

~~TOP SECRET~~**Disposition of Iraqi Scud-Type SRBMs****Key Findings (U)**

Iraq in 1991 probably destroyed any remaining Scud-type short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) based on our review of all currently available information. Despite a comprehensive investigation involving interviews of Iraqi officials and document exploitation, we did not find definitive evidence confirming this destruction. Iraq after 1991 continued to hide components, production equipment, and documents for later reconstitution, but by 1996 Baghdad probably had destroyed or declared to the United Nations all of these items. Additional hidden components could be uncovered; but even if such items exist, they would probably be remnants of Iraq's Scud program.

This Intelligence Assessment revises CIA's pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) assessment—which we held for more than a decade—that Iraq probably retained a small, covert force of up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs. The prewar assessment was always predicated not on direct evidence, but on gaps in Iraq's declaration to the United Nations of its unilateral destruction—a declaration that lacked credibility because of Baghdad's well-documented recalcitrant and deceptive behavior. The prewar assessment also was influenced by a large body of often vague reporting of varying reliability through March 2003 that Iraq was hiding Scud-type ballistic missiles.

Iraq Survey Group (ISG) debriefings of Iraqi officials have provided new context to past reporting, and ISG investigations have uncovered historical information to which we did not have access before OIF. This new body of information and a reassessment of previous reporting have combined to undermine the circumstantial case and assumptions that formed the basis of the pre-OIF assessment. The new evidence supporting this revised assessment follows:

- In post-OIF interviews, former senior Iraqi officials some of whom have provided evidence of 2000 to 2003 proscribed ballistic missile development activity—deny that Iraq retained any of its previously hidden Scud-type ballistic missiles after 1991.

¹ This assessment was shared by the Intelligence Community in multiple National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) over the years, most recently in the NIE 2002-16HC (Top Secret) 4 October 2002, *Iraq's Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction*.

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Scope Note (U)

This is the first Intelligence Assessment (IA) in the CIA's *Iraq WMD Retrospective Series* that addresses our post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) understanding of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery system programs. These IAs address aspects of Iraq's pre-OIF WMD and delivery system capabilities by reevaluating past assessments and reporting in light of the Iraq Survey Group's (ISG) investigations. [redacted]

This IA goes beyond the ISG's efforts to investigate Iraq's delivery systems programs by focusing on both the status and history of assessments on Iraq's Scud-type ballistic missile force. This assessment includes information uncovered by ISG, but also draws upon historical information to review past intelligence assessments and intelligence reporting. Although the conclusions of this IA are consistent with ISG's findings, the review of historical reporting and assessments helps to provide additional context to support this reassessment. [redacted]

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According to former senior Iraqi officials, Baghdad feared that UNSCOM would destroy al-Qa'Qaa' State Company's nitric acid plant if inspectors knew it had produced Scud IRFNA. This nitric acid production capability was critical to Iraq's munitions production industry.



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Limitations of Pre-OIF Intelligence [redacted]

Prior to OIF, we had no direct evidence that Iraq maintained a Scud-variant force. We did have a long history of Iraqi deception and denials during inspections, gaps in Iraqi accounting [redacted] and a body [redacted] reports that often described hidden missiles that were moved continuously on trucks or buried in the desert.



[redacted] reporting on Iraq's hidden Scud-variant force varied in credibility. The reporting was often vague and based on hearsay, and rarely [redacted] could accurately identify a Scud-type ballistic missile.



The limited reporting did not provide details on the



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These alternative explanations are difficult to support when [redacted] have denied the existence of hidden Scud components, have admitted to designing proscribed ballistic missiles based on available SA-2 technology, and Coalition forces or the ISG have not found Scud-type SRBMs or components. We cannot rule out, however, that some components may have been hidden years ago and later forgotten, or may still be uncovered. [redacted]

Iraq possibly could have transferred hidden Scud technology to another country [redacted]

but [redacted] no ballistic missiles were transferred because Saddam Husayn's regime collapsed more rapidly than expected [redacted]

Conclusions (U)

It is unlikely that there are any complete Scud-type missiles remaining in Iraq, either operational or disassembled. It is possible, however, that Scud-related components or equipment have remained hidden since the early 1990s when Iraq thought inspections and sanctions would be temporary.

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Disposition of Iraqi Scud-Type SRBMs

The Iraq Survey Group's (ISG) investigative efforts over the past year have yet to uncover any evidence that after 1991 Iraq retained operational Scud-type ballistic missiles. Instead, post-Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) debriefings and recently available historical information support the idea that Iraq in 1991 probably unilaterally destroyed its hidden Scud-type ballistic missiles. The assessment that Iraq probably retained up to a few dozen Scud-variant SRBMs was based on gaps in [redacted] declarations, Iraqi deception, and a large body of often vague but sometimes plausible [redacted] reporting. The combination of all this information was weighed against Iraq's denials, but Baghdad's lack of credibility led us at the time to believe Iraq probably had such missiles. [redacted]

- Although most of these officials probably have not been completely forthcoming with the ISG, the consistency of the denials and the fact that most of these officials³ have provided extensive evidence of Iraq's other proscribed ballistic missile activities lend credence to their claims. [redacted]

Aftermath of Husayn Kamil's Defection

Husayn Kamil al-Majid, the former director of OMI, minister of Industry and Minerals, and Saddam's son-in-law, on 8 August 1995 defected to Jordan. This set in motion a series of events within the Iraqi regime to figure out what Husayn Kamil might reveal to the international community regarding Iraq's WMD programs and how best to handle this potential damage. Iraq handled the situation by providing many new details of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile programs and how the ballistic missile program was destroyed as well as details regarding post-1991 proscribed missile-related activity. ISG has acquired new information that puts these events in greater context, indicating that in 1991 Iraq probably eliminated its Scud-type ballistic missiles. [redacted]

Iraqi Officials Deny Existence of Scud-Variant SRBM Force


Former senior Iraqi officials since OIF all have denied that Iraq continued to hide Scud-type ballistic missiles after 1991 or any related components after the mid-1990s. [redacted]

[redacted] deny Iraq retained Scud-variant ballistic missiles after 1991.

This assessment was prepared by the DCI Center for Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to [redacted]

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


does not refer to any hidden Scud-type SRBMs or components.

Iraqi Revelations After Kamil's Defection



Iraq through 1996 provided more details about its unilateral destruction and proscribed ballistic missile design work. This additional information that Iraq had originally withheld tended to create more questions than it answered, causing additional damage to Iraq's credibility.



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

- A 1995 Iraqi document obtained after OIF that enumerates weapons-related information Iraq continued to hide from the United Nations at that time makes no reference to Scud-type SRBMs or related material, suggesting Iraq no longer hid such missiles.
- Iraq's 2000 to 2003 efforts to develop a proscribed ballistic missile capability did not involve Scud technology.
- Post-OIF interviews of former Iraqi officials suggest that Iraqi deception was not an attempt to hide actual missiles, but to protect the military industrial infrastructure and the regime in general. [redacted]

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Protecting Security Services

After Husayn Kamil's defection in 1995, Iraq revealed that in 1992 it had disposed of Scud engine components and related production equipment buried at a farm



Could Any Scud-Type SRBMs Remain?

A key assumption of the pre-OIF assessment was that Iraq retained a small, covert force of Scud-variant SRBMs to use as a weapon of "last resort," such as when Saddam thought his regime was threatened. The absence of any launches of Scud-variants suggests Iraq did not have a covert force, but there are other possible explanations for the lack of use, such as:

- Iraq had dismantled these missiles to keep them hidden from UNMOVIC, but was unable to reassemble them before OIF.
- Iraq had retained only a small number of Scud-type components for future reconstitution.
- Iraq's command and control had broken down to such an extent to preclude any launches.

Iraqi officials lied about how the Scud-related material was destroyed



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- Baghdad launched roughly 18 al-Samoud 2 and al-Fat'h missiles at Coalition forces, compared to the approximately 90 Scud-variants launched against Coalition forces and Israel in 1991.
- Although no Scud-variant missiles have been found, some al-Samoud 2 and al-Fat'h missiles were abandoned by deserting or retreating Iraqi forces and subsequently discovered and destroyed by Coalition forces.

Iraqi Deception: Not Always Hiding Weapons

Protecting Industrial Infrastructure

According to [redacted] senior Iraqi officials [redacted]

[redacted] Iraq hid documentation related to its unilateral destruction of Scud propellant because it would show that Iraq had produced its own inhibited red-fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) for its Scud-type ballistic missiles before 1991. Knowledge of this may have led the United Nations to destroy the nitric acid plant at al-Qa'Qaa'. Hiding this evidence directly contributed to UNSCOM's inability to account for Iraq's Scud propellant, a significant gap that suggested Iraq retained a covert Scud-variant SRBM force.

Iraq's deployed missile forces during OIF seemed ill prepared for operationally launching ballistic missiles

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

**Iraq WMD
Retrospective**

**Iraqi
Weapons (U)**

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