


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B-1 - Continued



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B. Estimate of What it Would Take to Achieve Some Local Balance of Forces in Angola

1. To achieve some sort of local balance of forces in the now conventional war in Angola would require the removal of the 11,000 Cuban combat troops, or the introduction of conventional forces to match them, or a decision to undertake a long-term guerrilla and political war against the MPLA.

2. Removing the 11,000 Cuban combat troops, would deprive the MPLA of the trained troops who operate the Soviet tanks, rocket launchers, aircraft, artillery, and other weapons which are beyond the capacity of the untrained Angolans themselves to manage.

3. To introduce a conventional force equivalent to the Cubans, it would be necessary to assemble a force of foreign military specialists. Such men are not available in the numbers and quality required. The effort would also call for the recognition of the Huambo government to permit the provision of modern conventional weapons to that force. It would require extensive military assistance to the Huambo regime as well as increased economic and military assistance to neighboring Zaire. ~~Such a program is neither feasible nor politically acceptable.~~

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offensive against UNITA. This judgment of the MPLA is almost certainly correct. Although UNITA can be expected to put up stiff resistance, it does not have--without the combat participation and heavy weapons of South African forces--the ability to withstand the combined Cuban and MPLA forces. UNITA's military position has been seriously undermined by the withdrawal of more than 1,000 South African troops and advisors. Even a continuation of covert South African material assistance is not likely to shore up UNITA significantly as a conventional military force. South African military officials have advised UNITA to revert to guerrilla operations if it hopes to survive.

4. Given the present situation, the remaining forces in Angola opposing the MPLA cannot expect to receive any significant increase of aid--either materiel or manpower--from Zaire, Zambia, South Africa or other nations. These nations are all in the process of rethinking their policies toward Angola and related questions. <sup>IN THE ABSENCE OF NEW AND SUBSTANTIAL WESTERN ASSISTANCE,</sup> They are in every case more likely to make an accommodation to what they see as an emerging new situation in southern Africa, than they are to expand their support to the UNITA and FNLA in an effort to preserve what they now think is unpreservable.

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FUNDING

1. As to sources of funds:

-- Options A and B would require Congressional appropriations.

-- Option C would require Congressional approval of reprogramming of Department of Defense funds to CIA.

-- Option D would require notification of Congressional Committees of a release from the CIA reserve.

2. Funding of Zaire, Zambia, the FNLA or UNITA by other foreign powers, could help sustain a program at the level of Option C.

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 [Redacted]

4. Option D

~~LIMITED~~  
 Use ~~funds remaining in the CIA~~

~~reserve~~ to seek the most advantageous political settlement that is feasible and to facilitate an orderly withdrawal from Angola -- helping the FNLA and UNITA leaders to get the best deal within reach, giving them funds to permit them to disengage their forces, to resettle key leaders and to try to put an end to the fighting on terms better than outright surrender.

5. Options C and D could include any among the following steps:


- Support of a peace effort by Kaunda or Mobutu.
- Promotion of UNITA in the United Nations by a personal visit of Savimbi.
- Establishment of secret contacts with the MPLA in Luanda to secure the most favorable terms for the FNLA and UNITA.
- Search for the cooperation of Nigeria, offering to accept the Nigerian view that the way to get rid of Soviet and Cuban presence in Angola is to recognize the MPLA.

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
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ANNEX TO OPTION B

B - 3



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5. In sum, as the situation now stands, there is little to prevent the MPLA side from winning a conventional military victory, and in fairly short order. There is every indication that Soviet and Cuban aid will continue to arrive in Angola in amounts regarded by Moscow and Havana as necessary to finish the job quickly. While the MPLA over the short term probably cannot totally eliminate guerrilla activity by its rivals, the MPLA and Cubans will be able to consolidate their military position throughout Angola. They will also succeed in tightening their administrative grip on Angola's major urban and economic centers and gaining control over the Benguela railroad. They will, at least initially, leave the rural population to fend for itself as the Portuguese did before. Finally, they will probably avoid a direct military confrontation with South Africa by not challenging, with conventional forces, the South African forces in the far south of Angola around the Cunene hydroelectric project.

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-- The motivation of the Angolans may not be sufficient to overcome the hardships of guerrilla life.

-- Tribal differences will divide a nationwide guerrilla movement and spoil some of its effectiveness.

-- Facilities are lacking in Zaire for the logistics support of a guerrilla movement.


-- Distances within Angola are great, necessitating air support over long routes if more than raids across the frontier are desired.

-- Surface-to-air missiles and interceptor aircraft make air support tasks more complex to carry out safely.

-- ~~American~~ <sup>WESTERN</sup> logistics support would have to flow by sea to Matadi, which is vulnerable to attack from Angola, or by air through a narrow corridor into Kinshasa after staging through the Azores and Liberia. The staging points may be vulnerable to political pressures to deny their use to us.

4. Unless the guerrilla war can be accompanied by political and diplomatic efforts to secure a fair peace which would have a reasonable chance of success, prolonging the guerrilla warfare would lead to further suffering and loss of life without prospects of bettering the lot of the

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[redacted]



DISCUSSION

1. There seem to be few feasible and politically acceptable means available to achieve the removal of the Cuban troops. Among the possibilities would be:

-- Political negotiation employing inducements or pressures to persuade the Cubans to withdraw, including pressures on the USSR.


-- Blockade of Angolan ports.


-- Firm action by the Organization of African Unity or the United Nations.

2. In response to an introduction of more ~~troops~~ troops in Angola, the Soviets would have the means again to escalate their intervention to a level which would again give the MPLA superior strength. They might even be able to get troops from Nigeria. ~~(At a minimum, the relations of the United States and other countries such as Nigeria would be disturbed)~~


3. Both Savimbi and Roberto have expressed the intention of waging a guerrilla war if their forces are unable to stop the current Cuban-led MPLA offensives. Their ability to do so, however, faces some limitations:

-- Without strong <sup>WESTERN</sup> American support, neither Zaire nor Zambia is likely to permit significant guerrilla forces to operate from its territory.





B-3 -- Continued



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[redacted]

OPTIONS

1. Option A

Organize an "international brigade," recognize Huambo, provide modern weapons, including tanks, missiles and aircraft. Provide military and economic support to Zaire and Zambia.

[redacted]

2. Option B

- Option B-1
- Option B-2
- Option B-3

Support a guerrilla war in Angola from bases in Zaire of varying intensity per attached annexes over 12 months at the levels of Options B-1, B-2 and B-3 (plus economic and military aid to Zaire).

[redacted]

3. Option C


Provide additional help to the FNLA and UNITA over the next 60 days to help them to try to knock out tanks and 122mm rocket launchers by [redacted] helicopters and to defend their populated centers and roads while attempting to make peace.


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


B-2 - Continued





ANNEX TO OPTION C



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4. An alternative would be to help the UNITA and FNLA defend their populated areas and lines of communication as long as they can, and if necessary to carry on a guerrilla struggle thereafter. Such a guerrilla war would require substantial outside support to the guerrillas over an extended period, as well as economic and military aid to Zaire and perhaps Zambia.

5. A final alternative is to cut our losses, push Zaire and Zambia to adjust to MPLA control of Angola and to salvage as much influence as possible.

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anti-Communist side. It would also threaten the stability of the present regimes in Zaire and Zambia whose cooperation would be needed to support any guerrilla force.

5. The example of the success in the Congo in the 1960's is not applicable to the present situation in Angola. Those there were for the most part up against untrained and ill-armed Africans and enjoyed overwhelming superiority in weapons. The South African troops who recently fought in Angola were a better-equipped and a better-disciplined force than could be put together within a few months. On the other hand, one of the reasons for the South African withdrawal was the inability of the South African contingent to gain a decisive victory over the MPLA-Cuban force.

6. The defeat of the army of Zaire in northern Angola and Cabinda makes unlikely any further significant military intervention by Mobutu.

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ANNEX TO OPTION B

B-1



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ANNEX TO OPTION B

B-2



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A

A. Estimate of the Present Military Situation in Angola

1. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), reinforced by about 11,000 Cuban troops and a continuing flow of Soviet military equipment, now holds a clear superiority of military power in Angola. The MPLA's military leaders are convinced that they can win a conventional military victory over their opponents in the very near future, perhaps within the next several weeks. We believe that this outcome is likely, although it will fall short of a total victory in that at least small-scale guerrilla and insurgent activity will probably continue.

2. MPLA and Cuban forces have already destroyed the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) in the north; the Front is not likely to pose a significant conventional military threat to the MPLA in the near future, though it may fight on as a guerrilla movement.

3. The MPLA side is confident that it can win a similar victory over the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in central and southern Angola, and the MPLA and Cubans are now regrouping their forces for a concerted

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-- Offer of economic inducements, including trade (oil, Boeing-737, etc.) to the MPLA for political concessions to the Angolan opposition to the MPLA.

[Redacted]

-- Encouragement of other Third World countries to assist in creating a climate for negotiations [Redacted]

[Redacted]

-- Appeal by the Chairman of the Organization of African Unity to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to intercede to achieve a cease fire.

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