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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# WEEKLY SUMMARY

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
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## NONPROLIFERATION TREATY NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE AT GENEVA

Moscow is expected to agree soon to the tabling at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee meeting in Geneva of a revised draft nonproliferation treaty (NPT) worked out by the US and Soviet delegations. Recognition of the dangers which could have arisen had the Arabs or Israelis possessed nuclear weapons has added impetus to the effort to get a treaty. In addition, the Johnson-Kosygin and Rusk-Gromyko talks on the subject have raised hopes at Geneva.

The revised draft leaves blank the controversial Article III on safeguards. For Article IV, which sets forth the means of amending the treaty, two proposals have been referred to Moscow. The first would allow amendment by a majority of the signatory states; any such amendment would not be binding on a state which declined to accept it, and any of the nuclear states could veto it outright. The second proposal would make binding on all signatory states any change accepted by a majority but would give veto rights to all 30 nations on the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) at the time of the vote. Only the nuclear states have permanent seats on the board.

When the NATO foreign ministers at their 14 June meeting approved tabling the revised NPT draft of Geneva, West Germany's Brandt initially demurred, and Bonn still has doubts about several aspects of the treaty. In a demarche delivered last week

the Germans insisted the US stick to the essence of the Article III safeguards clause previously agreed to by the NATO allies and cautioned against accepting, even for negotiating purposes, any Soviet proposal without full consultation with the allies. The German note also reiterated opposition to the second alternative amendment clause for Article IV and stated that even the first is unsatisfactory because it gives a veto only to the nuclear powers.

The safeguards issue still focuses on the roles of EURATOM and the IAEA, and two compromise proposals have been raised. One would have Article III refer neither to verification of EURATOM safeguards by IAEA nor to any specific transition period in which safeguard arrangements would be worked out between the two agencies, but the EURATOM countries would withhold final ratification until there is a IAEA-EURATOM agreement. IAEA officials and the Soviets are very cool to this.

The other proposal would have each nonnuclear party to the NPT undertake to conclude within three years' time "bilateral or multilateral" agreements with IAEA. The term "multilateral" could apply only to EURATOM, but the omission of any specific reference to EURATOM might make this resolution acceptable to all concerned. EURATOM officials, however, are objecting to the three-year time limit on grounds that it would give all the bargaining power to the IAEA. [REDACTED]