THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

.

29 APRIL 1964 TOP SECRET

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- It has by now become quite clear that the UN presence, by itself, is not sufficient to end the fighting.
- Thant is expected to support Gyani's proposals in his forthcoming report to the Security Council.
- The Secretary General is also said to be considering putting a high-ranking civilian in charge of the UN operation in Cyprus as was done in the Congo.

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
Laos

- Souvanna has asked Pathet Lao leader Souphannouvong to meet with him in the Plaine des Jarres.
- He has also called upon the Pathet Lao to stop their attacks, being understandably concerned that the continuation of such military pressure would reduce what precious little elbow room he has to stave off the demands of the right-wing generals.
- The Pathet Lao do not seem to be paying much attention to him. rightist positions on Phou Nong, a commanding height southeast of Ban Bau, came under heavy pressure yesterday afternoon.

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
- d. As expected, the Pathet Lao have brushed off as mere "propaganda" Phoumi's call for the absentee ministers to return to Vientiane. They have, however, since the coup, spoken in favor of renewed tripartite talks outside the capital.
- e. It is now up to the coup forces to decide whether to let Souvanna out of their clutches to meet with Souphannouvong. If they do, Souvanna may be tempted not to return.
- f. In any event it will probably be some time before the two leaders complete the preliminary sparring over the time, place, and security arrangements for their meeting.

3. Yemen

- a. The republican government has been shaken up during Nasir's visit to Yemen.
- b. Although Sallal remains as president, the man coming out on top as premier, Hammud al-Jayfi, is no great friend of Egypt.

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- c Jayfi, by Yemeni standards, is a forceful and efficient administrator with considerable popularity among the republicans. However, the Egyptians have long distrusted him and suspected him of Baathist leanings.
- d. They have also felt that Jayfi wanted to limit the Egyptian role in Yemen and consequently have had him on ice in Cairo as Yemeni ambassador.
- e. The Egyptians have been disappointed with Sallal and for good reason. The fact that Jayfi is being allowed an important role in the government is a good indication that Nasir has no where else to turn.
- f. Nasir may hope by this means to cut his losses, broaden the base of government, and attract Faysal into accepting this solution to the Yemeni problem.
- g. The only trouble is that Faysal may not see it this way. Rather he may interpret the reshuffle as a sign of weakness and hold out for the complete collapse of republican fortunes.



4. Bolivia

- a. Tin miners loyal to leftist Vice President Juan Lechin are acting up again.
- b. There was a series of clashes last weekend between progovernment and pro-Lechin miners in the Huanuni mining area.
- c. These outbursts prompted miners in the large Catavi Siglo Viente mining complex to walk off their jobs in protest. Other mining centers are threatened with strikes today.
- d. Lechin, who rushed to the scene of the fighting, delivered a fiery speech on Sunday calling on the miners to unite and "fight to death against American imperialism and the tyranny of Victor Paz."
- e. All opposition parties, except the Communist Party, have rejected Lechin's proposal of an electoral front to support his candidacy for the presidency in the 31 May elections.
- f. Lechin, knowing that he has little chance of gaining power through elections, may now try to make his bid for power by force of arms.

NOTES

- C. India Nehru's talks with Sheikh Abdullah which began today will be crucial for the future stability of Kashmir and for relations between India and Pakistan. Though some Indian officials are prepared to go quite far toward a compromise involving a measure of autonomy for Kashmir, pressure from extremist elements will probably make it difficult for the two men to reach any agreement.
- D. Congo Bands of terrorists, calling themselves "Mulelists," are active in Kwilu Province near the Burundi border. They may force the commitment of additional units of the Congolese Army, already hard pressed by the Mulele rebellion in Kwilu and disturbances elsewhere.

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| E . | Venezuela-OAS | 50X1 |
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| | Venezuela will not get a strong OAS resolution condemning Cuba in the arms cache case. | 50X1 50X |
| F. | Pakistan - Communist China | 50X1 |
| | General Mohammed Musa, Pakistani Army Commander-in-Chief, has received an invita- tion to visit Communist China. President Ayub will probably authorize the trip. Ayub accepted a similar invitation during Chou En-lai's | 50X1 |
| | February visit to Pakistan and is considering going late this year. | 50X1 50X1 |
| G, | Syria the situation is critical there today. Despite the government's efforts and announcements of agreements, the strike of shopkeepers continues. A showdown for the Baath regime may not be far off. | 50X1 |

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