

(b)(1)
(b)(3)

**Soviet Naval Activity
Outside Home Waters
During 1982**

Key Judgments

*Information available
as of 12 March 1983
was used in this report.*

Statistical analysis of Soviet naval operations indicates that Soviet naval ships spent nearly 57,000 ship-days outside home waters in 1982—almost 3 percent more than in 1981 but nearly 2 percent below the record high level set in 1980. Soviet presence increased only in the Pacific Ocean and the waters off West Africa. Several changes in deployment patterns and composition occurred:

- In the Indian Ocean, Soviet presence fell marginally. The Soviets continued their efforts to secure naval privileges in Seychelles, Mauritius, and other littoral states. Other activities included operations by the Minsk vertical takeoff and landing aircraft carrier and the initial deployment of a Victor-III nuclear attack submarine to the region.
- In the Pacific Ocean, the overall Soviet presence increased almost 16 percent. Deployment to the South China Sea expanded, helping to create a 90-percent rise in ship-days of general purpose submarines in the Pacific.
- In the Mediterranean, Soviet presence declined somewhat, in spite of a moderate reinforcement of the squadron during the Lebanese crisis. The Soviets continued to develop naval ties with Libya and to pursue contracts for the repair of naval auxiliaries in Greek shipyards.
- In the Atlantic, the Soviet presence remained stable. The Falklands crisis generated a minimal Soviet response. Coordinated intelligence ship and submarine operations were conducted close to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of the United States.
- In the Caribbean, a Soviet task group arrived in Cuba late in the year and conducted extensive training activities with Cuban naval forces. Despite the task group's presence, Soviet ship-days in the region declined more than 12 percent.
- Off West Africa, the number of Soviet ship-days increased by nearly 80 percent with substantial growth in the presence of general purpose submarines and surface combatants. This was due principally to a number of show-the-flag visits and to the low-level response to the Falklands crisis.

[Redacted]

- Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) continued to make up a substantial part of the Soviet presence in 1982. Deployment days fell moderately, however, with irregularities in deployments occurring in Ethiopia, Aden, and Cuba. [Redacted]

We believe that the pattern and scope of Soviet naval deployments in 1983 probably will not change greatly. The Soviet commitment to distant deployments is highly visible but represents only a small portion of total naval resources. We believe that Moscow is unlikely to undercut its readiness to perform high-priority wartime tasks in waters close to the USSR by significantly increasing the proportion of naval units operating in foreign waters. The Soviets will continue to respond to situations involving fluctuations in the level of Western naval presence in distant regions and to pursue the operational and political benefits of new or expanded naval privileges in Third World nations. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]



Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Key Judgments	iii
Introduction	1
General Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments	1
Measuring Soviet Naval Presence	1
Regional Levels	2
Indian Ocean	2
Pacific Ocean	4
Mediterranean Sea	5
Atlantic Ocean	7
Caribbean Sea	8
West African Waters	8
Soviet Naval Air Deployments	9
Comparison of Soviet and US Naval Presence Outside Home Waters	11
Outlook	14

Figures



1.	Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Region, 1974-82	vi
2.	Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by Type, 1974-82	vi
3.	Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1974-82	3
4.	Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean, 1974-82	4
5.	Soviet Ship-Days in the Mediterranean Sea, 1974-82	5
6.	Soviet Ship-Days in the Atlantic Ocean, 1976-82	7
7.	Soviet Ship-Days in the Caribbean Sea, 1974-82	8
8.	Soviet Ship-Days off West Africa, 1976-82	9
9.	Overseas Deployment of Soviet Naval Aviation, 1976-82	10
10.	Soviet and US Out-of-Area Deployments Compared by Type, 1982	11
11.	Soviet and US Out-of-Area Deployments Compared by Region and Type, 1982	12
12.	Representative US and Soviet Ships	13
13.	Deployment Areas of Soviet Naval Forces Outside Home Waters	15
14.	Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces	17

Figure 1
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Region, 1974-82



^a West African ship-days for 1974-75 are included in Atlantic Ocean data for those years.

Figure 2
Soviet Ship-Days in Distant Waters,
by Type, 1974-82



^a The data for patrol combatants are included in surface combatant category.

Soviet Naval Activity Outside Home Waters During 1982

Introduction

This paper examines Soviet naval presence during 1982 in six regions.¹ It compares the level of naval deployments with that of recent years and highlights important naval activities that took place in each region. The paper also looks ahead to developments that are likely in 1983 as a result of the trends established during 1982.

The US Navy provides the statistics for US naval ships that operate abroad. The Naval Operations Intelligence Center (NOIC) supplies similar data concerning Soviet naval activity outside home waters. We use the yearly tabulation of ship-days—the presence of one ship away from home waters for one day—to compare deployment levels with those of preceding years and to identify changes in deployment patterns.

Analysis of Soviet naval activities and use of facilities is based on [redacted] as are descriptions of improvements made at major facilities. We also use NOIC's monthly summary of port calls to follow Soviet interest in individual countries or regions. Judgments about Soviet use of naval forces for political purposes are all-source evaluations.

General Pattern of Soviet Naval Deployments

Soviet naval presence outside home waters rose almost 3 percent in 1982, to approximately 56,800 ship-days, but was nearly 2 percent below the record high level set in 1980. Although the ship-day total has been relatively stable in recent years, there have been changes in both the number and type of ships deployed to individual regions (see figures 1 and 2). In 1982 Soviet ship-days in the Pacific Ocean increased by almost 16 percent, while the number in the Indian Ocean dropped by about 5 percent. In the Caribbean Sea, Soviet deployment declined about 13 percent. West African ship-days, which fell 40 percent in

¹ Regional limits, as shown in figure 13, are determined by the Naval Operations Intelligence Center.

1981, increased almost 80 percent in 1982. As in 1981, changes in the two areas that have the largest commitment of Soviet ships—the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean—were minimal.

Overall changes in deployment patterns included increases in deployments of general purpose submarines, research and space event support ships (SESSs), and amphibious ships. There were cutbacks in the presence of surface combatants, ballistic missile submarines, and mine warfare ships.

From Moscow's perspective, the acquisition of naval privileges associated with distant deployments serves both operational and political purposes. Operationally, the Soviets' use of foreign facilities contributes to their ability to sustain worldwide deployments in keeping with the position of a major international power. It provides an opportunity for peacetime reconnaissance of Western naval forces that could extend into the early stages of hostilities. Most foreign facilities currently are not suitable for extensive logistic support in time of war or for pre-positioning supplies, however. They serve largely as secure, sheltered anchorages; and most would be highly vulnerable in wartime. Politically, the Soviets appear to believe that naval forces abroad can reinforce Moscow's response to regional crises, underscore their commitment to specific policies or local regimes, and support their efforts to strengthen ties to individual governments. Such benefits are intangible, however, and historically transient.

Measuring Soviet Naval Presence

The measurement of Soviet out-of-area presence through ship-days can be misleading because it does not reflect the combat potential of naval forces outside home waters. Although foreign deployments attract significant attention, they tie up only a small

portion of Soviet warships. In 1982 the Soviets deployed a daily average of about 19 surface combatants and 39 general purpose or ballistic missile submarines to foreign waters. This is less than 5 percent of the USSR's surface combatant inventory and about 10 percent of its submarines. [redacted]

Regional ship-day counts are also misleading if used to indicate Moscow's wartime priorities. The Indian Ocean Squadron, for example, fluctuates in size largely as a result of the level of US forces in the region. The sharp increase in presence in the region in 1980 did not reflect a change in Soviet wartime strategy or make the Squadron an adequate counter to US forces in the area. [redacted]

Yearly statistics for overseas deployments do not highlight the large percentage of noncombat ships that the Soviets maintain abroad. Because the Soviets are less dependent on facilities ashore to support overseas deployments, a deployed naval group generally includes more auxiliaries than its Western counterpart. Logistic support ships make up just over half of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, and Soviet augmentation during a crisis frequently includes as many additional auxiliaries as warships. Soviet naval auxiliaries stationed in overseas ports, such as yard craft, repair ships, and submarine tenders, are also counted as naval ships deployed out of area. In 1982 the USSR had a daily average of 88 auxiliaries deployed in distant waters. [redacted]

Other Soviet operating procedures also narrow the judgments that can be made based on ship-days:

- Analysis of the operating patterns of deployed Soviet ships indicates they are less active than their Western counterparts, operating only about one-third of the time they are in distant waters. Our figures, however, do not differentiate between days spent at sea and those spent in ports or at sheltered anchorages.
- Ships in transit for sea trials or interfleet transfer are part of our count although they may not perform any operational duties.


- During a regional crisis, the Soviets usually expand their naval presence and then gradually reduce it as tensions abate. Their presence sometimes remains above the precrisis level, as it has in the Indian Ocean.
- To maintain its overseas force levels, the Soviet Navy must commit ships both to predeployment and postdeployment maintenance and to transits to and from their home fleet. Thus the ship-day count, which includes only deployed units, does not reflect the total effort required by distant naval operations.
- In peacetime, Soviet ships occasionally perform duties overseas for which they are not primarily designed. For example, ships configured for antisubmarine warfare were used to react to the movement of US carriers to the eastern Mediterranean Sea during the crisis in Lebanon, and minesweepers have been used to monitor the activity of US battle groups. [redacted]

Regional Levels

Indian Ocean. Soviet ship-days in the Indian Ocean declined 5 percent during 1982 (see figure 3). The squadron there consisted of an average of about 28 ships—down from 30 in 1981 and 32 in 1980—including two or three general purpose submarines, three major surface combatants, a mine warfare ship or patrol craft, one or two amphibious ships, and at least 15 auxiliaries and four research vessels. Several changes in the squadron's composition were noted in 1982:

- A Pacific Fleet V-III nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) made the first deployment of that class to the Indian Ocean. Use of Pacific Fleet V-IIIs in the region would ease the burden on the Northern Fleet, which has been responsible for providing V-I and V-II SSNs for deployment to the Indian Ocean since 1980.

Figure 3
Soviet Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1974-82



~~Secret~~

589914 Y-83

- Surface combatant ship-days fell more than 45 percent, continuing a pattern begun in 1981 as the tensions surrounding the American military response to the Iranian hostage crisis faded.
- The presence of general purpose submarines also continued to decline, dropping almost 26 percent to a level roughly half the total for 1980. The cutback

included a gap in the presence of F-class diesel submarines (SSs) and a total absence of submarines for several weeks during the fall—the first such gap since just before the hostage crisis in late 1979.

The Kiev-class carrier Minsk made its first Indian Ocean deployment since joining the Pacific Fleet in mid-1979. During its month of operations in the Indian Ocean, the Minsk was observed to conduct erratic maneuvers and trail oil.

Its Forger vertical takeoff and landing aircraft (VTOL) demonstrated improved proficiency over its last deployment in 1980—as would be expected given the greater experience of the pilots. The Minsk's Forgers were observed for the first time armed with AA-8 air-to-air missiles during flight operations and interceptions of US naval aircraft.

The Minsk task group made only two port calls in the Indian Ocean—at Aden, South Yemen, and Bombay, India. The Bombay stopover included a Soviet naval airshow probably intended to bolster aircraft sales to India. The departure of the Minsk group on 15 January 1983 left the Indian Ocean Squadron without a major surface combatant.

In November 1982 the new leftist government of Mauritius permitted the first Soviet port call since the June election. the Soviets have raised the issue of regular naval ship access to Mauritian ports with the new government on several occasions. They expressed their strong interest in such visits and have attempted to convince various officials of the importance of a clearly defined policy on the issue. The Mauritian regime apparently reconsidered the exclusion policy because of economic and political considerations. Early in 1983 the government indicated that US and UK naval ships would be welcome.

Soviet ships also demonstrated their continuing usefulness in supporting regimes by calling in the Seychelles during periods of unrest—in late summer following an army mutiny and in October when

President Rene was concerned about domestic unrest.

[Redacted]

The Soviets continued to support the Indian Ocean Squadron with auxiliary ships and yard craft stationed at Ethiopia's Dahlak Island in the Red Sea and at Aden, South Yemen.

[Redacted]

Sri Lanka granted Moscow permission for its naval auxiliaries to be repaired there in 1982. Singapore's yards, where repairs were previously undertaken, have been closed to Soviet naval vessels to protest the invasion of Afghanistan.

[Redacted] Sri Lankan shipyard officials have expressed enthusiasm for a continuation of Soviet contracts.

Pacific Ocean. Soviet presence in the Pacific Ocean reached a record high in 1982, with ship-days increasing almost 16 percent (see figure 4). The daily average of 35 ships outside home waters in the Pacific included three major surface combatants, six general purpose submarines, four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), a mine warfare ship, 13 or 14 auxiliaries, and five or six research ships.


According to our analysis of Pacific Fleet operations, the expanded deployment in the Pacific is largely due to a 90-percent increase in the presence of general purpose submarines along with moderate increases in deployments of mine warfare ships (14 percent), auxiliaries (29 percent), and research ships (19 percent). The presence of both major surface combatants and SSBNs declined.

The SSBN decline was partially due to the transfer of two Y-class units from out-of-area operations to the Sea of Japan. It may have also resulted in part from the removal of units from the inventory to comply with SALT limitations. Moreover, the age of the

Figure 4
Soviet Ship-Days in the Pacific Ocean, 1974-82

- Hydrographic and space event support ships
- Auxiliaries
- Amphibious ships
- Mine warfare ships
- Surface combatants^a
- General purpose submarines
- SSBNs

Ship-days
16,000



^aThe data for patrol combatants are included in surface combatant category.

Y-class submarines and attendant overhaul requirements make it increasingly difficult for the Soviets to maintain them in distant patrol areas. Additionally, D-class SSBN units, which are increasing in number on active duty, do not have to deploy out of area to cover intercontinental targets.

In both 1980 and 1981, the level of Pacific Ocean ship-days primarily reflected expanded transits to and from the Indian Ocean. In 1982, however, with the drop in Indian Ocean deployment, it appears that the primary factor in the increase of Pacific ship-days was the group of ships operating in the South China Sea. This included an average of two or three surface ships, eight auxiliaries, and—in the second half of the year—three general purpose submarines.

Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, continues to serve as the main stopover point for units transiting to and from the Indian Ocean and for those operating in the South China Sea.



The Soviets may be interested in concentrating some ship repair activity at Ho Chi Minh City. The city has the only large graving dock in Vietnam, the Soviets have recently towed an 8,500-ton floating drydock there as well. A small transporter dock was also transferred to Ho Chi Minh City from Cam Ranh Bay, but it was returned in early 1983 after repairs.




The Soviet Pacific Fleet reacted vigorously to American naval activities in the Sea of Japan. Soviet ships conducted extensive surveillance of the USS Lockwood in May, two US battle groups in the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk in late 1982, and other US ships exercising near Soviet waters. Soviet ships also monitored Chinese naval activities in the South China Sea.

Figure 5
Soviet Ship-Days in the Mediterranean Sea, 1974-82

- Patrol combatants
- Hydrographic and space event support ships
- Auxiliaries
- Amphibious ships
- Mine warfare ships
- Major surface combatants
- General purpose submarines

Ship-days
25,000



~~Secret~~
589916 7-83

Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea decreased by nearly 4 percent in 1982 (see figure 5). The Mediterranean Squadron in 1982 normally included about 44 ships: eight or nine major surface combatants, seven general purpose submarines, a mine warfare ship, 23 auxiliaries, and

three or four research ships. As in the past, the size of the squadron increased during the summer months because of training and Moscow's use of naval forces to respond to tensions in the eastern Mediterranean.

Our analysis indicates that changes in the composition of the squadron were marginal. The Soviets continued to deploy C- or E-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) throughout the year, but there were lengthy gaps in the presence of SSNs. No J-class cruise missile submarine (SSG) deployment occurred until the end of the year. The presence of all types of Soviet ships except patrol ships declined in 1982.

The Soviets carried out routine exercises in the Mediterranean. The Kiev VTOL aircraft carrier participated in training with units of the Mediterranean Squadron in August. Later in the year there was a joint deployment of the Moskva and Leningrad helicopter carriers to the Mediterranean Sea, the first since 1970.

Most Soviet activity in the region occurred in connection with the Lebanese crisis and the subsequent augmentation of US forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Initially, the Soviets moved several large combatants to the eastern Mediterranean and established surveillance of US battle groups and the coast of Lebanon. Two cruisers—a Kynda and a Sverdlov with the Mediterranean Squadron commander aboard—remained in or near Tartus, Syria, from mid-June to mid-September, and two warships patrolled the Lebanese coast. These gestures probably were intended to demonstrate Moscow's commitment to Syria, but neither joint Soviet-Syrian training nor Soviet naval aviation deployment to Syria took place, as it had in 1981. In spite of this augmentation during the Lebanese crisis, the ship-day total declined.

Soviet naval ties with Libya continued to develop in 1982. In October a Soviet task group conducted joint exercises with the Libyan Navy.


an Oskol-class repair ship with a J-class SSG in Tobruk. The repair ship remained after the submarine departed

until 15 February 1983, perhaps indicating that the Soviets hope to establish limited upkeep capabilities in Tobruk like those in Tartus. This may point to a new dimension in Soviet-Libyan affairs. There seems to be caution on both sides, but we believe Qadhafi is unpredictable enough to change his mind and perhaps give the Soviets attractive, new naval options.

Current Soviet access for repairs in the Mediterranean includes routine servicing of submarines in Syria and Yugoslavia and use of Menzel Bourguiba Shipyard in Tunisia for surface ships. According to Greek media in January 1982 Papandreou's socialist government renewed a 1979 Greek-Soviet agreement allowing the repair of unarmed naval auxiliaries at the Neorion shipyards on Syros Island. Fewer than 12 ships were overhauled in 1982 under the terms of the agreement, which required case-by-case approval. Athens remains unwilling to provide unrestricted access for naval auxiliaries or to permit repairs of Soviet combatants. The Soviets do not require access to Greek shipyards to support their deployments to the Mediterranean; the squadron relies heavily on its own auxiliaries for logistic support and routine maintenance. Nonetheless, any improvement in land-based support would ease the burden on afloat logistics and on repair cycles at Soviet shipyards. As a result, we expect the Soviets to continue to pursue repair contracts during the coming year.

In November 1982 the Turkish Government raised the issue of access to the Mediterranean by greatly increasing fees for transiting the Turkish Straits. Most Soviet surface ships serving in the Mediterranean come from the Black Sea, and the Soviets are the most frequent users of the Straits. Littoral Black Sea countries—Romania, Bulgaria, and the USSR—as well as some other maritime nations opposed the fee increase, and the Turks responded with threats of sanctions against nonpaying ships.

Figure 6
Soviet Ship-Days in the Atlantic Ocean, 1976-82



^aThe data for patrol combatants are included in surface combatant category.

~~Secret~~
589917 7-83

Atlantic Ocean. Soviet ship-days in the Atlantic Ocean dropped less than 1 percent in 1982 (see figure 6). The Atlantic Ocean presence usually comprised about 38 ships—eight SSBNs, 10 general purpose submarines, two major surface combatants, a mine warfare ship, nine auxiliaries, and eight research ships. Changes in composition included an 8-percent increase in general submarine presence, roughly a

7-percent drop in surface combatant deployment, a sharp decline in the presence of amphibious ships, and an almost 4-percent decrease in SSBN deployments.³

The 1982 statistics reflect normal Soviet activity— participation in joint Warsaw Pact training in the North Sea, routine Northern Fleet exercises in the spring simulating protection of SSBN operating areas and deployment routes, and operations against US and NATO deployments.

The Soviets' limited use of naval forces in response to the Falkland Islands crisis reflected a natural concern and caution about the movement of a large Western naval force. US Navy data show that the Soviet Navy, which does not regularly operate in the lower South Atlantic, did not deploy forces there in response to the hostilities. Soviet naval units monitored the progress of the British task force from the United Kingdom to Ascension Island.

Their reconnaissance aircraft flew several missions over the task group, but collection of real-time data was limited. The Soviet and East European

³ Although the number of Soviet ship-days in the Atlantic is second only to that in the Mediterranean, the Atlantic ship-day totals do not represent the same kind of operational naval presence that is found in the Mediterranean, where an on-station squadron makes up the majority of the ship-days. Ships moving from the Northern Fleet to the Mediterranean, West Africa, and other regional deployment areas appear in Atlantic ship-day counts, as will most interfleet transfers, maiden deployments, and sea trials.

fishing fleets that normally operate in the South Atlantic cooperated in some rescue efforts during the crisis but generally remained well clear of the area of conflict.

Caribbean Sea. In 1982, as in 1981, the highlight in the Caribbean Sea was the arrival of a Soviet task group, which entered the Caribbean late in November. The group—a guided missile cruiser, a frigate, a Tango-class submarine (SS), and an oiler—called in Havana during the first week of December in time for the celebration of Cuban Armed Forces Day. Like previous task groups, the Soviet ships conducted joint antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and antisurface warfare (ASUW) exercises with Cuban forces and the surface combatants made a cruise through the Gulf of Mexico. The Tango and the oiler were berthed at the Punta Movida submarine base at Cienfuegos, which had not previously been used by Soviet ships.


In addition to the task group there was also the normal Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean—a small number of research, space support, intelligence-gathering, and other auxiliary ships (see figure 7).

West African Waters. Soviet naval presence in West African waters increased nearly 80 percent in 1982, close to that in 1979 and 1980 but well below that in the late 1970s (see figure 8). The composition of the West African patrol in 1982 also conformed more closely to that before 1981:

- An F-class submarine operated off West Africa after the British task force began its transit to the Falkland Islands. No submarines had served with the patrol throughout most of 1981.
- An Alligator-class landing ship was deployed to the region in February. No amphibious ships had served in 1981, although landing ships were generally part of the force in the 1970s.
- At least one major surface combatant was present throughout most of the year in contrast to the irregular presence of warships in 1981. The presence of supporting auxiliaries rose concurrently.

In 1982 the Soviets made several port calls to show the flag. The helicopter carrier (CHG) Moskva's tour of West African waters, the first of the Moskva-class


Figure 7
Soviet Ship-Days in the Caribbean Sea, 1974-82



^aThe data for patrol combatants are included in surface combatant category.

since 1974, provided a highly visible naval presence. The Moskva, along with a frigate and an oiler, made port calls in Lagos, Nigeria, and Luanda, Angola—the first Luanda port call by a Moskva. A naval group—cruiser, frigate, and merchant tanker—visited

Figure 8
Soviet Ship-Days Off West Africa, 1976-82



^a The data for patrol combatants are included in surface combatant category.

~~Secret~~
589919 7-83

Point Noire, Congo, the first Soviet call there since early 1976. Several Soviet port calls were also made to Mocamedes, Angola, continuing a policy begun in 1981 to demonstrate Soviet support for Angola in its conflict with South Africa.

Ships deployed to West Africa contributed little to the Soviets' limited response to the Falkland Islands crisis. Moscow had already restored a major surface

combatant and an amphibious ship to the contingent before the outbreak of hostilities. These ships remained in normal operating patterns throughout the period.

Soviet AGIs watched both the northern part of the transit and the British activity at Ascension Island—where AGIs periodically monitor US missile tests—

A Soviet minesweeper continues to patrol the West African fisheries protection zone in the waters off Morocco. This patrol began in 1981 after the seizure of Soviet fishing boats by Morocco.









Soviet Naval Air Deployments

Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA) provides Moscow with a valuable tool for reconnaissance of Western naval forces, especially US carriers and battle groups. It also contributes to Soviet presence in distant areas and to Moscow's capability to react to regional events.


Soviet naval aircraft deployments abroad declined about 12 percent in 1982 (see figure 9). Although the level of presence increased in two regions, there were also disruptions in the pattern of deployments to several countries. The general decline in out-of-area aviation days is due mainly to a lessened SNA presence in the Indian Ocean. IL-38 May ASW aircraft deployments to Aden, for example, dropped more than 20 percent. Instead of the four aircraft usually present, only a pair were deployed for several months. These Mays monitored Western naval activity in the Indian Ocean. Veering from their usual pattern, they also flew to the southwest Indian Ocean near the Seychelles in October and November at about the same time that Soviet warships visited the island to show support for the regime.

in February 1983 the Mays at Aden

Figure 9
Overseas Deployment of Soviet
Naval Aviation, 1976-82

- | | |
|---|--|
|  Syria, IL-38 May and TU-16 Badger |  Vietnam, TU-142 Bear F |
|  Libya, IL-38 May |  Vietnam, TU-95 Bear D |
|  Ethiopia, IL-38 May |  Angola, TU-95 Bear D |
|  South Yemen, IL-38 May |  Cuba, TU-95 Bear D |

Aircraft days in country
5,000



there by a pair of IL-38 Mays was broken from early February through May, possibly because of the threat posed by Eritrean rebels. If this was the case, the Soviets simply packed up and left, returning after the danger had passed. This ease and flexibility are typical of Soviet deployments of naval aircraft overseas for limited operations. These Mays carried out surveillance of Western navies, including the first surveillance of a US carrier in the Red Sea in September. [redacted]

Continuous SNA deployment to Cam Ranh, Vietnam, consists of pairs of TU-95 Bear D maritime reconnaissance aircraft and TU-142 Bear F ASW aircraft. The deployment pattern to Vietnam was stable in 1982, with the aircraft averaging about 60 days per deployment. [redacted]

Naval aircraft based in the Soviet Union also participated in surveillance against Western naval forces in the Pacific. [redacted] The United States conducted an exercise in the Sea of Japan in fall 1982 involving two aircraft carriers. It attracted particular SNA attention—the first use of an SNA Backfire in response to US carrier deployment and extensive flight activity by Bear F ASW aircraft for surveillance. [redacted]

Pairs of IL-38s deployed four times—at approximately two- to three-month intervals—to Libya in 1982. This is an increase of almost 70 percent over deployments to Libya during 1981, which occurred only after midyear. The Mays conducted their first surveillance from Libya of US carriers and participated in the first joint Soviet-Libyan maritime exercise. [redacted]


[redacted]
[redacted] There was no SNA deployment to Syria in 1982. [redacted]





deployed to Al Anad Airfield, South Yemen, for the first time. If permanent, this move may be designed either to reduce Soviet visibility in Aden or to increase security for the Soviet aircraft or both. [redacted]


[redacted] SNA presence at Johannes IV Airfield near Asmara, Ethiopia, fell by a third in 1982. The previously continuous deployment


The Soviets increased the presence of the Bear D reconnaissance aircraft in Cuba more than 45 percent in 1982. Bear activity from Cuba was vigorous in 1982, with a record number of surveillance sorties against transits of US forces. The sorties were also






more aggressive in nature than in the past. In January, for example, two Bears entered the US air defense identification zone off Virginia and flew to within 1 nautical mile of the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson. The Bears also acted as targets of opportunity for small-scale Cuban air defense exercises as SNA aircraft have in other countries where they were deployed. Pairs of aircraft were in Cuba almost continually until early November when deployments ceased for the remainder of the year. 


In early 1983 Bear D reconnaissance aircraft returned to Cuba.  
 the Soviets made their initial deployment of Bear F antisubmarine warfare aircraft to San Antonio de los Banos Airfield outside Havana. Regular Bear F missions from Cuba would enhance Soviet ASW capabilities in the northern Atlantic. 

SNA Bear D deployment time to Angola rose about 14 percent in 1982, but the pattern of presence was irregular. In April and May the Bears conducted six surveillance missions against British forces transiting to or from the South Atlantic during the Falkland Islands crisis. During much of the crisis, however, the Soviets had no aircraft in Angola. 

According to a fairly reliable source, the Soviets continued efforts to regain air access in Guinea in 1982. Landing rights in Conakry could improve their capability to monitor US traffic in the eastern Atlantic. 







[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Moscow will continue to probe for the operational and political benefits of new or expanded naval privileges. Target nations will probably include Guinea, Mauritius, Libya, Seychelles, Greece, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, and North Yemen. Major improvements to existing facilities in South Yemen, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Angola are unlikely and unnecessary. Nor are the Soviets likely to make greater use of facilities in Cuba or secure privileges elsewhere in the Caribbean unless they alter their naval commitment to the region. [Redacted]

Outlook


We do not expect major changes in the pattern of Soviet deployments to foreign waters during 1983. The peacetime mission of naval forces deployed abroad is both political and operational: to respond either to changes in the regional presence of Western navies or to opportunities to expand Moscow's influence. Deployments that exploit the vulnerabilities of Third World governments and demonstrate military power are valuable to the USSR. They cannot, however, interfere with the Soviet Fleet's preparedness for combat; there is probably an upper limit of naval units that Moscow is willing to commit to distant operations. The relative stability of total ship-days over the past decade suggests that the Soviets are near that optimum balance. [Redacted]

The Soviets will vigorously pursue opportunities for deployment of aircraft in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean, or West Africa as well as options to improve communications and intelligence-gathering capabilities. Overall, however, Moscow will not permit pressure for such privileges to interfere with its pursuit of good relations with potential host states. [Redacted]

Naval forces will continue to be available for extended contingency responses, such as the resumed concentration of forces in the eastern Mediterranean during January 1983. Such unforeseen activities, however, may begin to force the Soviets to adjust deployment levels elsewhere, particularly if changes in their inventory resulting from retirements, overhaul of aging units, or slowed production reduce the availability of ships. We expect to see continued experimentation with foreign deployments of surface combatants and submarines, like that of the V-III SSN to the Indian Ocean this year. We also expect further adjustments in fleet responsibilities for supporting overseas operations as the ship and submarine inventories of the individual fleets continue to evolve. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Figure 13
Deployment Areas of Soviet Naval Forces Outside Home Waters



634467 7-83

Figure 14
Overseas Facilities and Anchorages Used by Soviet Naval Forces

