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## THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 - 28 APRIL 1964

TOP SECRET

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1.	Laos: Souvanna embarked on Tuesday on a new attempt to reach a political solution to the crisis.	
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*	We are not so sure the coup group, which still has a firm hold on Vientiane, will let the premier slip from its grasp.	
	The right-wing generals are still working to get Souvanna to reorganize his government and the army; the sooner the better.	
	The Pathet Lao has rejected out of hand Phoumi's call for absentee ministers to report for duty in Vientiane, but since the coup Souphannouvong has	50X1
	spoken in favor of renewed tripartite talks	50X1

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2. <u>Cyprus:</u> The UN seems to be increasingly ignored by the combatants as they move, inexorably it seems, toward a final showdown.

The Turkish Cypriots face a concerted Greek Cypriot effort to clean them out of their last remaining strongholds, and they see themselves now in a "life-or-death" struggle to preserve what little they still hold.

They feel the UN is powerless in the situation, and are counting ultimately on Turkish intervention to save them.

Inonu said on Monday, that whatever happens on the Kyrenia road, Turkey would not let the island fall from its hands.

			forces	in	the	Iskenderun area are stir-	
r	ing	again;					
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3. Zanzibar-Tanganyika: The new United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar became official with the exchange of ratifications on Monday.

Babu has accepted a post (one of three economic planners) in the new government. He had restrained his more hot-headed followers on the island, and, although they are still armed, the possibility of violence and open opposition to the union has receded for the moment.

The initial test of Nyerere's ability to control the situation will probably arise over the issue of German representation.

Tanganyika has been looking to West Germany for substantial aid while the East Germans have been extremely active in Zanzibar.

African reaction to the new union has been generally favorable. Nkrumah, however, sees it as a personal setback in that Nyerere's stature was given a boost and an East African federation brought nearer to reality.

4. Yemen-Egypt: With Nasir still on the scene, the Yemeni government was suddenly reconstituted on Monday, but not, apparently, in the way the Egyptians would choose if they had any alternative.

Sallal is still President, but a popular, Egyptian-baiting Yemeni with suspected Baathist connections has been charged with forming a new government under a revised constitution. At long last, provision has been made for a broader political and legislative base for the government.

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This is a substantial Egyptian concession—one which they have long tried to forestall.

Prince Faysal is likely to take this, as he has Nasir's trip, for what it is -a sign of weakness. He is thus also likely to reject Nasir's overtures on settling their differences over Yemen.

5. South Korea: Student demonstrations have died down for the time being, but pressures on Pak are building up, both from within the government and from his many opponents on the outside. Something will have to give soon.

The prescription most generally offered is for Pak to get rid of Kim Chong-pil and begin to clean up his regime. Kim, who has been through all this once before, says he will not resign as party boss but will leave the country if Pak asks him to.

6.	France - Sino-Indian Border:	
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The Chinese Communists have encouraged mediation proposals, which give them a chance to appear reasonable, but they have refused to accept binding arbitration and still do. Nehru would be reluctant to reject the idea outright but has political problems to contend with on this issue and will probably stall.

We think De Gaulle is trying to demonstrate the validity of his proposition that, if the Chinese can be brought out of isolation, they will behave.

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7. <u>Malaysia:</u> Rahman's Alliance Party, running on a "to hell with Sukarno" platform, gained a resounding vote of popular approval in elections last weekend.

He picked up an additional 15 seats from the opposition and now controls 89 of the 104 seats in Parliament. He has the state assemblies almost completely sewed up, controlling 248 of the total of 282 state assembly seats.

- 8. Burma: Ne Win and Burma's Buddhist leaders are inching ever closer to direct opposition. The country's most influential organization of Buddhist monks is trying to unite all Buddhist groups in refusal of Ne Win's demand that they register.
- 9. British Guiana: Opposition leader Forbes
  Burnham has returned from a trip to the turbulent
  west coast of British Guiana convinced that Jagan
  is trying to create so much racial violence that
  elections will be impossible.

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10.	Brazil-Cuba:	
	a break in relations with Cuba	50X1 50X1 50X1
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