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24 April 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: ADSO

SUBJECT : Transmittal of Staff Study of Problems of OAD

1. Transmitted herewith is a staff study on the above subject prepared at the request of Mr. Richard Helms, APO.

2. A sincere effort has been made to present the OAD problem in terms of magnitude, responsibility, position with respect to OSO, OPC, and CIA, organization, personnel, procurement, and space.

3. Recommendations have been presented for the solution of the immediate problems. However, the basic problem of the relationship of OAD to a similar unit within OPC remains to be resolved. On the resolution of this problem, many of the over-all far-reaching problems will depend. It is felt that this is beyond the scope of OAD's responsibility in such matters and will of necessity have to be solved at a higher level. These problems, however, have been pointed out in the study presented.

4. It should be noted that since the initiation of this study the Table of Organization presented in TAB B has been approved. For the purpose of fulfilling the mission and responsibility as outlined in this study, this T/O is inadequate.

[Redacted signature box]

Chief, OAD

Attachment

APPROVED FOR RELEASE  
DATE: MAR 2007

*The copy in  
DDP - Hunt.*

*14 August -*

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A STAFF STUDY OF THE OPERATIONAL AIDS DIVISION,  
OFFICE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

I. INTRODUCTION

1. a. The Operational Aids Division (OAD) is presently responsible for the support of the clandestine operations of OSO by all material means except electronic communications and logistical support. There is a similar obligation to OPC which exists but is not clearly defined. To fulfill these responsibilities means that OAD must collect and process information, documents, equipment, etc. OAD must also have the capability of rapidly producing or reproducing those "tailor-made, hand-wrought" items by the appropriate art or craft necessary to answer the requirements as established by the foreign divisions. OAD also furnishes the equipment, technical skill, and technical training in the following fields: S/W, propaganda printing, photography, [redacted], and observation and audio-surveillance. Finally, OAD has a research and development responsibility to CIA, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force for all specialized equipment (except electrical communications) peculiar to clandestine intelligence operations. The procurement responsibility, however, is vested in the Procurement Office/CIA over which OAD has no control.

b. To accomplish this myriad of diversified tasks, OAD has a currently authorized strength of [redacted] slots (see Tab A for present T/O) and a proposed authorized strength of [redacted] slots.\* Since 1947, the authorized strength of OAD has increased from [redacted] in 1951 or approximately two and one-half times while the estimated authorized strength of OSO/OPC has increased over ten times in a similar period. The volume of requirements resulting from this increase in operational capability is not possible to calculate since the foreign divisions, being aware of the static condition of the OAD capabilities, have not always made known their total requirements.

c. As a result of these increases, not only in requirements but also in responsibilities, it is obvious that a complete reexamination of OAD is essential. The object of this reexamination should be the delineation of those responsibilities which should be assigned to OAD and the establishment of an organization designed to fulfill those responsibilities.

\* See Tab B for organization under proposed [redacted] T/O.

II. THE PROBLEM

2. Confronting OAD/OSO at the present time are the following problems

a. The lack of appreciation for the need, magnitude, and importance of the OAD program is such that the command and staff echelons are neither knowledgeable nor sympathetic to a point where adequate assistance is forthcoming.

b. The present definition of the OAD responsibilities is neither clear nor within the capabilities of the Division.

c. The location of OAD within the command structure of CIA for command and staff guidance is not in the best interest of OSO, OPC, or CIA.

d. The present organizational structure of OAD does not permit it to fulfill its responsibilities as required by the foreign divisions of OSO and OPC.

e. The present personnel policy does not take cognizance of unusual talents required by OAD.

f. The present procurement policy does not permit OAD to meet the security and deadline limitations set by the foreign divisions.

### III. DISCUSSION

#### 3. Importance and magnitude of the OAD operation.

a. The magnitude and importance of the OAD operation must be clearly understood or OAD will always want for support. As differentiated from a foreign division, it must be appreciated that OAD is not bound by geographical limitations. The collection of documents and document intelligence must be on a world-wide basis, backed up by an indexing, filing, and analyzing activity which is the equivalent of a good-sized reference library. The chart under Tab C shows the multitude of steps necessary in fulfilling a cover and authentication request. Note this collection process is a continuing program.

b. In the field of reproduction the Plant Branch/OAD is capable of performing or imitating most of the processes found in large reproduction plants throughout the world. The versatility essential in OAD technicians to accomplish this is evidenced by the chart under Tab D which shows the steps in reproducing a document.

c. Heretofore, OAD, due to lack of personnel and space, has been able to complete only part of its reproduction requests. It has not been possible to engage in reproduction against anticipated needs. The service rendered by OAD will never be adequate until a document may be reproduced "just in case" and without creating a backlog.

d. The importance of OAD to OSO/OPC is irrefutable and can only be emphasized by the fact that notwithstanding the acquisition of the TAD shop and POTBOILER, the backlog of documents for reproduction continues to grow so that only top priority jobs have a chance of being done.

e. An apparent lack of understanding of the close cooperation essential between all branches of OAD and its customers finds OAD in seven (7) different locations in five (5) different buildings of CIA. In spite of objections to the contrary, thinking still continues that OAD can render effective support physically removed in toto from OSO/OPC.

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#### 4. Responsibilities.

a. The responsibilities of OAD are unnamed and unnumbered. Many things now considered as part of the OAD mission have been acquired from units which were closed down at the end of World War II. The most obviously misplaced of these is the responsibility for research and development for the Armed Forces in the field of "special intelligence equipment". OAD does not presently have the capability to do research except in the field of S/W. It is undesirable from a security standpoint to bring the Armed Forces into such close proximity to this sensitive operation. OAD stands ready to advise divisions in any of its fields of competence; it may even indulge in a modicum of developmental modification, but true research is not practicable.

b. Included in this pyramid of responsibilities has been electronics surveillance. Much of this Branch's equipment is stocked by Communications Division. The part of its work that requires a machine-shop is done in Communications' shop. While not strictly a communications activity, the similarity of technical knowledge and equipment makes these two units functionally alike. Surveillance personnel within OAD have no further outlet for their talents, a situation which is not true were they in the Communications Division or a new Division.

c. Between OAD and TRD there is some overlap in responsibilities. This exists in photography, [redacted], electronics surveillance [redacted]. The soundest basis for division appears to be for OAD to retain those subjects which are purely technical training and pass those that involve operations in addition to technical training to TRD except that electronics surveillance training should pass to Communications Division. This would leave all photographic training [redacted] with OAD. Since TRD has never entered the S/W or documents training field, these should remain in OAD. Study will be given at a later date to strengthening the instruction given by OAD in these subjects utilizing the TRD courses. The annual training load under normal conditions has been about [redacted] persons in each category; however, increases are anticipated (see para. 7b).

d. Other areas of conflicting responsibilities exist between OAD and some foreign divisions, but it is believed that these would solve themselves if OAD was granted an appropriate authorized strength and assisted in coming somewhere near this strength. Due to OAD's limited potential, the divisions have adopted other means to obtain aid to the extent of using operational people to do document intelligence work without the knowledge or coordination of OAD.

e. An effort has been made to spell out those items for which OAD should be responsible. Those items which fall within other functional zones have been eliminated and will be recommended for assignment elsewhere. (See Tab E).

#### 5. Location.

a. The location of OAD within the organizational structure of CIA is unsound. This position under OSO was established at a time when

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there was only one unit engaged in clandestine operations. Since the creation of OPC, OAD has had unwritten obligations to OPC and yet there has never been any joint control or assistance. The situation now exists where OAD is trying to run an overseas shop with people on T/O's of both OSO and OPC.

b. The present organizational position is impossible in the terms of personnel, finance, and space arrangements. OAD operates under two different sets of regulations, a situation which is not conducive to efficiency.

## 6. Organization.

a. The present organization of OAD (see Tab A) is the result of the deactivation of the wartime Research and Development Office of OSS. OAD is now trying to keep alive all the functions which fell to R&D during World War II. This attempt has forced OAD to spread itself so thin that it now finds itself hopelessly backlogged because of being compelled to accept an overload of responsibilities.

b. After settling on an adequate organization at Headquarters, OAD must plan overseas organizations which are located strategically to serve the geographical areas concerned. Where there is a large OAD unit [ ] it is desirable that the organization of the unit parallel the Headquarters organization. This would simplify the entire administrative problem between OAD/Headquarters and OAD/Field.

## 7. Personnel.

a. It must be borne in mind that OAD has a group of highly skilled technicians in addition to the usual group of intelligence officers such as found in a foreign division. While it is not impossible for a technician to become an intelligence officer, it is not very probable due to differences in the years spent in acquiring their technical skill, and in temperament, motivation, and job-satisfaction. The technicians who work for OAD must shroud themselves in anonymity. Whereas this is the stock and trade of the normal intelligence officer, it is difficult for the technician. Therefore, the job must be doubly attractive to draw competent personnel from well-paying commercial enterprise. Many of these employees stand to lose seniority rights in unions and trade organizations by employment with OAD. This consideration must be faced squarely and met by a realistic personnel policy.

b. As has already been discussed the present allotment of personnel is inadequate to meet the demands of OAD. Firm estimates from OPC thru June 1952 call for documenting [ ] persons, training [ ] in [ ], and training [ ] in photography. In [ ] alone our staff is inadequate to train the [ ] students per year we are receiving.

c. While the technicians will usually remain in OAD, the document intelligence personnel are potential intelligence officers. By the same token there is no reason why case officers should not be rotated in to Document Intelligence either at Headquarters or overseas. Only then will a well-rounded team be built in this OAD field to support

OSO/OPC operations. The impetus for such a program must come from the Staffs of OSO and OPC.

8. Procurement.

a. The elimination of OAD from the procurement field has seriously handicapped its operations. For procurement purposes OAD is a technical service; common practice in the armed forces has always been for the technical services to do their own procurement, yet OAD is dependent on a procurement office that is not technically qualified to produce the required results. These current procurement processes are time-consuming and insecure.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

9. From the above discussions it may be briefly concluded:

a. That since there is little sympathetic understanding of OAD's mission and limited thinking as to the magnitude of its mission, OAD suffers from a lack of administrative support. Space and personnel are the priority needs of OAD, and the lack of these illustrates the absence of real support.

b. That a satisfactory outline of assigned responsibilities has never been furnished to OAD on which it may base its daily operations and under which it may intelligently plan for the future requirements and commitments.

c. That OAD's manifold responsibilities are so diversified that satisfactory performance in all fields is well-nigh impossible under the existing organization.

d. That the responsibility of research and development of special intelligence equipment for the Armed Forces is not only beyond the capability of OAD but is undesirable from a security standpoint.

e. That there is overlap between OAD and TRD in several types of technical training.

f. That there is justifiable usurping of OAD responsibilities by certain foreign divisions due to lack of personnel in OAD.

g. That for OAD to be a division of OSO is organizationally and functionally unsound.

h. That an inadequate effort has been made to establish a personnel policy to satisfy the unusual problems of OAD.

i. That procurement has been centralized unrealistically to the detriment of efficiency and security.

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## V. RECOMMENDATIONS

10. The following recommendations are offered by OAD/OSO to the problem presented:

a. That the Branches of OAD be relocated in suitable space adjacent to the Office of the Chief and to each other and close enough to the operating divisions of OSO/OPC to permit the frequent personal contact that is necessary.

b. That a group of consultants be immediately employed to make a survey of the reproduction problems peculiar to clandestine intelligence operations and to make recommendations concerning the utilization of private enterprise or of liberalized government procedures to solve production, personnel, and procurement problems.

c. That a disinterested survey be made of those OSO/OAD functions now exercised by OSO foreign divisions and those arrogated functions be returned and the personnel involved be transferred to OAD.

d. That the existing procurement policy be revised to enable OAD to accomplish its mission within the time and limits set by the foreign divisions.

e. That OAD assume responsibility for all photographic, S/W, and document intelligence training and relinquish all others. Electronics surveillance training to remain in OAD until the entire surveillance problem is resolved.

11. In the remaining recommendations necessary to complete this study, OAD/OSO finds itself in the difficult position of making recommendations involving both OSO and OPC, as well as CIA. It is therefore necessary for OAD to make the subsequent recommendations as a responsible staff whose obligations are divided between OSO and OPC and who in specific cases exercises responsibility for the Agency to outside sources.

a. That the mission and responsibilities expressed in paras. 1 and 2 of Tab E, which are based on those functions which OAD logically feels it should perform for OSO, OPC, and CIA, be adopted and assigned to OAD.

b. That OAD be relieved of those real or implied responsibilities listed in para. 3 of Tab E.

c. That if recommendation 11a is approved, OAD be directed to submit a new T/O of organization to accomplish this mission as assigned.

d. That OAD be transferred from the administrative control of OSO and placed under control of the office or staff responsible for the operations of OSO and OPC and be directed to render support to OSO and OPC as outlined in its mission and responsibilities.

e. That an appropriate committee be designated to make recommendations on the following points:

(1) The disposition of those responsibilities relinquished by OAD in para. 3 of Tab 4, including:


(a) The assignment of the research and development responsibility for CIA, Army, Navy, and Air Force for special intelligence equipment.

(b) The advisability of either establishing a Surveillance and Investigations Division to include the Electronics Surveillance Branch/OAD or its transfer to Communications Division.

(2) The advisability of establishing an Office to embrace all these functions including those of OAD.




ORGANIZATION CHART FOR OPERATIONAL AIDS DIVISION/CSO




OAD Personnel Overseas on T/O of FDM -

OAD Headquarters TOTAL -

NOTE: There are not OAD personnel presently in



OAD Headquarters TOTAL - [ ] OAD Personnel Overseas on T/O's of Foreign Divisions



NOTE: There are not OAD personnel present in [ ]

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THE MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF OAD.

Stated in paragraphs <sup>1 and 2 below</sup> is what is believed to constitute the logical mission of OAD:

1. The Operational Aids Division provides cover and authentication for agents; research, training, and operations in SW; and research, training, and service in photography.

2. Particular responsibilities include:



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r. Advice to authorized persons on any subject within the OAD field of competence.

Described in paragraph 3 are another group of responsibilities which must be provided for since they are requirements of operations, but should be discontinued as OAD responsibilities except as specifically assigned.

3. a. Development and procurement

b. Research and development of special equipment for intelligence purposes.

c. Research, development, and procurement

d. Training and development of techniques and equipment for  physical surveillance (except where an OAD specialty would be of assistance).

e. Training and development of techniques and equipment for electronics surveillance.

f. Research development, and procurement of