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In response to questions regarding key milestones in our assessments of Iraq's nuclear program

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In 1979 and 1980, the Intelligence Community concluded there was no hard evidence that Iraq had decided to acquire nuclear weapons but judged Baghdad had positioned itself to do so by developing its nuclear infrastructure. These assessments, based on foreign nuclear cooperation projects underway with suppliers from Russia, France, and Italy, accurately captured Iraq's weapons potential.

- We now believe, based on subsequent inspection and defector information, that Saddam had decided to pursue nuclear weapons by the late 1970s. [Redacted]

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Israel's destruction of the Osirak reactor in 1981 and war-related economic difficulties had not dampened Iraqi interest in enhancing its nuclear capabilities. CIA anticipated that once the war with Iran ended, which happened in 1988, the nuclear program would accelerate.

- This assessment erred in putting Baghdad at least a decade away from having nuclear facilities with the potential to support a weapons program, underestimating Iraq's potential by seven years. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] Iraq had a strong interest in developing nuclear weapons and that it could complete a weapon in less than 10 years from a go-ahead decision.

- Accompanying these strengthened judgments was a worst case scenario in which CIA assessed Baghdad could have a weapon in as little as two to four years if it had a clandestine source of fissile material.
- This worst case assessment, now known not to have been a worst case but actually representing Baghdad's emerging capabilities at the time, caused significant disputes in the Intelligence Community. [Redacted]

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In the months leading up to the Gulf war, CIA stated Baghdad had a nuclear weapons program and could

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produce a weapon by the late 1990s. CIA became surer of these conclusions [redacted] but mistakenly put less emphasis on the prospect for a worst case scenario.

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[redacted] revealed Baghdad's nuclear weapons program was much broader and more advanced than we had assessed. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The current analytical debate over Iraq's ultimate use of high-strength aluminum tubes mirrors some of the pre-war interagency disagreements on whether Iraq had a nuclear weapons program. While all agencies agree that the aluminum tubes could be used in centrifuges, today's debate centers on whether this is Iraq's intended use. [redacted]

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