





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
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
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


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


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South African Parliamentary Byelections




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SOUTH AFRICA: Elections Test White Support

The ruling National Party probably will retain at least four of five seats being contested in parliamentary byelections tomorrow, even though rightwing opponents are expected to make a strong showing. 

The press reports that the contests probably will be close in two districts where the rightwing Conservative Party and the Herstigte National Party are fielding a single candidate against the ruling party. The liberal Progressive Federal Party expects to finish second in the two elections it has entered. 

National Party campaigners, including President Botha, have taken a tough line in the rural, heavily Afrikaner constituencies of Orange Free State and northern Cape Province. The appeal to conservative voters has followed law and order themes, defiant statements of resistance to foreign pressures, and condemnation of recent liberal opposition meetings with the African National Congress. Recent polls have shown an approval rate of 82 percent among Afrikaners nationwide of state-of-emergency measures. 

The Conservatives and the Herstigte National Party have been exploiting recent unrest and dismal economic conditions. 
 in the contest in Springs district the Conservatives have been conducting a "black peril" campaign in contrast to the government's program of gradual racial reform. 

Comment: The elections will not affect the balance in Parliament, where the National Party has 128 of 178 seats, but a poor showing by the National Party would be a setback for government efforts to sell its reform program to whites. The rightwing parties probably will interpret any narrow victories by the ruling party as a sign that their support is growing amid increasing dissatisfaction with the government's handling of unrest and the economy. The Nationalists, on the other hand, probably will regard victories in all five constituencies as a mandate for its present policies. 



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
CEMA-NICARAGUA: Increasing Aid

Soviet Bloc countries promised to boost economic and technical aid to Nicaragua during the second annual meeting of the CEMA-Nicaragua Mixed Commission, which ended Friday in Managua. According to [redacted] press releases, Sandinista policymakers claim the new accord will substantially increase aid, but they refuse to provide specifics. Projects that CEMA countries are financing include cattle and vegetable farms, a deepwater port on the Atlantic coast, and scholarships for Nicaraguan students in the USSR and Eastern Europe. [redacted] the Soviets and East Europeans rejected Managua's continuing attempts to become a full CEMA member. [redacted]


Comment: The Soviets almost certainly saw the meeting as a way to encourage their allies to increase aid to the Sandinistas. They also hope that continuing the annual meeting will improve the effectiveness of Bloc economic aid. Moscow's concerns about its increased outlays if Nicaragua becomes a full CEMA member, and possibly about adverse reactions in the West, almost certainly will prevent Nicaragua from becoming any more than an observer. [redacted]



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IRAQ-IRAN: Air Attacks on Additional Oil Facilities

Iraq's reported airstrikes against inland Iranian oil facilities indicate Baghdad may be expanding its air war against economic targets. The Iraqis claim their Air Force struck four pumping stations inside Iran yesterday, although the attacks have not been confirmed so far. The strikes follow extensive attacks last week against Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf.

Comment: The Iranian ability to keep Khark Island functioning despite continuing Iraqi attacks may have caused Baghdad to extend its operations into Iran's interior. Damage to critical pumping stations and other facilities could decrease refinery output, cut natural gas to Iranian cities, and reduce oil exports. The Iraqis, however, would need to make a determined effort to achieve these results. The raids against the oil platforms are designed to knock out Iranian early warning stations there, possibly as a prelude to a larger attack on Khark.

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
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
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Planned Saudi Aircraft Redeployment



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In Brief

Middle East

— **Saudi Arabia** moving quickly to implement Tornado program . . . first squadron to be based at Dhahran on Gulf . . . F-5s to replace obsolescent Lightning interceptors at Tabuk in January . . . British pilots will fly Lightnings to UK for resale.

— **Syria and Iraq** began exploratory contacts last week at behest of **Saudi Arabia** . . . high security officials met under guise of routine border security talks . . . Syria's support for Iran obstacle to reconciliation.

— **Iranian Consultative Assembly** yesterday approved 22 of 24 ministerial nominees provided by Prime Minister Musavi . . . two not endorsed had been slated for economic jobs . . . shows Assembly still concerned Musavi has mismanaged economy.

— **Prominent Qatari** journalist recently completed trip to **USSR** at Soviet invitation . . . first of its kind . . . Qatar playing down political importance . . . Qatar may reassess lack of ties to Moscow.

Africa

— **Liberia** to announce today Head of State Doe won elections . . . troops deployed in Monrovia to head off possible violence by oppositionists claiming fraud . . . probably could not handle widespread unrest.

— **Sudan's** last F-5E fighter aircraft lost in air show over Juba Friday . . . other than one F-5F trainer, Air Force has no more ground attack fighters . . . although operations against rebels not significantly affected, will lower troop morale.

USSR

— **West German** newspaper claims **Soviets** have told wife of Andrey Sakharov she may travel to West for glaucoma treatment at her convenience.

continued

Americas

- Cuban press reports Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze met with President Castro on Sunday . . . probably discussed coming Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, US-USSR discussions on Latin America . . . first official meeting with Castro.

- Peruvian Foreign Minister's visit to Ecuador last week, trip to Chile early November intended to promote President Garcia's proposal for arms control in region . . . major breakthrough unlikely despite optimism of Chilean Foreign Minister.

Europe

- Leaders of outgoing Italian coalition meet today . . . Defense Minister Spadolini's Republicans still distancing themselves from coalition partners on Middle East, terrorism . . . press insists that return of Craxi Cabinet intact most likely outcome.
- NATO approved funds for Oslo to build second set of storage facilities in northern Norway next summer . . . will house weapons, equipment for a second Norwegian brigade now based in south . . . will speed reinforcement for defense in north.
- Netherlands campaigning to win invitation to next May's economic summit in Japan as EC presidency nation . . . wants views of smaller countries represented . . . will cite precedent in 1982 when Belgium participated in same capacity.

South Asia


- Several more Pakistani opposition leaders arrested to prevent united action against Parliament decision granting immunity to martial-law administrators . . . regime likely to try to weaken opposition by letting principal leader Benazir Bhutto leave country.
- Israeli Prime Minister Peres met Sri Lankan President Jayewardene in Paris yesterday . . . probably trying to shore up flagging ties . . . Jayewardene urged to expel Israeli interests




Special Analysis

ISRAEL-PLO: Prospects for Israeli Retaliation

Israel probably will launch reprisals comparable to the airstrike on PLO headquarters in Tunis earlier this month if terrorist attacks continue. 

Israel has long claimed the right to attack PLO facilities wherever they are located, as it did in Lebanon before the invasion of June 1982 and in Jordan from 1968 to 1970. Such attacks are intended to disrupt the PLO's infrastructure and to upset planned and ongoing operations. They are also meant to persuade other Arab governments that they would be wise to crack down on PLO activities in their countries to avoid similar Israeli action there. 

The Tunis raid muted criticism from Likud hardliners—most notably Minister of Commerce Sharon—that Prime Minister Peres is soft on terrorism, but they will resume their demands for reprisals if attacks against Israelis continue. They are certain to press hard for strikes against PLO bases in Jordan if future terrorist attacks are linked to planning in Amman. For the time being, however, Peres's newly strengthened credibility will enable him to keep the upper hand in Cabinet discussions of terrorist issues and help him forestall Likud pressure for reprisals against the PLO in Jordan. 



Outlook


The Labor-led unity coalition probably would prefer to attack PLO facilities in Algeria or in North or South Yemen, believing such action offers less risk of harming relations with the US and undermining the peace process than would striking at the PLO in Jordan. Since the Tunis raid, Peres and Rabin have repeatedly stressed that King Hussein has not allowed cross-border attacks or establishment of terrorist training camps.

Peres and Rabin, however, probably would support punitive action against PLO bases in Jordan if there were a terrorist "spectacular" or a series of smaller attacks they believed were launched from Jordan. In such circumstances, public pressure for retaliation—fanned by Likud—would leave them little flexibility.

As a warning to Amman, Tel Aviv probably would sharply increase statements denouncing King Hussein for allowing Palestinians to operate from Jordan and for supporting an intolerable threat to Israel's security. If Israel still felt it necessary to attack, it would be likely to try to reduce the danger to civilians by striking at the PLO military base near Zarqa rather than at PLO administrative offices in Amman. Israel's aim would be to force Hussein to expel the PLO from Jordan and to hold out the threat of further reprisals.

As an alternative to airstrikes, Tel Aviv might consider selectively killing PLO officials responsible for organizing terrorist operations, including Arafat's deputy Abu Jihad and his lieutenants. Although this strategy might disrupt PLO operations for a time, it would not discourage further attacks over the long term or satisfy Israeli public demands for a more significant show of force.

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Special Analysis

AFGHANISTAN-UN: Insurgent Representatives

The arrival of an Afghan resistance delegation at the UN General Assembly last week was the first significant effort by the new insurgent alliance, Ittihad Islami, to focus international attention on the Afghan issue. The delegation plans eventually to challenge the Afghan Government's representatives at the UN and hopes to set a precedent for representation at other international forums.

The group is led by Islamic fundamentalist Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and includes a representative of each of the main groups in the Afghan resistance alliance. The last significant effort by the insurgents to lobby at the UN was in November 1980, when a delegation—split between supporters of former King Zahir and guerrilla leaders—was denied entrance to the General Assembly.


If the insurgents become more visible in international organizations—and especially if this were to result in serious challenges to the Kabul regime's credentials—the Soviets would pay a somewhat higher political cost to maintain their occupation of Afghanistan.

Gulbuddin and other resistance leaders have in the past played down political efforts in favor of military activity, but they may come to see the benefit of a more active international role. An effective presentation at the UN might also help insurgent unity efforts. A fractious, high-profile delegation, on the other hand, would discredit the resistance, improve Kabul's position, and hamper efforts to build diplomatic and material support.

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


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