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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

ADENAUER'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

West Germans expect that Chancellor Adenauer's visit to Moscow will have few tangible results other than the release of some German citizens who have been held in Soviet custody since World War II. (For a detailed discussion, see Part III, p.1.)

West German expectations about the gains which Adenauer might attain during the visit have been modified considerably since the Geneva conference. Soviet firmness in opposing German reunification at Geneva has disillusioned many West Germans as to the possibility of real progress on this subject in the near future. According to German officials, Chancellor Adenauer anticipates that the conference will only define the issues between the two governments and consider some principles for their eventual solution, with specific agreement to be reached possibly in the case of detained German citizens.

Many Bonn politicians believe that Moscow's willingness to recognize the Federal Republic is merely a device to gain eventual recognition of the East German government by non-Soviet bloc countries--a devel-

opment which would formalize the division of the nation.

To avoid jeopardizing German unification, Bonn government spokesmen have indicated that an exchange of representatives will not occur unless Moscow gives some assurance on unity, accepts Bonn's policy of nonrecognition of East Germany and the postwar German boundaries, and consents to release German citizens. Should sufficient progress occur during the meeting, Adenauer may consent to exchange diplomatic representatives immediately.

Most West German observers expect the Soviet Union to free many of the estimated 17,000 German prisoners of war. The chancellor has referred in public statements, however, only to "Germans," a term which would also apply to an estimated 115,000 civilian internees who, according to the German Red Cross, are still believed to be in the Soviet Union.

If Adenauer returns from Moscow without a concrete understanding with the Soviet Union on reunification, this would not be accounted a great personal failure in West Germany, since most West Germans continue to believe that reunification cannot be realized now.

THE CYPRUS ISSUE

Failure of the London conference to find agreement on the Cyprus question has resulted in severe tension between Greece

and Turkey. Co-operation on defense planning in the eastern Mediterranean will probably suffer, and for the first time

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violence on Cyprus is likely to be directed against the Turkish minority as well as the British colonial government.

The conference of Britain, Greece and Turkey was "suspended" indefinitely on 7 September after British foreign secretary Macmillan offered Cyprus limited self-government, together with the creation of a tripartite committee to examine details of the proposed new constitution for Cyprus.

The Greek reaction to the proposal was noncommittal, but Athens will almost certainly reject it because of the omission of any assurance regarding self-determination for the island's predominantly Greek population.

Turkey's immediate reaction was "very negative." Ankara, however, will probably accept on condition that the self-government proposal be amended to provide for equal representation of the Greek and Turkish populations of Cyprus.

The rebuff to Greece in London will probably weaken the Rally government still further and increase maneuvering among the Rally's disparate factions. King Paul, who has been concerned over the government's lack of an effective leader during the prolonged illness of Prime Minister Papagos, may appoint a provisional prime minister and call for new general elections.

Acting Foreign Minister Kanellopoulos told the American chargé in Athens on 6 September that Turkish delegate Zorlu's "intolerable" press statements

in London had deeply wounded Greek national honor. If Greece were forced to accept Turkish views on Cyprus, Kanellopoulos said, his government would have to resign and might be replaced by one less well disposed toward the West.

Any Greek government will be committed in advance to pressing the appeal regarding Cyprus in the UN General Assembly. Greek anger at the anti-Greek outbreaks in Istanbul and Izmir on 6 September will probably be vented in intensified preparations for a bitter UN debate with Britain and Turkey over the Cyprus issue and in more open encouragement to the Cypriot Nationalists.

As a result of the Turkish riots, which revealed a deep religious antagonism toward the Greek Orthodox Church, the NATO Council was summoned to an unprecedented meeting on 8 September. Also, the Turkish Grand National Assembly has been called into a special session on 12 September.

Like the Greeks since the beginning of the London conference, the Turks appear willing to sacrifice the short-lived friendship between their two countries over the Cyprus issue. Both may now give free rein to the many divisive issues which have lately been submerged. NATO will have increased difficulty co-ordinating Greek and Turkish contributions to European defense, and the Balkan alliance will probably atrophy or be replaced by a Greek-Yugoslav entente.

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