CAESAR - 6 29 July 1953

THE ZHDANOV - MALENKOV RELATIONSHIP

HR70-14
(U)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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The hypothesis is frequently advanced that Zhdanov and Malenkov engaged in a bitter political conflict for Stalin's favor and for control over the Soviet Communist Party. This is a matter of some importance, since many observers profess to see in this conflict and its outcome an explanation for many of the problems of Soviet policy in the post-war years. The hypothesis set forth below is a composite of various versions of the alleged Zhdanov-Malenkov controversy.1/

Under this hypothesis, a rise in the influence of one was accompanied by a partial eclipse of the other. Zhdanov, who was pre-eminent in the Party and generally accorded to be Stalin's favorite prior to the war, was sent to Leningrad at the time of the Nazi attack. Malenkov, a rising young man who had become prominent only in February 1941, was made a member of the Supreme Defense Council, a five-man streamlined Politburo for the conduct of the war.2/ In the Supreme Defense Council Malenkov was Stalin's immediate subordinate for Party affairs, with additional responsibility for aircraft production and for the relocation of Soviet industry from western USSR to the east.

After the tide of the war turned and the Soviet armies began to retake occupied areas, Malenkov was made Chairman of a new State Committee for the Rehabilitation of Devastated Territories. This committee, with Beria, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Andreev as members, was responsible for industrial, agricultural and political reconstruction in the Soviet territories recovered from the Germans. Since the German-occupied areas had held a large portion of Soviet industry, agriculture and population, the magnitude of the responsibilities of this committee was great.

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1/ Proponents of this hypothesis, such as Ruth Fischer, Franz Borkenau and Boris Nicolaevsky, have their own variants, and each has drawn attention to facts overlooked by others. Nicolaevsky, for example, was the only outside observer to discover that Malenkov appeared in Soviet agricultural affairs in 1947.

2/ The original five members of the Supreme Defense Council were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Malenkov and Beria. Later additions were Kaganovich, Voznesensky and Mikoyan. Voroshilov was later replaced by Bulganin.

Zhdanov, meanwhile, whatever the reason for his original assignment to Leningrad in 1941, may have been in some sort of disfavor in January 1945. After the successful defense of Leningrad, he was relieved of his duties as First Secretary of the Leningrad City and Province Committees. In January 1945, when the city of Leningrad was presented with the Order of Lenin, Zhdanov's name was mentioned, but only as one of the Politburo members. Zhdanov moved to Helsinki as Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Finland and remained there until December 1945, at which time he returned to Moscow.

Thereafter, Zhdanov again managed to secure Stalin's favor and to eclipse Malenkov. Zhdanov sold Stalin on the necessity for an ideological cleansing of the Communist Party and for a tightening up of Soviet society generally. Zhdanov himself spearheaded the ideological purge. He then began undercutting Malenkov: he successfully unseated him from several key positions, and then attacked such associates of his as Varga and Aleksandrov. As for Malenkov, he appeared to be concerned, from late 1946 on, with agricultural problems and suffered a great loss of prominence.

Zhdanov is said to have been a fanatic Communist, and to have believed that it was possible to make striking advances internationally through foreign Communist Parties, particularly in France and Italy. Specifically, he is said to have been responsible for the organization of the Cominform in September 1947, a foreign policy move which at the minimum was intended to sabotage the Marshall Plan but which was also intended to launch the French and Italian Parties into revolutionary action to seize power.

The French Communist Party undertook violent action in November of 1947 and, until broken by the French army, almost succeeded in paralyzing the government and the economy. The Italian Party undertook similar action, but with much less seccess. In February 1948, the Czechoslovak Communist Party succeeded in seizing power; the impetus for this was attributed to Zhdanov.

At the founding conference of the Cominform in September 1947, Zhdanov supported the Yugoslav delegates in their criticism of the backward policies of other Communist Parties, especially the French and Italian, and in general indicated his approval of the policies of the Yugoslav Communists. Tito, however, was proving to be less than completely obedient, and in 1948 Stalin decided that it was necessary to take disciplinary action. After negotiations lasting four months, characterized by efforts of Stalin and Molotov to intimidate and split the Yugoslav Politburo, it became necessary to apply the extreme sanction against Tito: excommunication from the Communist fold.

During this period, the turn of events in Western Europe had led the United States to take the initiative in attempting unilateral solution of the West German economic situation. The British and the French joined in this effort in the winter of 1947-48. Russian reaction entailed an attempt to capitalize on the most exposed position of the West, the Allied sectors of Berlin, an effort that culminated in the full blockade of Berlin in June 1948.

According to the hypothesis being set forth, Stalin held Zhdanov responsible for the various reverses in Soviet policy, in particular the Yugoslav defection.1/ Zhdanov's death on 31 August 1948 signalled the end of the so-called Zhdanov period.2/ After his Death, Malenkov rapidly achieved a high position in official listings of the Politburo, which was generally taken to indicate that he had returned to grace. Malenkov then allegedly initiated a purge of various persons who owed their positions to Zhdanov's influence. Meanwhile, the Berlin blockade was liquidated and the Greek Civil War was permitted to come to an end, and the emphasis in Soviet foreign policy visibly began to shift to the Far East, where the Chinese Communists were rapidly gaining complete control of mainland China.

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What now can be said with regard to this hypothesis? There are several very critical questions involved in it. These questions are: Was there in fact political enmity between Zhdanov and Malenkov? Did Malenkov truly lose out in the period from, say, August 1946 up to some time early in 1948? For example, did Malenkov find himself in

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1/ At the time, many observers attributed the Yugoslav break to Zhdanov's purportedly hard line toward the Yugoslavs, i.e., to an attempt on his part to set the same standards of ideological and political conformity for the Satellite countries as had been applied in the USSR. Others believed, on the contrary, that Tito was Zhdanov's principal ally in the international Communist sphere, and that Tito's defection was not so much a result of Zhdanov's effort to bully the Yugoslavs as it was the cause of his being irrevocably discredited.

2/ There were numerous rumors and much speculation that Zhdanov was murdered. This speculation was revived and given added impetus by the so-called Doctors' Plot of January 1953.

agriculture as a top-ranking trouble shooter or was he relegated to this field in disgrace? Was Zhdanov in fact responsible for the international communist expansionism of this period? Was there in fact a purge conducted by Malenkov after Zhdanov's death and after Malenkov was back in Stalin's good graces? Was there in fact a shift in emphasis in Soviet policy to the Far East following Zhdanov's death and during the period of Malenkov's rise?

THE POLITICAL ECLIPSE OF MALENKOV

The question of whether Zhdanov and Malenkov were political enemies depends a great deal on the answer to the question whether Malenkov really lost both responsibilities and prestige in the fall of 1946. The evidence for Malenkov's political eclipse is as follows:

1. In early October 1946, a source of the US Military Attache in Moscow reported that Malenkov had suffered some measure of disgrace, although he was unable to give the reasons for the alleged trouble. Although on 18 October it was announced that Malenkov had been "confirmed" as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, there was a rumor in Moscow that this constituted a demotion. This was given added credence on 24 October when [redacted] received from the Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau an official biography of Malenkov. This biography omitted reference to Malenkov's "responsible work in the Central Committee," which is believed to have been done in his position on Stalin's personal secretariat; it omitted reference to the fact that Malenkov had been a Secretary of the Party for many years; and finally, it omitted reference to the fact that Malenkov had been an alternate member of the Politburo since 1939 and a full member since only the preceding March. [redacted] the biography had been initialed by a superior of the Chief of the Soviet Information Bureau, [redacted] such initialing was usually an indication that the item had been cleared with higher authority.

2. Apparently, Malenkov was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee and lost control over Party personnel matters during this period. He was given these responsibilities in 1939 and he retained them through the war; he was last identified in the Party Secretariat in the spring of 1946. Thereafter he was not listed among the Party Secretaries, nor was the designation "Secretary" given after his name on Soviet calendars, election listings, and so forth, until 20 July 1948.

On this date he signed a telegram of condolence to the leader of the Japanese Communist Party, Tokuda, as a Secretary of the Central Committee.

In 1947 and 1948, Zhdanov was clearly the leading Secretary of the Party; he signed decrees on behalf of the Central Committee, and he was identified as filling the leading role in the Secretariat. The only indication that Malenkov was still a figure of some power and still concerned with Party organizational questions was his appearance with Zhdanov at the founding conference of the Cominform in September 1947. At this conference, Malenkov gave the report on behalf of the Soviet Communist Party. It was a recital of the program of the Party since the war, the problems it faced, its educational, ideological and economic tasks, its problems of reconstruction, and so forth. It may be noted, however, that Malenkov very definitely was the junior partner at the Cominform Conference: Zhdanov gave a far-reaching analysis of the entire international situation and of Soviet policy as well, whereas Malenkov served simply as rapporteur for the Soviet Party.

As noted above, there is no evidence associating Malenkov with the Central Committee apparatus, nor with Party personnel matters, during this period. The supposition that Malenkov lost these responsibilities would be strengthened if some other person could be reliably identified as responsible for them. Tentative evidence suggests that A. A. Kuznetsov may have received these responsibilities. A. A. Kuznetsov was a former deputy to Zhdanov in the Leningrad Party organization, and became a member of the Secretariat and Orgburo in March 1946.

A report of early 1949 stated that the Central Committee "had created a commission headed by Central Committee Secretary Kuznetsov, which adopted very stern measures in approving prospective Soviet Military Administration (in Germany) officials and workers."1/

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3. Malenkov, following his apparent eclipse, was subsequently identified by the Soviet press as "directly" engaged in agricultural work.

This requires a certain explanation of the agriculture problem existing at that time. During the war the Communist Party had relaxed a number of its harsher measures with regard to the peasantry and, as a result, the peasants had concentrated their efforts on private holdings at the expense of communal land and had disposed of the produce from these private holdings on the free market at high prices. Due to the destruction resulting from the war, the disruption of the kolkhoz system, and a severe drought and a poor harvest in 1946, the Government and Party found it necessary to restrict severely bread rations and the release of grains. However, because an unduly large proportion of agricultural produce was grown on private holdings and disposed of by the peasantry on the free market, the Government found it difficult to control the flow of grains and to effect a cut in bread rations. Due to the same factors, furthermore, there had been a disproportionate flow of money from the city to the countryside, and peasant savings had risen sharply. This served to strengthen the bargaining position of the peasantry vis-a-vis the Soviet Government and Party. (It may be noted that it was this situation which led to the extreme devaluation of the ruble in December 1947, which practically wiped out peasant savings.) Agriculture was thus the most critical problem facing the Soviet Government in the fall and winter of 1946-47. The possibility exists that Malenkov was moved into agriculture as a top-flight trouble shooter.

This possibility, however, does not appear to be supported by available evidence. Beginning in September 1946, the Government and Party began to issue a series of joint decrees designed to correct abuses of the kolkhoz charter and to meet the agriculture crisis. These decrees were signed by Stalin on behalf of the Government and by Zhdanov on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party. On 8 October 1946 a Council for Collective Farms Affairs of almost forty members was established. A. A. Andreev, a Politburo member, was designated Chairman of this council. Malenkov was not a member. In March 1947, a plenary session of the Central Committee was held to discuss the agricultural crisis and it was Andreev who presented the report.

. Thus, although agriculture was indeed the key problem in late 1946 and 1947, it does not appear that Malenkov became the dominant policy-making figure, but rather he seems to have occupied an anomalous position.

4. There is, finally, the question of Malenkov's prestige throughout this period. In March 1946, the US Embassy reported that Malenkov "was acknowledged to be Stalin's principal adviser on internal political problems." Yet, by 7 November 1946, Malenkov's position had dropped in the Politburo listing and Zhdanov appeared to have taken his place in Stalin's favor. It is important to note that Malenkov was the only Politburo member whose status dropped significantly in the period from 1946 to 1948 and whose position rose measurably after Zhdanov's death. In the 1947 elections, Malenkov was not widely propagandized, and he was not one of the five principal "candidates". This relative obscurity prevailed through 1947 and the first half of 1948.

The evidence adduced above almost conclusively establishes that Malenkov's career suffered a very sharp set-back in 1946, involving a severe reduction in the scope of his duties and responsibilities and, therefore, in his power. What his personal relations with Stalin were cannot be said; it must be remembered that Malenkov did survive this critical period, and we can be sure that if Stalin had developed real dislike or distrust of Malenkov, the latter would have disappeared completely.

FURTHER INFORMATION RELATING TO MALENKOV'S POSITION IN THE HIERARCHY

In 1945 Malenkov was involved in many activities other than those relating to the Communist Party. These activities undoubtedly brought him into conflict with other Soviet leaders. There is attempted below a summary of information relating to these activities, in an effort to throw some light on Malenkov's fortunes during this period.

Soviet Intelligence Activities. In 1940 and 1941, Malenkov was the Politburo member responsible for personnel questions, including those of Soviet intelligence. He was also said to have been responsible for resolving jurisdictional disputes between the People's Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, and the Military Intelligence apparatus. In connection with intelligence questions, the Chief of the GRU (Military Intelligence Directorate) at that time, F. I. Golikov, was said to have a direct telephone line to Malenkov's office. A similar

association is revealed in the information made available in the Gouzenko case. According to Gouzenko, Malenkov had been Chief of the Foreign Sector of the Central Committee apparatus, which was apparently responsible for the selection and supervision of Soviet personnel sent abroad.

It may be that Malenkov's political eclipse in the summer of 1946 was in some way associated with this responsibility. the then Minister of State Security Merkulov had been dismissed because of a breakdown in Soviet intelligence operations in North America towards the end of the war. The coincidence in time of Merkulov's dismissal and Malenkov's fall is striking; they occurred roughly within a two-month period in middle of 1946. Malenkov may have been compromised, both because of his responsibility for the loyalty of Soviet citizens abroad and also in connection with foreign intelligence. There was indeed a series of important incidents in this field in 1944 and 1945. Kravchenko, a high level Soviet official who had come to the US with the Soviet Purchasing Commission, defected; a Soviet Naval Lieutenant in Seattle was tried and acquitted of espionage by US courts; lastly, in September 1945 Gouzenko defected in Ottawa.

It was not until April and May of 1946 that, in the course of public disclosures and testimony, the full ramifications of the Gouzenko defection became known. This would correspond very closely with the replacement of Merkulov, which, according to available evidence, probably took place in late June or early July of 1946. The reverses listed above may have contributed to Malenkov's difficulties.

Soviet Policy on Germany. Malenkov became involved in foreign policy in connection with his chairmanship of the State Committee for Rehabilitation of Devastated Areas, to which he was appointed in August 1943. This body, called the Special Committee, later became the authority responsible for the policy of industrial dismantling in Soviet-occupied areas in Eastern Europe and possibly in the Far East.

The Special Committee was represented in the Soviet Military Administration in Germany by M. Z. Saburov, who had also been one of the Soviet economic advisors at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945. There does indeed seem to have been some sort of policy difference in Moscow on the

problem of Germany, and it seems probable that this was in some way associated with the dismantling program.

The whole dismantling operation was very badly handled and a great deal of valuable property was destroyed or lost. The program also created hostility toward the Soviet Government among the people of Eastern Europe and Germany. In a 10 July 1946 foreign policy speech, Molotov announced that dismantling was to be discontinued and that Soviet policy in the future would support German industrialization. The actual dismantling of German industry appears to have dropped off in 1946. In 1946 and early 1947, a new form of economic control was developed, which involved Soviet ownership of controlling shares in industrial and commercial firms in Germany and in other non-Soviet areas. This new program appears first to have been placed under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade under Mikoyan. In mid-1947 the program was identified under a newly established Chief Administration for Soviet Properties Abroad (GUSIMZ), which is believed to have belonged nominally to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This administration was under the direction of Merkulov, who had been replaced in June 1946 as Minister of State Security.1/

It is noteworthy that Evgenii Varga, the ranking economic analyst for the Communist Party and Director of the Institute of World Politics and World Economics, had written a series of articles, beginning in 1943, regarding the necessity of rebuilding Soviet industry and economy with equipment and plants expropriated from the enemy powers. Varga himself was not on the Special Committee which handled dismantling; yet it seems likely that he had been, if not the moving spirit, at least the man who was providing theoretical propaganda justification for this policy. This series of articles is one of the indications that Varga was in some way closely associated with Malenkov in this period. The dismantling policy was terminated some time in 1946; it was in the summer of 1946 that Malenkov lost influence; and it was in May 1947 that Varga was brought up for criticism because of his theoretical analyses of the impact of the war on the capitalistic economic system.

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1/ It is interesting to note, in this connection, that many of the Soviet-owned plants in Austria, Germany and Manchuria were turned back to the respective Satellite Governments in 1951 and 1952, which suggests not the dissolution but at least the reduction in scope of activities and influence of this Chief Administration. Merkulov himself moved from this administration to the Ministry of State Control in 1950, replacing the incumbent minister, Mekhlis.

there was conflict between the various Politburo figures over Soviet economic policy in Germany. the dismantling and removal of German industrial plants was intended both to prevent future German resurgence and to assist in Soviet reconstruction. This initial post-war policy was said to have been predicated on the estimate that the Soviet forces would not remain in occupation for a long period of time. Malenkov had been the leading proponent of this policy, but that he had met opposition from Mikoyan and the Soviet Military Administration, under Marshal Zhukov until early 1946.1/ Mikoyan allegedly favored the retention of German plant capacity in

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1/ It is not implied that the purported conflict between Malenkov and the SMA was at that time a factor in Zhukov's career. Zhukov's difficulties apparently originated in another quarter. Zhukov clashed with Vasili Stalin and Col. Gen. I. A. Serov. it was "well known" that Zhukov was "well known" that Zhukov was "a very difficult character" and "held a rather dim view of the MVD and MGB." Serov was Zhukov's deputy in the SMA, in overall charge of NKVD and NKGB activities. Zhukov reportedly "could not stand Serov." Serov, however, was a close friend of Vasili Stalin and Beria, and also was on very good terms with Malenkov and Stalin. Vasili Stalin "behaved very badly" when he was in Germany, and when adverse reports on him were sent back, Serov frequently defended him. When Vasili Stalin was sent back to Moscow, Serov allegedly again helped by writing a favorable report on him and an unfavorable one on Zhukov.

Zhukov, after his recall from Germany, was summoned before the Central Committee and disciplined for a number of delinquencies and acts of malfeasance. He was reassigned as Commander of the Odessa Military District and later as Commander of the Sverdlovsk Military District. Zhukov's assignment from March to June 1946 as Commander in Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces.)

Serov subsequently became First Deputy Minister of the MVD under S. N. Kruglov, and presumably remained in that position until Stalin's death. He was named a candidate member of the Central Committee in October 1952. His assignment subsequent to 7 March 1953 is not known.

Germany, in the interests of efficient production and a balanced East Germany economy capable of supporting the Soviet economy. Zhdanov became involved in the controversy, seeing it as a useful political weapon against Malenkov. Voznesensky then sided with Mikoyan and Zhdanov, in the interests of rational planning and accounting. alleged that Malenkov clashed with the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, which was aware of the profound antagonism the removal program was creating among the German populace and believed it was prejudicing Soviet occupation and political objectives in Germany.

The evidence already set forth partially supports the above report. We have already noted Varga's role in espousing the dismantling policy, the apparent association between Varga and Malenkov, In addition, there is the fact of the presence of M. Z. Saburov as plenipotentiary of the Special Committee in the Soviet Military Administration.2/ There is, further, the actual shift in Soviet economic policy in 1946 and early 1947, and the establishment of the nominal jurisdiction of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade, under Mikoyan, over this economic policy.

It seems reasonable to suppose that Malenkov may also have met opposition from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, i.e., Molotov. This supposition cannot be supported by available evidence.

The Varga Case. Under instructions from the Central Committee, in 1944 and 1945 Varga's institute produced an analysis of the impact of the war on the Western capitalist economy. The book was completed

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2/ Saburov was reported to be a strong supporter of Malenkov. He succeeded Voznesensky as Chairman of Gosplan in 1949, presented the Fifth Five Year Plan of the Party Congress in October 1952, and became a full member of the Party Presidium in March 1953.

about December 1945 and received fairly wide circulation, as indicated by several remarks made during the debate on the book to the effect that a number of Communist and progressive public figures of both the USSR and the Satellites had been "disoriented" by Varga's position. Sometime in very late 1946 or early 1947, it was decided to convoke a conference of economists to discuss the book. The debate was held in May 1947.

One of Varga's statements during this debate seems to present almost positive evidence that it was Zhdanov who inspired the debate and the criticism of Varga's position. Varga's statement is worth quoting in full: "The difference between the author and the critic among us in the scientific field is different than in the field of art. In the field of art a division of labor is to be observed; the artist paints a picture, the sculptor creates a statue, but the critic writes a criticism. We cannot have such a situation, in which one works and another only criticizes---I deny such a 'division' between those writing books and those criticizing them--but if such a 'division of labor' exists, then, although I am no longer a young person, and not very healthy, I want to remain, to the end of my life, in the camp of those who work and not in the camps of those who merely criticize." This statement, made barely ten months after Zhdanov's furious criticism of Soviet literary figures, and during the Party's new attack against "Art for Art sake" cannot but be considered to have been a very courageous statement. It also clearly indicates the quarters from which the criticism of Varga's book was emanating. Elsewhere during the debate, Varga's statements imply that the attack originated from doctrinaire members of the Party hierarchy.

Subsequent to this debate, Varga has had a career of ups and downs. Suffice it to say that he was not completely disgraced, and, while his Institute was subsequently broken up, he seemed to remain an important economist in the USSR. The Party decision on Varga and assessment of his position was revealed in Pravda in January 1948; it is interesting to review the conclusions: Firstly, Varga was adjudged to have ascribed too much independent power to the bourgeois states in economic planning, whether in war or in peace, and in particular to have misunderstood the nature of the Labor Government in the United Kingdom. (The debates of May 1947 indicated that this was apparently causing considerable controversy among Soviet economists and political analysts.) Secondly, he was accused of having separated political from economic problems; he had taken up only economic problems in his first book, and it was adjudged that this was not only erroneous but also harmful, since the two are inseparable. Thirdly, Varga was condemned for failing to permit the Party to point out the errors in his thinking, that is, for refusing to recant. It may be noted in passing that only one of these three criticisms was a substantive question which would have

a bearing on Soviet estimates of the situation in the Western world and on forecasts of future trends.

More interesting is the fact that there was a wide variety of views expressed by the various professional economists during the debate on the various theses that Varga had propounded. This may be taken to indicate that there was considerable uncertainty in the Soviet Union at that time regarding these questions. Moreover, since these questions were so intimately associated with policy, it may be inferred that there was, correspondingly, some degree of uncertainty in policy formulation. It is further interesting to note that several of the points discussed in the Varga debates were treated in Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism, published in 1952, and some of the formulations in Stalin's Economic Problems would appear to have been taken almost verbatim from several of the speeches made in these early debates.

The Varga debates were interpreted in the Western world as indications and, so to speak, as indices of the Soviet estimate regarding future economic trends in the West and the prospects of the Western powers. This is probably correct. However, the information given herein leads to the supposition that Varga's fate was also something of an index of the degree of predominance which Zhdanov had managed to obtain. It should again be noted in this connection that Zhdanov never did succeed in completely submerging Malenkov, and that, as is indicated by Varga's career, Zhdanov's influence was probably not so great that he could effect the complete disgrace of this man associated with Malenkov.

ZHDANOV AND INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Zhdanov's role in the formulation of Soviet policy during this period, with regard to the outside world in general and international Communism in particular, is a very complex and controversial problem. We are on unsure grounds because, since the 30's, international Communism has been closely intertwined with the foreign intelligence apparatus of the USSR, and this apparatus is of course largely shrouded in secrecy. Available data, however -- primarily that contained in published books and articles including, for example, Dedijer's biography of Tito, -- permits some tentative suppositions and conclusions regarding this problem.

reported that control of the Czechoslovak Communist Party had been exercised by men working out of Malenkov's

staff in Moscow.

Malenkov was chief of the Foreign Sector of the Soviet Communist Party in 1945. However, the exact responsibilities of this position, as well as the nature of its relations with the international Communist movement, are unknown.

has reported rumors in the top echelon of the Czechoslovak Communist Party that Zhdanov had been responsible for the appointment of Rudolph Slansky as Secretary General of the Czechoslovak Party. Zhdanov had been associated with the Comintern since at least 1935 and, with Kuusinen, was one of the two Soviet signatories of the decision dissolving the Comintern in 1943. In 1947, according to Dedijer's biography of Tito, the Yugoslav Ambassador in Moscow dealt with Zhdanov on questions concerning Yugoslav relations with the Albanian Communist Party. At the founding conference of the Cominform, it was Zhdanov who laid out the broad lines of policy for the foreign Communist Parties. It has been reported that Rudolph Slansky cleared the proposed Czech Communist coup in February 1948 with Zhdanov in Moscow. The Chief of the Czech Communist secret police, who defected in March 1948, reported that a secret radio station in Prague, which was used only by the highest Party figures, was linked with Zhdanov's headquarters.

Finally, in the fall of 1952 when Andre Marty was defending his position in the French Communist Party, he reportedly cited the authority of Zhdanov as justification for his actions in the early post-war period.

According to some sources, the Greek Civil War was espoused by Zhdanov. This would be of considerable interest, if true. The Yugoslavs claim that the Yugoslav Communist Party was the principal protagonist of the Greek Communists and, in fact, provided the bulk of the materiel support for the Greek Civil War. that, before launching the new revolt in 1947, the Greek Communists sounded out the French and the Yugoslav Communist Parties for advice. The Yugoslavs also claim that Stalin himself was skeptical regarding the Greek revolution and did not believe that it had any prospects of success. Furthermore, according to the Yugoslavs, the second Greek insurrection of 1947 was undertaken by agreement between Markos and Tito without previous policy coordination in Moscow.

1. After the dissolution of the Comintern, Zhdanov advocated the establishment of a new international Communist organization. In 1946, there was, reportedly, a divergence of views in the Politburo regarding the character of the new organization. Zhdanov advocated an organizational concept that would allow for specific differences in the methods to be applied in different foreign countries.

Comment: Dedijer, in the biography of Tito, noted that Tito advanced the proposal of a new international Communist organization in 1945, and that Tito and Stalin discussed the question in June 1946.

2. Zhdanov illustrated his position by the Yugoslav example. He publicly labelled Yugoslavia as the most advanced People's Democracy. Dimitrov, the world-known Comintern functionary, supported Zhdanov's views.

Comment: Zhdanov publicly supported the Yugoslav criticism of the other Communist Parties at the Cominform meeting in September 1947. With regard to Dimitrov, circumstantial evidence supports the contention that he supported Tito's position during Yugoslavia's conflict with Moscow.

3. [redacted] disclosed in 1948 that Zhdanov disagreed with the tone of the resolution condemning Yugoslavia, and insisted that an "escape" clause giving the Yugoslavs an opportunity to recant be included. The "other wing" was for an immediate and complete break with Yugoslavia.

Comment: In Tito's biography it is claimed that Stalin and Molotov signed the original letter denouncing Yugoslavia. According to the Yugoslav-Soviet letters, Molotov had levelled at least one accusation against the Yugoslavs. [redacted] Beria was responsible for at least some decisions regarding the provision of equipment and materials for Yugoslavia. It is possible that Beria was antagonistic to Yugoslavia because of Yugoslav charges regarding Soviet intelligence activities.

On the other hand, Zhdanov wrote an article in January 1948 denouncing a speech of Dimitrov's favoring Balkan federation. Balkan federation was a project especially favored by Tito, and Tito and Dimitrov had had several discussions on the subject. Zhdanov forced the break with Yugoslavia.

Comment: None

5. Zhdanov was considered an "aristocrat of the Party" and one of the best brains in the Soviet hierarchy. However, he was said to be reckless.

Comment: agree that Zhdanov was brilliant, arrogant and dynamic. have reported rumors in Soviet circles that Zhdanov had attempted to pursue "an independent line."

6. Yugoslavia played the chief role in support of the Greek Civil War. Greek General Markos had been "greatly influenced by the Yugoslav role and support."

Comment: Yugoslav support of the Greek Civil War is well known. Circumstantial evidence strongly supports the contention that Markos was associated with Tito.

The evidence clearly demonstrates that Zhdanov was responsible for international Communist affairs. This conclusion, taken in conjunction with reports regarding Zhdanov's character and with the reported rumors regarding Zhdanov's "independent line," strongly supports the hypothesis that the militant international Communist policy of 1947 was indeed an "individual" policy advocated by Zhdanov.

Circumstantial evidence of another nature tends to give further weight to this hypothesis. Stalin, it is known, had little or no

respect for foreign Communists and foreign Communist Parties. He had long been mistrustful and suspicious of foreign Communists. Thus, if a broad, militant Communist policy was adopted, then the presumption must be that Stalin's mistrust and skepticism had been overcome by some advocate of such a policy. Zhdanov evidently was this advocate.

A militant and aggressive policy was in fact adopted. The Western Communist Parties were given the task of sabotaging the Marshall Plan: Zhdanov bluntly stated this in his September 1947 speech. In 1947 the Finnish Communist Party, for no apparent reason, adopted a disruptive strike program. The Greek Communists, given the challenge of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, revolted in the summer and fall of 1947 and proclaimed a Government in December of that year. The Czech Communists seized the Government in February 1948. It is easy to believe that Zhdanov's political fortunes depended upon the success of the militant policy. It succeeded only in Czechoslovakia, and this was a minor victory when compared with the reverses suffered.

CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions of this analysis can be summarized as follows:

1. The broad hypothesis set forth is not refuted by available information. Certain sub-hypotheses are strongly supported by the weight of evidence. These specific points are:

2. It appears well established that Malenkov lost important positions and suffered a reduction in status from mid-1946 to early 1948.

3. Available evidence supports the contention that Malenkov's eclipse was directly related to Zhdanov's return to Moscow. Malenkov's most important position was lost to a longtime associate of Zhdanov. The hypothesis that Zhdanov and Malenkov clashed over control of the Soviet Communist Party appears plausible. Available evidence indicates that Malenkov probably clashed with other Politburo members also, and that he probably received little if any support from them in his difficulties.

4. It is highly probable that Zhdanov was responsible for the policy line of the foreign Communist Parties in this period, and that he was an advocate of a militant revolutionary policy. It is probable that Zhdanov's career was compromised by the failure of the French and Italian Communist Parties in 1947 and 1948, and by the intransigence and defection of Yugoslavia.