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IV/67

1. Organizational Development of the Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1950, Paper No. 1, by G. S. Jackson, April 10, 1952 *See HS files, Mr. Jackson's paper #1*
2. Memorandum from Montague, L. L. to Assistant Director, R&E, January 29, 1947

IV/68

1. For Souers' opinions see above, pp. 14-23 (Ch. III)
2. Montague, L. L. to J. K. Huddle, March 11, 1947, Tab "A" *In HS files under ORE Program + Production of*

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Research and Estimates

It is well to recall the mandates under which General Vandenberg took the primary obligation of the Central Intelligence Group before examining his procedure with regard to estimates upon the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries for the policy-makers. By the President's Directive of January 22, 1946, the Director of Central Intelligence was to accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security, and he was to disseminate the resulting "strategic and national policy intelligence" within the Government. This he was to do under the National Intelligence Authority, but he was to have full use of the staffs and facilities in the intelligence agencies of the Departments.

The first directive of the Authority on February 8, 1946 then instructed the Director to furnish that intelligence to the President, the State, War, and Navy Departments, and, as appropriate, to the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other agencies of the Government with strategic and policy-making functions related to the national security. The Central Intelligence Group was to utilize all available intelligence. It should note in its reports any substantial dissent by a participating agency.

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IV/111

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ITEM 46

- 1. Vandenberg, H. S. to Vannevar Bush, March 13, 1947, S, filed in (File RDB-CIG Relationship) *HS under CIG: JRDB-CIG Conf Sci. Intell*
See below, pp. 62-64 (Ch. VI)

- 2. N.I.A. Meeting #9, February 12, 1947 (File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office) *see Reference in General Counsel's office*
N.I.A. Directive #9, April 18, 1947

- 3. Wright, E. K. to Asst. Director for Reports and Estimates, March 28, 1947 (File CIG 6.05) (S), filed *HS under DRE: Sci-*
For Scientific Intelligence in Hillenkoetter's administration see below, pp. 61-72 (Ch. VI) HS/HC-204
For the news of the Eberstadt Committee and the Dulles Group, see pp. 24-26, 64, 94 (Ch. VIII) ITEM 47

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IV/105

1. Wright, E. K. to S. J. Chamberlin, August 12, 1946, TS;
(File NIA 6-9) filed HS under NIA 6-9, Coord. Intell. Activ.
atom. Energy Devels.
2. N.I.A. Meeting #6, August 21, 1946 TS; filed HS under NIA 6-9;
(File NIA 6-9) Coord. Intell. Activs.

A Digest of the Act establishing the Atomic Energy Commission was prepared in the Legislative Counsel's Office for Vandenberg. A summary dated September 24, 1946 is in the Historical Collection, 3; filed HS under "Atomic Energy Act, 1946"

Groves, L. R. to the Atomic Energy Commission, November 21, 1946 (File Scientific - Technical Intelligence), 5; filed HS under "Atomic Energy Act, 1946"

IV/106

1. Leahy, W. D. to H. S. Truman, August 21, 1946
(File NIA 6-9) TS; filed HS under NIA 6-9; Coord. Intell. Activ.
Atom. Energy Devels.

Leahy, W. D. to Secretaries of State, War, Navy,
and H. S. Vandenberg, August 23, 1946

(File NIA 6-9) TS; filed in HS under NIA 6-9; Coord. Intell. Activs.
atom. Energy Devels.

See footnote IV/105

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the Central Intelligence Group eventually would broaden its scope. He was about convinced, he said, that the Authority should now endeavor to obtain its own appropriations. They should be small, of course, as the three Departments would continue to furnish the bulk of the appropriations.

Patterson still thought that the administrative problems might be solved under the existing arrangement. Byrnes too thought that the Departments might find a way to give the Group whatever money it had to have. There was further discussion in which Langer for the State Department joined to endorse Admiral Leahy's suggestion that funds might be separated from actions concerning personnel. The money might be appropriated from the funds of the Departments without an independent appropriation for the Group; but the Director of Central Intelligence, for reasons of security as well as efficiency, might be given full charge of selecting and directing his personnel.

The discussion went on to consider the relationship with Congress and its eventual legislation. General Vandenberg stressed that the Group was not an agency authorized to disburse funds. Even if it had sufficient funds from a Department for a particular purpose, it would be obligated to maintain disbursing officers and auditors in all three Departments besides the necessary accounting staff in the Group. Thus four fiscal operations were required where one really would suffice. All of this pointed to the necessity for making the Central Intelligence Group an agency authorized to control its

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IV/69

1. Montague, L. L. to J. K. Huddle, March 11, 1947,
Tab "B" *See footnote 10/68*

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ITEM 31

For Souers' Progress Report, see above, pp. 53-55
(Ch. III)

2. Edgar, D. to R. H. Hillenkoetter, June 18, 1947
(File CIG 6.05)

Wright, E. K. to Chief, ICAPS, March 25, 1947
(File CIG 6.05)

IV/70

1. Edgar, D. to E. Watts, June 25, 1947
(File Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff)

Jackson, G. S. to A. B. Darling, in conversation,
June 20, 1952

2. See above, pp. 40-41 (Ch. I) pp. 29-31 (Ch. II)

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IV/101

None

IV/102

1. JCS 1569 Series (File in the Pentagon)
2. See below, pp. 73-85 (Ch. VI)

For Donovan on military deputies, see the interview with him, February 17, 1953; TS interview in files of HS, under "OSS"

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IV/107

- 1. Clark, R. L. to A. B. Darling, in conversation, July 28, 1952; TS; *filed HS under SI*

Mr. Clark, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Scientific Intelligence, served under Vannevar Bush in the Joint Research and Development Board.

Waterman, A. T. to A. B. Darling, in conversation, July 28, 1952

Mr. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation, was deputy to Karl Compton during the war in the field service of the Office of Scientific Research and Development.

IV/108

- 1. ORE 3/1 October 31, 1946; TS; *filed HS in folder J.R.D.B. Tech. Adv. Pol. Council*

Minutes of Meeting of Technical Advisors, Joint Research and Development Board, November 20, 1946; C; *filed HS under J.R.D.B. Tech. Adv. to Pol. Council (meeting 20 Nov 46)*

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- 2. See above, pp. 2-4 (Ch. II)

ITEM 43

Donovan, W. J., article in Life, September 30, 1946

Look, August 12, 1952, Inside CIA, The Story of Our Spy Network, by J. Gunther; U; *filed CIA: Story of Spy Network*

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IV/21

HS/HC-804

- 1. Army Order, Quinn, W. W. to S. B. L. Penrose, July 17, 1946 (File CIG 6.03) *filled in HS files under CIG Capt. Appointments* **ITEM 3**
For "NSCID 5," see below, pp. 52-54 (Ch. VI)

For the Army's activities in 1951, see Kirkpatrick, L. B. Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence November 30, 1951, on "Agreed Activities under NSCID #5" A photocopy of this document is in the Historical Collection, File Records Integration - Foreign Intelligence *(filled in HS files under SO Activities Under NSCID #5, TS # 72172)*

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ITEM 4

- 2. Galloway, D. H. to Executive Officer, CIG, July 29, 1946 (File CIG 6.03) *filled in HS files under SO (C)*

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- 3. Wright, E. K. to A. B. Darling, May 28, 1953; *see HS under CIA (general) TS*
Order to "OSO" of October 25 signed by Colonel W. H. Harris, Executive for Personnel and Administration *Order in Darling's footnotes (previous), Chapter IV/21 (3) says: see references in File Cig 6.03 Special Operations. Can only find draft of proposed admin memo, not original. EL)*

IV/22
HS/HC-800
VOL. IV

- 1. Vandenberg, H. S. to A. B. Darling, March 17, 1952; *TS; interview in HS files under CIA - general*

HS/HC-804
ITEM 6

- 2. Harris, W. H. to Assistant Executive Director and Assistant Director for Special Operations, July 31, 1946. *(S) in HS files under SO (copy in files of CIA Personnel and SSU)*

HS/HC-804
ITEM 5

- Vandenberg, H. S., Memorandum for the Secretary of War, September 12, 1946, and accompanying papers *under CIG External Activities (TS) 3. Filled*
- Quinn, W. W. to H. C. Petersen, April 11, 1947 *HS/HC-804 under SSU, Disposition of (C)*

HS/HC-804
ITEM 7

- Vandenberg, H. S. to H. C. Petersen, April 11, 1947 **ITEM 8**
(These papers are in File CIG 6.03) *see also First Staff files under SSU, Disposition of*

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IV/93

1. Vandenberg, H. S. to T. D. Inglis, September 4, 1946
(File C.I.G. #15)

see footnote IV/92

2. Edgar, D. to H. S. Vandenberg, September 12, 1946

Lay, James S., Jr. to H. S. Vandenberg, September 18, 1946

see footnote IV/92

IV/94

None

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Theirs was the counter-theory of collective responsibility. The Group was to them a cooperative interdepartmental enterprise in which, for all matters of deliberation and decision, they were the representatives of the Departments and therefore the equals of the Director. If he was not their executive secretary, he was no more than their chairman.¹

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Vandenberg wished the Director of Central Intelligence to be the executive officer of the National Intelligence Authority. While the President kept him in the office, he would have command of its functions. This was quite different from thinking of the Central Intelligence Group as a "cooperative interdepartmental activity." We meet again as in the days of the Office of Strategic Services the fundamental concept of individual responsibility in conflict with the principle of collective responsibility. Members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, representing the intelligence services of the Departments, were immediately aware of the change.¹

As Vandenberg expressed it, the Board had the right to give him advice, either in concurrence or dissent. He would accept such counsel, listen to argument, and consider new facts; but he would make up his own mind and determine the position of the Group. He would not block dissent. But it was not to be the official position of the Group, not even if it were the unanimous opinion of the Advisory Board. His superiors in the Authority might prefer the dissent. It was their right. But so long as he was Director of Central Intelligence, at the pleasure of the President, Vandenberg intended to make the final decision within the Group. He was individually responsible through the Authority to the President.²

There was solid ground in the President's Directive for this interpretation of the powers of the Director. But acceptance of it by the chiefs of intelligence on the Advisory Board was most unlikely.

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IV/79

See footnote IV/79

1. C.I.G. #18/2, November 21, 1946

I.A.B. Meeting #11, November 26, 1946

(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)

See reference in the General Counsel's office

2. For "Bogota" see below, pp. 86-94 (Ch. VI)

IV/80

1. I.A.B. Meeting #12, December 17, 1946

See reference in General Counsel's office

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IV/53

- 1. ORE #17, May 31, 1947; see *Mr. Jackson's file*

Babbitt, T. to R. H. Hillenkoetter, July 16, 1947
 The incoming Assistant Director of ORE signed
 a report on July 16, 1947 on the Failure of
 Coordination, see below, pp. 58-60 (Ch. IX)

*C. filed this together w memo for AS/RE
 from Exec. Dir., 25 July 47 (C), under
 C19. Admin order # 32*

IV/54

HS/HC-804

- 1. Galloway's inquiry of August 1, 1946 cited in *ITEM 20*
 Memorandum of Montague, L. L. to D. Edgar, August 7, 1946; *no*
classif. shown; filed HS under ORE

- 2. Huddle, J. K. to H. S. Vandenberg, December 31, 1946
 (Progress Reports - Research and Evaluation) *filed in*
H. S. Vandenberg's ORE; Progress Reports (TS)

- 3. Montague, L. L. to A. B. Darling, April 1, 11, June 12,
 1952, TS, interview in HS files under ORE

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IV/55

None

IV/56

- 1. Montague, L. L. to A. B. Darling, April 1, 11, June 12, 1952, TS, interview in HS files under

ORE
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- 2. Montague's Memorandum, May, 1947, no classif. shown, filed HS under ORE

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ITEM 21

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experts in the branches to those who used it. The expert must be relied upon for "incisive intelligence." To allow a group of men who spent but little of their time in studying the subject, to censor, change or suppress the conclusions of the expert, he said, was to stultify the product for both quality and timeliness. It was to be assumed, until proven otherwise, that the expert possessed the background, current information, the talent, and the will to produce the forecasts which were timely and directly useful in both short and long-range operations of the Government.¹

The Chief of the Intelligence Staff was not aware of the memorandum of the Western Europe Branch. But he was aware of the friction over the so-called "editorial" and "substantive" functions; and so, to bring the issue to an end, he submitted to the Assistant Director on April 17, 1947 a memorandum upon the authority and responsibility of the Staff and the Branches.

From his point of view, there should be no separation of the functions. Both should be exercised in the Branches as well as in the Staff. The distinction between them, he maintained, was that the personnel of the Branches as specialists in their particular fields should amass the significant evidence and prepare the reports; the members of the Staff were responsible for supervising and coordinating that activity of the several Branches. The Staff rather than the Branches should make the decision with regard to the estimates. The Office, he said, could not accomplish its purpose unless the Staff

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Staff during the war. But the presence of civilians in military councils was not generally acceptable to the Army and the Navy.¹

Admiral Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence, and member of the Intelligence Advisory Board, had proposed to General Vandenberg on August 12, 1946 that a channel be established between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were working upon subjects of common interest such as atomic energy and making parallel reports. There should be a method of handling such papers for the benefit of both. Useless duplication was to be eliminated.

Inglis planned to have the Joint Intelligence Staff of the Joint Intelligence Committee serve as the staff also of the Intelligence Advisory Board. At first glance this looked good. The permanent members of the Board, chief intelligence officers of the Departments, were the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At that time the State Department was still represented on the Joint Intelligence Committee. Additional members of the Advisory Board could appoint ad hoc representatives to the proposed Intelligence Advisory Staff whenever their affairs were considered.²

But General Vandenberg was aware of the flaws in the Inglis plan. Moreover, he had other ideas regarding the representation of the Central Intelligence Group in the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Donovan or his representative had sat in their Joint Intelligence Committee as well as taken orders from the Joint Chiefs. Vandenberg replied to Inglis on September 4. The

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General Vandenberg reviewed his difficulties with the Intelligence Advisory Board. He was at that time, as we have seen, at odds with the chief intelligence officers of the Army and the Navy over the authority of the Director in relation to the Advisory Board, the requirements and the coordination of collection by the Departments and the Group, and the place which the Director and the Group should have with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹

The result of this three-day conference in December, 1946 was agreement that the Joint Research and Development Board should find a head for the section in the Central Intelligence to have charge of evaluating scientific and technical intelligence, and should help him obtain the experts necessary for his work. It was further agreed that there should be a statement of the scope of the term "scientific and technical intelligence," a general plan for securing coverage of foreign developments in science, and a definite relationship between the Board and the Group.²

Vannevar Bush and General Vandenberg issued their program for cooperation in the field of scientific intelligence on January 10, 1947. It provided that the Scientific Branch in the Office of Reports and Estimates of the Group should assume the initiative and responsibility for developing a national program of scientific intelligence. The head of the Branch should serve as adviser on scientific intelligence to the Director of Central Intelligence. He should have direct access to the activities of the Joint Research and Development Board pertaining to his work.

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original phrasing because it seemed to infringe upon the responsibility of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board; each was supposed to be responsible for executing within his own Department the recommendations of the Authority. The Director might engage in "coordinating;" but he might not, in "supervising" the intelligence activities of the Departments. The Director's right of inspection was involved in this affair. How to coordinate those departmental activities without inspecting and supervising them was a question which prolonged the dispute between the Director and the Board for months. Admiral Hillenkoetter had not yet solved the problem in 1949 when the Dulles Report called for leadership in the endeavor without the power to coerce.¹

As Magruder had so effectively urged, Vandenberg wished to have all espionage and counterespionage for the collection of foreign intelligence abroad conducted by the Director of Central Intelligence. But the directive as revised by the Advisory Board on June 28 carefully stated that the Director of Central Intelligence should conduct only those "organized Federal" operations which were outside the United States and its possessions. This of course was designed, first, to assure to the military intelligence services that they might continue departmental operations in collecting intelligence for their own purposes. Presumably those operations were not "organized." Second, the provision was to guard the Federal Bureau of Investigation in performing its duties within the area and jurisdiction of the United States.

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The third problem of importance before the Advisory Board was the collection of intelligence. It became entangled with production and dissemination as the debate progressed. The State Department proposed on October 18 that in an effort to eliminate duplication, it should assume complete responsibility for the overt collection of intelligence in foreign areas upon all political, economic, social and cultural matters. There of course would be some overlapping. The Departments would assist each other. But the State Department would be responsible for these matters. It would share with the armed services the collection of scientific intelligence.¹

The Military Intelligence Division of the War Department matched this proposal with a plan to coordinate the intelligence activities of the three Departments. It was not so much an answer to the State Department, however, as notice to General Vandenberg, Director of Central Intelligence, that the Secretaries and not the Director would manage the intelligence activities of the Departments. Vandenberg had heard Leahy say much the same thing in July.²

The War Department intended not only to have the Departments retain determination of their primary interests but also do their own research, evaluation, and analysis on those subjects. Collection in the field would follow the same lines of primary interest. Matters of principle would be coordinated between the Departments in Washington. But in the field the coordination of collection would be the function of the "Chief of Mission," presumably for each Department.

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the Army would discontinue its own activities in espionage. The question was still being discussed in 1951.¹

Thus leading officials were reassigned during the summer of 1946 and provision made for major operations in collecting foreign intelligence by the new Office of Special Operations. Colonel Galloway admonished his subordinates in "OSO" that they were to reduce to the minimum their associations with members of the Departments of State, War, and the Navy; and these were to be only through the Control Officer. They were to have nothing except official business with the other offices in the Group. Their activities were to be kept as much as possible under cover.²

The conception of "OSO" which Vandenberg, Wright, and Galloway had was that the new office should be as free as possible from connections which might expose its affairs. They believed that the operations of the Group should be kept apart from the observation and influence of the departmental chiefs of intelligence in the Intelligence Advisory Board. The operations of the Group were different from other services of "common concern" to the Departments. And yet, the Office of Special Operations should be in close touch with the agencies of the Government which used its product. It was therefore authorized on October 25 to receive requests for information or action directly from those agencies through its own Control Officer.³

This way, "OSO" in a semi-autonomous relation, could maintain direct liaison on secret operations with other parts of the Government.

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Beyond personal antagonisms, the issue between the regional branches and the Intelligence Staff was that unending dispute among those who know the facts and those who endeavor to reflect upon them. There is no implication here that a single person cannot attain both knowledge and judgment, and present his ideas in good literary form. But there is a disparity between the processes of accumulating knowledge and of appraising it.

The expert in an area of knowledge is expected to form judgments from his mastery of the facts and to express those judgments intelligently. It does not follow that in so doing he has arrived at the definitive judgment, that there can be no other besides his own. He certainly is not expected to be an expert in all fields of knowledge which may have some association with his.

Neither is the estimator supposed to know everything. But he is expected to subject the knowledge and the judgment of the expert to scrutiny and reflection, and to correlate it with intelligence from other sources. It is the duty of the estimator to make the synthesis.

This was the issue between the regional branches and the Intelligence Staff in the Office of Reports and Estimates. It was blurred with animosity and bickering over editorial changes of text; one may question an author's fact often with impunity, it would seem, never his style. But the issue was so important in the development of central intelligence that we should ignore the personalities as we look into the controversy.

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of the month all had approved without further change. It was issued on January 2, 1947 as Directive No. 7 of the National Intelligence Authority.

It allocated primary responsibility to the Departments for collection within broad categories. It then allowed the collectors in the field to send copies of all materials regardless to their own agencies. The senior representative of the United States in each area with a foreign service post was made responsible for coordinating all collection in that area. There was no supervision over him by the Director of Central Intelligence in Washington. All facilities for collection were to be utilized within budgetary limitations to their maximum in order to avoid duplication and overlap. How this self-contradicting feat could be accomplished, the directive did not say. It should provoke laughter. But its consequences were not humorous. Coordination by the "senior U. S. representative" in the field was to prove no coordination at all.¹

Directive No. 7 stipulated that there should be free and unrestricted flow of information between the Departments to meet the secondary needs of each. Common sense would be applied to insure individual initiative and favorable contacts by collecting agents. No interpretation of these principles and objectives should negate the basic principle that all departmental representatives abroad were individually responsible for the collection and transmission to Washington of all intelligence material useful to their Departments

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intelligence, and possibly others. This grandiose scheme was abandoned with the explanation that such committees and boards were not necessary; all personnel in the Group were authorized and encouraged to establish relations and to consult with persons of similar positions in other intelligence agencies. This, as we have seen, was not true of the members of the Office of Special Operations. But it was applicable to other offices and staffs in the Group. One interdepartmental coordinating committee was sufficient.¹

The "mission" which the Chief of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff set for it, and which seems to have been unchallenged by the Director or his Executive, would have kept a dozen committees engrossed. If "ICAPS" had come near to accomplishing its declared purposes, several offices and staffs elsewhere in the Government would have been excess baggage. It was to act for the Director in coordinating the intelligence activities of the State, War, and Navy and other Departments. In doing this, it was to assure that the facilities of each Department were ample; that each was covering its proper fields of intelligence, and that its methods, procedures and controls were adequate for the collection, integrated research and evaluation, and dissemination of strategic and national policy intelligence.²

The most optimistic advocate of central intelligence could not have imagined in August, 1946 that the intelligence services of the Departments would tolerate such supervision and control. It would have meant inspection of the most vigorous and persistent nature.

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But there was further discussion on into the afternoon. Should collectors in the field make their reports on duplicating pads or should they not? Should political intelligence be separated in the allocations from economic intelligence? Had they not been bracketed in the State Department for years? Other questions also took time and led to no significant conclusions. They seemed like obstructionist tactics in defense of vested interests.

Mr. Eddy asked for the State Department that the section in the directive to the Group concerning the allocations of primary responsibilities be incorporated in the directive of the Authority. General Vandenberg consented. With it was included the provision that collectors in the field might send copies to their own agencies when they transmitted materials directly to the field representatives of the agencies most concerned.¹

Such a procedure vitiated the distinction between primary responsibility and secondary interest. If both agencies had the same access at practically the same moment, what did it matter if one were considered superior to the other? The procedure was certain, however, to eliminate any coordination or control by the central intelligence organization of the Departments. It is questionable that the Group could even be thought a "cooperative interdepartmental activity" as it was thus passed by and ignored. But then, collection was not yet accepted as a matter of common concern.

Since the Board had adjourned without taking a vote, the final draft of the directive went to the members individually. By the end

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IV/71

1. Montague, L. L. to J. K. Huddle, January 29, 1947
See footnote II/67
2. Shannon, L. T. to D. Edgar, October 14, 21, 1946
(File ICAPS Weekly Reports)

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ITEM 32

IV/72

1. Edwards, S. to D. Edgar, December 31, 1946(S) *Filed in HS Files under ICAPS: Annual Report; also in ICAPS: Weekly Reports*
2. Edwards, S. to D. Edgar for "DCI ONLY," December 31, 1946 (S)
(File ICAPS Weekly Reports) *In HS Files ICAPS Annual Reports also (dupl.)*

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ITEM 33

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ITEM 34

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MacArthur and Admiral Cooke. Vandenberg was in correspondence with General Willoughby [redacted]

[redacted] It was time to make the specifications for the activity within the Communist area.¹

The Office of Reports and Estimates had prepared a draft of the intelligence requirements for China on October 1 at the request of "ICAPS." The Office formulated a tentative policy for the United States under the headings: peace, unity, democracy, non-intervention, rehabilitation, and foreign trade. It laid out the fields of subject matter according to the policies and actions of the three parties concerned: the Central Government, the Chinese Communist Party, and the Soviet Union. A fourth field of intelligence contained developing situations in the strategic areas of China. Under these classifications there were details with regard to trends of policy, military dispositions, industries, crops, and other matters which need not be elaborated here.²

From this beginning "ICAPS" had developed, in conference with another ad hoc committee for the Advisory Board, the draft of a directive to be issued by the National Intelligence Authority. It did not include basic intelligence. It omitted scientific information on the assumption that there would be little in the area. It focused upon current intelligence. Little exception was taken in the Advisory Board's meeting on November 7, except that the text was changed to make the words "essential elements" become "current essentials" and "requirements" give way to "objectives." But General

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IV/41

None

IV/42

1. N.I.A. Directive #5, July 8, 1946 *See footnote IV/6*
2. For Donovan's perception, see above, p. 8 (Ch. I)
For Souers' statement, see above, p. 53-54 (Ch. III)

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and the Branches were in close collaboration. He asked that the Assistant Director call a meeting on April 25 to settle the matter.¹

The rejoinder on April 21 from the Western Branch, which the Chief of the Intelligence Staff did not see, was that he had failed to appreciate the role of the Chiefs of the Geographical Branches. They were more than specialists in the Office at one end of the scale from him at the other. They were authorities in daily contact with the problems of their areas with "the widest possible, coherent overall viewpoints." In comparison, the information of the Intelligence Staff was "only general and necessarily superficial." The rhetorical question was: would the Assistant Director wish to stake his reputation on the former or on the latter type of authority?²

Mr. Huddle left no categorical answer whether he would or he would not, so far as we have yet been able to discover in the files of the Group. He replied to the Chief of the Intelligence Staff on April 23 that the subject had long been considered. He would attempt soon to have the respective authority and responsibility delineated in a general instruction. He did not wish a general discussion of the theme at that time. A pencilled note on a copy of Montague's memorandum of April 17 recorded that no meeting occurred on Friday, April 25, but the matter was discussed on Monday, April 28 in a meeting of the Branch Chiefs. This Montague himself called. His own papers contain the notes of a statement in that meeting to make clear his position. And then he went on a month's temporary duty in Europe.³

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vi

Intelligence and Military Planning

Vandenberg brought the relationship between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Chiefs of Staff before this same meeting of the National Intelligence Authority. The arrangement which had existed between the Office of Strategic Services under General Donovan and the Chiefs of Staff must have been in the minds of all, especially General Marshall who now sat in the chair as Secretary of State. Admiral Leahy too could well remember when he had presided as senior member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and considered opposing plans for a new central intelligence organization. Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal were thoroughly conversant with the origins of the Central Intelligence Group. They had taken part in its construction. All were concerned at the time with the legislation for merging the armed services and establishing the National Security Council.¹

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There had been representation of the State Department, the Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of Strategic Services in the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of

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Central Intelligence Group was designed to represent the interests of the State, War and Navy Departments adequately and equitably. A full-time staff for the Advisory Board, said Vandenberg, implied that the Board would have to act unanimously. Its recommendations could be submitted to the Authority at that time even though a member of the Board did not concur. He urged Inglis to join in sponsoring a study of the problem by "ICAPS" together with the Joint Intelligence Staff. This placed Vandenberg's working committee on a par with the staff of those who were both the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board and of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In the light of subsequent events, there is little doubt that Admiral Inglis appreciated the adroitness of Vandenberg's response.¹

Before Inglis could make another move, "ICAPS" working with Lay, Secretary of the Authority and the Group, had prepared a counterplan. It would establish the Director of Central Intelligence as the chief adviser on intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and therefore rank him above the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Director would meet with the Chiefs of Staff as he sat, without a vote, in the meetings of the National Intelligence Authority. He would submit appropriate matters to the Joint Intelligence Committee of which he should be chairman, as in practice he was presiding officer of the Intelligence Advisory Board.²

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the business of the Central Intelligence Group to find the needs of all and endeavor to satisfy them. This would require an adequate staff, and independent funds; it was extremely difficult to secure the necessary personnel by requisition from the Departments. The Director of Central Intelligence should have the right to hire his own staff. This, he knew, would mean that the Central Intelligence Group should eventually become an agency in the Government established by Act of Congress.¹

~~Secretary Byrnes demurred on the ground that the National Intelligence Authority had been intentionally created to avoid any need for an independent budget. The statement was historically inaccurate. The Authority, composed of the Secretaries, had been conceived as a better institution than the single Director proposed in Donovan's plan. The conception was not involved with the budget. Nor was the question of the budget uppermost when the Army and Navy pushed the Authority to keep the State Department from taking charge under McCormack's plan. But Secretary Patterson agreed with Byrnes and explained that the amount of money spent upon Central Intelligence should be concealed for reasons of security.~~²

General Vandenberg interposed that such considerations ought to be balanced against the administrative difficulties which they caused. For him the important thing was to have an effective and efficient organization. At this point Admiral Leahy, representative of the President, remarked that it had always been understood that

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abroad. It had stated that the briefing should be performed "only by representatives of the Central Intelligence Group." It now provided that the briefing should be done "by the agency making the contacts." If agreeable to the person interviewed, however, a representative of the Group was to be present, and upon request by a participating agency, technical specialists furnished by that agency would also take part.¹

It is wrong to conclude from this restriction by the Advisory Board that the Central Intelligence Group was denied the right of overt collection in this country. What was denied to the Group was the exclusive right of briefing and interrogating. The chance of eliminating competition among the intelligence services of the Government was gone for the time being. Vandenberg might have taken the matter to the National Intelligence Authority. But there was no point in doing so at this stage in the development of overt collection. The Departments were not yet ready to give up their own facilities and rely for such a service of common concern upon the Central Intelligence Group under General Vandenberg.²

The Group was not deprived of the right to have a Contact Branch with field offices for collecting information in this country about foreign countries. The fact that the directive, as finally accepted by the Intelligence Advisory Board on October 1, 1946, did not in so many words grant the right of collection, does not prove that the Group had no right. The directive provided for field representatives of the Group who should maintain liaison with the intelligence officers

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When he returned he found that Huddle had left the Group for a post in the Foreign Service. Admiral Hillenkoetter had become Director of Central Intelligence in place of General Vandenberg. Acting Assistant Director, Captain McCollum, had adopted the new plan of organization for the Office of Reports and Estimates. The Assistant Director was to assume the duties of the Chief of the Intelligence Staff. It was abolished. Its three divisions - Basic Intelligence, Current Intelligence, and an Estimates Group - were responsible to the Assistant Director. But a line ran straight past them from the Branches to his office. On one side, there was space for a "Global Survey Group" in which the Chief of the Intelligence Staff and his¹ deputy were laid to rest.

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v

The Battle with the Board

The Director of Naval Intelligence offered on September 6, 1946 a plan for merging the "static intelligence functions" of the State, War and Navy Departments in the Central Intelligence Group. By "static intelligence" Admiral Inglis meant political, economic, sociological, topographic, and technical information such as composed the Joint Army-Navy Studies, papers prepared for the Joint War Planners of the two Departments, and the Defense Project then under way in the Pentagon. This subject of "common concern" had been discussed before. The chief obstacle in the Group was the lack of personnel and equipment. It made sense to have the work done centrally if for no other reason than to eliminate the waste of public funds upon duplication.¹

The matter came before the Advisory Board on October 1. The representative of the State Department, Mr. Eddy, caused some distraction by declaring that his Department was not willing to turn over to the Group its responsibility for obtaining economic and political intelligence. The representative of the War Department, General Chamberlin, caused more distraction by wondering if it were not possible to "parcel out functions on the basis of primary responsibility." Each would furnish finished intelligence, he said, to others and they could then "rework it to meet their particular needs." In other words, there would be no central operation.

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"educated guess work." But it was impressive as coming from representatives of the Army and Navy and the coordinator of the Defense Project; it has since proved surprisingly accurate. With this substantial evidence before them of the work which the Central Intelligence Group was preparing to do, the Technical Advisors then listened to Dr. H. P. Robertson, scientific consultant of Admiral Souers and General Vandenberg, explain the organization of the Group, discuss the problems in the field of scientific intelligence, and suggest ways of mutual assistance between the Group and the Joint Board.¹

The third meeting of the Technical Advisors on December 6, 7, and 8 brought together General Vandenberg, Allen W. Dulles, and General Donovan for a thorough discussion of foreign intelligence. Unfortunately there was no stenotypist present to make a record of their remarks. From the recollections of a member of the secretariat who was present, we may gather that Mr. Dulles gave his experiences during the war in the Office of Strategic Services at Berne, Switzerland. General Donovan repeated with his usual fervor the principles which he advocated, and the criticisms of the Central Intelligence Group which he had made in the issue of Life for September 30, 1946. He did not like the National Intelligence Authority as a board of control. The Director of Central Intelligence should be responsible directly to the President, with the Secretaries of the Departments serving as advisers and not as superiors of the Director.²

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IV/85

- 1. See above, pp. 48-49 (Ch. III) p. 23 (Ch. IV)
- 2. Huddle, J. K. to D. Edgar, October 1, 1946; TS; no number, (File ICAPS) filed HS under ORE; X-reference under SCAPS

HS/HC-804

ITEM 38

IV/86

- 1. I.A.B. Meeting #10, November 7, 1946 (File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)
- 2. C.I.G. #19, October 30, 1946; TS;
- 3. Vandenberg, H. S. to S. J. Chamberlin, January 23, 1947 (File C.I.G. #19) TS

filed HS
under
"C.I.G. #19 =
NIR/China"

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intelligence was that collected from every available source, both covert and overt, and then verified, appraised, and synthesized in estimates for the benefit of the policy-makers of the Government.¹


After listening to General Vandenberg's statements, Secretary Patterson saw no alternative to approving his request, provided that any aggrieved agency might appeal from his action to the Authority itself through the Secretary of the Department concerned. Vandenberg acknowledged such a right as inherent. Admiral Leahy agreed with Patterson. The change altered only the stress of Leahy's statement in the preceding July. Secretary Forrestal gave his consent. Mr. Eddy, member of the Advisory Board who was also present with Secretary Marshall for the State Department, assumed that normally any directive would have prior discussion by the Board. Vandenberg assented.²


The Authority approved the statement that the Director of Central Intelligence should "operate within his jurisdiction as an agent of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy," and delegated the necessary authority to him so that "his decisions, orders and directives" should have full force and effect as emanating from the Secretaries. Any aggrieved departmental agency might have access to its own Secretary and through him to the Authority.

And then to make General Vandenberg's satisfaction complete the Authority authorized the definition: "Strategic and national policy intelligence is that composite intelligence, interdepartmental in

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Vandenberg with the aid of Admiral Leahy made clear that the Group would not encroach upon the jurisdiction of the Bureau. 



The value of information about foreign countries from American businesses, institutions, and individuals with connections abroad had long been recognized. The problem of correlating and reducing the overlapping efforts of the agencies in the Government with real or fancied interests in the information had not been persistently attacked. Never has Jimmy Durante's universal judgment been more apt. Everybody wanted to get in this act; no one seemed willing to let anyone else do the work for the rest of them. Many of the investigators talked of "exploiting" the businesses. This is a matter of terminology, to be sure; but the usual meaning of the word is sinister. And the behaviour of some interrogators has been of that nature, where as a matter of fact the business under examination was seeking to do the Government a favor, provided that its trade secrets were not divulged to its own enemies or competitors. The attitude of policing rather than inquiry to obtain help has often characterized this activity.²

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The work involved in such periodic and accumulative production was tremendous. If the Office could get the staff for it, he said, the revision and issue of subsequent reports should not be done rigidly month by month. They should be governed by events.

To the suggestion that the Office of Reports and Estimates should assign persons from the several branches to the production of National Intelligence Digests - basic intelligence on the grand scale of the Defense Project in the Pentagon - there was the same answer which Souers had given at the inception of the Project. The Group was not yet ready for the undertaking. Its Office of Reports and Estimates did not have the staff for the work, nor the immediate prospect of obtaining it.¹

The Chief of "ICAPS", however, insisted upon forcing the Office of Reports and Estimates to undertake the enlarged program of production and urged that the Assistant Director set dead-lines. These were so close that they were preposterous. The Office had fifteen key persons in its six regional branches at that time and only two more in prospect, where a total of seventy-seven had been authorized. But this was a relatively minor point in the controversy. The crux of it was that a planning staff was dictating a program worse than unrealistic in terms of possible achievement. It was distorting the original and true purpose of the Office of Reports and Estimates, successor to the Central Reports Staff.²

As soon as equipped, the Office might produce basic intelligence, taking charge of the Defense Project and the Joint-Army-Navy

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strength and equipped only for reporting current intelligence and attempting to synthesize departmental estimates. The Group would have to ask that the intelligence service of the Army should continue to grade these secret materials so essential in the formulation of national estimates.¹

How much longer the Group would have to remain at this disadvantage was unpredictable. By the end of the year, Huddle, Assistant Director in charge of the Office, now called the Office of Reports and Estimates at the request of the Department of State, reported to General Vandenberg that it was still operating at only 20 per cent of its proposed strength. It was not until June, 1947 that the Office of Special Operations began to have a file of evaluations from the Office of Reports and Estimates. And even then the work put a strain upon its facilities.²

After the new Assistant Director, Huddle, came to the Office of Reports and Estimates from the State Department, Montague and his deputy, Van Slyck, remained at the head of the Reports Staff now called the Intelligence Staff. They were to concentrate upon producing the current summaries and the synthesis of national estimates. This was agreeable to them, and it might have been reasonably effective if others in the Office and elsewhere in the Group had been advised that the Intelligence Staff had full authority for those purposes. But there were difficulties with the regional branches of the Office. There was persistent obstruction by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.³

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IV/15

None

IV/16

1. Houston, L. R. to H. S. Vandenberg, June 13, 1946

See above, pp. 54-55 (Ch. III)

See footnote TEL/50

2. See below, pp. 62-64 (Ch. IV)

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IV/97

1. I.A.B. Meeting #8, October 1, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)

See footnote IV/75, also, references in General Counsel's office

IV/98

1. I.A.B. Meeting #10, November 7, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)

Inglis, T. B. to R. H. Hillenkoetter, July 17, 1947; C; in files of JCS, Pentagon, cy in HS, under "CIG - general".
The memorandum of the Chief of Naval Operations was numbered JCS 1569/2. Brigadier General R. C. Partridge gave permission, July 10, 1952, to examine in the Pentagon this series of papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ("Partridge notes" (S) filed under "CIA - Origins / Partridge notes")

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ITEM 40

2. I.A.B. Meeting #10, November 7, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)

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they have no experience in the actual work for which they are planning. At first Vandenberg had some idea of letting those do the planning who would have to do the work. But the idea did not long remain undefiled. The Office of Research and Evaluation was to meet the same sort of interference from the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff that the Central Reports Staff had experienced from the Central Planning Staff.

General Vandenberg issued the order on July 19 that the Office of Research and Evaluation should replace the Central Reports Staff. Montague, acting as Assistant Director of the new office for the time being, was to arrange the details. At practically the same moment, Vandenberg called upon him also to produce its first estimate on the foreign and military policy of the Soviet Union.¹

Preliminary organization of the new office on August 7, 1946 amounted to little more than continuation of the Central Reports Staff with a program for enlargement as funds and personnel became available. There were to be added a Library, an Information Center, and a Plans and Requirements Staff. This staff would do further organizing in consultation with other staffs and branches in the Office. The Information Center was to have charge of receiving the materials of intelligence for the Office and of sending out the products of its research and evaluation. The Library of the Group was to be in the Office of Research and Evaluation at first, presumably to have its resources at hand for the persons with the most use for them. It was moved later to the Office of Collection and Dissemination. The

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The production program which Captain McCollum as Deputy Assistant Director had submitted on May 29 for the Office of Reports and Estimates did not lack the long-range view; nor was it deficient in specification on paper. The Chief of "ICAPS" ordered one of his men to make a tour of inspection in the Office of Reports and Estimates by July 10 to see how it was progressing. The Chief of the defunct Intelligence Staff could look on from the Global Survey Group with perspective, some humor if he chose, and leisure.¹

Throughout this discussion, we should note that the Chief of the Intelligence Staff had not lost sight of the fact that the primary function of the Central Intelligence Group and its subdivisions was to produce national intelligence estimates, the intelligence for "national policy and strategy" which General Donovan had conceived at the start and the framers of the President's Directive of January 22, 1946 had stated explicitly.²

Others lost sight of it or preferred to discount it in considering the importance of departmental activities or the particular concerns of regional and special branches within the Group. To this reversal General Vandenberg himself made some contribution when he insisted upon taking over the function of research and evaluation and greatly enlarging the Group as an independent producing agency. This meant duplication in spite of all protests and intentions to

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IV/3

1. N.I.A. Directive #1, February 8, 1946, p. 1

See footnote III/3

IV/4

See footnote III/1

1. C.I.G. Memorandum #10, June 20, 1946, Appendix "B" p. 7, *filed in HS file under C1910*

2. N.I.A. #4, June 29, 1946 *filed in HS/DET files*
Cunningham, H. F. to Chief, CPS, June 24, 1946,
re Comments on C.I.G. Memorandum #10, June 20, 1946;
filed in HS files in NIA 411, 8 July 1946 (TS) copy 26

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General Vandenberg had not obtained all that he sought in this first endeavor to reorganize the Central Intelligence Group so that the Director might perform "operations and functions" implicit in his duties and responsibilities. But he did have authority now to determine what activities in research and analysis were not being performed adequately, and to centralize them in the Group with the consent of the Department concerned. He could act for the Authority in coordinating all departmental activities in intelligence, though he could not supervise them. He could perform two services of common usefulness; he was to conduct all organized federal espionage and counterespionage abroad for the collection of foreign intelligence and all federal monitoring of the press and broadcasts of foreign powers. He had a clearer statement regarding the allotment of funds from the Departments and the supplemental budget which he desired. He was equipped to go before the National Intelligence Authority on July 17, 1946 in its first meeting since he had taken office and argue there that the Director must have independent funds and the right to hire his own people.¹

In his opening remarks Vandenberg called attention to the conclusions in the Progress Report of Admiral Souers. Vandenberg explained that each intelligence agency was working at the moment along the lines of primary concern to its own Department. The Departments, he said, might be interested in much the same thing, but from different points of view and often with separate purposes. It was therefore

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own purse. Secretary Byrnes undertook to discuss the matter with officials in the Bureau of the Budget and report back to the National Intelligence Authority.¹

General Vandenberg then made a brief report on his progress to date. The Group was about to take over the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, and all clandestine activities in foreign intelligence. He had set up an Office of Special Operations. He expected soon to have in good working order other Offices for Collection, Dissemination, and Research and Evaluation. The Group was receiving requests almost daily to assume other functions now being performed by various committees of the State, War, and Navy Departments.

He was establishing an Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.²

As this significant meeting of the National Intelligence Authority came to an end, it was in the mood of Secretary Patterson who felt that all of General Vandenberg's immediate problems should be solved if the Secretary of State could obtain help from the Bureau of the Budget. Vandenberg put it more explicitly. He needed money, the authority to spend it, the authority to hire and fire. But he must have left the meeting with his mind turning over the remarks of Admiral Leahy.

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IV/95

- 1. Clarke, C. W. to W. M. Adams, September 25, 1946
(File C.I.G. #15)

See footnote IV/92

- 2. Adams, W. M. to D. Edgar, September 27, 1946
(File C.I.G. #15)

See footnote IV/92

IV/96

- 1. N.I.A. Meeting #7, September 25, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's
Office) *for reference, see General Counsel's Office*

Vandenberg, H. S. to A. B. Darling, March 17, 1952
in NS under "CIA"

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- 2. N.I.A. Meeting #7, September 25, 1946; *see General Counsel's
office*

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Daily and Weekly Summaries. The chief of the Staff, Montague, was experienced in strategic intelligence and prepared to establish a national estimating board of representatives from the intelligence agencies of the Departments as soon as qualified persons could be obtained to give their full time.¹

The situation was propitious. But there were dangers. Whenever new personnel began to come, it might arrive too rapidly and in too great number to be properly assimilated into the organization. It might continue to think itself departmental rather than national. The supply of information might prove difficult to get in both quantity and quality from the intelligence agencies of the Departments, the collecting offices of the Group, and elsewhere. It was easy to say that persons and materials should be available at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence. Delivery was another matter.

Quite apart from their personal ambitions and antipathies peculiar to governmental enterprise, there were political encumbrances without and within the Group. The Departments were determined to have equal rights, though they might be remiss in fulfilling their obligations to supply the Group with skilled personnel and adequate facilities. Their mood varied with the importance of an issue to themselves, from wary cooperation to studied reluctance to open warfare. These were meanings never absent from the word "coordination." General Vandenberg deferred to them when he asked the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy to nominate his Assistant Directors.²

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to the Central Intelligence Group, and then the members of the Authority heard General Vandenberg pass quickly over the accomplishments of the Group since his last remarks to them on October 16, 1946 concerning the budget for 1948. Vandenberg concentrated upon his present difficulties.¹

They grew from uncertainty with regard to the "directive authority" of the Director of Central Intelligence. He found it adequately stated in the President's Directive of January 22, 1946 and the fifth directive of the Authority on July 8, 1946. He was to "act for" the Authority in coordinating foreign intelligence activities. The interpretation of the agencies, he said, was coordination "by mutual agreement"; and in some instances this had taken from six to eight months. He requested authority to act as agent for the Secretaries of the Departments. The alternative was that the Central Intelligence Group should forward its directives to the members of the Authority for issuance from their own offices. This would be cumbersome and it would involve great loss of time for all concerned.

The production of "strategic and national policy intelligence" by the Group, its primary purpose as the central intelligence organization of the Government, was further hindered by uncertainty among the agencies over its definition. Vandenberg asked the Authority to approve the definition established in the thinking of the Group ever since it had taken over the ideas of Donovan and Magruder. Such

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IV/73

None

IV/74

1. C.I.G. #13, September 17, 1946 (Enclosure) *in file under*
CTC #13 State Intelligence Functions. — w/RC,
 See above, pp. 14-23 (Ch. III) *job 64-257*

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IV/83

1. For the Dominican affair in 1947 and "Bogota" in 1948, see below, pp. 55, 86-94 (Ch. VI)

IV/84

1. N.I.A. Directive No. 7, January 2, 1947
2. See below, p. 88

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Republic and Costa Rica by August 16, and from Haiti, El Salvador, and Honduras soon thereafter [redacted]

[redacted] A hurried meeting of the National Intelligence Authority, with Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the chair, was held on August 7 to consider Hoover's action. The State Department had understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was obligated to remain in Latin America if necessary, until June 30, 1947. The Authority directed that a letter should go to the Attorney General asking him to keep the personnel of the Bureau in Latin America [redacted]

[redacted] Such a letter went over the signatures of the four members of the Authority. Hoover slowed his withdrawals, but insisted that the Group should not employ men who had been working for the Bureau in Latin America.¹

The episode was not simply a clash of personalities. There was sharp feeling, but that was not all. The Office of Strategic Services had been excluded from operating in the Western Hemisphere. The whole area had been reserved for the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the grounds that the primary concern there had been protection of the United States against subversive practices. It was the field of counterespionage and security intelligence. For the same purposes the Bureau had been allowed liaison stations in Spain, Portugal, France, and Britain. Donovan had sought to remove geographical barriers and to gain world-wide operations. But even in the Office of Strategic Services itself the distinction had been kept between Secret Intelligence

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organizations, and persons in whom it was "primarily interested because of its responsibility in covering Communistic activities within the United States." The issue was beginning to clear.

Mr. Hoover would not be concerned how the Group should check with the Bureau "in connection with contacts made with American business concerns doing business abroad"; normally he would not care either about scientists, students and other private persons travelling abroad. He would be satisfied if the provision relating to "other non-governmental groups and individuals with connections abroad" were eliminated from the directive, so that the Bureau would be free to attend to Communist activities without hindrance.

The tension over "investigations" within the United States rapidly subsided so far as it involved the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Group. Mr. Hoover approved on September 23 the changes which General Vandenberg made at his request. There was no need even to stipulate that the Bureau had the primary interest in foreign nationalities groups within the United States. The statement was stricken from the draft of the directive. Vandenberg reported to the Intelligence Advisory Board on October 1, 1946 that he had reached agreement with Director Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Group would not interfere with the Bureau's control over subversive activities in this country. And so the directive of the Central Intelligence Group with regard to the overt collection of foreign intelligence within the United States

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branches of Eastern Europe and the Middle East were temporarily consolidated. Montague's administrative order expressly stated that the Reports Staff would direct and coordinate the activities of the regional branches in producing strategic and national policy intelligence.¹

The first estimate deserved its fame as "ORE 1." The findings of July 23, 1946 still have significance with regard to Soviet intentions and capabilities. Montague received Vandenberg's request on Friday; he wished to have the estimate on the following Tuesday morning. There was no adequate staff in the Office. The Central Reports Staff had not been able to get from the Departments the persons to put its Estimates Branch into operation. There were not enough available even to assign the editorial assistants needed by the Defense Project. Montague himself was the only one in the Office of Research and Evaluation with extensive experience in estimating. His work on the Joint Intelligence Staff for the Army served him well in this emergency. Fortunately there was material available in reports and papers from the Joint Intelligence Staff as brought up to date in connection with the Defense Project in the Pentagon.²

An ad hoc committee which had undertaken the problem for the Joint Intelligence Staff, was not making use of the material accumulated in the Defense Project. The task came down upon Montague himself, if it were to be done that weekend. He spent Saturday until 9 P.M. and Sunday into Monday at 3 A.M. studying the reports and papers, reading cables from George Kennan in Moscow, drawing the determinant factors together

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Whether or not the heads of the branches felt free to ignore the Chief of the Intelligence Staff because he had been demoted from Acting Assistant Director of the Central Reports Staff in the Souers organization by the Vandenberg administration is one of those personal inquiries which historians are to set aside. Let us not be unaware of it, however, as we pass to the next event in the dispute between the expert in research and the estimator of his product for submission to the policy-maker.

On behalf of the Western Europe Branch and others mentioned but not designated, someone prepared a memorandum on organizational defects in the Office of Reports and Estimates and recommendations for their correction. From internal evidence we may be fairly certain that it was written in February or March, 1947; its ideas had been taking form long since. From the location of the original, it is likely that the memorandum reached the Chief of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff. It may have gone farther to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Perhaps it reached General Vandenberg, though we have no indication that it did. One cannot be confident that the Assistant Director in charge of the Office had a chance to see it. It is certain that the Chief of the Intelligence Staff did not.¹

The memorandum opened with the statement that morale in the branches had been deteriorating for some time because of the Intelligence Staff. It should be disbanded at once and its duties reallocated. "Sound intelligence theory and practice," said the author of the memorandum, required that intelligence should pass directly from the

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expenditures" from the working fund, under the policies established by the Authority. He was to arrange with the Comptroller General the procedures, practices, and controls necessary for proper accounting. Once the allotments from the Departments were in the working fund, Vandenberg had authority and the resources to maintain a staff and facilities for the Central Intelligence Group upon his own responsibility as Director of Central Intelligence. But he still could not be sure that his allotment from a Department would not be cut. He protested to Congressional committees that the Central Intelligence Group should have an independent budget.¹

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Vandenberg, and objections in small detail. But the real cause for hesitance on the part of the military men became obvious with the question from General Chamberlin whether it would be acceptable to the Planners for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He wondered whether they would be willing to let an outside agency know their thoughts. He knew well, in fact, that the Planners would not. It would require orders from higher up to develop such willingness. General Vandenberg knew that too. He suggested further study. General Chamberlin agreed. He would like, he said, to discuss the problem with General Eisenhower.¹

When the Intelligence Advisory Board met on November 7 Admiral Inglis had a new proposal from the Navy. It modified Vandenberg's plan by confining the members in the Joint Intelligence Committee to representatives of the armed services. Thus it eliminated the membership of the State Department, but it left the Director of Central Intelligence as one of the committee and its chairman. Its name would be changed to Joint Intelligence Board. The Joint Intelligence Staff would remain, but without a representative from the State Department. The State Department should have its contact henceforth only through the Intelligence Advisory Board and the National Intelligence Authority. Inglis believed those connections would be adequate for the State Department. He thought also that the Director of Central Intelligence should be responsible to the Authority in peace time and become responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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"senior U. S. representative" be used. Reference to theater commanders should be omitted, because coordination in occupied areas was temporary. They listened to another division of intelligence into categories, this one by the representative of the Army. The name was different, but the nature of the category seemed much the same: "factual" took the place of "basic"; "current" did not change, but "staff" replaced "departmental." The production of "strategic and national policy intelligence," so essential to the policy makers of the Government, did not enter the discussion. One cannot escape the conclusion that the representatives of the Departments were not present to advance the case for the Director of Central Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Group.¹

The draft of "ICAPS" as modified by the ad hoc committee and without the supplementary directive of the Group went to the Intelligence Advisory Board on December 17 in what proved to be its last meeting with General Vandenberg as Director of Central Intelligence. He explained why the directive for the Group had not been submitted to the Board. The ad hoc committee had gone over it with "ICAPS." Directives within the Group did not require the approval of the Intelligence Advisory Board. The recommendations of their ad hoc committee had been accepted. There should be no further need for extensive discussion. The State Department's request was urgent. The directive of the Authority regarding collection should be completed and put into effect.²

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IV/77

1. C.I.G. #18, October 25, 1946 (c) *in HS files (Coord - Colbr Activities)*
Eddy, W. A. to DCI, October 18, 1946

For scientific intelligence, see below, pp. 103-111,
62-72 (Ch. VI)

2. C.I.G. #18/1, October 28, 1946

IV/78

1. See preceding footnote

See footnote IV/74 (1)

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completed but awaiting approval, others nearing completion, and still others in the "planning stages." Anyone experienced in the ways of governmental reporting would know at a glance that "ICAPS" had neither instituted nor planned nor completed these undertakings alone. But the report itself admitted that some of the work had been done by other offices in the Group. What "ICAPS" contributed was called "guidance." Its participation, though claimed, could not even be called guidance in the case of the establishment of the Contact Branch in the Office of Operations.¹

The Chief of the Interdepartmental Coordination and Planning Staff was on much surer ground when he considered the difficulties which the Staff encountered in endeavoring to plan and coordinate with the Departments for the Director of Central Intelligence. These were the difficulties which General Donovan, General Magruder, Colonel McCormack, Admiral Souers, and others had experienced whenever they sought to bring the intelligence officers of the Departments together. These men seemed not to understand each others problems. They did not like to turn "operational" information over to civilians. They shied away from the centralization of common functions. They deplored but they did little to eliminate duplication of effort. They were unwilling to give up their own activities. They came to interdepartmental meetings poorly prepared to discuss matters which had been for some time on the agenda. And there were frequent changes in announced policy. Any concurrence which had been approached was then no longer valid. The whole negotiation went back to the beginning.²

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Admiral Inglis answered the objection of the State Department by stating that he was talking about processing, not collection. He might have recalled to General Chamberlin, Langer's point in the meeting of June 28 that any distinctions between primary and secondary interests were extremely difficult. But the Board rambled on, discussing whether the Departments wished to conduct the Group as a "middle man" and whether or not one Department used the same kind of political and economic intelligence as another.

Admiral Inglis reduced it to simple terms. Each Department should retain its own operational intelligence. It should supply the raw materials of static intelligence to the Group, which would do the processing very much like a publishing house, and turn the product over to the Departments. They could then put it in a different "final form," if so desired by their "customer," and assume the responsibility for its dissemination. The Advisory Board, however, came to no conclusion at this meeting. A special committee was to make further study of the problem for the Director and the Board.¹

This committee of personal representatives met on October 8. It too ranged the fields of intelligence near and far from the question at issue: should the Central Intelligence Group undertake to produce basic intelligence for the Departments from materials supplied by their intelligence services? The Office of Naval Intelligence offered to transfer its personnel engaged in strategic intelligence to the Central Intelligence Group if other agencies participated in similar fashion. But the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department

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IV/7

None

IV/8

1. For the "Russell Plan" of February 25, 1946 in the State Department, see the Historical Collection. (File 6.05 R&E); *filed in HS files under 055: Russell Plan "Ins. + Org., ORI"*

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IV/89

1. See above, p. 77

See above, p. 41 (Ch. I), p. 31 (Ch. II)

Montague, L. L. to Chief, ICAPS, October 28, 1946, *no classif. shown; filed "ICAPS", H S files; copy in "O.R."*

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2. For Leahy's statement see above, p. 17

ITEM 39

IV/90

1. N.I.A. Meeting #9, February 12, 1947
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office); *see files in office of General Counsel*

2. C.I.G. #24, March 12, 1947; C; *in NS files under "IAB: Suggested Procedures"*
N.I.A. Directive #11, September 16, 1947; C; *filed "IAB: Sug. Proc."*
For Hillenkoetter see below, pp. 10-23 (Ch. VI)

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IV/91

1. For Marshall and Donovan see above, p. 23 (Ch. I)

For Leahy, Patterson and Forrestal see above, pp. 10-11
(Ch. II)

See below, pp. 2-3 (Ch. V)

IV/92

1. See above, p. 11 (Ch. II)

2. C.I.G. #15, September 18, 1946; C; in US files under
"C.I.G. channel w/ JCS"

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But, of course, no realist in the business, perhaps not even the Chief of "ICAPS", anticipated that he could subject the Departments to such control. The members of the Staff were to confer, to discuss, to propose plans and measures, to engage in liaison with the intelligence officers of the Departments.

The Chief of "ICAPS" intended to exercise a much more effective right of inspection and direction within the Group. He instructed himself to maintain continuous supervision over the planning and coordination of its intelligence activities. And General Vandenberg, who had given the impression at first that he would let the offices do their own organizing and policy-making subject to his approval, seems to have put no check upon the internal activities of "ICAPS." In any case, it was allowed the right of constant inquiry and suggestion, if not dictation, to other offices with regard to their "policies, plans and procedures."¹

The Chief of "ICAPS" at once sent a memorandum to the heads of the Offices of Collection, Research, and Evaluation, and Dissemination requesting information on the Peace Conference scheduled to open in Paris on July 28. What steps had been taken by the State, War and Navy Departments to provide reports? What steps had been taken to disseminate the information when it had arrived in Washington? The offices should consult with agencies of the Departments, find out, and report to "ICAPS." Why the Chief did not send his inquiries on behalf of the Group directly to the intelligence officers of the Departments is a fair question. General Vandenberg had established "ICAPS" to work with the Intelligence Advisory Board.²

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to overt action. The Soviet objective was to prevent the use of China, Korea, or Japan as bases of attack upon the Soviet Far East, and so the Soviet Union sought an influence in those countries at least equal to that of the United States.

The military policy of the Soviets was to maintain an armed force, primarily large masses of ground troops, capable of assuring security and supporting foreign policy against any combination of hostile powers. The Soviets were impressed with Anglo-American strategic air power and sought accordingly to create fighter defense and long-range bombing forces; they would obtain as quickly as possible guided missiles and the atomic bomb. The estimate advised too that they had it within their power to develop a considerable submarine force.¹

This was a masterly demonstration of what could be done by a single person in correlating, evaluating, and producing strategic intelligence. It was coordination too of a sort, but not the kind that Montague wished to have. From his experience on the Joint Intelligence Staff for the Army, he had proposed that full-time assistants in the Central Reports Staff should both represent their respective Departments and work with the chief of the Reports Staff at the same time upon the syntheses of departmental intelligence to produce national estimates. The chief might have the decision which would be the estimate of the Group when approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. But substantial dissents from that estimate would be submitted with it to the policy-makers, as stipulated in the first directive of the Authority.²

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Even if the State Department had been willing to allow the Group to engage in extensive evaluation of geographical, economic, and social factors, which was most unlikely, such an undertaking would have required a staff and equipment beyond existing facilities of the Group or any that it could hope to obtain from the Departments of State, War and the Navy for some time to come. Though possessed of the whole right, General Vandenberg would not have been able to use it. He would have had still to rely, as he believed he could not, upon the evaluated intelligence from the Departments to supplement the information which the Group obtained for itself from its collecting offices.

If the Group had taken no part of the function of research and analysis, so runs another argument, there would have been no investigation anywhere that would have been adequate for the production of strategic intelligence. The State Department had abandoned the McCormack plan to concentrate research and analysis and had dispersed it among the geographical divisions of the Department. The War and the Navy Departments were engaged in nothing like the work of the old Branch in the Office of Strategic Services. Though respecting the scholarship evident in the armed services, one must concede that it was present in neither the amount nor the steady application to research and analysis that were essential to the production of national estimates.¹

The Defense Project, inspired by Colonel Lovell in the War Department, was a huge undertaking of great moment. But it was

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a realistic appraisal of eventualities without knowing the capabilities and intentions of its own side. The board should know at least as much as the enemy is likely to know. There ought to be no real dilemma caused by civilian participation in the formulation of war plans. After all, the Secretaries of the Departments themselves by tradition are civilians. It can hardly be said that they should be kept in ignorance of war plans.

General Vandenberg accepted the principles declared by Chamberlin for Eisenhower, but said that the Central Intelligence Group proposed to have a "watertight compartment" for military secrets. The war planners should have the best intelligence available; the Group therefore should work closely with the planners. The talk went on and on but reached no conclusion. General Chamberlin disavowed personal opposition to Vandenberg, but doubted the wisdom of mixing with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the head of an agency which reported to civilian authority. That is to say, the National Intelligence Authority consisting of the three Secretaries and Admiral Leahy was a civilian authority. So was the President, although the Constitution made him Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and the State militia when called into the Federal service.

Admiral Inglis observed that the Director of Central Intelligence reported to the National Intelligence Authority, and so Inglis would assign additional duties to the Director for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But he did not discuss the fact that the Authority was made

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IV/45

1. C.I.G. Directive #11, July 19, 1946; C. in HS files under C.I.G. Directive #14, in ICAP's files, A/R, Feb 64-65

IV/16

HS/HC-804

1. O.R.E. Administration Order #1, August 7, 1946; C ITEM 17/14 under ORE: Admin order #1 (Reing: ORE)
2. O.R.E. #1, July 23, 1946, Soviet Foreign and Military Policy, Copy #37, TS, unnumbered

Review of Formal Reports and Estimates Produced under the Central Intelligence Group and Agency, 1946-mid-1948, Paper No. 12, by G. S. Jackson, November 26, 1952, p. 2, TS: see Jackson papers in HS files; TS

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political, cultural, sociological, economic and international matters; to the War and Navy Departments, their respective military and naval concerns; and scientific intelligence to each agency according to its particular interests. A specific list was constructed to fix the allotments and reduce misunderstandings and conflicts of interest to a minimum.

Admiral Inglis commended "ICAPS" for its fine paper, but wished to have another week to study it. General Vandenberg asked if it might not be approved as a guide. The controversial parts might be set aside to be considered later. He felt that there should be no further delay. General Chamberlin too praised the paper; but he still wished to assign fields of primary responsibility for activities besides those of collection. He thought that ambassadors as political officers went abroad without training in intelligence; certain principles should be defined for their guidance. And so, the Board agreed to have another ad hoc committee which should study with "ICAPS" and bring back another report to the Board. A companion piece should also be prepared on the coordination of production and dissemination of intelligence. By this time any idea which Vandenberg may have had that "ICAPS" was the representative working staff of the Advisory Board in the Group, must have left him.¹

The ad hoc committee and "ICAPS" met on December 3, 1946. They defined "area" to mean a country which had a station of the Foreign Service. They recommended that the word "coordinator" be dropped and

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to have a trained officer from the Group placed in the message center of each Department, to review and transmit under necessary restrictions those items which had value for intelligence. Secretary Patterson thought such an arrangement could be made. Vandenberg could have added that he was obtaining secret intelligence through the Office of Special Operations which he might have received from the War Department's "G-2". The inference that it was deliberately withheld is unavoidable.¹

Against this sharp background Vandenberg pointed out that the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was duplicating work of the Central Intelligence Group. The coordinating activities of the Committee often conflicted with similar activities of the Group. The studies of the Committee got priority in the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments because the Chiefs of Staff were the immediate superiors of the heads of those agencies. It had been suggested, he said, that the Group should be combined with the Joint Intelligence Staff. Secretary Patterson responded that he saw no reason why the Staff should not be disbanded. Admiral Leahy agreed with Patterson and remarked that he had so stated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²

This was the situation as the Intelligence Advisory Board met on October 1, 1946. It is hard to believe that the departmental chiefs of intelligence present had not heard in fairly accurate terms what Vandenberg had said at the meeting of the Authority on September 25. There were random comments upon the plan offered by

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restricted Vandenberg's direction and control over research and analysis, the Departments of War and the Navy insisted now upon revising the draft of this directive on overt collection. The Navy had a register of its own. In April, when Vandenberg had been chief of intelligence on the General Staff, the Army had appeared to favor "central control of contacts"; it would eliminate the confusion and embarrassment when two or more agencies tried to use a source of information simultaneously. That practice was, moreover, annoying to those who were interviewed. But in August, the Military Intelligence Division opposed the idea that the Central Intelligence Group should have control of the register.¹

Kingman Douglass summed up the contentions and desires of the armed services, and the situation for Vandenberg on August 26, as they prepared to meet the Intelligence Advisory Board. The Army and Navy had not liked the powers of direction and supervision delegated to the Director of Central Intelligence in the original draft; these were functions of their own Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff. To remove their obstruction on this account, the words "direct" and "supervise" and "control" had been taken from the directive. The word "coordination" now stood alone and untrammelled, though it was hard to perceive how there could have been coordination without at least some supervision of the collecting agencies. The services had to be satisfied too that the Director would not have final authority in requisitioning military and naval personnel and facilities.

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IV/75

- 1. I.A.B. Meeting #8, October 1, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)

*See Reference in General Counsel's Office
Cypps-9, In HS Files under CIG Establishment of National CIG/SCS (S)*

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ITEM 35

IV/76

- 1. See above, p. 20 (Ch. III)

Edgar, D. to Assistant Director, ORE, October 2, 1947
(File ICAPS) *Progress + Prod. ORE. No classification*

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ITEM 36

The "Defense Project," First Post-War Experiment in Cooperative
Interdepartmental Intelligence Production, Paper No. 3, by
G. S. Jackson, May 20, 1952; *Hist. Colln., Jackson Papers*

- I.A.B. Meeting #8, October 1, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)

See footnote IV/75 and reference in Gen. Counsel's Office.

- 2. I.A.B. Meeting #9, October 31, 1946,
Gen. Counsel's Office
See above, pp. 49-51

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ITEM 37

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If Vandenberg and his assistants could prevent it, their endeavor in collecting foreign intelligence by clandestine means was not to gain the reputation for "free wheeling" and self-exposure which he ascribed to the Office of Strategic Services.¹

Schedules were established in July and arrangements made for taking over the personnel, undercover agents, and foreign stations of the Strategic Services Unit during the fall. On September 12, Vandenberg notified the Secretary of War that all activities of "SSU" would end as of October 19. There were delays in clearance for reasons of security. There was a shortage of persons to do the clerical work involved. By April 11, 1947, however, the services of all civilians had been terminated. Military personnel had been transferred or reassigned. Foreign missions and stations had ceased to be installations of "SSU." There were funds adequate to meet outstanding obligations. Some claims and inquiries would continue, a few indefinitely, but persons on duty with the Central Intelligence Group were familiar with them. Colonel Quinn had completed the liquidation of the Strategic Services Unit.²

Colonel Galloway applied himself to European affairs as the United States and Britain economically joined their zones in Germany. Captain Goggins concentrated upon the Far East and left soon for Tsing Tao, where he arranged with the Commander of the Seventh Fleet to support the old mission of the Office of Strategic Services, known as External Survey Detachment #44. This, General Vandenberg had been

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This was a fair record of accomplishment within six months since the establishment of the Office. By the middle of January, when "ICAPS" offered its criticism, the Office at the direction of General Vandenberg was undertaking also to make oral presentations of the world situation weekly to the personnel of the Group and visitors from other intelligence agencies. One participant has recalled that it became customary in the Group to estimate from the attendance who were the most idle. Attendance from "ICAPS", he said, was "exceptionally faithful."¹

Now that the Office was under fire from "ICAPS," the Chief of the Intelligence Staff wrote again to his Assistant Director on January 29, 1947 to counter the interpretation by "ICAPS" of the adequacy survey. The impression is strong from an examination of the survey itself that the Chief of the Intelligence Staff read the report more accurately than his opponent. Comments upon the summaries had been complimentary for the most part; there had been no demand for a substantial change in them. There was no reason to distinguish the President from his Secretaries and their intelligence officers as recipients of the reports from the Central Intelligence Group.²

The Chief of the Intelligence Staff accepted the idea of "situation reports." Their origin from a request of the Navy was in fact separate from the criticism of "ICAPS"; they had much to be said for them as another form of knowledge between basic intelligence and current information. But the resources of the Office were still inadequate.

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

*The Central Intelligence Agency
An Instrument of Government, to 1950*

*Chapter IV The Central Intelligence Group
Vandenberg's Regime*

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
HS-1, chap. IV
December 1953

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Douglass

and Jackson were to learn if General Sibert, chief of intelligence on General McNarney's staff, could be assigned to the Central Intelligence Group. The thought was that General Sibert should become the Deputy Director under Vandenberg, and eventually might succeed him as Director of Central Intelligence. Sibert was to have charge of all collection, both clandestine and overt.²

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IV/13

- 1. C.I.G. Memorandum #10, June 20, 1946 *in His files under*
c.g. Index of Orders-Memoranda (TS)
 N.I.A. Directive #5, July 8, 1946 *in His files (TS)*

See above, p. 29 (Ch. III)

See footnote II/1

See footnote II/6

IV/14

- 1. Minutes of N.I.A. Meeting #4, July 17, 1946
 (File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's
 Office)

See above, pp. 27-32 (Ch. III) pp. 40-44 (Ch. II)

- 2. See above, pp. 55-56 (Ch. I) pp. 18-26 (Ch. II)

See footnote II/4

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functions stipulated in the program of cooperation between the Central Intelligence Group and the Joint Research and Development Board.¹

Meanwhile the Authority at its meeting on February 12 heard a brief report by Secretary Patterson upon the arrangement for the Atomic Energy Commission to retain the information concerning uranium deposits and approved the transfer of the files and personnel in the intelligence division of the "Manhattan Engineer District" to the Central Intelligence Group. The transfer was completed on February 18. The directive which authorized the Director of Central Intelligence, however, to coordinate all intelligence related to foreign developments of atomic energy was not issued until April 18, 1947.²

Those who were transferred from the "Manhattan Engineer District" to the Central Intelligence Group became the Nuclear Energy Group in the Scientific Branch of the Office of Reports and Estimates on March 28. They were instructed to conduct and coordinate research and evaluation of nuclear intelligence. They were to prepare estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries in the field of nuclear energy. They were to represent the Director of Central Intelligence in dealing with the Atomic Energy Commission, to attend to its needs for intelligence and as it should specify, to be the point of contact between the Commission and intelligence agencies of the Government. This was a very large order. How it was fulfilled, will be discussed in subsequent chapters.³

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IV/87

1. Vandenberg, H. S. to S. J. Chamberlin, January 23, 1947
See footnote IV/86(3)
For the President's Directive, see above, p. 53 (Ch. II)

IV/88

1. N.I.A. Meeting #9, February 12, 1947
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office) *See general Counsel's Office for reference*

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The Chief requested on August 5 that the Office of Research and Evaluation undertake a general study of the periodic and special reports of the intelligence agencies of the Government. Upon receipt of the request, the Office was to inform "ICAPS" of the date when the study would be completed. Montague had just produced "ORE 1" between a Friday and a Tuesday, but he was hardly familiar enough with all of the intelligence reports, both periodic and special, by all of the agencies of the Government, to answer offhand when he would complete the study of their "general content and scope" - if it had been within his province to do so. He replied on August 9 that the task fell within the jurisdiction of the Office of Dissemination which had already issued one directive upon the subject.¹

There were other attempts on the part of "ICAPS" to keep the Office of Research and Evaluation (Reports and Estimates) "on its toes." The Executive to the Director stopped one memorandum asking it for a report on a lurid story out of China. But the effort to manage its program of production succeeded. In this, there seems to have been an understanding if not agreement with those in the branches of the Office who opposed its Intelligence Staff with regard to estimating.²

The Office of Dissemination had begun a study of the Daily and Weekly Summaries at the end of July to determine if they met the requirements of the President and others who received them. There was question whether they should not be divided according to recipients

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character, which is required by the President and other high officers and staffs to assist them in determining policies with respect to national planning and security in peace and in war and for the advancement of broad national policy. It is in that political-economic-military area of concern to more than one agency, must be objective, and must transcend the exclusive competence of any one department."¹

It would seem as though these decisions should have been final. They were not. Admiral Inglis, for one, persisted in taking the first directive of the Authority literally. The Intelligence Advisory Board should have "all recommendations" of the Director for study and concurrence or dissent, prior to submission to the National Intelligence Authority. If Inglis had his way, the Board would govern the Director even though he was the executive agent of the Secretaries and "his decisions, orders and directives" had force and effect as emanating from them. Admiral Hillenkoetter inherited a bitter controversy from General Vandenberg.²

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Opportunity came in October to restore the arrangement which had been provided on paper for the Central Reports Staff. Admiral Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence, objected to the fact that "ORE 1" gave no indication that the intelligence agencies or the Departments had concurred prior to its dissemination. There was no issue with Montague. He agreed. The point was that the permanent members of the Intelligence Advisory Board represented those agencies. Inglis maintained that, in approving the estimates of the Group, the Board should employ the voting system used by the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.¹

What Admiral Inglis was seeking to entrench was the exclusive right of each Department to give its concurrence or dissent through the chief of its intelligence service. He wished to have the Daily and Weekly Summaries of the Office of Research and Evaluation, its factual publications, distinguished from its formal estimates. These should not be left to the judgment of the Navy men in the Office; they should be reported severally to the Chief of Naval Intelligence. He should have at least two or three days to consider each paper. Inglis was willing in case of delay to let the estimate go forward with a statement that the dissent, or concurrence, should follow from the Department. He was willing to have a part-time representative of the Navy assigned to the estimating staff. But that officer, he said, should be only a "messenger" to the Office of Naval Intelligence. He should not exercise the right of dissent.²

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There were decided opinions for and against the compromise between the Director and the Advisory Board. One extreme view was that he should have left research and evaluation entirely with the Departments. But if he had done so, any office which he might have created in the Group to bring their products together would have been no more than a stapling device to put the departmental papers in one bundle. There would have been no analysis of the materials. There could hardly have been synthesis into a national estimate. That job would have been left to the policy-makers, as the Director of Central Intelligence was not supposed to leave it.

Another view was that he should have insisted upon taking over the function as a whole from the Department of State, which had received the Research and Analysis Branch from the Office of Strategic Services. If Vandenberg had been allowed to do so, any work of that nature remaining in the State, War, or Navy Departments, and elsewhere, would have been merely a limited service, to verify and support the information which the Department had received. The Central Intelligence Group would have had the task of doing the research into underlying geographical, economic, and social factors for all of the Departments and agencies of the Government interested in intelligence. The Group would have rendered them a common service. It would have supplied itself with the requisite materials for producing "strategic and national policy intelligence" as directed by the National Intelligence Authority.

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IV/19

- 1. See above, pp. 6-7, 14-15 (Ch. II)

IV/20

- 1. Administrative Order #53, January 20, 1947 *filed HS, CIG: asst officials*
(File CIG 6.03)


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Wright, E. K. to A. B. Darling, April 10, 1953; *TS, in HS files under CIA*

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
Jackson, W. H. to A. B. Darling, March 15, 1952, *interview; TS in HS files under OSS*

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The full results of the Douglass-Jackson mission in August, 1946 did not come until later in the administration of the Central Intelligence Agency by General Smith. But the report at the time had value for the Group under General Vandenberg. It showed the ineffectiveness of the Strategic Services Unit in competition with the intelligence services of the Army, Navy, and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

There was need for a single collecting agency



Douglass and Jackson returned with a careful description of the Joint Intelligence Board which had been organized



The Board has been called the first institution of its kind actually to administer services

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IV/57

- 1. Some Considerations of Organizational Defects Imposing Qualitative and Quantitative Restrictions on the Output of Intelligence Material in Office of Reports and Estimates, and Recommendations for Their Correction.

Simons, G. P. to S. A. Dulany Hunter, April 15, 1947
 (Historical Collection)

Controversy, Intel Staff, Res, 1947, memo 15 Apr 47
 Montague, L. L. to A. B. Darling, June 11, 1952 *not found in moment*

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- 1. See the preceding footnote

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IV/99

None

IV/100

1. For the National Intelligence Authority, see above, pp. 53-54 (Ch. II)
2. N.I.A. Meeting #9, February 12, 1947
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office) *see General Counsel's office*

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VOL. IV

- 1. C.I.G. Memorandum #10, June 20, 1946 *filed in HS/DCI files under C.I.G. #10 in C.I.G. Index 7 others - memoranda*
- Souers, S. W. to A. B. Darling, April 16, 1952 *in HS/DCI file under C.I.G. Souers / Darling interviews*
- Leahy, W. D. to A. B. Darling, July 3, 1952, TS; *in HS files under "C.I.G."*
- Vandenberg, H. S. to A. B. Darling, March 17, 1952, TS; *filed in HS, under C.I.G.*

2. Minutes of I.A.B. Meeting #3, April 8, 1946
 The Minutes of the Intelligence Advisory Board and of the National Intelligence Authority are in a collection kept by the General Counsel's Office;
(Darling's footnotes say "see referred in the Historical Collection")

IV/2

- 1. N.I.A. Directive #1, February 8, 1946, p. 1
 See above, pp. 39-42 (Ch. I), p. 3 (Ch. III)

- 2. Vandenberg, H. S. to A. B. Darling, March 17, 1952 HS/HC-800
filed as an interview, under CIA VOL. IV

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have ruined the Board itself. The requirement that the Director must consult regarding activities of "common, but secondary" interest placed him at the mercy of the intelligence officers in the Departments. Under such conditions, there would be very few instances where they thought an activity so secondary that it could be wholly relinquished to the Central Intelligence Group. We are to hear more of this requirement later.¹

Vandenberg well understood the meaning of the "turmoil" over his proposals. He regretted that the original version had caused it. He accepted revisions designed to make the research and analysis in the Group supplementary to the work of the Departments. He discarded altogether the stipulation that departmental funds, personnel, and facilities would be "integrated" into the Group. His primary purpose, he told the Board, was to get the staff necessary to do the job of assisting the Departments of State, War, and the Navy. He wished to find where their intelligence activities stopped short; he wanted to meet the deficiencies and fill the gaps. But he did not give up his intention to have the Central Intelligence Group engage in the initial research and analysis requisite to the production of "strategic and national policy intelligence."²

As he spoke for the Department of State, Dr. Langer must have had memories of the Research and Analysis Branch in the Office of Strategic Services. Then, research and analysis had been closely tied with clandestine collection. The Branch had been both guide

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over seizing the advantage of the surprise attack. The thought of a "Pearl Harbor" with atomic weapons was shattering.

General Donovan urged retaining the Office of Strategic Services as the permanent system of foreign intelligence because all nations would increase their secret activities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff too understood, though they did not care to perpetuate the Donovan regime. Admiral Souers took the initiative soon after the Central Intelligence Group had been established, to coordinate scientific intelligence with the Office of Scientific Research and Development. He directed the Central Planning Staff to look into the problem. He obtained Dr. H. P. Robertson as his scientific consultant. The Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy through their coordinating committee, predecessor of the National Security Council, investigated Japanese research in nuclear energy and deliberated upon policy with regard to controlling it as the atomic tests against naval vessels were made at Bikini in the summer of 1946. On August 1, Congress passed the act creating the Atomic Energy Commission.¹

Anticipating that the Commission would take over the "Manhattan Engineer District" from the War Department, General Vandenberg had a directive prepared to place within the jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Group those intelligence activities which were related to foreign developments of atomic energy. Vandenberg knew from his experience with the fifth directive in July that his plan would never get by the Intelligence Advisory Board with the phrases in it regarding

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IV/109

1. I.A.B. Meeting #10, November 7, 1946, pp. 4-6
(File NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office) *see reference in General Counsel's office.*
2. Minutes of the Meeting of the Technical Advisors to the Policy Council, December 12, 1946 C; *filed in HS under J.R.D.B.: Tech. Adv. to Pol. Council*

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ITEM 44

IV/110

1. Agreement of H. S. Vandenberg and V. Bush, January 10, 1947; S; *filed HS; under C19: J.R.D.B.-C19 Coop Sci Intell.*

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ITEM 45

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only in time of war. It was evident then, as he admitted later, that Admiral Inglis had been in touch with higher authority in the Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations proposed a similar plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 9.¹

General Chamberlin brought to the meeting of the Advisory Board on November 7 five principles from his discussion with General Eisenhower. He too had misgivings about civilian participation in the committees of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It must remain essentially a military agency. But he would hesitate, as Admiral Inglis and his superiors apparently would not, to change the existing arrangements for coordination with the Department of State. The second fundamental in Eisenhower's thinking, said Chamberlin, was that the Director of Central Intelligence had duties beyond the scope of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; this fundamental should be observed. Third, there should be no obstacle between the President and the Chiefs of Staff in wartime. Fourth, no civilian agency should be interpolated between the Chiefs of Staff and their agencies engaged in making war plans. Fifth, and of the same nature, no agencies which were not strictly military should have access to military plans.²

To an outsider, this appears to be the continuing problem of today even though the interpolating agency, "CIA", is controlled and manned, in large part, by men of military experience. The plans upon which a commander bases his estimate of probable success have to be jealously guarded. And yet no estimating board can give him

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logical end of its career and should go out of existence, much as the Office of Strategic Services and other wartime agencies had done. He himself and members of the old organization were willing to stay at the request of the Secretaries and carry on those functions and programs of the Office which were considered worthwhile.¹

The new Joint Board was not exactly a continuation of the old Office. The Board was to be more concerned with planning than with operations which had engaged so much of the Office's time. The Office had been an independent executive agency like the Office of Strategic Services, the Foreign Economic Administration, and others which had been closely associated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff from policy-making to working levels. The new Joint Board was directly responsible to the Secretaries of War and the Navy. The old Office had collected intelligence with regard to foreign activities in science, as had the "Manhattan Engineer District." The new Joint Board was interested in arranging with the new Central Intelligence Group for its intelligence while it concentrated upon its planning for the Army and the Navy.

It was in this spirit that the Technical Advisors of the Joint Research and Development Board held a preliminary meeting on October 23, 1946. At their next meeting, November 20, they had an estimate from the Office of Reports and Estimates to read and consider on the capabilities of the Soviet Union for developing the atomic bomb, guided missiles, heavy bombers, fighters, radar, and submarines during the next ten years. It was, as it said, at best

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National Intelligence Authority were also the superiors of the Chiefs of Staff. It was possible that the Secretaries might employ the Director as their adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff upon matters of intelligence.¹

In further conversation Colonel Clarke remarked for himself that the Joint Intelligence Committee should be abolished, though one good reason for keeping it was its relationship with the British committee. Clarke believed that the Director of Central Intelligence should be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and he felt sure that General Eisenhower would agree. Clarke was doubtful of the Navy. If the Director of Central Intelligence were included with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he said, the Central Intelligence Group would then be in an echelon above the Joint Intelligence Committee. In that case there would be little use for the Joint Intelligence Committee apart from the Intelligence Advisory Board. The permanent membership was identical.²

At this juncture on September 25, 1946 Vandenberg took the matter before the National Intelligence Authority. First of all he set the scene by stating plainly that the Central Intelligence Group could not produce national intelligence unless it had all of the information available to the Government. He was getting complete coverage, he thought, from the State Department and the Navy; but he was not obtaining access to the President's messages, General Marshall's, nor the War Department's "OPD eyes only" messages. He would like

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and Counterespionage. It was not until Magruder took over the Strategic Services Unit that the two functions began to merge.¹

They were consolidated in the Foreign Security Reports Office preparatory to incorporation in the Office of Special Operations of the Central Intelligence Group. But there still remained the habit of thought that counterespionage was a defensive measure against subversion; it was counterintelligence rather than aggressive intelligence, a safety device rather than a weapon of attack. To those accustomed to think of it in such terms, counterespionage or security intelligence should continue to be the business of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, especially in those geographical areas where the agents of the Bureau were established.

General Vandenberg did not think so. It was his conviction that as head of the national intelligence agency, he could not do his job if some other organizations were engaged in the same work. One was likely to expose the other. In his opinion, Hitler's system of intelligence had been easy to penetrate because the parts of it so often interfered with each other. Either Vandenberg or Hoover should withdraw from the field. Since the National Intelligence Authority in its fifth directive, July 8, 1946, had decided that the Director of Central Intelligence was to conduct all organized Federal espionage and counterespionage, the Federal Bureau of Investigation should give way to the Central Intelligence Group in Latin America.²

The Federal Bureau of Investigation interfered in another activity assigned to the new Office of Special Operations until General

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IV

The Central Intelligence Group
Vandenberg's Regime

The new Director of Central Intelligence brought to the Group the prestige of high rank in the Army, prominence before the public, forthright determination to take responsibility. Lieutenant General Vandenberg and Admiral Souers agreed that the time had come when the Group should perform certain operations in the national system of intelligence. The initial organization and planning had been done. It was time to develop the power latent in the duties which the President had assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence.¹

Experiences of the past six months on the Intelligence Advisory Board had convinced General Vandenberg that if he were to fulfil those duties, he must be able to get the persons necessary for his work without having to wait upon the will of the Departments to supply them. He must have "operating funds" which he could expend as he chose without dependence upon or accountability to some other agency. He was certain that the Central Intelligence Group could not meet its primary obligation to produce strategic intelligence unless it had better arrangements for collecting the raw materials of such intelligence. It must have the means to conduct the initial research and analysis necessary for the production of estimates. The Group should not have to rely entirely upon the contribution of the Departments.²

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IV/65

1. Edgar, D. to Acting Assistant Director, Office of Research and Evaluation (Publication Review File, ITEM 26 CIG Weekly and Daily) & August 1946 (c) Filed in NS File under ICAPS, Relation with ORE
Office of Dissemination, Dissemination Study No. 1, July 31, 1946 Filed in NS Files under ICAPS ^{Relation} with ORE
HS/HC-804
ITEM 26
2. Edgar, D. to E. K. Wright, January 7, 1947 (File 6.05 R&E) Filed in NS Files under ICAPS, Relation with ORE.
HS/HC-804
ITEM 27

IV/66

1. Edgar, D. to Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates, January 13, 1947 (c) In NS Files under ICAPS
Progress & Prod. for ORE
HS/HC-804
ITEM 29
2. Montague, L. L. to Assistant Director, R&E, December 17, 1946 In NS Files under ICAPS: Prog & Prod. for ORE.
HS/HC-804
ITEM 30

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IV/11

1. N.I.A. Directive #5, June 28, 1946, p. 2, in *His files (TS) (drafts)*

For the criticism of Hillenkoetter on this score in the Dulles Report, see below, pp. 79-81 (Ch. VIII), pp. 24-25 (Ch. IX)

*See Mr. Jackson's Papers in the
Alphabetical Files - Historical Collection
See footnote IV/6*

IV/12

1. Draft of N.I.A. Directive #5 dated June 28, 1946 under NIA Dir #5

See footnote IV/6

(TS)

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IV/29

1. The Fortier Report, March 14, 1946, p. 12 *See footnote III/69*
2. Vandenberg, H. S. to A. B. Darling, March 17, 1952 *See Interviews in NS files under CIA, T5*
For Hoover, Clark, and NSC 17/4, see below, pp. 18-23 (Ch. IX)

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IV/30

1. For the earlier period, see the History of the Office of Operations, Historical Collection *See NS files*
2. History of the Contact Division, Chapter II, pp. 4, 5, 6 *See NS Files, 00*

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The second directive of the Authority on February 8, 1946 stipulated that the Departments of State, War, and Navy were to assign personnel to the Group upon the requisition of the Director; and it stated that he should have a Central Reports Staff to assist him in accomplishing the correlation, evaluation, and dissemination. The fifth directive of the Authority on July 8, 1946 authorized the Director, in performing these functions, to undertake such research and analysis as the Departments were not performing adequately and as, in his opinion and that of the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board, the Central Intelligence Group might accomplish more efficiently or effectively.¹

These provisions should be carefully studied and remembered. They formed the complete authorization to General Vandenberg by the President and the National Intelligence Authority with regard to the production of "strategic and national policy intelligence." Donovan had perceived the vital importance of strategic information in June, 1941. It was imperative again in the summer of 1946 as the Working Committee of the Defense Project in the Pentagon endeavored to amass the best intelligence possible on the Soviet Union in the shortest period of time.²

The instructions to Vandenberg were complex but they were clear. Their limits were defined. The area of his operation was marked off. He had the nucleus of his organization already at work in the Central Reports Staff producing current intelligence with the

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from the Joint Intelligence Committee. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this concept of the Committee on February 21, 1947 and there the matter rested for months as all were far more concerned with actions in Congress over the merger of the armed forces and the National Security Council.¹

When the question rose again, General Vandenberg was no longer Director of Central Intelligence and was soon to be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Hillenkoetter had become Director of Central Intelligence. One suggestion was to be that if the Director were a civilian, his Deputy should represent him in the councils of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The deputy to a civilian presumably had to be a military person. The possibility that two civilians might head the nation's central intelligence organization was inconceivable.²

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and customer of Secret Intelligence. But now Langer, who had succeeded McCormack, presented the case of the State Department's division of Research and Intelligence. Langer doubted that it was necessary for the Central Intelligence Group to engage in extensive research and analysis. When the Departments could not do the work, specific authorization might be given to the Group. The Director of Central Intelligence should undertake only such research and analysis as might be necessary to determine what functions were not being performed adequately "in the fields of national security intelligence."

Langer saw danger to the "solidarity of the Board" in negotiations by the Director with individual members. He feared that the Board would "pass into eclipse;" it must be maintained, he said, to give moral support to the Director. But he appreciated the difficulty, if not uselessness, in endeavoring to distinguish primary from secondary interests in an enterprise. The Group should assume those activities in research and analysis which might be accomplished better by a central agency. Langer had to defer in the end to the individual member; the Board could not act by a vote of the majority. The decision was to be made by the Director and the appropriate member or members of the Intelligence Advisory Board. This was the provision as it was finally adopted and included on July 8, 1946 in the fifth directive of the National Intelligence Authority.¹

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IV/47

None

IV/48

1. O.R.E. #1, July 23, 1946, *see footnote II/46*
2. See above, p. 29 for comment on the Joint Intelligence Committee (Ch. II)

Also see above, pp. 24-32 for the plan in the Central Reports Staff (Ch. III)

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It would be the duty of the Branch to formulate the requirements of scientific intelligence in collaboration with the Board and the Army, Navy, Air Forces, State Department, and other agencies. The Branch would be responsible for the plans and the coordination necessary to adequate collection. It would prepare estimates on the scientific capabilities and intentions of foreign countries. It would correlate these scientific estimates with those in other fields of intelligence for the production of strategic intelligence.

The Central Intelligence Group undertook to provide the Joint Research and Development Board with the intelligence to meet its needs, particularly foreign items of specific interest. On its part, the Board undertook to cooperate in supplying the Group with qualified personnel, special facilities, and close day-to-day liaison on scientific matters.¹

General Vandenberg endeavored to arrange a meeting of the National Intelligence Authority for January 6 prior to the adoption on the 10th of the agreement with Bush. The meeting was not held. Nor had the person been obtained to head the Branch when it was formally established on January 23, 1947. Pending the arrival of the new chief of the Scientific Branch, Vandenberg wrote to Bush on March 13 to say that he was appointing an acting chief within the Group who should report to the chairman of the Joint Board and should make himself and the Branch as a whole fully available. It was a long while, however, before the Branch was equipped to perform the

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IV/63

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1. Lay, J. S., Jr. to the Director of Central Intelligence, **ITEM 23**
 April 25, 1946 (CIG 6.04)(C). *HS filed under CIA
 Monitoring of Press and Propaganda Broadcasts of Foreign Powers*
2. ICAPS "Box" in the chart of July 22, 1946 (C) *In HS Files
 under ICAPS, Mission of*

HS/HC-804

ITEM 24 + ITEM 25

IV/64

1. Change #2, Administrative Order #6, August 12, 1946 (C). *In
 HS Files under CIG Admin Ord #6, Change 2; in ICAPS
 Mission, folder also*
2. Edgar, D. to Acting Assistant Directors for Collection,
 Research and Evaluation, Dissemination, July 26, 1946
 (File CIG 6.04) *In ICAPS, General of HS Files*

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vii

Scientific Intelligence

The British had shared their information with the American services during the war, especially in regard to the V-weapons of Germany. There had been a reading panel of the Army, the Navy, and the Office of Scientific Research and Development within the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep up with discoveries in electronics and new weapons. The "Manhattan Engineer District" was represented in London to coordinate information on atomic energy.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Office of Strategic Services supplied technical and scientific intelligence. It had brought to this country foreign experts in air flow and electronics. It kept General Groves informed regarding German progress with atomic fission.¹

The atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki made certain that the secret collection of scientific intelligence would continue regardless of any public controls which the United Nations might establish. All nations would seek atomic weapons in self-defense, and they were likely to obtain them. The spread of scientific knowledge was only a matter of time. Thanks to espionage, the Soviet Government acquired the information on the atomic bomb sooner than anticipated. The nations were bound to intensify their scientific research. They were likely to hesitate even less than in the past

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IV/81

1. Minutes of the ad hoc committee, December 3, 1946
(File CIG #18) *(This reference not found in file cited.)*

For the continued struggle over this subject in
Hillenkoetter's time see below, pp. 57-59 (Ch. VI)

See footnote IV/77

2. C.I.G. Directive #18, January 23, 1947
There is conflicting evidence regarding the date of
the meeting. It appears to have been December 17
rather than December 20. *(C), filed HS under C19
Directive #18.*

IV/82

1. C.I.G. #18/3, December 16, 1946; *see footnote IV/77*
I.A.B. Meeting #12, December 17, 1946; *see references
in General Counsel's Office.*

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IV/49

1. C.I.G. #16, October 14, 1946; C; *see H's files*
2. Minutes of I.A.B. Meeting #9, October 31, 1946, p. 4
(File NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)
*(for other papers referring, see H's files
under ORE; Prod. (ORE))*

IV/50

1. Montague, L. L. to D. Edgar, October 16, 1946
See for details 10/26 (1)

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and formulating the conclusions which Monday afternoon at two he submitted to representatives of the Departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Following their comments, Montague spent the rest of Monday until midnight revising his paper and checking it with the report of the ad hoc committee. The clerical work was finished and the estimate delivered to Vandenberg Tuesday afternoon.

The summary of "ORE 1" stated that the Soviet Government anticipated an inevitable conflict with the capitalist world, and so it endeavored to increase its own strength and to undermine that of its antagonists. At the same time, the Soviet Union needed to avoid the conflict indefinitely; it had therefore to avoid provoking reaction by a combination of major powers. In matters essential to its security, Soviet policy would prove adamant; it would be grasping and opportunistic in others, but flexible in proportion to the nature and the degree of the resistance which it encountered.

The Soviet Union would insist upon exclusively dominating Europe east of the line from Stettin to Trieste, and would endeavor to extend its predominant influence over all of Germany and Austria. In the remainder of Europe, the Soviet Union would seek to prevent regional blocs from which it was excluded. It would try to influence national policies through the political activities of local Communists.

The Soviet Union wanted Greece, Turkey, and Iran within its security zone. Local factors favored such friendly governments, but the danger of provoking Great Britain and the United States in combination was a deterrent

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Chamberlin stopped acceptance and issue as a directive until he could see the contents of the directive for collection which should be based upon these requirements for China.¹

It was not until January 8, 1947, not until after the Authority's directive on collection had been issued, that General Chamberlin came again to the question of intelligence on China, and then he gave his views to General Vandenberg. The Authority's directive on collection, he said, and the plan for coordinating the production of intelligence by the Departments, which seemed about to be approved by the Advisory Board, appeared to make "the China experiment" unnecessary. Chamberlin thought that it should be withdrawn or at least postponed for consideration "to insure that it be brought into full consonance with the broader directives."²

Vandenberg knew those "broader directives" too well ever to accept such an invitation. It meant sending the project for intelligence upon China into oblivion. He replied on January 23, 1947 that the Chamberlin proposal indicated a "misunderstanding of the national intelligence program" as it was being developed by the Central Intelligence Group with the "advice and the assistance of the representatives of the Advisory Board."³

Vandenberg then unfolded the argument that we should expect. The Director of Central Intelligence was endeavoring to develop the plans in the President's Directive of January 22, 1946, a year before. They laid the foundations of a central intelligence system which should

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IV/5

- 1. See below, pp. 55-57 (Ch. VI)

- 2. Minutes of I.A.B. Meeting #6, June 28, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)

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ITEM 1

filed in HS files under CIG functions of DCI (TS), copy in Cig #10 files.

IV/6

- 1. The Fortier Report, March 14, 1946, p. 4

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ITEM 1

Minutes of I.A.B. Meeting #6, June 28, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office) of DCI (TS); *filed in HS files and CIG functions folder also, see II/5 (r)*

N.I.A. Directive #5, July 8, 1946 *filed in HS files under NIA Directive #5*

For Research and Analysis, COI and OSS, see above, pp. 24-26 (Ch. I)

See footnote III/39

See footnote III/5

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IV/35

1. C.I.G. #12/1, August 21, 1946 *See footnote IV/31*
C.I.G. #12/2, August 27, 1946 *See footnote IV/31*
2. N.I.A. Directive #1, Section 3, February 8, 1946 *See footnote III/10*

IV/36

1. C.I.G. Directive #15, October 1, 1946 (S) *and H S Files*
2. History of the Office of Operations, p. 2, 7; T.S. Historical Collection

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of common usefulness to other departments and governmental agencies.

Its organization has influenced similar institutions here.¹



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IV/39

None

IV/40

1. Hoover, J. E. to H. S. Vandenberg, September 5, 23, 1946
(File CIG #12) *see footnote IV/36*

Draft of C.I.G. #12/3, undated

Minutes of I.A.B. Meeting #8, October 1, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office) *In H.S. Files*

C.I.G. Directive #15, October 1, 1946; *S; see H.S. files under CIG directives*

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2. Douglass, K. to A. B. Darling, April 2, May 28, 1952; *TS; in H.S. files under CIG (interview)*
For Donovan's use of American business and travel, see above, pp. 12, 28 (Ch. I); *see footnote IV/36*

For further light on General Sibert's appointment, see Helms, R. to A. B. Darling, November 10, 1952; *interview; TS; in Historical Staff files, under "79"*

For Foreign Documents Branch, see Chapter IV, History of the Office of Operations

see reference in files, H.S.

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The Admiral was convinced that the Group should have funds for which it did not have to account in detail. The President, however, had authorized him to "make it clear": the Director of Central Intelligence was "not responsible further than to carry out the directives" of the National Intelligence Authority. The President would hold the Cabinet officers "primarily responsible for coordination of intelligence activities." Were the Secretaries then to see to it that their decisions in the Authority were obeyed in their Departments whether or not those decisions were popular? General Vandenberg, anyhow, was to know that he should not become another General Donovan seeking an independent directorate.¹

In immediate consequence of Vandenberg's urging, a letter from the National Intelligence Authority, July 30, 1946, to the Secretary of the Treasury and the Comptroller General, requested the establishment of a "working fund" for the Central Intelligence Group. This fund was to contain the allotments from the Department of State, War, and the Navy and to be subject to the administration of the Director of Central Intelligence, or his authorized representative, for paying personnel, procuring supplies and equipment, and the certification of vouchers.²

Upon approval of the fund, a second letter to the Comptroller General, signed by each member of the National Intelligence Authority, gave the authorization on September 5. The Director of Central Intelligence now had "full powers" to determine the "propriety of


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The fifth section of Vandenberg's draft dealt with the funds, personnel, and facilities of the Group. The Departments upon his request were to provide such funds and facilities to the extent of available appropriations and within the limits of their capabilities. At the earliest practicable date, he would submit a supplemental budget. The revision in this section of the directive by the Intelligence Advisory Board made sure that the Departments should continue to have the decision in regard to the funds which they apportioned to the Central Intelligence Group.

The proposed directive as it had thus been amended by the Intelligence Advisory Board went to the members of the National Intelligence Authority individually on June 29. The Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy approved it without change. But Admiral Leahy objected to Vandenberg's use of the word "agent" in the paragraph concerning the coordination of foreign intelligence. This word, he said, might imply unwarranted freedom for the Director of Central Intelligence. General Vandenberg agreed that the possibility of such an interpretation was not desirable. The paragraph was reworded so that it authorized the Director of Central Intelligence to "act for" the Authority in coordinating such activities. With this last change, Vandenberg's proposal became on July 8 the fifth directive of the National Intelligence Authority and took its place next to the President's Directive of January 22, 1946 as most important in the instructions to the Director of Central Intelligence.¹

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With the dissolution of the Office of Strategic Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had lost their hold upon the American intelligence organization. Their Joint Intelligence Committee continued, but it kept aloof from rather than worked with the Central Intelligence Group. Here was one lesson to be learned from the British system. General Vandenberg endeavored to apply it before he left office as Director of Central Intelligence.¹]

As Douglass, Jackson, and Quinn worked  in London, and Goggins negotiated in Tsing Tao and Tokyo, General Vandenberg himself undertook to settle with J. Edgar Hoover and the Federal Bureau of Investigation affairs concerning this hemisphere. According to Vandenberg's memory, Mr. Hoover was irate; but he yielded to the request that the Bureau withdraw from Latin America. It would confine its activities to security intelligence within the United States and possessions as anticipated in the fifth directive of the National Intelligence Authority on July 8, 1946.²

Hoover complied so swiftly in fact that he was preparing to remove his men, their equipment and records, from the Dominican

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IV/9

None

IV/10

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1. Van Slyck, D. to A. B. Darling, January 10, 1952 and April 21, 1953; TS; in ORE file of HS, interview

Wright, E. K. to A. B. Darling, April 10, 1953; TS; filed HS under CIA (general); interview

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where it was essential. Without inter-agency offices, the competition which was now so undesirable would continue.

Douglass was none too hopeful. He expected "various other unrelated objections for no other reason than to defeat the general purpose" of the directive. There were officers in the Army who had plans for "a G-2 exploitation in this field." It did not include coordination with any other Department.¹

The meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board on August 26, 1946 was taken up mostly with the objections of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The representatives of the armed services seemed to be on the side of Vandenberg. But more was to happen before the meeting closed. There was some discussion of the central register, now separated into two parts; one was to be the depository of all foreign intelligence acquired by the Government, a tremendous undertaking even in prospect; and the other, a careful record of the companies and persons interviewed by the intelligence agencies. There was an exchange of views whether the "contacts" should or should not be registered. The final opinion was that they should be unless they insisted upon secrecy. And then came an end to the hopes of Vandenberg and Douglass that they might get the Intelligence Advisory Board to accept the "monopoly" of briefing and interrogation by the Central Intelligence Group on behalf of all agencies concerned.²

William A. Eddy, Langer's successor on the Board for the State Department, suggested and the Board agreed that they should change the paragraph with regard to briefing private persons about to go

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The Intelligence Staff maintained that it was to have the "final review" in the Office upon the finished product, except of course the decision with regard to it by the Assistant Director himself who in turn was responsible to the Director of Central Intelligence. This was the opinion which the new Assistant Director held throughout the period of controversy. He failed, however, to make this authorization clear to the heads of the branches in the Office, and to others in the Group who were concerned in one way or another with the controversy. General Vandenberg apparently took no part. He was pleased with "ORE 1," and well aware of the experience and skill which made it possible. But he seems to have left the subsequent difficulties of the estimators on his staff to his administrative subordinates.¹

The number of the branches in the Office increased. By October, 1946 a new chart appeared showing the relationships among them, the Intelligence Staff and the Assistant Director's office. The Staff was placed to one side, with the line going straight from the branches to the Assistant Director's office.²

The explicit understanding of the Chief of the Intelligence Staff with the chartmaker and the Assistant Director, however, was that the Staff as in the past should have supervision over and final review of the reports and estimates coming from the several branches. Otherwise, there could have been little if any synthesis within the Group. On the merits of the case, we may say that if the Staff had not been there, General Vandenberg would have had to establish some office for the purpose. It was essential to the production of "strategic and national policy intelligence."

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IV/23

- 1. Vandenberg, H. S. to C. A. Willoughby, November 27, 1946 (File CIG 6.03 Special Operations), *copy also under, C. A. Willoughby (S)*

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ITEM 9

- 2. For MacArthur, see above, pp. 65-66 (Ch. I)

Vandenberg, H. S. to C. A. Willoughby, November 27, 1946 (File CIG 6.03 Special Operations)

IV/24

- 1. [Redacted]

Douglass, K. and Jackson, W. H. to H. S. Vandenberg, August 10, 1946; *TS; in HS files under CIG - Relations with British*

HS/HC-804
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HS/HC-800

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HS/HC-800

VOL. I

- 2. Jackson, W. H. to A. B. Darling, March 15, 1952; *interview; TS; in HS files under OSS*
Douglass, K. to A. B. Darling, April 2, May 28, 1952; *TS; in HS files under CIG*

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IV/33

1. Douglass, K. to H. S. Vandenberg, August 26, 1946,
p. 2 (File CIG #12) *See footnote IV/31*

IV/34

1. Douglass, K. to H. S. Vandenberg, August 26, 1946,
p. 2 *See footnote IV/31*
 2. Minutes of I.A.B. Meeting #7, August 26, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's
Office) *See H.S. files*
- Cunningham, H. F. to Secretary, NIA, August 27, 1946
(File CIG #12) *See footnote IV/31*

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furnish the President and the Departments with "strategic and national policy intelligence." These plans came under the three general heads of collection, research and evaluation, and dissemination. They were designed to facilitate departmental intelligence as well as national intelligence. But it was allocated by the President to the Director of Central Intelligence alone. He had therefore to determine its requirements and procedures for collection, research, and dissemination.

General Vandenberg became peremptory. He requested that General Chamberlin concur in the immediate release of "NIR China" and that he issue directives to the individuals already named by him to assist the Group in preparing a similar paper on the Soviet Union and the Near East. To cap this ultimatum, Vandenberg stated that he was withdrawing the "implementing directive to NIR China" and referring the problem to his Assistant Director for Collection and Dissemination within the Group. He would issue such requests regarding collection as might be necessary. On February 12, 1947 "NIR China" appeared as the eighth directive of the National Intelligence Authority, with the concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Board and without further comment from the members of the Board, the Authority, or anybody else, at least that we have been able to discover.¹

This was the day of the historic ninth session of the Authority. It met to discuss the problem of correlating intelligence upon foreign developments of atomic energy and to hear a report from the Director of Central Intelligence. Secretary Patterson made a brief statement on the transfer of personnel and files from the Atomic Energy Commission

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IV/51

1. C.I.G. 16/1, October 26, 1946, *see footnote IV/49*
Administrative Order #32, November 1, 1946
2. Minutes of I.A.B. Meeting #9, October 31, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office) *(see files of General Counsel)*

IV/52

1. Montague, L. L. to H. S. Vandenberg, April 15, 1947 HS/HC-804
HS under CIG Admin. Order #32
For Vandenberg's action, see below, pp. 88-90 ITEM 18
2. Montague, L. L. to Eddy, Chamberlin, Inglis, McDonald,
August 11, 1947; *C. filed HS under CIG Admin*
Order #32. HS/HC-804
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between the Director and the Board. Others we shall consider in a moment. At first glance, it seemed as though Montague's plan was adopted and put into operation by administrative order on November 1, 1946. Closer examination revealed that it was not.¹

Each member of the Advisory Board was to designate a personal representative as liaison in the estimating division of the Office of Research and Evaluation. He was to concur or to present dissenting opinions as directed by his chief. He was to be afforded "complete opportunity to participate in all phases of the development of estimates." But this was far from what Montague proposed. The participation might take the officer's full time, if he and his chief so desired; but it was optional, not mandatory that he give his full time to such participation in producing estimates. Whether or not the plan should become effective depended upon the willingness of the Departments to have it succeed.²

When Montague came to take stock on April 15, 1947 at the end of Vandenberg's administration, it was apparent that the Departments had been more than wary in their cooperation. It looked as though there had been open warfare upon the effort of the Office of Research and Evaluation in the Central Intelligence Group to produce "strategic and national policy intelligence." The members of the Advisory Board appointed their personal representatives as requested. But the record showed that none of these men gave his full time to the work of estimating. Only one, in fact, held an office in the Group. They were, as Admiral Inglis wished, no more than messengers to the chiefs of intelligence in the Departments.

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THE DCI HISTORICAL SERIES

HS 1

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AN INSTRUMENT OF GOVERNMENT, TO 1950

CHAPTER IV THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
VANDENBERG'S REGIME

by

Arthur B. Darling

December 1953

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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IV/17

- 1. Minutes of N.I.A. Meeting #4, July 17, 1946
(File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)

For Magruder to Donovan on an independent directorate, see above, pp. 3-4 (Ch. II)

- 2. Vandenberg, H. S. to the Secretaries, July 30, 1946 ^{(C) see under}
(File 210 Budgets, Appropriations, Allotments) ^{C19: Working Fund}

HS/HC-804

ITEM 2 footnote IV/4

(along with other papers)

IV/18

- 1. Letter from the Secretaries to the Comptroller General, September 5, 1946 (File 210 Budgets, Appropriations, Allotments) *See footnote IV/17*

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Vandenberg, H. S. to A. B. Darling, March 17, 1952, *TS, interview*
in HS files under "CIA-general"

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except as provided by law and directives of the President. No one questioned that the restriction applied to the Group and the Director; the issue turned upon the meaning of the word "investigations." Mr. Hoover took it to envelop the work of General Vandenberg's field offices and agents in liaison with the intelligence officers of local military, air, and naval headquarters.¹

Mr. Hoover disapproved. He would accept uniform procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence. He would engage to transmit promptly any foreign intelligence gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the course of its investigations of American businesses. But he would not accept control by the Central Contact Register. The Bureau should be exempt from such clearance, because it had to work on a daily basis. Instead the Group should obtain clearance from the Bureau. After all, it had the right of making the "investigations" within the country. Until Congress or the President changed the terms of the concept, Mr. Hoover would decide what they were.

To Admiral Leahy, Hoover described Vandenberg's proposal as an "invasion of domestic intelligence coverage" assigned by law to the "sole responsibility" of the Bureau. If the proposed directive of the Group should go into effect, he said, it would lead inevitably to "confusion, duplication of effort and intolerable conditions to the detriment of the national well-being." Admiral Leahy did not think so. He replied on September 4 that a careful reading of the

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Secretary Patterson, however, persisted in saying that the matter was already within the province of the Authority, and it was urgent. The Atomic Energy Commission would only delay the transfer while attending to matters of more importance to itself. Admiral Leahy gave Patterson further support. And so Secretary Acheson suggested that Leahy clear the directive with the President. This Leahy agreed to do by telegraph, with a note to commit the Authority to any change in the future which the Atomic Energy Commission might desire. The President replied on August 23 that he wished to postpone action until he had returned to Washington. There followed delay until December as the appointment of David Lilienthal to the chairmanship of the Commission aroused opposition. In the meantime "ICAPS" became much interested in coordinating the intelligence of several agencies on guided missiles and the requirements of scientific intelligence concerning Russia.¹

As General Vandenberg sought to transfer the collection of foreign intelligence on atomic energy from the "Manhattan Engineer District" to the Central Intelligence Group, he was endeavoring also to obtain a close relationship with the Joint Research and Development Board which Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal had established on July 3, 1946. President Truman had been inclined to continue the Office of Scientific Research and Development which had done so well during the war under the chairmanship of Vannevar Bush. But the opinion of Bush prevailed that the Office had come to the

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IV/59

- 1. Montague, L. L. to J. K. Huddle, April 17, 1947

Montague, L. L. to A. B. Darling, June 12, 1952;

H.S. files under ORE

HS/HC-800

VOL. III

- 2. Simons, G. P. to S. A. Dulany Hunter, April 21, 1947,

P. 2 no classif. shown; filed H.S. under ORE. Controversy. Intel stuff / Base, 1947

- 3. Montague's Memorandum, May, 1947, *see footnote IV/56*

HS/HC-804

ITEM 21 + ITEM 22

IV/60

- 1. Jackson, G., Paper No. 1 - Organizational Development of the Office of Reports and Estimates, 1946-1950, dated April 10, 1952

see Mr. Jackson's paper in H.S. files

For the resurrection of Montague and Van Slyck, see below, pp. 46-47, 71 (Ch. X)

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Goggins was moved from his post at the head of the Central Planning Staff to be Galloway's Deputy. Kingman Douglass, no longer the Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, became "B" Deputy and Chief of Foreign Commerce under Colonel Galloway. Upon the understanding that there should be no one between himself and General Vandenberg, Colonel Wright had come from the position as Vandenberg's Executive on the General Staff, "G-2", to be his Executive to the Director in the Central Intelligence Group. Colonel Dabney accompanied Wright as his Assistant Executive. (For the time, there was no Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Colonel Wright received this appointment on January 20, 1947.¹)

The Director of the Strategic Services Unit, Colonel Quinn, who had succeeded General Magruder, now found himself also under Colonel Galloway as Executive for Special Operations. Perhaps this was so that Galloway could give Quinn orders more readily pending the ultimate extinction of the Strategic Services Unit. Meanwhile the Secret Intelligence and the Counterespionage (X-2) Branches of the Unit had been consolidated in a temporary organization of the War Department, named the Foreign Security Reports Office for want of a better title. The head of this office, Stephen B. L. Penrose, formerly in the Office of Strategic Services, became "A" Deputy under Galloway at the request of Colonel Quinn. As the liquidation of "SSU" progressed, Penrose logically would have charge of secret intelligence and counterespionage within the Office of Special Operations of the Central Intelligence Group. This did not mean that

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The duplication was unnecessary. He recommended that the Joint Intelligence Committee be abolished. The Central Intelligence Group should provide the necessary intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Secretary Forrestal inquired if the plan to replace the Joint Intelligence Committee with the Central Intelligence Group had been taken up with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vandenberg was sure that it had, through the members of the Advisory Board. He could have said Joint Intelligence Committee. Mr. Eddy, present for the State Department, thought it important to abolish the Committee and to have all interdepartmental intelligence under the Group. Without further comment the Authority agreed that the Joint Intelligence Committee should be abolished and its functions assumed by the Central Intelligence Group, but withheld decision until the Joint Chiefs of Staff should discuss the matter. Admiral Leahy was to consult with them.

What the Joint Chiefs were likely to decide had already been indicated. On December 9, 1946, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Nimitz, declared that the time had come to reorganize the Joint Intelligence Committee upon the principle that it should consist only of representatives from the military services. Coordination with other agencies, he said, should be had through the Central Intelligence Group. The wartime representation of the Foreign Economic Administration and the Office of Strategic Services had come to an end. Only that of the State Department remained. It should be removed

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Since these bodies were identical in permanent membership, their secretariats would be merged to insure coordination, though they were kept in separate sections especially to protect certain affairs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which for reasons of security ought not to be divulged in other parts of the Central Intelligence Group. And finally, under this plan, the sub-committees of the Joint Intelligence Committee together with its Joint Intelligence Staff would be combined with the Group to create a compact and efficient intelligence organization serving both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of the Departments constituting the National Intelligence Authority.

This plan too had merit. But the military and naval authorities saw in it features which they were reluctant to accept. Colonel Carter W. Clarke, Deputy Director of Intelligence on the War Department's General Staff, summarized the weakness as he saw it for General Chamberlin. The Director of Central Intelligence was to be chief intelligence adviser to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but they would have no authority over him. He would be responsible still to the National Intelligence Authority. An external agency which the Chiefs did not control, said Clarke, would come between them and their subordinates. This violated the usual chain of command; it was a fundamental in the Army that intelligence was a function of command. Colonel Clarke did not discuss for General Chamberlin, however, the point that the Secretaries who were the Director's superiors in the

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and the "national intelligence mission." But the directive contained no statement of the authority and the sanction under which violations of these instructions would come to judgment. They were useful as ideas, perhaps, but little more.¹

There was no mention in the directive of the Central Intelligence Group nor of the Director of Central Intelligence. The permanent members of the Advisory Board had obtained control over the collection of intelligence for the Departments, excepting the secret intelligence of the Office of Special Operations and the collections of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence and the Contact Branch in the Office of Operations. Vandenberg let the directive pass. He had no veto over the actions of the Advisory Board. He might have withheld his approval formally. But there was no point in arguing further with the chiefs of intelligence in the services. He took his case up to the Secretaries in the National Intelligence Authority.²

Now that the general matter of collection had been settled for the time being, the specific question of collection in China perhaps could be answered. It had been proposed as an area for trying out the coordination of collection by the intelligence agencies of the Departments. As a member of the Advisory Board under Admiral Souers, General Vandenberg had urged that the Strategic Services Unit be kept at work until it could be replaced. The Central Planning Staff had begun to study the problem. Admiral Goggins had gone to the Far East during the summer to make arrangements with General

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The Intelligence Advisory Board did not accept "ICAPS" in the role of working staff as Vandenberg wished. Instead, the Board sent ad hoc committees to confer with it, and these specially appointed representatives carried back to the members of the Board what they found "ICAPS" pondering for the Director. The procedure did not make for speed or decisiveness in coordinating the intelligence activities of the Departments. It certainly did not expedite the formulation of policies and procedures by the central agency in which they had a common concern.

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Intelligence Studies, and in time developing an elaborate series of National Intelligence Surveys - as the Agency is doing today. It might continue, and improve, its service of current intelligence with Daily and Weekly Summaries, Bulletins, and Special Estimates. It might engage in providing what has been called Staff Intelligence, special reports as required by the Director and situation reports according to regional, national, or functional plans. All of these the Office might do when it had the staff, facilities, quarters, and departmental support for such enterprises. But they were contributory, and they were subordinate, to the primary purpose of the Group which Admiral Souers had stated in his Progress Report. The purpose was the production of "definitive estimates of the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries" as they affected the security of this nation.¹

The decision of General Vandenberg, recorded on March 25, 1947 by his Deputy, General Wright, favored the plan of "ICAPS" for production by the Office of Reports and Estimates. He spoke of a "reasonable balance" and recognized the immediate problems of space, staff, and support for the remainder of the fiscal year. But he threw his influence on the side of "ICAPS." The proposal of the Office, he said, was lacking the long-range view and it was not sufficiently specific. The Assistant Director in charge should submit his program for the next quarter to the Chief of "ICAPS" by June 1. The Chief would submit his "comments and suggested revisions or additions" to the Director before June 15. The Assistant Director apparently could then take the revised program, and like it.²

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As the Department of State had something of a vested interest in producing the intelligence essential to national policy, Vandenberg stood ready to let it choose the head of the new Office of Research and Evaluation. He offered to retain the Chief of the Central Reports Staff in the position. Montague had come to the Group from McCormack's organization in the State Department. But Vandenberg's Executive, Colonel Wright, felt that Montague did not properly represent the Department; the selection should be made from its Foreign Service. Montague had learned his intelligence in the Army.

Vandenberg yielded to this argument, and the State Department sent Mr. J. Klahr Huddle to be the Assistant Director in charge of the Office of Research and Evaluation. The Deputy Assistant Director had therefore according to custom to be selected from some other Department. Montague was too much of a representative of the State Department for that post, and so Captain A. H. McCollum of the Navy received the appointment. Montague remained in the Office as Chief of the Intelligence Staff to carry on the production of estimates. For this purpose the Assistant Director assured Montague that he was in fact though not in name the Deputy. This, however, as we shall presently observe, was not made sufficiently clear to save him from trouble with others in the Office.¹

Besides this encumbrance from interdepartmental politics, there were within the Group, as apparently there must always be in governmental services, the planners who think upon policy and talk about policy though

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IV/61

- 1. N.I.A. Directive #1, February 8, 1946, see footnote III/3

IV/62

- 1. Montague, L. L. to A. B. Darling, April 11, 1952, HS/HC-800 *Interview*
in HS files under ORE *VOL III*

HS/HC-800
VOL IV

- 2. Vandenberg, H. S. to A. B. Darling, March 17, 1952, TB, interview
in HS files under CIA (general)
C.I.G. Directive #14, July 19, 1946, see footnote IV/45

Administrative Order #6, July 22, 1946; C, see HS files under
C.I.G. admin orders; C.I.G. admin order 6.
For reorganization of "ICAPS" later, see below, pp. 22-23
(Ch. VI)

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was adopted that day. It had the unanimous consent of the Intelligence Advisory Board and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. General Vandenberg proceeded to organize the Office of Operations.¹

Meanwhile Kingman Douglass had withdrawn from the Group. General Sibert was to take charge of all collection, both clandestine and overt. As he came to do so, however, Vandenberg listened to the pleas that secret collection should be kept separate under Colonel Galloway in the Office of Special Operations. The staff of his "B" Deputy and Chief of Foreign Commerce, renamed the Commercial Contact Branch, was placed in the new Office of Operations to do the work of collecting foreign intelligence in this country. With it there was joined the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch to take over that service from the Army. The Foreign Documents Branch was added later in December. General Sibert became Assistant Director for Operations on October 17, 1946.²

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Frequent conferences between June 23 and July 14 brought the dissent of the State Department to its final form, substantially as it had been on June 23. If this presentation of the case strikes the reader as absurd, the papers are accessible in the files of the Agency.¹

The story of the estimating functions in central intelligence had been carried into the summer of 1947 to show that the Office of Reports and Estimates had not effectively produced national estimates with substantial dissents up to that time. The failure was due in largest part to the fact that the intelligence officers of the Departments were not ready, if they were willing, to make the work of the central agency swift and definitive. Such concerted interdepartmental action was remote from their experience. It certainly was not according to tradition except in the dire circumstances of war, and even then it took the leadership of exceptional men to accomplish it with the minimum of procrastination and exchange of views. But there were other handicaps besides the propensity of the departmental officers to hinder the formulation of the national estimates in the Office of Research and Evaluation.

For months it could not undertake the research and evaluation which Vandenberg intended it to have. For example, Galloway inquired on August 1, 1946 concerning the evaluation of the reports in the Office of Special Operations from the Strategic Services Unit. A directive went to Montague. He had to reply that the Office of Research and Evaluation at that time had neither the persons nor the working files for appraising such information. The Reports Staff was at half

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IV/25

HS/HC-804

- 1. Quinn, W. W. to D. H. Galloway, August 16, 1946 (File RI/FI) *S; copy in HS file under 219-
BTEA and with British*

Wright, E. K. to H. S. Vandenberg, August 19, 1946 (File RI/FI)

HS/HC-804

ITEM 11

- 2. Douglass, K. and Jackson, W. H. to H. S. Vandenberg, August 10, 1946, pp. 15-16 *See footnote II/24*

HS/HC-804

ITEM 10

IV/26

HS/HC-800

VOL. II

- 1. Jackson, W. H. to A. B. Darling, March 15, 1952, TS interview in HS filed under OSS

Montague, L. L. to Chief, ICAPS, October 16, 1946 Intelligence Estimates Prepared by the Central Intelligence Group; TS; memo; filed HS

HS/HC-804

together with other pertinent papers *EL*

ITEM 13 R. 99

- 2. Douglass, K. and Jackson, W. H. to H. S. Vandenberg, August 10, 1946, p. 11 *See footnote II/24*

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ITEM 10

Scott, W. M. to W. W. Quinn, April 30, 1946 (S); (File RI/FI) *cy also in HS files under*

HS/HC-804

ITEM 14

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ii

Operations: Covert and Overt

The Group had a military character in spite of Admiral Souers' efforts to make it a cooperative activity representing the State Department as well as the armed services. He had been successful in obtaining some men with experience as civilians though they were in the Army or Navy during the war. But for the most part he was obliged to rely upon those who thought of the Army or Navy as a career. The distinction between regular and reserve officers, if seldom expressed, was always present. The Agency still reverberates with talk of the Colonels who arrived with General Vandenberg and took over from others who possessed military records, but who for one reason or another did not measure up to his expectations.

Maturer minds will not linger upon the military aspect of the matter. There doubtless were varied reasons for changing personnel. But neither should the criticism be ignored altogether. It entered as a fact into the deliberations of Congress upon the legislative provisions of the future for central intelligence in the national system of security, just as it had embittered the argument between the State Department and the armed services prior to the establishment of the Central Intelligence Group by the President.¹

Colonel Fortier was relieved from duty as Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services on July 11, 1946. Colonel Galloway became Assistant Director for Special Operations. Captain

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The Group was to be the truly central organization in the national system of intelligence. The new Office of Research and Evaluation was to process all of the material that came into Washington, with a staff of researchers and analysts that might rise to two thousand persons. DeForest Van Slyck, deputy to Montague in the Central Reports Staff at the time, recalled the situation of July, 1946 with both exasperation and amusement. The idea was altogether good that the Group should do the estimating; but it could not get enough qualified persons to do the reflective writing required in the weekly summaries, let alone to undertake the grandiose scheme of Vandenberg and Wright for research and synthesis.¹

Following the check by the State Department, representatives of the Army and Navy also made reservations which were adopted by the Board and included in the fifth directive of the Authority. Vandenberg had asked that the Director of Central Intelligence should be authorized to act as the "executive agent of this Authority in coordinating and supervising all federal foreign intelligence activities related to the national security." As changed by the Advisory Board on June 28, the directive stipulated that the Director of Central Intelligence should merely act as the agent of the Authority in coordinating such activities.

There were two significant omissions. The word "executive" was dropped before the phrase "agent of this Authority." The word "supervising" disappeared. Exception had been taken to Vandenberg's

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have it otherwise. This meant, too, intensified efforts to defend the prerogatives of established services. The close interdepartmental cooperation so indispensable to the production of strategic intelligence for the policy-makers was not to be had under such circumstances. Here was a "mission" which might have absorbed more of the time and energy of the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff.¹

The Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff was not divided into functional sections or branches. Its members formed working groups and received assignments from time to time, each submitting a weekly report of his activities, conferences, and accomplishments. The result was a flow of papers that impressed the reader until he observed how often the same subject reappeared from week to week as unfinished business, and recognized too that some of these were old friends from the days of the Central Planning Staff. The candor of one weekly reporter deserves whatever immortality this study can give him. He wrote on October 14, 1946 that he had made "no progress worthy of reporting." A week later he had finished the organization charts, but there was "no other progress of note," he said, "except in frustration."²

At the end of the year, the Chief had called for an annual report, and got a list of projects from "a" to "k" which had been "instituted, planned and completed" by the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff. There were additional lists of undertakings

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declined on the ground that it would lose direct control over intelligence functions related to its problems of staff and command. The representative of the State Department emphasized again its "inescapable responsibilities," particularly those concerned with political and economic intelligence.

The special committee observed that positive results could be obtained in some fields. It suggested recourse to bilateral agreements between the Group and the departmental agencies, and asked to be relieved. The Group on its own responsibility made further study of the problem of basic intelligence in the following winter and spring. A member of the Office of Reports and Estimates became chairman of the Working Committee of the Defense Project in March, 1947. The Joint Army and Navy Studies were taken over by the Group October 1, 1947 as it began its program of National Intelligence Surveys.¹

The second major issue before the Advisory Board in October, 1946 was that of national estimating. We have already carried it into the summer of 1947 in order to show why the primary function of the Central Intelligence Group failed to develop as both Admiral Souers and General Vandenberg intended that it should. Admiral Inglis had been as determined and as clear in his opposition to the Montague plan for national estimates with substantial dissents as in his advocacy of basic intelligence studies by the Group. Through the whole debate within the Board, Admiral Inglis consistently looked upon the Group as a cooperative interdepartmental enterprise and upon the Director of Central Intelligence as subject to more than the advice of the Intelligence Advisory Board.²

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directive failed to find for him where it invaded the responsibility of the Bureau. By this time the meaning of the word "investigations" was suffering under the tension.¹

James S. Lay, Secretary of the Group, the Board, and the Authority, had submitted a memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence on September 3 to show the changes in the position of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as presented before the Advisory Board on August 26 and to provide answers to Hoover's objections. His representative on the Board had indicated that he would agree to the activities of the Group's field offices in the United States if they confined themselves to "business concerns;" he would still object to the inclusion of other groups and persons for fear that the activities of the Group would conflict with the operations of the Bureau.

The answer to Mr. Hoover in all cases was that the "investigations" which he had in mind were for the internal security of the country. Those which the Group wished to conduct were normal methods of collecting intelligence which the Army and Navy had employed within the country and out of it for years. Lay suggested that Hoover might be assured that the Group would consult with the Bureau on the "advisability of contacts of other than American business concerns." This should preclude "any danger of conflict."²

The next letter from Hoover to Vandenberg, September 5, 1946 narrowed the anxiety of the Bureau to foreign language groups, other

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and classification of materials. Certain matters were for the President and Cabinet members only; other officers might receive daily reports on less restricted materials.

This preliminary investigation brought about by December 9 an adequacy survey which found that the summaries of current intelligence were generally considered good. But there were specific queries and suggestions which gave the Chief of "ICAPS" an opportunity to criticize. He made the most of it to submit on January 13, 1947 a program of production for the Office of Reports and Estimates. The argument in detail is not necessary here. Its outstanding features were that the Office should have a current intelligence staff giving its whole time to the work; that the Office should issue monthly "situation reports" on the several geographic and strategic areas of the world; and that there should be created within the Office a group drawn from the personnel of its branches to prepare for "National Intelligence Digests."¹

The Chief of the Intelligence Staff had already submitted a report to the Assistant Director, December 17, 1946, on the production of intelligence by the Office of Reports and Estimates. It was handicapped by the lack of personnel qualified and equipped for the work; but it had kept up the Daily and Weekly Summaries, initiated a special series of evaluations and interpretive comments upon current reports, and carried on the series of deliberate and coordinated estimates which had begun with "ORE 1." Five of these had been published, six were in various stages of preparation. Five more were planned.²

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IV/31

1. First draft of CIG #12 by H. S. Vandenberg, July 22, 1946 (File CIG #12) (S); see H.S. files under CIG #12: Exploitation Amer. Bus. Concerns, etc.

(Note: Bureau has been advised of this CIG #12 copy, as well as of the fact that it was signed by [redacted])

IV/32

1. Cunningham, H. F. to D. H. Galloway, August 14, 1946 (File CIG #12) See Footnote IV/31.

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IV/37

1. Hoover, J. E. to H. S. Vandenberg, August 23, 1946
(File CIG #12) *See footnote II/31*

Hoover, J. E. to W. D. Leahy, August 23, 1946 *See footnote II/31*
(File CIG #12)

President's Directive, January 22, 1946, p. 2 *See footnote II/53*

IV/38

1. Hoover, J. E. to W. D. Leahy, August 23, 1946
(File CIG #12) *See footnote II/31*

Leahy, W. D. to J. E. Hoover, September 4, 1946
(File CIG #12) *See footnote II/31*

2. Lay, J. S. to H. S. Vandenberg, September 3, 1946
(File CIG #12) *See footnote II/31*

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i

Reorganization - The Fifth Directive

Vandenberg's memorandum of June 20 explaining his purposes created such a stir that it was revised before the meeting of the Board on June 28. The original text with his signature declared that "to discharge his vital responsibilities," the Director of Central Intelligence "should not be required to rely solely upon evaluated intelligence from the various Departments." He should have authority to undertake within the Central Intelligence Group such basic research and analysis as in his opinion might be required to produce "the necessary strategic and national policy intelligence." This would require the "centralization" of activities concerning more than one agency; existing organizations of the State, War, and Navy Departments, including their "funds, personnel, and facilities," would be "integrated into the Central Intelligence Group as a central service."¹

There was no mention of the Intelligence Advisory Board in the original text. Criticisms ranged accordingly from insistence that a single member of the Board should have virtually the right of vetoing the Director's choice of subjects for research, to the requirement that he must consult the appropriate members of the Board whenever he planned central activities of "common, but secondary interest" to more than one Department.²

The right of an individual member to veto would have destroyed the function of the Director of Central Intelligence, as it would

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Regardless of source, reports would be sent directly to the agency primarily concerned. Estimates too would be the responsibility of each agency; they would provide information on their respective subjects to other agencies as the needs required. Communication would be direct from one agency to another, and not through the Central Intelligence Group. Each would collect information and maintain files on persons within their primary responsibility; a central file should be maintained for common reference. Each agency should contribute chapters of a Strategic Intelligence Digest like the Defense Project. Apparently this would be maintained as an interdepartmental activity.

The central agency, thus carefully segregated from the departmental activities of "primary responsibility," was nevertheless to maintain supervision over interdepartmental cooperation and production. No explicit indication was given regarding the authority which should determine which Department had such "primary responsibility" in case two or more claimed it. The inference is that the Secretaries, and the President's personal representative, Admiral Leahy, would make that decision. It would have to be done by unanimous opinion, hard to get unless the President's personal representative revealed the President's mind as Leahy had to Vandenberg in July.¹

This plan from the War Department came before the Advisory Board on November 26, together with the proposal from the State Department, the draft of a directive for the National Intelligence Authority which had been prepared by "ICAPS," and specific reservations by General Vandenberg. The directive, if adopted by the

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transitory at best, and it was not comparable to the plan for the production of strategic intelligence by the Central Intelligence Group. Even though the Defense Project was an interdepartmental enterprise, in a sense under the supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence, he could not choose the subjects for research and analysis. He could merely settle disputes among the members engaged in the Project. However successful it might have been in obtaining strategic intelligence for effective national estimates of the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Union, it would only have proved that the Director of Central Intelligence should have under his administration a permanent organization for research and analysis.

Being a practical man inclined to action, General Vandenberg withdrew the provisions in his first draft which seemed so obnoxious that they might defeat his purpose. He accepted changes to mollify the Advisory Board. But he retained the principle. There was to be within the Central Intelligence Group the research and analysis which it had to have regardless of duplication and overlapping with the departmental services. It is naive to think that he was artless because he did not delay over problematical aspects of his situation. He took what he could get then. If that were established, more would come in time.

Vandenberg and his Executive, Colonel Wright, had large plans for the Group as they came over from "G-2" in the War Department.

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anxious to keep for the Army in China as the Strategic Services Unit went out of existence. The usefulness of the organization, for both overt and clandestine intelligence in China, Manchuria, and the hinterland which it could penetrate, was greater now than ever as the Communist Chinese increased their Manchurian operations in the summer of 1946 and tension grew over Korea.¹

Stopping in Tokyo on the way home, Captain Goggins reached tentative agreement for cooperation between the Central Intelligence Group and General MacArthur who, we will recall, once had no room in his plans for the Office of Strategic Services.

Captain Goggins had to postpone for later discussion the issue whether or not these installations of the Central Intelligence Group should be under the command of General MacArthur and Admiral Cooke of the Seventh Fleet. Vandenberg declined because the units of the Central Intelligence Group were not military activities. He was directly responsible to the National Intelligence Authority. He could not take orders from MacArthur and Cooke.²

While Captain Goggins visited the Far East as General Vandenberg's representative, Kingman Douglass and William H. Jackson undertook a special mission for Vandenberg on July 27

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iv

Coordination and Control

The President's Directive gave the Director of Central Intelligence with his planning the right to inspect the operations of the intelligence services of the Departments. This was of course to be done only with the approval of the Secretaries of the Departments and the personal representative of the President, who constituted the National Intelligence Authority. Their first directive to him stipulated that arrangements should be made with the members of the Intelligence Advisory Board. But it was far too early in the development of central intelligence to expect any of them to give his consent. The thought that the Director might invade the precincts of the Departments was revolutionary. The provision was for the future. It still is, so far as it relates to physical inspection. Admiral Souers made no move in that direction. He kept his Central Planning Staff at work instead, preparing studies and recommendations on paper that the chiefs of intelligence in the Departments might consider. The Staff took upon itself the related but additional function of planning for other staffs and offices within the Central Intelligence Group.¹

As a result of this activity, which proved irksome to others, Vandenberg came to the directorship inclined to let them make their own plans and set their policies for his approval. It was in this

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General Vandenberg took up the report of the Central Planning Staff. His directive as first prepared on July 22, five days after the meeting of the National Intelligence Authority, provided that the Director of Central Intelligence should maintain a "central contact control register" of the persons and groups interviewed or to be approached. This logically would accompany the use of American businesses, institutions, and individuals as sources of intelligence regarding other countries. It was an obvious service of common concern to the agencies in the Group and others of the Government. It afforded nonetheless, for those who would, an opportunity to object.

The word "control" coupled with the authorization of the Director to maintain the register gave him power. Another provision would have field offices of the Central Intelligence Group to do the work of collecting this particular kind of "foreign intelligence information." The Departments of State, War, and the Navy were to make available the persons and facilities which the Director might require, and to take with him the steps necessary to carry out the policies and procedures. Through the first draft of the directive ran the idea that the Director should supervise as well as direct and coordinate the activities.¹

It was not enough for the Departments that they could give the Director counsel through their chiefs of intelligence on the Intelligence Advisory Board and check him through the Secretaries in the National Intelligence Authority. As the Department of State had

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in local headquarters of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces "through the medium of local inter-agency offices;" they would effect for the Director of Central Intelligence the coordination of such overt¹ collection.

It was a loose and indirect statement, but its meaning was evident. Any intelligence which the Director's field representatives obtained in liaison with the local officers of the services was the legitimate by-product of that coordination. All foreign intelligence acquired by the Government was to be deposited in the central register maintained by the Group.

These were the more serious obstacles. Vandenberg sent his memorandum of August 21, 1946 to Hoover and received a reply two days later by special messenger. At the same time Hoover expressed his opinions to Admiral Leahy, personal representative of President Truman in the National Intelligence Authority. If Hoover's views had prevailed, the Central Intelligence Group might have been unable to exploit the rich source of positive intelligence upon world affairs which lies in American business abroad and the travel of American individuals everywhere.

Hoover called Vandenberg's attention to section nine in the President's Directive. It specifically withheld "investigations inside the continental limits of the United States and its possessions,"

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up of the Secretaries and the President's personal representative who were superiors of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vandenberg brought the discussion finally to an end by proposing further work upon the problem by staff members. Another ad hoc committee therefore was named to deliberate with "ICAPS." They might bring in majority and minority reports.¹

This committee agreed on December 3 that each agency should submit its own plan. The proceeding came to naught. In the meantime the Joint Intelligence Committee had endorsed what had been Admiral Inglis' original plan to use the Joint Intelligence Staff as the Intelligence Advisory Staff of the Intelligence Advisory Board. Let us repeat once more that the permanent members of the Advisory Board were the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Vandenberg saw no point in discussing the matter further with Admiral Inglis, General Chamberlin, General Samford, and Mr. Eddy. He took the question to the National Intelligence Authority on February 12, 1947.²

General Vandenberg stated his position to Secretaries Marshall, Patterson, Forrestal, and Admiral Leahy. Those who had created the Central Intelligence Group, he understood, had in mind that the Group would replace the Joint Intelligence Committee. This, however, had not occurred; nor had any working relationship been achieved. The two organizations continued with parallel responsibilities; there was no effective coordination. There was constant friction with the intelligence agencies of the War and Navy Departments over priorities.

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mood that he broke up the Central Planning Staff on July 20, 1946 and distributed its members among the Offices of Special Operations, Collection, Dissemination, Research and Evaluation. The heads of the new offices were directed to organize them by administrative orders. But Vandenberg's struggle with the Intelligence Advisory Board over the fifth directive of the Authority convinced him that he still should have a representative staff to prepare the way in future dealings with the Board.¹

He established the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff for that purpose. Its membership represented the Departments, with its chief from the Department of State. Its title indicated clearly what it was to be. Vandenberg intended, no more than Souers, to stress his right of inspection. He was having trouble because he insisted upon his individual responsibility. It seemed wise, therefore, to have representatives of the Board work with him before he formulated his opinions and reached his decisions; the chief intelligence officers of the Departments then would know in advance what entered into his thinking. In short, "ICAPS" was to have been a working staff within the Group for the Intelligence Advisory Board representing the Departments. Like the Central Planning Staff preceding it, "ICAPS" gained more of a reputation for action inside the Group than for coordinating the activities of the Departments.²

The Central Planning Staff had conceived of a whole series of interdepartmental coordinating committees which should handle matters of foreign, scientific, military, political, economic, geographical

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The Departments should still determine "availability." The Navy could be assured, said Douglass, that there would be no interference with its own "Special Observer Plan."¹

Douglass expected that the chief arguments in the meeting of the Board would be aimed at the establishment of inter-agency field offices and at the monopoly of "briefing" and interrogation which the Central Intelligence Group sought. But it was essential that the amount of briefing should be kept to a minimum; only those who had been completely checked for security and discretion should be told what the intelligence services were endeavoring to learn. The representative of the Group would be in the best position to know the specific requests of the departmental agencies and then to interrogate in the interest of all rather than one.

As for the field offices in liaison with local headquarters of the Army, Navy, and Air Forces, serious objection was to be expected - especially from the Army - because the participating agencies would lose control over their personnel to some degree. On the other hand, they were not as well equipped as the Group to do the work.

The armed services had more to gain than to lose, he said, by cooperating in the enterprise. Moreover it would insure coordination "on the working level in the field,"

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IV/27

- 1. The Douglass-Jackson Report, August 10, 1946, pp. 14-18 *See Footnote IV/54*

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ITEM 10

See below, pp. 91-102

HS/HC-800

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- 2. Vandenberg, H. S. to A. B. Darling, March 17, 1952 *See interview w/ HS files under CIA, TS.*

IV/28

- 1. Minutes of NIA Meetings #5 and #7, August 7 and September 25, 1946 *See General Counsel's Office (File of NIA and IAB Meetings in General Counsel's Office)*

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At its best, such a system meant that the proposed estimate received painstaking and diligent review by the chief intelligence officer in the Department. At its worst, it was merely obstructive, time-consuming, and baffling to the researchers and analysts in the Group. In any case, it did not provide what Montague and others of experience in estimates at the working level sought to establish - representation and responsibility for the Departments at the working level. With the Inglis plan, there was likely to be no real fusion of departmental intelligence into a national estimate. The proposal of Admiral Inglis laid the process open to dissents from the Departments as they saw fit. In that event there might be no synthesis.

The plan of Montague was to have the men who took part in making the estimate exercise the right of dissent on behalf of their respective Departments, subject of course to review by their superiors on the Intelligence Advisory Board. He believed that as they worked day after day with the evidence, giving their full time to the business, they would make more effective synthesis of the materials. They did not have to lose their sense of responsibility to their Departments because they became expert in the common concern of all of them. The chances were good that they would make better estimates, and dissents, in shorter periods of time.¹

Taken up by General Vandenberg, Montague's plan went to the Advisory Board on October 31. It was debated at length; or, we should say, the debate ranged for some time over many phases of the relation

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The average lapse of time between submission of estimates and receipt of concurrence or dissent from the Departments was seventeen days. Montague reached the conclusion that the procedure hindered substantive agreement as well as caused unnecessary delays. It is no wonder that in February Vandenberg had urged again that he should be named the executive agent of the Secretaries of the Departments, and his decisions accepted accordingly as emanating from them.¹

Another survey of the twenty reports and estimates which had been fully coordinated by August, 1947 as the Group became the Agency under the National Security Council brought out the degree of difference in the performance of the several Departments with respect to medians, averages, and extremes. The Air Force had scored the best record with seven, eight, and fourteen days respectively. The Navy came next with eight, nine, and seventeen. The Army lagged with eight, eleven, and twenty-seven. The State Department had the worst record; its median was eleven days, its average fourteen, and its extreme fifty-five.²

The last case merits special attention.

It

was submitted to the departmental representatives on May 20, and received the concurrences of the Navy, Army, and Air Force on May 28. A dissent from the State Department arrived on June 10. This was surprising, as prior comments from the Department had not foreshadowed it. There had been some changes in personnel; but more than that, another section of the Department in the meantime had given a contradictory opinion to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

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Authority, was to be accompanied by a directive to the Group providing definitions and arrangements in detail to put into effect the whole scheme for coordinating collection. Vandenberg's reservations before the Board covered the secret activities of the Office of Special Operations and the overt collection by the Foreign Broadcast Information Branch and the foreign information obtained by the Contact Branch from American businesses and travelers. What had been drawn into the central organization, Vandenberg was not disposed to put back into the field of departmental activity and control.¹

The draft prepared by "ICAPS" brought the proposals of the State and War Departments together, and added provisions for coordinators in foreign areas as well as the Director of Central Intelligence at Washington. The stress was upon maintaining him as the chief coordinator of the whole system of collection and the Group under him as the central intelligence organization. The duties of the coordinators for the agencies in the field were precisely indicated according to the situation in the areas. The coordinators might be the chief of the diplomatic mission or the senior military commander--or in some cases, both; then the Director of Central Intelligence with the approval of the Advisory Board would designate someone to supervise them. We shall find this provision missing from the final directive. The omission will have significance in the affair at Bogota in April, 1948.²

By agreement among the Departments, the factors of primary responsibility would be assigned in careful detail: to the State Department,

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"control and supervision." He accepted the looser concept of "coordination." The papers were ready for the Authority on August 13. Secretaries Patterson and Forrestal approved. Admiral Leahy wished only a few editorial changes. But Acheson, Acting Secretary of State while Byrnes attended the peace conference in Paris, would not permit the directive to issue. Instead, Acheson called a meeting of the National Intelligence Authority for August 21.¹

Secretary Patterson opened the discussion. It seemed senseless to him that the small division in the office of General Groves engaged in collecting information about foreign activities in the field of atomic energy should be kept apart from the Central Intelligence Group. The division was not concerned with the production of atomic energy in this country; there was no reason to leave it under the Atomic Energy Commission. Secretary Forrestal agreed, if the Commission were not denied the information. Admiral Leahy favored the plan of the directive. Vandenberg assured them that it was designed to provide and not to deny information; he would certainly furnish the intelligence to the Atomic Energy Commission as directed by the Authority. But Acheson demurred. He would not interfere with the organization which was searching for uranium ore. In any case, they should wait until President Truman had appointed the Commission and it could establish its policies. He had reason to believe that the President would so prefer.²

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IV/43

- 1. C.I.G. Administrative Order #3, March 4, 1946, C. filed *HS*
under C.I.G. Admin order #3
 See above, p. 29 (Ch. III)

HS/HC-804

ITEM 15 + ITEM 16

- 2. Vandenberg, H. S. to J. F. Byrnes, July 31, 1946
 (File 6.05 R&E); *no classif shown; file under*
C.I.G. nomination by state, ADRE

IV/44

- 1. Montague, L. L. to A. B. Darling, April 1, April 11,
 June 12, 1952, *TS; interview in HS files*
under ORE.

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IV/103

- 1. The History of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, May 9, 1952, pp. 5-6 and Tab "A", *see HS files, OSI*

Technical Section SI - History, by H. W. Dix, February 9, 1945; *S; filed HS under OSS; cy under* HS/HC-804

Dix, H. W. to W. J. Donovan, September 4, 1945 ITEM 42
 (File 12,733 C), *filed HS, under OSS; cy under*
"OSI", S. HS/HC-804

ITEM 41

IV/104

- 1. See above, pp. 1, 11-12 (Ch. II)

Status of Projects, March 18, 25, 1946; *TS, filed HS under*
"CIQ - Status of Projects"
 New York Times, August 2, 1946

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