



The President's Daily Brief

30 July 1970

46

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

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PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

The current situation in Cambodia is discussed on
Page 1.

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[Redacted] tensions between Nasir and the
Palestinians continue to deepen. (*Page 3*)


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[Redacted] Chile [Redacted]
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The present status of relations among Turkey, Greece,
and Cyprus is discussed at annex.

Cambodia: Current Situation



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*FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY***CAMBODIA**

Four government battalions that withdrew from Kirirom regrouped south of the town near Route 4 yesterday. They have been reinforced by three battalions, including some Khmer Krom troops rushed from Phnom Penh. These combined forces apparently have launched a counterattack to retake Kirirom, but a Cambodian officer participating in the operation told the press it would be "very difficult" to do so. The Cambodians do not attach any strategic value to Kirirom, but after more than two weeks of fighting it probably has become a point of military honor to hold it.

South of Phnom Penh, two government battalions withdrew from their position at Bat Rokar in Takeo Province, following an attack by an estimated 800 Communist troops. No air support was available to help defend the position. In the west, Cambodian Army positions in and near Siem Reap city were again harassed by enemy fire on 29 July. The Communists also directed mortar fire on the airport there, closing it at least temporarily.

Anti - South Vietnamese sentiments in Cambodia show no signs of diminishing. A Cambodian student leader in Phnom Penh has told US Embassy officers that students are increasingly upset over reports of looting and pillaging by South Vietnamese Army troops. Some students apparently have spoken of driving ARVN forces out of Cambodia even before the Communists are dealt with, and blame the US for ARVN's presence. According to an embassy report, two government sections dealing with psychological operations do not want to undertake programs which push the idea of popular cooperation with ARVN.

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Light international commercial activity has resumed at the port of Phnom Penh after a three-month interruption. A Panamanian-flag ship delivered a

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cargo of petroleum to the port last week, and another Panamanian ship is scheduled to load more petroleum in Singapore for Phnom Penh. Shipping companies canceled all deliveries to the port in late April after two Japanese freighters traversing the Mekong were hit by small arms fire.


It remains to be seen whether other foreign ships will attempt the still risky trip up the Mekong. The recent Communist attack on a refugee-carrying South Vietnamese naval vessel on the Mekong, ten miles north of the Neak Luong ferry crossing, will not allay fears of commercial shippers.

Truck shortages and interdiction of road and rail routes continues to slow movement to and from Cambodia's other major port at Kompong Som (Sihanoukville).

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ARAB STATES




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In Amman yesterday a spokesman for a radical guerilla organization characterized Cairo's shutdown of two Palestinian radiobroadcasting outlets as the first shot to be fired against the fedayeen by the Egyptians and the beginning of an attempt to liquidate the Palestinian resistance movement. This organization has declared that fedayeen groups now have complete freedom to adopt independent policies. For their part, Egyptian authorities are now requiring visas for all Arabs traveling to Cairo.

The differences between Nasir and the fedayeen are deepening. Relations between the two are the stickiest they have ever been.

The Egyptians' decision to deny the commandos the use of Cairo radio facilities for their inflammatory broadcasts--a step long urged on them but never before taken--is a measure of this.

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
The widely circulated press report claiming that Iraqi troops have been put under the command of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations appears to be a misunderstanding of a Baghdad radiobroadcast. According to FBIS, a broadcast yesterday dealt with Iraq's record of support for the Palestinians, and noted that Iraqi troops had been put at the disposal of the Palestinian Armed Struggle Command "during crises faced by our people's struggle in Palestine," probably a reference to the Jordanian crisis of June 1970. A later Baghdad broadcast quoted a fedayeen newspaper's report that Iraq had "placed all its resources and capabilities at the disposal of the resistance until complete liberation."

These references are both sufficiently vague to be probably rhetorical flourishes rather than clear statements that Iraqi troops are being subordinated to Palestinian guerrilla orders. Coordinated action between the Iraqis and fedayeen cannot be entirely ruled out, however, although the Iraqis seem to have steered clear of this in the past. King Husayn is taking precautions against the possibility of Iraqi-fedayeen trouble-making in Jordan during the coming weekend.


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TURKEY-GREECE-CYPRUS

Relations among Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus have remained unchanged on the surface since the attempted assassination of Cyprus President Makarios last March and the subsequent murder of his political enemy Georkatzis. At that time rumors of impending Greek intervention on the island alarmed the Turks and evoked bellicose statements by Foreign Minister Caglayangil. Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis handled the situation coolly, however, and his reassurances to Ankara returned the tension to more normal levels.

Beneath the surface, however, the relationships among the three capitals have undergone significant changes in the last few years. Until the present Greek Government came to power in 1967, there had been a clear sponsor-client relationship between Athens and the Greek Cypriot community on the one hand and Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot minority on the other. Relations between Athens and Makarios began to fray, however, after the coup of April 1967, and become further strained during the crisis of November 1967 when the Athens government appeared to back down in the face of Turkish threats to invade Cyprus. The Greek presence on the island has since been reduced, but it is still considerable. A Greek Army regiment is still stationed there under the terms of the 1960 London-Zurich agreements, and Greek Army officers make up practically the entire officer corps above lieutenant rank in the Cyprus National Guard--the Cyprus Army. 50X1

The political arrangement in Cyprus, that of side-by-side "communal" government based on a proportional system, satisfied none of the parties involved. It is a compromise which sought to balance long-standing conflicting objectives: union of Cyprus with Greece (enosis) wanted by the Athens government and by a majority of the Greek Cypriots--but not by Makarios; and partition of the island, or, failing that, an independent, biracial republic with ironclad guarantees for separate status for the ethnic Turks, wanted by the Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Makarios himself accepts the side-by-side "communal" arrangement, and seems willing to live with the system which leaves him as the unquestioned leader of Cyprus.

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These aims have become blurred, particularly on the Greek side, over the years. Although they publicly espouse enosis, many Greek Cypriots, whether for reasons of personal ambition or dislike of the present regime in Athens, no longer feel much enthusiasm for it. The Greek Government contains some diehard pan-Hellenists, but it realizes that it cannot achieve enosis without risking war with Turkey, and it now publicly supports the idea of an independent Cyprus.

The Turkish Government continues to support the Turkish Cypriots in their insistence on separate administration of the areas they control. Ankara wishes to avoid trouble with Greece, but it is committed to preventing either enosis or the forcible absorption of the Turkish Cypriot enclaves by the Makarios regime. Although Makarios is universally detested in Turkey, many Turks privately view his continuance in office with equanimity, realizing that he is a dedicated and wily foe of enosis. Finally, beset with domestic difficulties and with its parliamentary majority shrunken to a few votes, the Demirel government does not want to become embroiled in another crisis over Cyprus.

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There has been only barely perceptible progress in the intercommunal talks now going into their third year on Cyprus. Although the negotiators for the two communities are responsible and able men, they have been hampered in their efforts to reach agreement by their superiors. Makarios, who apparently continues to believe that time is on his side, feels under no compulsion to make the talks succeed. The Turkish Cypriot authorities, having no faith in the Makarios government's desire to come to a fair settlement with them, have allowed their spokesman to make almost no concessions.

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The Athens government was alarmed by leftist gains in the 5 July Cyprus parliamentary election and is strongly opposed to further increases in the influence of the Greek Cypriot Communist Party (AKEL). The Greek Government may believe that Makarios secretly connived with the leftists in order to stymie his serious political rival, Glafcos Clerides, the moderate Greek Cypriot negotiator in the communal talks.

After the election, Athens pressed Makarios hard to come to an agreement with the Turkish Cypriots, to clear the decks for action against AKEL and its allies. Just before his death Greek Foreign Minister Pipinelis met with Cypriot officials and insisted that the Cypriots begin work immediately on a plan that could serve as a basis of serious negotiations with the Turkish community. The death on 19 July of Pipinelis may cause this campaign to lose impetus, however.

Makarios has shown no new interest in making compromises to the Turks, despite the Greek pressure. The prospect is for the situation to simmer on. Tensions could reach flash point anytime, as it appeared they might in the aftermath of the assassination attempt on Makarios. Both Athens and Ankara, however, are presently disposed to using their influence to keep tension low and would likely work to keep the lid on, in the event of a serious incident on the island.

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