established" by the Potsdam Agreement, constitutes the western border of Poland. The German official thought this formulation could cause misgivings in Bonn since it might be interpreted as outright recognition of the border, rather than the provisional "acceptance" that Bonn has been offering.

For their part, the Poles flatly refused to accept a draft letter, separate from the treaty, acknowledging four-power rights for Germany and Berlin, lest such an act imply that the border settlement was indeed provisional and subject to four-power arbitration. In view of this, the German official said it might be necessary for Bonn simply to exchange letters with Britain, France, and the US restating their continuing rights pending a final peace settlement. Such an exchange would serve to protect the Brandt government from charges by the Christian Democratic opposition that it had given complete and final recognition to the Oder-Neisse line. French and British representatives have indicated, however, that this device would fail to meet their government's requirements.


Despite the remaining difficulties, the German official sensed that the Poles were eager to reach early agreement. He said that the two sides would meet next in Bonn some time between 4 and 15 September.

Both sides are anxious to sign a treaty if possible. The West Germans would view it as a positive movement in Ostpolitik, while the Poles could hold it up as proof that they do not always have to follow Moscow's lead.


FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

INDIA-CHINA-VIETNAM



50X1



50X1

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

NOTES

South Vietnam: Senior government and military officers agree that the recent angry exchange between Thieu and Ky has hurt both men and the unity of the government as a whole.



50X1

The press has reported the recent exchange in detail, particularly the two conflicting versions of how the military leadership decided on the Thieu-Ky ticket in 1967. The generals involved have been besieged by the press for their comments, but they have decided to keep silent and remain neutral in the dispute.

50X1

USSR: The Soviets are sending additional warships into the Mediterranean and probably will conduct naval exercises there in the next few weeks. Fifteen surface ships declared to pass through the Bosphorus between 25 July and 4 August, but only six have thus far gone through. If none of the Soviet warships now in the Mediterranean departs in the next few days, the Soviet squadron would number some 52 ships, including 21 surface combat ships and 12 submarines. Fifty-seven units were there during similar exercises a year ago.

Top Secret