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before

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WAR BEHIND THE LINES

In World War II, secret armies were organized to fight behind enemy lines in many countries -- France, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Greece, Norway, Italy, Russia, Burma, China, Thailand, Holland, Denmark to name a round dozen. There are good books describing these epic undertakings. There are two excellent books surveying the whole range of resistance activity in Europe.

Guerrilla movements in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania were a major factor in keeping some 40 German, Italian, Bulgarian, and Croatian divisions in Southeast Europe far from the arena of decision. Resistance armies in Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium tied up other German forces and delayed their movement to reinforce fighting in France. I will confine myself largely to the saga of the French resistance because I know something about that from first-hand experience and because it played the largest role in support of American forces.

When Great Britain found itself alone, its ground weapons and much of its army left behind on the continent, it could only carry on a war of attrition on the economy and the morale of the victorious Germans using the only weapons it had left -- the Royal Navy to blockade, the Royal Air Force to bomb and the people of Occupied Europe to sabotage and undermine.

To do this, Churchill created SOE, the Special Operations Executive, and issued the memorable orders, "Set Europe aflame." That proved to be easier said than done. There were many brave Brits ready to become commandos and many brave Europeans eager to risk their lives to inflict damage on the

conqueror and redeem their national pride and honor. Europeans at large cheered them on until they discovered what the occupier would do in reprisal, like wipe out an entire village. That turned the SOE and the resistance groups that sprang up all over Europe largely away from exploits of one-shot sabotage and hit and run raids toward long, careful, slow organizing, training and equipping of specialized groups and networks to get intelligence, spread propaganda, do quiet and difficult-to-detect sabotage and develop paramilitary units capable of striking when the time came. A long slow process, some three to four years, of building building skills, support structures, training capabilities, organization and relationships set in.

There were three separate but loosely tied together organizations which guided and supported this process from outside France -- SOE, the Free French in London and Algiers and, during the last two years, the OSS from Washington, London and Algiers. Inside France there were five principal strands from which separately led and frequently rival resistance forces developed. Indigenous resistance groups sprang up all over France and consolidated into some half a dozen movements, more or less focused in particular regions of the country. When the Germans attacked Russia, French Communist and far left groups which had largely supported the occupiers went into resistance and began to form their own units. SOE and General De Gaulle's intelligence and action service separately sent organizers and radio operators all over France to recruit resistance groups and provide them with communications, training and weapons. Finally, when the occupier imposed a labor draft, thousands of young men left their homes to hide in the hills and forests and ultimately formed themselves into military units seeking arms from London directly or through one of the earlier resistance networks.

These were the principal actors when the Americans of OSS arrived on the scene in London and Algiers, late in 1942 and early in 1943.

Our new and senior partners of SOE and the Free French had been in business for some four years and had become proficient and confident in sending organizers and saboteurs into France and keeping them there. They had performed sabotage jobs, established organizers and communications, built up caches of weapons, organized resistance bands and networks of resistance bands. But using these scattered and irregular forces in support of large-scale military operations in France was a new problem. It had to be worked out with military planners and commanders skeptical about the value of resistance forces. We were in something of a vicious circle. We had to satisfy ourselves about the reliability of resistance forces and persuade the arriving American military to provide the plans and equipment they would require to have any value.

Military commanders coming over from the US were schooled and geared to secure their objectives by the application of overwhelming firepower, and they believed they had it. For the most part, they knew little and cared less about French resistance or guerrilla warfare.

For the generals at SHAEF the French resistance movement might be as good and as important as OSS and Special Operations Executive said it was. On the other hand, the resistance might be a chimera and not materialize in the crunch. Sure, there were thousands of Frenchmen eager to fight the occupier, as many as 150,000 by some estimates. But they had to be organized, armed and directed. Could the still nascent and loosely knit resistance movement quickly become a cohesive striking force sufficiently under our command and

control to make a military contribution to the invasion? That belief required an act of faith. OSS and SOE officers in Grosvenor Street and Baker Street who had worked with Passy and his BCRA and with the men going in and out of France were willing to make that commitment. But selling the idea to our generals and their planners wasn't easy. Their distrust showed up dramatically in the paucity of arms and equipment the allies dropped to the Maquis and other French resistance groups. Arms deliveries to those areas of France where the invasion was planned had a lower priority than the air lift to Yugoslav and Italian partisans.

The Germans held the French resistance in much higher regard than some of our own generals. Of course the Wehrmacht had reason to, having lived cheek to jowl with the resistance for four years and watching it grow from a few disgruntled groups to a swelling national movement. As early as October 1943 Field Marshall von Rundstedt wrote a perceptive analysis of resistance potential:

"The aims of the Resistance movements and of the British organizations working with them is to set the stage for action against the rear of the German army to coincide with the Allied landings. Their most urgent task will be to attack our lines of communication with maximum force. Such is the danger inside the country, and it may have a very unfortunate effect in the course of a major battle. We can undoubtedly combat the Resistance movements effectively, but this will deplete our available forces and thus strengthen the position of the British and American troops."

We had only to look at the map of resistance forces pinned in our situation room on the fourth floor of Grosvenor Street to see the potential von Rundstedt discerned. Strong resistance forces threatened virtually all of the major communications lines linking German troop concentrations in France with the Reich and with each other. The resistance had built up strongholds in the mountains of the Haute-Savoie near the Swiss and Italian borders and from them could hack at links between Germany and the French Mediterranean coast. Troops defending the Bay of Biscay area were vulnerable to attacks on their lines to units stationed along the Channel coast. German Army Group B had its First Army headquartered in Bordeaux and the 19th in Marseilles. Charged with defending the area between the two coastal cities, the Army Group was caught in a pincer between resistance forces to the north in the Massif Central, and to the south in the Pyrenees. They had the potential for squeezing the Toulouse-Carcassonne gap. Dijon, Lyons, Grenoble, Avignon and Limoges were studded with resistance outposts. Clermont-Ferrand was the resistance center for the whole Massif Central. The Rhone, the major German traffic artery in southeastern France, was thus threatened from two sides. Finally, the resistance in the Massif Central and in the Morvan could harass any troops moved from the south and east to beef up defenders of the invasion coast. And while underground activities were more complicated in the heavily populated and strictly policed north, the resistance was a force the Germans had to reckon with there, too.

We could see great possibilities on these maps and there was no end of plans to exploit them. While how much support to give resistance forces and just how to use them was debated, time was running out and we had to get

on with getting organizers and radios in place, supplying them with weapons and ammunition and shaping up command and control arrangements if any plan at all was to be implemented.

The debate about whether to support the French resistance was being slowly resolved in the resistance's favor. Yet although Churchill's forceful action to increase planes and supplies in February gave France first priority, the debate on how to use resistance forces continued. French generals in London and Algiers kept pushing Plan Vidal, named after General Delestraint's nom de guerre. It called for seizure of large areas in the heart of France that had the physical geography to aid defense. Once seized, these outposts would give the Allies "ports of entry" for airborne troops and supplies. French and Allied soldiers would then strike at the enemy's rear. SHAEF thought the plan too bold and too risky and would have none of it. Yet despite the formal SHAEF rejection of Plan Vidal in February, the notion lingered on. The French never really gave up on it. And later on resistance groups in the Alpine areas and in the Massif Central actually tried to put it into operation. Others argued forcefully that resistance units be located in "redoubts of Resistance" in those parts of France geographically most suited for large-scale military operations. There, the Maquis could be organized and trained, and readied for sabotage and guerrilla operations behind enemy battle lines. For the professionals, Colonel Passy in London and Jacques Soustelle in Algiers, these redoubt concepts were hopelessly romantic. They counselled more sophisticated concepts of guerrilla war. Hit and run attacks, they argued, should be coordinated into an overall plan of action to support the military sweep across France. Such a sweep

would be necessary to liberate France, they believed, but it should be carried out in such a way as to limit reprisals and conserve strength for future action. De Gaulle himself advanced a third, even broader concept, which was to come closest to the reality. All the disparate resistance elements inside France would simply fuse into an "army of the shadows" to form a single "French Army."

The most ambitious, and finally the most rewarding, operational plan for French resistance forces was called Plan Vert because it was typed on green paper. It featured maps and drawings prepared by 20 draughtsmen and listed some 800 missions against French railways, all spelled out in detail. Its centerpiece was a series of simultaneous rail cuts designed to prevent designated German units from moving toward the front lines. These rail disruptions were to be maintained while the cross-channel Allied buildup went forward.

To back up plans for sabotaging the rails, the French Ministry of Roads and Bridges (remember that the Vichy government continued to function, however impotently, right up to the liberation) developed Plan Tortue or Tortoise. It was designed to delay moving up German reinforcements on the road by cutting highways and blowing up bridges, thus delaying movement of trucks and armor. The specific focus of the plan was German armor. It provided information to local resisters on how best to delay Panzer divisions rumbling toward Normandy -- by blocking possible alternate routes, erecting road obstacles, and creating bottlenecks.

The French Post and Telegraph Service, the PTT, provided London with a study of underground telephone and telegraph lines the Germans used. Plans were included for making cuts which would interrupt enemy communications between front lines and headquarters to the rear. Such cuts would force the Germans to abandon land lines and take to the air where we could pick up and read their messages.

In March, Eisenhower came down on our side in a directive which formally consolidated SO/SOE as Special Forces Headquarters, put it under direct command of SHAEF and ordered it to implement plans for activities in support of the invading armies.

Communications and command arrangements with the resistance moved to the front and center of our concern. Our ability to use these forces depended on both. Resistance leaders operating behind the lines and officers commanding invading troops would have to be able to communicate quickly and effectively if their operations were to mesh. Radio contact alone could not accomplish this. We needed men in Allied uniforms to advise the resistance on Allied needs, and specialists attached to the invading armies who understood the resistance to advise Allied commanders on what French forces could deliver.

We had some 90 tough, confident hell-for-leather volunteers completing their training at an enormous manse called Milton Hall, some 80 miles north of London. They had been recruited from airborne and infantry training camps in the States. Some had just gotten wind of "extremely hazardous mission behind enemy lines" and volunteered. They were a mixed lot -- lawyers, journalists, salesmen, teachers, West Pointers, a banker, a dairy farmer,

a stunt man who had done a hand stand on a ledge on top of the Empire State Building, a French chef in a New York restaurant. With about the same number of Britishers and Frenchmen, they had been toughened up in Scotland, given parachute training near Manchester, and were now being instructed in the gentle art of guerrilla warfare. The Frenchmen were mostly St. Cyr men and professional soldiers. During this month of March they were "marrying" into three-man teams, selecting the partners on whom their life might depend.

The concept of putting men in uniform behind the battle lines was a novel one, and one of the most effective of the war. They were to go in teams of three -- one French officer, a British or American officer and a radio operator. One was appointed the leader, another his deputy, the third served as radio operator. The teams were called "Jedburghs," named after the town on the English-Scottish border where they were trained. Sending them in uniform had a double purpose. Showing the flag would boost the hopes and morale of resistance forces and word would go around France that the Allies had arrived in uniform. In addition, the uniform offered some protection against reprisals if captured.

Hitler, the Gestapo and the Vichy militia paid little heed to such niceties of war as uniforms and terms of the Geneva convention. Indeed, the Fuehrer had issued orders to shoot anyone caught behind the lines, in uniform or not. But the Wehrmacht adopted an attitude of enlightened self-interest. As long as they adhered to the rudiments of the Geneva convention, chances were the Allies would, too. Thus the uniform did offer some protection to volunteers inexperienced in clandestine work and speaking at best a barely passable French that would give them away as quickly as their uniforms.

Hopefully, however, the Jedburghs would reach the shelter of the resistance group they were to advise safely. All in all we trained 300 volunteers and organized them into 93 teams. They were all dispatched into France after D-Day.

Halfway between Jedburghs and regular invasion troops were the OSS Operational Groups (OGs) and the British SAS detachments. Units were larger and better equipped. Their job was less clandestine and more operational. Armed with automatic rifles, machine guns, bazookas and explosive charges they went in to strengthen Maquis units fighting the Germans and to block or divert enemy forces. Our OGs were made up of 15 French-speaking men. We would have 14 of them ready by D-Day. The British had 2,000 soldiers in their SAS and they operated in larger units than OSS Operational Groups, though their aim and purpose were similar.

Teams of other officers and enlisted men would be assigned to invading armies as resistance experts. They were to be grouped into Special Forces detachments and detailed to each Army and Army Group headquarters. Equipped with direct radio links to OSS and SOE stations in England -- there were six in all that served the European resistance's central nervous system -- the SF units were in indirect contact with resistance forces. It worked this way: SE would radio London asking for particulars about a resistance unit operating in their sector, relay instructions on what the area commander wanted the resistance unit to do, and receive messages from the French underground forces about their position and activity. Though clumsy in concept, this "network" functioned with astonishing precision.

As D-Day approached, Eisenhower first put the SOE-OSS units supporting resistance forces together in SFHQ -- for Special Force Headquarters -- and some weeks later brought SFHQ and the Gaullist groups together in FMFFI, the French initials for General Staff French Forces of the Interior, and put the French General Koenig in overall command of all resistance activities and forces inside and outside of France.

When May arrived, organizational confusion was gradually being overcome, or, at least, we learned to live with it. Those inside France disposed to follow De Gaulle would take Koenig's orders, while those distrustful of outside direction would gravitate to the Communist-led Francs Tireurs Partisans as the strongest resistance force not integrated in the FFI. Apart from this split with its postwar political overtones, there was a drawing together of the internal resistance as the SOE organizers tended to follow their followers into full support of De Gaulle and virtually all the networks inside France as well as those organized under the direction of SOE and the Free France from London and Algiers and Rust became part of FFI.

Precise acts of sabotage were carried out all over France. The resistance hit factories turning out war material, bridges, canals, railways, ammunition dumps and communication lines. Supplies dropped from the skies included much more sophisticated weapons -- bazookas, mortar, anti-tank mines, incendiaries and grenades, hundreds of tons in all.

The long debate on how far to trust the underground and how much to use the FFI was resolved by the course of events as much as by conscious decisions in London. They were to be part of the battle flow but with strict Allied controls. FFI troops would attack specific targets or German units, depending

on the judgment of the Allied military commander on the scene. Guerrilla warfare was to be leashed until it could be coordinated with the military offensive. Agents were trained to act at precise times and in specific places to help an approaching Allied force. Anything more, it was agreed in London, would expose resistance groups to German retaliation. French units would be chewed up one by one before they could make their most effective contribution.

Right up to the end of May, Americans, British and French accepted as dogma that resistance forces should lay low until specifically ordered into action. But like so much dogma in the hectic weeks that were the countdown to D-Day, it would be subject to sudden, unexpected change.

In those last weeks before the landings, the wireless reports received in London in increasing profusion created a growing sense of control over large areas of France. Our agents would find themselves surrounded by a large group of people as they landed with fires burning, autos on hand to drive them through villages and smaller towns under Maquis control. Supply depots and hospitals for resistance fighters were functioning. German forces kept to the Routes Nationales and the big towns because they found the secondary roads too dangerous. By sticking to them it was possible to drive long distances with impunity.

Our planes were parachuting almost 100 tons of arms and ammunition a week, ten times what we had been doing two months earlier. The RAF was dropping even more. Still more came from Algiers. The radio set in contact with London or Algiers had become the great sources of power in dealing with

resistance factions and their leaders. The tapping of the morse key could, like magic, bring them sten guns, grenades, bazookas and explosives. A single radio could provide a center of communications for groups of hundreds and even thousands of resistance fighters extending over hundreds of miles of winding roads as their leaders came to request arms and propose or accept missions of destruction, interdiction or preservation.

The radio would give organizers sent into France the clout to insist that resistance leaders avoid pitched battles and split their forces into small units to hit and run, so that German troops scouring the countryside, reinforcing the bridgehead and, later on, retreating, would be ambushed and harried yet find nothing to fight.

The French were very jealous of their authority and control, but the saving grace was that Koenig was a very sensible man who had done a lot of fighting alongside the Allies. In spite of a certain amount of acrimony and apparent total confusion, things would work out better than we had any right to expect. A looseness and laxity in responding to requests would be noticed in the field, but this would be more than made up by zeal, initiative and ingenuity of resistance unleashed.

Against so edgy a background, the decision taken at the end of May about use of the French resistance was even more dramatic and fraught with friction than it would have been under the best of circumstances. On May 31, word reached us at Grosvenor Street that SHAEF had turned the policy for using French resistance upside down. We were told that instead of signaling the resistance to rise unit by unit and join the fighting on a gradual as

needed basis, all action signals to resistance groups in every corner of France would be sent out simultaneously. A year's worth of careful planning and analysis were to be thrown out the window. Conclusions about not exposing the FFI to Nazi retaliation until Allied forces were close enough to help were to be abandoned.

Our first reaction to the new order was one of gloom and foreboding. If issued as now planned it could touch off a national uprising. The Germans would have little trouble drowning the revolt in a blood bath with grave long-term political consequences. Finally, and perhaps most important, our troops moving across France would be deprived of military support from the FFI. David Bruce went to argue this out with General Walter Bedle Smith, Ike's chief of staff. To no avail. The decision was firm. Eisenhower wanted all the help he could get when he needed it most, at the time of the landing.

Some suggested that the French really favored a general call-out, primarily for political reasons. Others thought -- rightly as it turned out -- that too many Frenchmen were too eager to smash the hated Boche to keep them down. Resistance would flare spontaneously almost everywhere. A policy of closely coordinated control was futile. Still others, including some within the OSS community, argued that the greatest contribution resistance could make was to stretch German forces in France as a whole to the utmost. A sudden surge of resistance nationwide, they said, was the best way to achieve that goal. A final argument, and one that seems to have carried the most weight, contended that only a general uprising could keep the Germans confused about the site of our actual landing, and thus

safeguard the Pas-de-Calais deception plan. It cannot be stressed hard enough, moreover, how many hopes of a successful invasion had been hung on that deception plan. It permeated a great deal of Overlord thinking.

The issue, of course, was never in doubt. Ike had made up his mind and that, properly so, was that. The grand deception had to be protected. Our control over the French resistance was not that sure. We needed help on the beaches first. The future would have to be sacrificed for the present. And so, on June 1, the first set of some 300 messages went out over the BBC alerting resistance leaders all over France that the landings were to come during that week. The action messages on the night of June 5 triggered the rail, wire cuts, road and bridge destruction which had been targeted all over France. The French resistance made 950 cuts in French rail lines on June 5th, the day before D-Day, and destroyed 600 locomotives in ten weeks during June, July and August of 1944. Trains and convoys carrying German troops and supplies to the bridgehead were delayed for days and weeks, troops had arrived at the front on bicycles and horse-drawn carts, German headquarters with their telephone lines cut had to communicate with radios which our codebreakers in England read with dramatic consequences. Our greatest debt to them is for the delays of two weeks or more which they imposed on one panzer division moving north from Toulouse, two from Poland and two from the Russian front as they crossed France to reinforce the Normandy beachhead. We'll never know how many Allied soldiers owe their lives to these brave Frenchmen.

In the mountainous parts of France, even before D-Day, large numbers of Maquis, confident that the Allied landings would not be delayed much longer, were mobilizing to attack German occupying forces. This went back

to Plan Vidal, sponsored by officers of the French army, to create some kind of a redoubt within France as a base to which Allied troops could be sent by parachute and glider to join with the Secret Army in attacking German forces from within. This concept was never given the slightest encouragement in London.

Pitched battles occurred in Vernon, at Mont Mouchet, at Mont-St. Michel, and at plateau of Glieres in eastern France near the Swiss border. These were an unfortunate and unnecessary waste of life and resources. Only the hit and run protection of flank guerrilla actions paid off. Normandy, jammed with troops coast to coast, was no place for irregular forces to fight. This had been foreseen and emphasis in the phase was on activating resistance forces 50 to 150 miles behind the front to slow down reinforcements, tie down garrisons and harass German units from the rear. The first concentration of Jedburghs was in Brittany and on both sides of the Loire. On June 20, a message, which looked even beyond this, gave a new shot in the arm to our supply of resistance forces. It read:

"The Maquis has started open guerrilla warfare and is in temporary control of certain areas of southern France. The Germans are reacting strongly with fully armed troops. Every effort must be made to supply the Maquis at once with rifles, Bren guns, Piat guns, mortars and Bazoukas with ammunition, and whatever else is needful to prevent the collapse of the movement and to extend it. What is being done about this? Have you any difficulty in getting men to repack containers with the right sort of weapons? Could General Wilson help from North Africa? Pray tell me if I can help you to accelerate action." (Initialled W.S.C.)

Those initials had a special magic. They got immediate action. A message went back from Ike's chief of staff, Bedell Smith, and General Bull, as G-3 head of operations, "We will do everything we can to prevent the Maquis in southeastern France from being destroyed in detail by the German Armed Forces. A daylight sortie of 300 American bombers escorted by fighters will try to drop arms and other necessities to the Eastern Maquis tomorrow, 22nd June."

Our operations map showed six areas aflame with resistance activity. They stretched across France from Brittany in the west through the Haute Vienne, Creuse and Correze south and west of the Loire, through the Morvan south of Dijon and to the French Alps and down to the hills behind the Riviera and Grasse. Some 33,000 Maquis had been mobilized in areas outside Brittany, but only 13,000 were armed. Most drops had been made in other parts of France or the Germans had snatched the supplies.

On June 25 at four in the morning, 180 B-17s took off with fighter escort to drop supplies to the target areas. Dubbed Operation Zebra, it was the first daylight mission, precursor of many more to come. In the short June nights, we could not afford the cover of darkness and had to risk flying during the day.

Less than three weeks later, on Bastille Day, July 14, General Doolittle mounted an even more ambitious air drop operation. An awesome armada of nine wings -- 349 planes carrying supplies and escorted by 524 P-51 and P-47 fighters -- took off from nine airfields.

On August 1, the B-17s took off again, five wings of 36 planes each to parachute supplies to five targets.

This buildup of supplies and the lift it gave resistance fighters paid off during August and September when resistance groups south of Loire protected Patton's right flank as he raced across France from Brittany to Nancy and ultimately liberated all of France south of the Loire and west of the Rhone. East of the Rhone resistance forces, along Napoleon's route, protected the flanks of the American Seventh Army as it moved from its Mediterranean landing beaches to Grenoble in nine days, a march which the Seventh Army operational plan had figured would require 25 days.

As Patton swept across France, British and American armies approached the Belgian border. The port of Antwerp was a great prize. When Belgium was liberated in September, the Belgian secret army had prevented the Germans from carrying out orders to destroy it. The port was handed over to us intact. One of the great foul-ups of command in World War II was the failure to cross the Aebert Canal to seal off the German 15th Army in its retreat from the channel coast. The result was that substantial elements of that army survived to defeat Montgomery's thrust to cross the Rhone at Arhienm and that we had to sit until November to clear the approaches to Antwerp so that supplies could be brought to the front by the shortest and fastest route. The war would have lasted a good deal longer if we had not been able to use those port facilities in the late fall of 1944. During the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944 and January-February 1945, the Danish resistance virtually brought the railway system to a halt to delay German divisions brought closer from Norway. This was largely the result of a lot of ingenuity and resourcefulness in using a few hundred British, French and American officers to support and direct local resistance fighters and to fake a phantom army which kept 15 German divisions, which might have pushed us back into the channel, sitting less than 100 miles away waiting for an attack which was never intended.

When it was all over, General Eisenhower said, "...In no previous war and in no other theatre during this war have resistance forces been so closely harnessed to the main military effort...I consider that the disruption of enemy rail communications, the harassing of German road works and the continual and increasing strain placed on the German War Economy and internal services throughout occupied Europe by the organized forces of resistance, played a very considerable part in our complete and final victory...."

Since then, in Vietnam, we forgot all that and took over a losing war from locals, ready to fight for their homeland, who might have won it if intelligently supported and directed and if the external support provided the invaders had been effectively restricted.

Today we see weak and friendly nations all over the world threatened by insurgent forces supplied and directed in much the same way and from much the same source as the victors in Vietnam were.

In the aftermath of Vietnam, the Soviet Union soon began to test whether the US would resist foreign-provoked and supported instability and insurgence elsewhere in the Third World. Fully aware of the political climate in this country, in the 1970s they developed an aggressive strategy in the Third World. It avoided direct confrontation and instead exploited local and regional circumstances to take maximum advantage of third-country forces (or surrogates) to attain Soviet objectives. This enables Moscow to deny involvement, to label such conflicts as internal, and to warn self-righteously against "outside interference." There is little disagreement among analysts that Soviet and proxy successes in the mid- to late 70s in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Nicaragua, and elsewhere have encouraged the Soviets to rely on the Cubans, Vietnamese and, recently, the Libyans ever more aggressively.

Over the last several years, the Soviets and their allies have supported, directly or indirectly, radical regimes or insurgencies in more than a dozen countries in every part of the Third World. The United States and its friends have had difficulty countering these insurgencies. It is much easier and much less expensive to support an insurgency than it is for us and our friends to resist one. It takes relatively few people and little support to disrupt the internal peace and economic stability of a small country.

Recently, we had our cartographers prepare a map to show the Soviet presence in its various degrees of influence. They colored in red on a map of the world the nations under a significant degree of Soviet influence. Close to 50 nations were in red. Ten years ago, only 25 nations would have been colored in red. In the ten years between 1972 and 1982, 4 nations have extricated themselves from Soviet grasp and 23 nations have fallen under a significantly increased degree of Soviet influence or insurgency supported by the Soviets or their proxies. It is, in my opinion, no coincidence that the 11 insurgencies now under way throughout the world supported by Russia, Cuba, Libya and South Yemen happen to be close to the natural resources and the choke points in the world's sea lanes on which the United States and its allies must rely to fuel and supply their economic life. It is not hard to understand how this has come about. Time and again we have watched agents of the Communist apparatus move in to exploit underlying social and economic discontents, which are plentiful throughout the world. They gain a base, then expand it with trained men and military arms. With this help, local insurgents sabotage economic targets and drive out investment. This further heightens political and economic discontent. As discontent grows, more people go over to the insurgents which makes them bolder and stronger.

El Salvador provided an example of how we can help these beleaguered nations defend themselves. The training of El Salvadoran troops and officers in the United States imparted new capabilities to the government army. The success of the recent elections in El Salvador came largely from developing new intelligence sources and showing the El Salvadoran army how to use intelligence to break up guerrilla formations before they could attack provincial capitals in order to stop the voting. This resulted in the American television audience seeing in living color Usulután, the provincial capital nearest Nicaragua, with its streets empty and its inhabitants huddled behind closed doors as guerrillas fired their rifles at doorways. Then, a minute later, this television audience saw in the rest of the country long lines of people patiently waiting in the hot sun to cast their vote. That contrast in a few minutes wiped out weeks of distortion and propaganda about what has been happening in Central America.

Today, El Salvador has a new government and a vote of the people has overwhelmingly rejected the insurgents, organized, supplied and directed from Nicaragua and Cuba, in their attempt to stop the election. Next door in Honduras, a democratically elected civilian government, to which the military is fully subordinated, presides over a free and open society. Nicaragua can't stand this contrast to its own militarized and totalitarian society in which opposition forces, free expansion, and civil liberties and human rights are being stamped out. So instructions have gone out and Communist and extreme leftist elements in Honduras have begun to hijack airplanes, plant dynamite in buildings and otherwise lay the groundwork for revolutionary violence in their determination to see that free democratic government does not succeed in Central America.

The small and weak countries in which insurgencies can be fostered and developed to overthrow governments do not need and cannot handle expensive and sophisticated weapons for which virtually all of them clamor. What they need is light arms to defend themselves against externally trained and supported guerrillas, good intelligence, good police methods, good communications, training in small arms and their use in small unit actions, and mobility to keep up with the hit-and-run tactics of guerrilla forces. Today, with a relatively few skilled officers and a tiny fraction of our military budget, we can introduce an element of stability into the Third World by helping small countries to develop those skills and capabilities.
