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POST-MORTEM REPORT

*An Examination of the Intelligence Community's
Performance Before the Indian Nuclear Test of May 1974*

A Study Produced Under Intelligence Community Staff Auspices
for the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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July 1974

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. In the months prior to India's 18 May nuclear test, the intelligence community failed to warn US decision makers that such a test was being planned. This failure denied the US Government the option of considering diplomatic or other initiatives to try to prevent this significant step in nuclear proliferation.

2. The intelligence community had long known that India was capable of producing and testing a nuclear device. It had also estimated as far back as 1965 that India would "in the next few years" detonate a nuclear device. Its inability to predict the actual event was due essentially to two factors: inadequate priority against an admittedly difficult target, and lack of adequate communications among those elements of the community, both collectors and producers, whose combined talents were essential to resolving the problem.


4. The proper collection strategy against the nuclear proliferation target will necessarily differ from one nth country to another. It can be determined only by integrated analysis conducted by representatives of all collection modes and by both technical and political analysts. Once determined, it must be reviewed and reinforced by continuing close communications among all concerned.

5. Most importantly, success against the nth country intelligence problem will require that the community accord it a higher priority than it has received to date.

6. Specific recommendations are provided in paragraphs 34-38.

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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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