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12 March 1959


CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



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




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making friendly gestures toward Cairo and to suppress nationalist sentiment by banning newspapers and closing nationalist clubs. UAR interest in Kuwait was publicly demonstrated by the visit of a UAR military mission in mid-January.



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withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact. These "demands" are being broadcast by Baghdad radio, which is Communist directed, and by the Baghdad press. All "nationalist" and pro-UAR newspapers in Baghdad were put out of action by mobs which destroyed their presses on 10-11 March.

UAR

The most immediate international result of the suppression of the Iraqi revolt has been a sharp deterioration in Baghdad's relations with Cairo. The Iraqi Government on 9 March declared 11 members of the UAR Embassy in Baghdad personae non gratae, and some 30 Egyptians left Baghdad the following day.

The expulsion of the Egyptians was accompanied for the first time by direct attacks, without euphemisms, on Nasir and the UAR as the instigators of the rebellion, although local Communist elements--following Moscow's initial line--also sought to throw some of the blame on the United States.

The UAR President replied to the Iraqi attacks in a speech on 11 March in Damascus, where he has been engaged in a round of political fencemending and handshaking. Frustrated by the failure of the revolt and stung by this and previous Iraqi accusations, Nasir lashed out in the strongest terms he has yet used against Qasim and the Communists. He said Qasim was dividing the Arabs--making a play on Qasim's name, which means "divider" in Arabic--and he denounced the Communists as "agents" of "the foreigners." He reiterated that his own "mission" to bring about full Arab unity remains unchanged. He concluded with an oblique

reference to the possibility of further difficulty between the UAR and the Soviet Union by saying he intended to pursue his mission "regardless of the harm which may befall us."

This speech breaks the surface concord which had been established last month by Nasir's speech and Khrushchev's letter on their respective attitudes toward Arab Communist movements. Moscow's initial commentary on the Iraqi uprising sought to avoid identifying it with the UAR by asserting that the revolt was a consequence of American attempts to bolster the Baghdad Pact, but it is unlikely that Soviet leaders will be able to ignore so blatant an attack on the Communists as Nasir's latest. The most recent Moscow comment has predicted that the "secrets" of the anti-Qasim conspiracy will be revealed, as will the "threats" which "lead outside the borders of Iraq."

With the eclipse of his influence in Iraq, Nasir's contests with Qasim and the Communists may move into peripheral areas. One possible arena is Kuwait, whose oil revenues have long been eyed by both Iraqi and UAR leaders. Baghdad is in a favorable geographic position to apply pressure on Kuwait--there are border disputes which could be revived on short notice--and the Kuwaitis have traditionally feared and resisted Iraqi pressure.

Nasir has long been a hero to the Kuwaiti populace; and his propaganda has been spread by non-Kuwaiti schoolteachers, taxi drivers, newspaper writers, and other professionals. The ruling family has been less enthusiastic, but has sought both to appease Arab nationalism by

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
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T H E W E E K I N B R I E F

PART I


OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST



Page 1

MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS Page 4

The suppression of the army revolt in northern Iraq is being followed by Communist pressure on Prime Minister Qasim to move against all non-Communist elements. Nasir, in reaction to direct accusations from Baghdad that the UAR supported the revolt, has attacked Qasim and Communist influence in the strongest terms he has yet used. With the eclipse of Nasir's influence in Iraq, his contests with Qasim and the Communists may focus on other areas, such as Kuwait.



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
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MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS

Iraq

The revolt of the Mosul army garrison in northern Iraq has been suppressed. Army units from Baghdad have been sent north to reinforce the local security units in curbing tribesmen who have been pillaging and cutting communications in the countryside. Reprisals against rebel sympathizers are probably also occurring in Mosul.

Colonel Shawwaf, the Mosul garrison commander who led the revolt, clearly expected immediate support from army units elsewhere in Iraq, and his plans apparently depended in large part on the success of an assassination attempt against Prime Minister Qasim. None of the other phases of the plot materialized, and even the best known army opponent of Qasim's policies, Brigadier Tabaqchali,

commander of the Second Division of which Shawwaf's force was a part, only sat briefly on the fence before pledging support to Qasim.

Remnants of the rebel force are reported to have fled toward the Syrian border, under strafing attacks by Iraqi Air Force planes, but Shawwaf and a number of his officers apparently were killed by their own men after a government air attack on their headquarters.

The Iraqi Communists are using the revolt to justify intensified demands for a purge of all "sympathizers and supporters" of the revolt from the government and army, for the arming of the Communist-controlled Popular Resistance Force, for the execution of anti-Qasim leaders now under death sentence, and for immediate

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