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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: FEB 2006

15 July 1963

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Major General Alva Fitch
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Room 2E464
Pentagon

Dear Alva:

My point of departure is the upcoming NIE 11-10-63,
"The Soviet Chemical Warfare Threat to NATO and Europe."

A little preliminary thinking and talking has indicated that one of the important factors likely to influence a Soviet decision to initiate the use of chemical weapons in a war situation in the NATO area would be Soviet appreciation of US capabilities in the CW field and US policy and doctrine with respect to use.

If I am on the right track in the paragraph above, it would follow that the Soviets would be very considerably interested in all phases of our capabilities -- not merely such obvious things as present stockpile, and standby production facilities, probable means of delivery, but more importantly US capabilities for defense against chemical weapons, particularly those in the G and V series. Of particular concern to the Soviets, I would guess, would be information indicating how well fixed the US was with equipment to detect the odorless agents.

To the end of trying to find out whether or not the US has evidence that the Russian intelligence service has been served with appropriate requirements regarding the US CW situation, I have addressed the attached questions to the chief of our own counter-intelligence staff. He informs me that he will take the matter up with an interdepartmental committee of CI people and try to get us some answers. It may be that this is all that is necessary.

However, realizing your own interests in the subject, as well as that of other components of the Department of the Army, I wanted to inform you of my action and suggest

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that, if you thought appropriate, you might want to get separate lines of inquiry going within your own CIC, and the various security components deployed at the Army's several CW installations.



SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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
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