




Director of
Central
Intelligence

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National Intelligence Daily

Saturday
9 January 1982


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
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
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3 POLAND: Purge of Party Liberals

A purge of party liberals will make it difficult for Premier Jaruzelski to carry out his pledge to continue reforms. Reports from Krakow indicate that the regime has given intellectuals better treatment than workers in the detention camps. TASS again has accused the US of interfering in Poland's internal affairs and violating the Helsinki Final Act. [redacted]

A leading liberal in the Communist Party, Tadeusz Fiszbach, has resigned as party chief in Gdansk Province. Fiszbach had been a strong supporter of reforms and had sought--with relative success--to establish a working relationship with Solidarity. [redacted]

4-7
Although some officials assert there will be no purge, the party media continue to emphasize that the party must remove quickly those people with "alien" ideological and political convictions. Jaruzelski's political and economic program will not be made public for another two to three weeks. A plenum of the Central Committee is being prepared, but no date has been set. [redacted]

Comment: The purge in the party is probably hitting hardest the liberals who advocated that the party give up its highly centralized and authoritarian style of rule, although the evidence is inconclusive. This group includes intellectuals, members of the academic community, and workers in the largest and most strategic industries who were the strongest supporters of Solidarity. More resignations are expected before the Central Committee convenes. [redacted]

A conservative victory in the party will present it with serious and long-term problems. By insisting on ideological purity and loyalty, the party will lose some of its most skilled people, thus making it difficult--if not impossible--for the party to initiate programs to meet Poland's problems. Despite his alleged desire to implement reforms, a conservative victory would diminish Jaruzelski's ability to do so. A conservative party will find it almost impossible to win any credibility with the population. [redacted]

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small groups of detainees who were formerly Solidarity leaders are on hunger strikes in several prisons and that there was a "rebellion" by detainees being held near Rzeszow. Relatives of these detainees have been denied visiting rights, and letters and packages have not been distributed. [redacted] a "model prison" had been set up to deceive the Red Cross and other groups reporting on prison conditions. Archbishop Glemp, in his sermon on Wednesday evening, criticized conditions in some of the detention centers. [redacted]

7

Comment: Most earlier reports that said that conditions in detention camps were not bad had come from intellectuals. The more gentle handling of intellectuals may reflect, in part, a realization that the military government will be judged in the West more by its treatment of intellectuals than of workers. [redacted]

Soviet Commentary


TASS yesterday assailed Vice President Bush's remarks on Thursday as another attempt by the US to "sell its anti-Soviet line" to Western Europe. The article contended that Washington is exploiting divisions within Europe to pressure the Allies into applying their own sanctions against Poland and the USSR. [redacted]

1/4-1

TASS also attacked the decision by the Voice of America to increase the number of Polish-language broadcasts as an escalation of US "psychological war." The commentary described the broadcasts, along with those of Radio Free Europe, the British Broadcasting Corporation, Deutsche Welle, and others as a blatant effort to turn the population against the Warsaw government and the USSR, "in violation of the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Accords." [redacted]

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Comment: The TASS commentary on Western broadcasts also was intended as a response to the US demarche made on Thursday about Soviet jamming of Voice of America Polish-language broadcasts. Since the start of the Polish crisis in the fall of 1980, the Soviets have countered Western accusations that jamming violates those provisions of the Helsinki Final Act governing the free flow of information with the contention that some Western broadcasts contravene the Act's principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries.

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
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


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
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


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


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
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⑥ GHANA: Uncertainty and Instability

The new government's lack of direction militates against an early return to stability. [redacted]

Coup leader Rawlings still has not completely formed his government. He also has failed to provide clear guidance on how he intends to improve economic conditions and restore military discipline. The regime's statements and actions so far have stressed nonalignment and the avoidance of excesses that characterized the last Rawlings regime. [redacted]


Supplies of goods remain near normal, and government pressure has resulted in some price reductions. Nothing has been done, however, to attack the economy's underlying problems. [redacted]



Comment: Without stronger domestic direction and some results in the economic sphere, more unrest seems inevitable. Rawlings presides over an uneasy coalition of Army officers and former supporters eager for reforms. [redacted]

The establishment of people's tribunals outside existing laws to lead the anticorruption drive could degenerate into a witch hunt. In addition, public criticism of security agencies of the ousted government are likely to be followed by drastic reforms or purges that could raise new fears among the military. [redacted]





(6)

SOUTH AFRICA - NAMIBIA: Tougher Negotiating Position

South Africa is portraying the skirmish with Cuban soldiers in southern Angola earlier this week as confirmation that Soviet-directed Cuban forces are taking over the Namibian insurgency from guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization. Only four Cubans were involved in the encounter near Cahama, and they were not accompanying Angolan or SWAPO units. At least one was a logistic specialist. The government-controlled radio and principal Afrikaans newspapers are linking the incident to the Namibian negotiations, and are stressing that withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola will affect domestic acceptance of a settlement.


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Comment: Pretoria is trying to exploit the clash to help build its case for withdrawal of Cubans from Angola as part of a Namibian settlement. It is misrepresenting the time and place of the clash to support its exaggerated claims of a threat by Cuban troops to Namibia. Although media accounts claim that one Cuban was captured in the area of operations against SWAPO, the incident actually occurred more than 100 kilometers inside Angolan territory.

[Redacted]

[Large Redacted Area]



④ HAITI: Failed Invasion Plot

The ill-conceived and highly publicized attempt yesterday by longtime exile leader Bernard Sansaricq to overthrow the Duvalier regime is one of a number of coup plots rumored in recent weeks. Sansaricq had planned to launch an airborne invasion of Haiti from South Caicos Island. Turks and Caicos officials seized a small amount of arms and ammunition intended for his group and arrested two American mercenaries, leaving the 37-man Haitian contingent stranded. Sansaricq, who participated in three unsuccessful invasion attempts during the 1960s and a leaflet airdrop over Port au Prince in October, and his group face deportation to Miami. Unconfirmed information from Haiti, however, indicates that the group has relocated to The Bahamas. [redacted]

Comment: Exile plotting is continuous, and the recent international publicity over the exodus of the "boat people" has intensified the rumormongering. The disparate exile groups lack organization, unity, and effective leadership. Security forces will remain on full alert in Haiti until Duvalier is confident that the threat posed by Sansaricq has subsided. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

(10) WESTERN EUROPE - POLAND: Political and Security Concerns

Differences among West European members of NATO will continue to prevent a strong response to the imposition of martial law in Poland. The West Europeans remain determined to insulate their economic interests and detente as much as possible from the Polish crisis. The Allies feel frustrated at their inability to prevent the repression in Poland or US sanctions against the USSR, which many fear will neither alleviate the Polish situation nor change Soviet policy.

Disagreements like the one over Poland do not threaten the unity of NATO members in their determination to resist the latent threat of direct Soviet aggression against the West, a threat that has been underscored for them by events in Poland.

On the other hand, the controversies in recent years over INF modernization and arms control, the Middle East, Afghanistan, and now Poland have found the Alliance able to arrive only at lowest common denominator solutions. The appearance of disunity and irresolution has steadily weakened NATO as a political force.

While some West Europeans were concerned about the risks involved in Polish reforms, many had hoped that liberalization, a revival of nationalism, and a trend toward limited independence would help increase European leverage on the superpowers. Increased ties between Poland and Western Europe, coupled with increasingly independent West European security policies, had raised European hopes of stimulating detente and insulating the region from the US-Soviet competition.

This was as true for most West European Communists as for the other parties, the governments, and the people.

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Poland was an object lesson for Communists who wanted to prove that, in the environment of detente, democracy and "socialism" could coexist in the same country. Before martial law, West European Communists pointed to evolution in Poland as evidence that a revitalized Europe could include a Communist system distinct from both the Soviet model and West European social democracy. [redacted]

These hopes have been dashed. The Allies nevertheless are encouraging Warsaw and Moscow to salvage renewal in Poland, while urging Washington not to allow Poland to damage the INF talks or other vestiges of detente. [redacted]

Domestic Political Factors

✓ The peoples of the West European countries have generally reacted more strongly than their governments to the imposition of martial law in Poland. Demonstrations have taken place in most large cities. Labor leaders have provided vocal and material support to Solidarity and seem intent on increasing their aid. [redacted]

The media, while skeptical of US sanctions, also have been solidly anti-Soviet and opposed to martial law. Public outrage explains in large part why West German and other European authorities have been persuaded to adopt stronger rhetoric. [redacted]

The crisis in Poland has temporarily distracted West European populations and media from the peace movement and the question of INF modernization and arms control. This distraction, however, will not kill the movement or substantially reduce the reluctance of most West European governments to allow new US missiles to be based in their territory. [redacted]

The West Germans, with the largest economic and political stake in the Polish crisis, have tried to limit the damage outside Poland. Bonn wants to prevent a Soviet invasion that would shatter *Ostpolitik* with Moscow

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and intra-German relations, the preeminent issue for many Germans. Chancellor Schmidt has been having increasing difficulty managing relations with both superpowers. Short of an invasion, West Germany will continue to trade with the East and to seek access to Soviet raw materials. [redacted]

France's economic and political stake in the crisis, on the other hand, is not as high as Bonn's, and Paris has been the Ally most willing to take a strong rhetorical--but not punitive--stand. [redacted]

President Mitterrand's political position at home enables him to take advantage of traditional French ties to Poland reflected in mass demonstrations against martial law. He is by inclination more critical of Moscow than his predecessor. [redacted]

Mitterrand can further embarrass the French Communists, whose tortured, pro-Moscow position on Poland has left them isolated from domestic public opinion and most West European leftist parties. Poland may have completed the destruction of the party's efforts to project its political independence from the USSR. [redacted]

Italian Prime Minister Spadolini also has taken a firm stand against Moscow. He must maneuver delicately, however, between contending partners in his fragile coalition. Socialist leader Craxi hopes to use a tough anti-Soviet line to gain votes at the expense of Italy's Communists and to forestall any rapprochement between the Communists and Christian Democrats. [redacted]

The Italian Communist Party, the largest and most influential in Western Europe, has reacted sharply to Polish developments, however. Party statements have been anti-Soviet and against martial law. [redacted]

Some party members have chafed, either out of loyalty to Moscow or because they consider Polish workers irresponsible. Party leaders have reacted to the dissension by preventing denunciations of martial law. [redacted]

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Outlook

As long as the situation in Poland remains as it is, West Europeans will continue to reject Soviet policy and react cautiously to the US response. If Moscow invades Poland, however, or if martial law results in renewed worker resistance or prolonged repression, the Allies may become more inclined to invoke limited sanctions against Warsaw. [redacted]

West Europeans have become apprehensive about US anti-Soviet sanctions following the invasion of Afghanistan. Public opinion could turn hostile if the West Europeans believe that US actions are becoming provocative, overly harmful to detente, and aimed at crippling the Polish and Soviet economies. [redacted]

Fears that the US is encouraging economic collapse would make it easier for Allied governments to convince their constituencies of the need for a divergent course. In addition, Communist parties once more would concentrate their fire against US rather than Soviet policies. [redacted]

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