

## Survey of Foreign Experts New York

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This will serve to confirm Monday's conversation during which I gave you a brief outline of results so far obtained from our various interviews on the above subject. These opinions apply particularly to northwest Korea in which region the various interviewees resided for many years. They may be summarized as follows:

1. A white man, regardless of previous familiarity with the country, would have virtually no chance of survival for any useful period of time if sent in under present conditions.

2. A native-born Korean with certain qualifications, as specified hereafter, would have a fair chance of keeping alive and being of some use.

People with whom this subject was discussed were as follows:

\* [redacted] and [redacted]  
Both these men were attached to the Maryknoll Catholic Mission in Korea and lived in the northwestern region for about twenty years, returning to this country on the Gripsholm in 1942. [redacted] had his own car in which he traveled frequently from his Chukochin Mission to Heijo, Shingishu and other parts of northwest Korea. [redacted] was an architect and spent most of his time in the erection of mission buildings. In connection with this he operated his own supply truck.

✓ [redacted] was for twenty years in Korea working under the auspices of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions. He was stationed in Kokai and is generally familiar with the surrounding country. He returned to the United States in 1940.

✓ [redacted] was a Methodist missionary who returned to this country in 1941, after a residence of 38 years in the Heijo area of Korea. His particular job was the establishment and management of primary and secondary schools. In this connection he often traveled to other parts of the country although his greatest familiarity is of course with his own immediate area.

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[redacted], is a teaching member of the Maryknoll Mission Society and for fifteen years was stationed at Youngyu, approximately twenty miles from Heijo. She returned to this country on the Gripsholm in 1942.

Index slips on all of the foregoing are attached and will provide you with more detailed biographies. Hereafter in this memorandum reference to specific opinions will be made by index numbers.

As regards the possibility of successfully using a white man as an intelligence agent in northwest Korea, subjects [redacted] all felt that such an undertaking would meet with almost immediate disaster. [redacted] gave such an agent a better chance of survival but even he was decidedly doubtful, feeling that it would be only a matter of time, and perhaps a short time, before the agent was discovered by the Japanese.

The principal reasons for these opinions are:

1. The close surveillance over the local population which is maintained by the Japanese-Korean police. This control is somewhat stricter in northwest Korea than in the central and southern regions as the area is regarded as more anti-Japanese than other sections. As a result the controls are very strict and of course include the Pao Chia system to which rigid adherence is insisted upon. This system, which consists of forming every community into groups of ten families or multiples thereof with one man as leader in each group, requires that the presence of an unregistered individual in a given house be reported to the police within 24 hours. This applies to any individuals, however close a relative or however transient a visitor, and the penalties for noncompliance with the regulation are very severe.

2. The belief that very few Koreans could be trusted under existing conditions not to denounce an occidental to the authorities. In the opinion of our interviewees this would apply even though such a man had been well and favorably known to them for years prior to the war. This is due to the long period of Japanese domination and their close police supervision, which has lowered the morale of the people to a point where little or no reliance could be placed upon them to maintain silence. This opinion was strongly held by subjects [redacted] and [redacted].

Use of Koreans as agents: Subjects [redacted] were however all of the opinion that under certain circumstances exiled Koreans might be used as intelligence agents. Aside from the question of basic reliability, such men should not have been away from Korea too long, i.e., not over seven or eight years, and should have close family ties which they maintained as long as communication was possible. In other words,

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their own field of operations would have to be confined to the general area of their own town or village as they would have to depend for protection and help upon the loyalty of relatives with whom the ties of blood would outweigh the very real element of danger in concealing a nonregistered individual. This would mean that such Korean agents would be strictly limited in their own personal movements while in the country, but it is thought that they would be able to obtain valuable second-hand information and establish sources of future intelligence, using close relatives for the purpose.

E.W.S.

CC: Mr. Bernard Knollenberg

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