

*Proposed Intelligence Advisory Committee
cable to Jordan showing GAC
has not changed its mind re SA.*

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

11 August 1958

1. We consider that in general the estimates concerning Saudi Arabia contained in SNIE 30-2-58 are still valid.
2. Radical nationalist forces working in Saudi Arabia have been strengthened by recent events in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon and by the decline in King Saud's power, prestige and health.
3. Indigenous dissidents supported by ^{UAR} foreign subversive influences are now probably strong enough to undertake a coup, though competent leadership may still be lacking. Amir bin Jiluwi and many Beduin, especially of the Nejd, are almost certainly loyal to the King. However, only those tribes immediately available at Riyadh or Taif would be able to affect the outcome of an attempted coup. The loyalty of many elements of the Army, including the royal guard regiment, is uncertain. Thus, an attempt at overthrow would appear to have a good chance of removing the King ^{and Feisal} and seizing power in at least part of the country.
4. Feisal is almost certainly vitally concerned with the threat to himself and the Saudi dynasty. We believe it unlikely that he can

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meet the threat merely by internal reforms and a policy of "non-involvement" with the rest of the Arab world. While he will attempt to maintain as much independence as possible, we believe he will almost certainly enter into some kind of cooperation with the UAR, *either through* possibly including membership in the UAS. *or thru participation in a revitalized Arab League.*

5. King Saud will probably continue for some time to maintain important sources of strength, ^(1/2) e.g. bin Jiluwi and the tribes. We believe, however, that even if Feisal were removed from the scene, the King would not be able to reassert his former absolute power in Saudi Arabia. Disappearance of either the King or Feisal would accelerate internal deterioration. Departure of both would probably be followed fairly promptly by the end of the Saudi monarchy.

6. If Feisal makes an accommodation with Nasser we believe Nasser would be unlikely to instigate a coup against the Saudi dynasty, within the next few months. Even in this case, however, internal dissidents might undertake a coup; the likelihood of their doing so would be greater if there were no accommodation with Nasser.

and indeed Nasser might, under these circumstances encourage them to do so.

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