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MISC.

Senior Executive Memorandum

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Memorandum

In response to an inquiry about what the Iraqis are likely to disclose if they use the US and British "white papers" as a guide:

Iraq probably will disclose much of, or perhaps even all of the activities listed in the US and UK "white papers" but probably will claim some points are either permitted or are innocuous activities. Iraq will not declare its most important ongoing programs and will attempt to hide its illicit procurement efforts. ~~(S//NF)~~

Missiles. Iraq may provide a detailed declaration of UN-permitted 150-km missile programs to cloak its longer-range efforts. It may declare a number of facilities, not mentioned in the "white papers," where its permitted Al Samoud and Ababil-100 missiles have been deployed and may admit that the missiles have slightly exceeded their permitted ranges, possibly by accident.

— Iraq
 may provide data to help resolve Scud missile and warhead accounting issues.

— Baghdad is unlikely to disclose its extended-range versions of the permitted missiles, work on longer-range systems, or its recent procurement activities. ~~(S//NF)~~

Chemical Weapons. Iraq may provide further information on the disposition of its pre-Gulf war stock of weapons, bulk agent, and precursors and may turn over data on chemical weapons usage during the Iran-Iraq war.

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will claim, as in the past, that the chlorine and phenol produced there are for legitimate purposes.

— Baghdad may provide data explaining the status of missing 155-mm mustard rounds and other munitions and may offer additional data on VX production after May 1988.

— Iraq is likely to deny ongoing chemical weapons activities. It probably will try to conceal its recent efforts to procure dual-use chemicals and it may continue to deny VX weaponization. ~~(S//NF)~~

CIA

continued ...

For further information, contact the

Biological Weapons. Iraq might make additional disclosures of its pre-Gulf war BW program. [redacted]

- Baghdad might offer new information to explain the disposition of bacterial growth media and may provide new figures on agent production and weaponization for past programs.
- It is unlikely to fully disclose its mobile production facilities or to disclose any ongoing weaponization or dispersal efforts. ~~(S//NF)~~

Nuclear weapons. Baghdad will include little new information in its nuclear declarations [redacted]

- Iraq probably will offer alternate explanations for its procurement of aluminum tubes, perhaps claiming they are intended for artillery rocket production, but probably will deny any ongoing uranium enrichment activities.
- Its nuclear declaration most likely will focus on Iraq's pre-Gulf war program but may ignore current activities [redacted] Iraq's nuclear scientists and engineers, whom it will claim are engaged in other activities. ~~(S//NF)~~

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). Iraq may declare much of its L-29 aircraft-based UAV activities but is unlikely to disclose the UAVs' full capabilities or acknowledge any role in dispersing chemical or biological agents. It also may disclose information on its newer UAVs but is unlikely to declare its extensive UAV procurement efforts or the autonomous flight capabilities of its UAVs.

- Iraq probably will assert that its UAVs are intended as target drones or reconnaissance platforms, and Baghdad may argue, as it did in the 1990s, that Security Council resolutions neither limit UAV range to 150 kilometers nor subject UAV programs to monitoring. ~~(S//NF)~~