

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
CIA HISTORICAL RELEASE  
PROGRAM  
JUNE 2017

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~

4233

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 October 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence  
FROM : William W. Wells  
Deputy Director for Operations  
SUBJECT : WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Problems of Rear Services  
Support of Naval Forces Under Conditions  
of a Closed Theater of Naval Operations

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on articles from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This article describes the functions, organization and procedures of rear services support of naval forces under conditions of a closed theater of naval operations. The need for cooperation with the rear services of other armed forces branches is noted throughout. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article appeared in Issue No. 5, which was published in 1973.


2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned the [redacted] Codeword [redacted].

[redacted]  
William W. Wells

TS #778552  
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



Distribution:

- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Director of Intelligence and Research  
Department of State
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence  
Department of the Army
- Director of Naval Intelligence  
Department of the Navy
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
U. S. Air Force
- Director, National Security Agency
- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence  
for National Intelligence Officers
- Deputy Director for Intelligence
- Director of Strategic Research
- Director of Weapons Intelligence

~~TOP SECRET~~

TS #778552  
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~THIS DOCUMENT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED~~



# Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 10 Pages

COUNTRY USSR/WARSAW PACT



DATE OF INFO. 1973

DATE 4 October 1977

SUBJECT

WARSAW PACT JOURNAL: Problems of Rear Services Support Under Conditions of a Closed Theater of Naval Operations

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article from a SECRET Soviet publication called Information Collection of the Headquarters and the Technical Committee of the Combined Armed Forces. This journal is published by Warsaw Pact Headquarters in Moscow, and it consists of articles by Warsaw Pact officers. This article was written by Rear Admiral F. Scheffler. This article describes the functions, organization and procedures of rear services support of naval forces under conditions of a closed theater of naval operations. The need for cooperation with the rear services of other armed forces branches is noted throughout. This article appeared in Issue No. 5, which was published in 1973.

End of Summary



TS #778552  
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



Page 4 of 10 Pages

Problems of Rear Services Support of Naval Forces  
Under Conditions of a Closed Theater of Naval Operations

by

Rear Admiral F. SCHEFFLER  
Deputy Commander of the People's Navy  
of the German Democratic Republic  
Chief of the Rear

The constant improvement of combat equipment entails a sharp rise in the volume and complexity of the tasks to be carried out by rear services.

For the rear services of naval forces this means the rapid growth of materiel-technical requirements and complication of the related tasks involving the storage and transport of these items, the preparation of complicated equipment, and the repair of electronic and other complex systems and devices. All of this of course puts forth new demands for preparedness on the part of personnel of all levels of the rear services.

In this article, based on experience accumulated during a period of training exercises, are set forth some problems of rear services support of naval forces under conditions of a closed theater of naval operations.

It must be noted that under such conditions naval forces usually carry out their main task in cooperation with other branches of the armed forces. For this reason, the nature and volume of tasks carried out by the navy are determined to a considerable extent by the combat activity of the ground forces operating on the coastal axis.

Several features characteristic of coastal theaters of military operations exert a particular influence on the work of the fleet rear, hampering or facilitating it:

-- the enemy has the capability to take action against units, subunits, and installations of the fleet rear with the forces and means of his ground forces over a great depth (even up to operational depth);

TS #778552  
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 5 of 10 Pages

- the fleet rear units and installations must be located in the rear area of the ground forces operating on the coastal axis;
- cooperation between the fleet rear and the ground forces rear, and also with the rear services of other branches of the armed forces, must be set up on a wide scale;
- joint utilization of transportation lines, various production facilities, depots, etc. must be coordinated with other branches of the armed forces, but at the same time there is a capability to interchange materiel-technical means of the same type among the rear services of the armed forces branches.

Taking into account the nature of the operations of naval forces in a closed theater of naval operations, and the conditions which arise for the rear services in this case, we shall consider the problem of rear services support as an aggregate of measures, a problem including the organization of the fleet rear services as well as materiel, medical, technical, emergency rescue, engineer, chemical, airfield engineer, airfield technical, and aviation technical support.

As is known, the main task of the fleet rear services is to carry out comprehensive and timely rear services support of fleet forces in conformity with standards.

The creation of a rear services organization in full conformity with the nature of the tasks it is to carry out is a determinant condition for successful work by all of its subunits and installations. Indeed, it is precisely in the coastal area of a closed theater of naval operations that subunits, facilities, and even whole groupings of rear services are concentrated, and they must be disposed with consideration for the requirements of dispersed deployment. Preference here is always given to operational-tactical interests. In other words, the fleet rear must sometimes refrain from deploying its own rear subunits to the fleet's advantage, giving the preference in this regard to the rear services of the ground forces or of other armed forces branches. An unavoidable requirement on the rear services support of naval forces under such conditions is the forming of detachments of auxiliary ships from the complement of floating forces and means; we regard the employment of such detachments as a means for uninterrupted rear services support of naval forces. During the exercises which were conducted, auxiliary ships with a displacement of 1,500 to 2,000 tons showed

TS #778552  
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 6 of 10 Pages

good results. It also became clear that it is extremely important to make wide use of the capabilities of river and coastal fleets. All of these measures can make it possible to substantially relieve the burden on ground transportation carried out on behalf of other armed forces branches and to organize the transport of materiel for naval forces, even up to rear naval groupings, without additional transshipments.

In our opinion, special attention should be given to the protection and security of rear services subunits and facilities. A fleet rear unit located in a ground forces rear area not only runs the danger of being subjected to enemy air strikes but is also within the operating range of the tactical and operational-tactical missiles of the enemy ground forces. In resolving the problem of protecting the rear, it is obviously necessary to concentrate the main attention on those of its subunits and installations which exert the decisive influence on the entire process of rear services support. In dispersing rear units and facilities in order to protect them, we must still not lose sight of the importance of preserving their high operating efficiency.

As experience shows, in order to quickly eliminate the aftereffects of enemy strikes on a rear grouping which includes subunits, units, and facilities of several armed forces branches, it is expedient to form temporary rear subunits. In case of need, they can be of significant assistance to all armed forces branches.

As regards materiel support, the proper echeloning and allocation of supplies are of decisive importance, in our opinion. If we assume that supplies located aboard ships and launches (part of the supplies of the tactical rear) must be at the highest possible level, then the supplies (up to 50 percent) placed at rear services facilities must be located aboard floating means. In addition, it is considered expedient to keep an equal amount of supplies aboard auxiliary ships of the operational rear in order to provide for the uninterrupted replacement of field supplies which are used up or are destroyed by the enemy.

As a rule, naval strike forces in a closed naval theater are capable of advancing to a new area of combat operations in a

TS #778552  
Copy # 3~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 7 of 10 Pages

short time, because of the relatively short distances to be covered. Under these conditions, the ships are in combat through almost the entire operation and thus do not have time for restoration of their combat effectiveness. This in turn entails an increased expenditure of the various means by each separate unit of the fleet's combat complement.

The fleet rear must of course carry out a great many measures connected with the preparation, transport, and delivery of various kinds of materiel and combat means.

It must also be kept in mind that under these conditions, especially in areas of deep water, both sides use mines extensively. The performance of minesweeping activities involves the expenditure of a great deal of minesweeping equipment, the supply of which is an important task of the rear services.

The work of the rear services to provide materiel-technical support of naval forces is considerably facilitated if national navies operating jointly in a closed theater of naval operations use materiel of standard type. In this connection, it is expedient, in our opinion, to form rear services subunits and facilities in such a way that they have identical functions and capabilities regardless of nationality.

For successful medical support of naval forces personnel, it is necessary to select a form of organization for the medical service such that casualties can be given timely medical aid at sea and evacuated to shore within the stipulated time limit.

The principal method of medical aid in a closed naval theater is the provision of specialized and professional medical aid at shore medical facilities.

In case of a debarkation of amphibious landing forces or the conduct of an antilanding defense, a major role is played by cooperation between naval medical services and those of the other armed forces branches. It is precisely during the debarkation of a landing force that the naval medical service is obliged to assume responsibility for a series of medical support measures, in particular the evacuation of casualties from the debarkation zone.

TS #778552  
Copy # 3~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 8 of 10 Pages

In our view, emergency rescue support throughout the operational zone can be organized according to emergency rescue sectors. The emergency rescue forces operating in each sector will function in support of all the naval forces located within that sector. For emergency rescue support of strike forces operating on the main axis and the secondary axes, it is considered expedient to provide for mobile emergency rescue forces equipped with high-speed auxiliary combat ships, supported when possible by helicopters.

The better we succeed in setting up established points for comprehensive ship repair, utilizing unfortified ports, harbors, and areas in which mobile subunits and facilities can be deployed, the more successfully we can provide technical support to our naval forces. Shipyards, bases, and large ports are obviously unsuited to this purpose in view of their overall military importance. We consider that most of the technical malfunctions which arise will have to be dealt with by mobile repair groups directly at their basing points or at appropriate anchorages under cover of the shore. Thus, in order to avoid excessive concentration of forces at repair points, it is necessary to have highly mobile repair forces on shore and at sea. The most effective form of eliminating malfunctions, particularly at the tactical level, is to replace entire equipment units or assemblies. In this case there is a saving of time expended on discovering the malfunction, and rapid restoration of the equipment's technical readiness is achieved.

Because of the concentration of rear subunits and installations of different armed forces branches in the coastal area under conditions of a closed theater of naval operations, very great importance is attached to cooperation of the rear services. The need for efficient cooperation of the fleet rear with the ground forces rear is dictated by the fact that the naval forces coordinate their actions with the actions of ground forces groupings located on the coastal axis. Under these conditions, in our view, the principle of control, the one ensuring the rapid mutual exchange of information and closer cooperation, must be the exchanging of operations groups from the rear services. Basically, however, control of the rear services must be implemented through the rear control post. We are assuming here that the rear services are represented at the main fleet command post by a liaison group made up of staff

TS #778552  
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 9 of 10 Pages

specialists and officers with specialties. Such an organization facilitates the rapid preparation of a plan in practically any situation and provides for timely assignment of tasks to subordinate rear subunits and facilities.

Regarding questions of rear services support of naval forces in a closed theater of naval operations, in our view, the following conclusions may be drawn:

- the fleet rear deploys its subunits and facilities on land; this must be coordinated in advance with the ground forces operating on the coastal axis;
- existing rivers and canals in the coastal area must be used primarily by the fleet rear;
- with the aid of auxiliary ships, comprehensive rear services support must be organized in such a way that the supplying of naval forces would not be disrupted in case of a massive incapacitation of shore bases;
- the use of temporarily formed bodies as groupings to eliminate the aftereffects of enemy employment of weapons of mass destruction must be carefully coordinated with all armed forces branches operating in the coastal zone;
- if several navies of a military coalition are operating in a closed theater of naval operations, it is necessary to have standard weapons and equipment and above all standard materiel, in order to provide for mutual support and interchange;
- it is very important to achieve standardization of the organizational structures of the rear services of a military coalition; at the very least there must be standardization of the level of operating capacity of subunits and facilities of identical function in the different navies;
- it is necessary to have on board auxiliary ships a certain quantity of materiel-technical means, which will comprise part of the supplies of large units and of the fleet;
- in the cooperation system, it is expedient to use the method of exchanging operations groups among the rear control posts of the navies, and of the groupings operating on the coastal axis of the ground forces, and of other armed forces branches.

In our opinion, we should continue to develop highly efficient forms and methods of rear services support of all armed forces branches.


TS #778552  
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



Page 10 of 10 Pages



TS #778552  
Copy # 3

~~TOP SECRET~~