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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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7 February 1957

Dear Allan:

Several weeks ago I was asked to produce (or arrange to have produced) a study on the Hungarian Rebellion covering the following questions as a first priority:

- a. What factors played a role in the start of the revolution, and to what degree? (Hatred of the Hungarian Communist Regime, of the Soviets; hatred of any special group within the Regime, such as the Secret Police (AVH); economic reasons; religious factors, etc.)
- b. How did the revolution actually start and who were the active forces behind it? Was it totally spontaneous, and if so, what elements participated initially and kept up the momentum? Or were organized forces behind it, at least partially, and if so, who were they (clandestine adherents of the former Hungarian regime, i.e. "fascists," labor elements, students, military, church elements, opposition elements within the Communist Party, etc.) and how and when did organizing start?
- c. What were the reasons for the Regime's unwillingness or inability to "absorb" the oppositional moves in time, as successfully done in Poland? Was it lack of the Regime's touch with the man-on-the-street and resultant inadequate intelligence information, or is the answer largely to be sought in the somewhat intangible element of difference in the emotional behavior of various nations?
- d. Did the revolution initially aim at the overthrow of the Communist Regime, or was the aim more modest in terms of achieving a fair degree of "liberalization"? If the latter was the case, what were factors which determined the all-out course, which inevitably had to lead to full Soviet repression?

and these questions as a second priority:

- e. The General Strike, its organization and its results.
- f. The workers councils, their functioning and their relationship with the Government and the CP on the one side, with the freedom fighters and underground groups, if any, on the other side.

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g. The technical experiences of street and guerrilla fighting, the actions against Soviet tanks in close combat, etc.

I felt at the time that we did not have sufficient information from intelligence, refugee and other sources to justify the preparation of a sound analysis. I still think that we should perhaps wait for additional reports from all sources [redacted]

[redacted]. However, I am now committed to set up some kind of schedule, and I would like to ask for your comments on the requested research. Specifically, is OIR planning to cover any of the listed points in scheduled IR's? Would OIR consider producing a paper on any or all of the points?

As we have in my shop one analyst who has followed recent Hungarian developments and has been keeping relevant materials, perhaps we could work together on some aspects of the research. In any event I would appreciate your comments some time next week, if possible, and I will of course be glad to come up and discuss the proposal if you wish.

[redacted]

John S. Tilton

[redacted]

Mr. Allan Evans
Director, Office of Intelligence Research
Department of State

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