


# **THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW**

ISSUED BY THE  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY




15 - 17 APRIL 1964

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
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**CYPRUS**

- ⊙ Capital
- District boundary
- District administrative seat
- Road




17 April 1964

1. **Cyprus:** Sporadic firing continued this week in Nicosia and along the Turkish-controlled Nicosia-Kyrenia highway. The number of incidents seems to have dropped off, however.

U Thant is still trying to get the Turkish Army contingent off the road, if not back to its barracks. Tuomioja has gone to Ankara to ask the Turks to put the contingent under Gyani, although not as a part of the UN force. The contingent could stay in the area, but the UN would take over the road.

The expected arrival of the Finnish and Irish units this coming week will bring the UN force close to its full strength of 7,000.



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Ankara is still using the Greeks in Turkey as a pressure point. So far, however, the government has restricted its harassment mostly to Greek citizens in Turkey--and resisted the demands of some Turks for action against the 60,000 ethnic Greeks who are Turkish citizens.

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For The President Only - Top Secret

The Turks are increasingly lamenting what they call inability or unwillingness of the US to put pressure on Greece and Makarios. Anti-Americanism is growing in the Turkish press and among Turkish students, while a left-wing columnist for a widely circulated newspaper has called for a review of US base rights.

2. South Vietnam: Heavy losses were suffered by both sides in this week's action in the delta. Preliminary estimates put the government's casualties at more than 300, including 131 killed and missing. The Viet Cong dead counted were 59, with many others carried off the field.

The government forces--the equivalent of seven battalions--fought well but were handicapped by a lengthy supply line. The Viet Cong--at least two battalions--were fighting a well-planned battle close to one of their strongholds and were well supplied.

The Communists have also stepped up small scale attacks in other areas, possibly in reaction to increased government operations throughout the country.

On the political side, rumors of trouble between Khanh and the civilians in his government have tapered off. Some Saigon newspapers, however, remain critical of Khanh's various actions

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3. Laos - North Vietnam: [redacted] Hanoi

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[redacted]  
charging that rightist forces had raided a village inside the North Vietnamese border.

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Hanoi probably hopes to aggravate the already strained relations between rightist leader Phoumi and Souvanna, as well as soften the latter's attitude toward the Pathet Lao [redacted]

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4. Brazil: The regime's preoccupation with purging Communists and other subversives is giving way to the business of forming a new government. The clean-up continues, but at a slower rate.

President Castello Branco's centrist-conservative cabinet ministers are mostly competent, pro-Western technicians with long experience in their fields.

Holdovers from Mazzilli's interim cabinet include Foreign Minister Leitao da Cunha, Finance Minister Bulhoes, and War Minister Costa e Silva. A number of the appointees are closely associated with Governor Lacerda and other governors involved in the anti-Goulart movement.

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5. Khrushchev's Birthday: Khrushchev's 70th birthday celebrations were apparently kept in low key-- deliberately so to contrast with the virtual deification of Stalin when he turned 70. 50X1  
50X1



As expected, high-level delegations from all the Communist states supporting Moscow were on hand. Also as expected, delegations from China and Albania were not.

6. South Korea: This weekend is the anniversary of the 1960 student uprising against the Rhee regime. Student demonstrations have already started and are likely to grow, protesting against government corruption and police interference in student affairs. Although Korean security forces contained the student demonstrations of last month, the danger of widespread violence is not being discounted.

7. Common Market: The EEC Council has again been unable to resolve the politically charged issue of unified grain prices. The Germans are still firm against lowering theirs and are likely to stay that way.


De Gaulle has said he sees little chance for the Kennedy Round negotiations next month until this problem is solved. In other words, he is determined to gain access to the West German agricultural market before he gives on anything else.

(Cont'd)

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In his television speech Thursday, which was largely devoted to rebuttal of press attacks on his military and foreign aid programs, he indirectly underscored this point.

8. Indonesia-Malaysia: The confrontation is likely to warm up before the month is over. The British intend to initiate their return fire and hot pursuit program--if the occasion requires it--on the 27th.



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9. Afro-Asian Meeting: The Chinese Communists netted some gain from the 10-15 April preparatory meeting of Afro-Asian nations in Djakarta, but did not get all they wanted.


They managed to exclude the Russians from the full-scale conference to be held next March in Africa, where Peiping expects to enlarge its contacts and gain a sympathetic audience for its militant anti-colonialist line.

The Chinese lost out, however, in an effort to hold the conference earlier, so as to compete with the Nasir-Tito sponsored meeting of nonaligned chiefs in Cairo this October.

10. Syria: The government quickly controlled last Wednesday's disturbances in the northern city of Hama. The Baathist regime's enemies are multiplying daily, however, and our embassy comments that the military's indispensable support of the government cannot last forever.

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11. Libya: King Idris may be indulging in over-optimism regarding his ability to head off the trend against US-UK bases in Libya.




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The King, however, may be underestimating the strength of nationalist sentiment in Libya, particularly in the populous Tripolitanian area, where attachment to the monarchy has never been strong. The current lull in anti-Western agitation--and Nasir's abstention from stirring up the base issue--might end abruptly if it should appear that the Libyan Government is taking a "soft" line in the negotiations.

12. Somalia-Ethiopia: Somalia is beginning to dismiss the volunteer forces recruited earlier for use against Ethiopia. Action is also being deferred on previously authorized enlistment of some 2,000 regulars.

The reason is probably as much an inability to provide maintenance as it is a desire to show that Somalia is doing its part to comply with the cease-fire.



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13. Kenya - Communist China: The Chinese are training [redacted] Kenyans in guerrilla warfare [redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] We suspect that the trainees are associates of Kenya's ambitious Home Minister Oginga Odinga. [redacted]  
[redacted]

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
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16. Spain-USSR: Negotiations for a resumption of diplomatic relations between Madrid and Moscow now appear to be indefinitely stalled.



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17. Gabon: Mba's "victory" in the 12 April legislative elections is not likely to strengthen his hold on the country. The opposition made a stronger showing than expected, and a move to oust the President would not be a surprise. Even an effort to compromise might not save Mba, since his opponents appear unwilling to accept anything short of his ouster.