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APPROVED FOR
RELEASE DATE:
19-Nov-2009

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

12 December 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : ARMORED ACADEMY TRAINING TEXT: The Offensive
Operation of a Combined-Arms Army

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is a translation from Russian of a SECRET training text on the army offensive operation published by the Armored Academy in Moscow in 1973. The text goes into some detail in treating the various combat operations of the combined-arms army with the use of both nuclear and conventional weapons. The steps in planning and conducting these operations are comprehensively outlined, and the role of the army in front operations is indicated.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

William W. Wells

HR70-14


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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

FIRDB - 312/03389-77

DATE OF INFO. 25 September 1973

DATE 12 December 1977

SUBJECT

ARMORED ACADEMY TRAINING TEXT: The Offensive Operation of a Combined-Arms Army

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of a SECRET training text on the army offensive operation published by the Military Academy of Armored Troops i/n R. Ya. Malinovskiy in 1973. The text goes into some detail in treating the various combat operations of the combined-arms army, which include the meeting engagement, the assault crossing of water obstacles, the breakthrough of an enemy defense, and border operations. The steps in planning and conducting these operations in nuclear and non-nuclear variants and in providing troop control and support are comprehensively outlined, and the role of the army in front operations is indicated.

End of Summary



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ORDER OF LENIN RED BANNER MILITARY
ACADEMY OF ARMORED TROOPS
I/N MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY

Department of Operational Art

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THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION OF A
COMBINED-ARMS ARMY

Academy Edition

Moscow

1973

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ORDER OF LENIN RED BANNER MILITARY
ACADEMY OF ARMORED TROOPS
I/N MARSHAL OF THE SOVIET UNION R. Ya. MALINOVSKIY

Department of Operational Art

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For students of the
1st special section
of the 6th faculty

THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION OF A
COMBINED-ARMS ARMY

Training Text

Inventory No. _____

Academy Edition

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1973

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FOREWORD

The Peace Program worked out by the XXIV Session of the CPSU is finding ever greater support among countries and peoples. The growing recognition of the principles of peaceful coexistence, however, does not mean that the capitalist states have renounced their imperialistic policies. There remain in the world forces which oppose the development of international cooperation and are crusading for the unrestrained increase of military budgets and the buildup of nuclear potential. It is understandable that in this situation the preparation of the armed forces of the socialist countries to protect the socialist camp against the aggressive forces of imperialism cannot slacken. To keep our powder dry, manifest vigilance, and increase combat readiness -- these demands on the armed protectors of the socialist camp fully retain their importance. Thoroughly understanding their tasks, the personnel of the armies of the socialist countries continue persistently to master military affairs and learn the complex science of victory. Study of the theoretical propositions of Soviet operational art and of the theory and practice of preparing and conducting army operations of the Ground Forces is the important task of the students of the command curriculum of the academy.

The training text "The Offensive Operation of a Combined-Arms Army" has been worked out in conformity with the program of the course in operational art for socialist country students of the sixth faculty.

In the text are set forth the theoretical propositions on the principles of the offensive operation of a combined-arms army, on the content and methods of preparing it, and on the nature of the conduct of the operation.

All questions of theory are presented in the text in the light of modern requirements and established official views on the preparation and conduct of modern operations.

Taken by the author as the basis of the text are the most important principles of Soviet operational art:

- constant maintenance of large units and formations in high combat readiness;
- constant readiness to conduct combat actions with the employment of nuclear weapons or with only conventional means of destruction;
- correct choice of the axis of the main attack, concentration of the main efforts of troops on the chosen axis and, at the decisive moment to save forces, in secondary sectors;
- aggressiveness, continuity, and daring in conducting operations for the purpose of seizing the initiative and holding it, delivery of resolute attacks throughout the depth of the combat and operational disposition of the enemy;
- achievement of objectives through the joint efforts of formations, large units, and units of all branches of the armed forces on the basis of their close cooperation;
- reliability of troop control and the ability to not only react to changes in the situation but also to foresee the development of events and prevent surprises.

DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ACADEMY
DOCTOR OF MILITARY SCIENCES AND PROFESSOR
GENERAL-LEYTENANT OF TANK TROOPS

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CHAPTER ONE

PRINCIPLES OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION OF A COMBINED-ARMS ARMY

1. Combat strength and combat capabilities of a combined arms army

Combat strength of a combined-arms army

By an operation of ground forces should be understood nuclear or fire strikes of conventional weapons and highly mobile actions of operational formations and large units, coordinated and interconnected by objective, place, and time and conducted according to a single concept to accomplish set operational or strategic tasks. According to scale they must be front or army operations, and according to objectives, tasks, and nature of actions they may be offensive or defensive. *

The objective of an operation is attained by the conduct of engagements.

An engagement is the sum of nuclear and fire strikes and battles connected among themselves according to objective, time, and space and directed toward the accomplishment of one of the important tasks of the operation.

The branches of the armed forces participate with their own operational formations in the operations being conducted. The strength of operational formations is not constant. It depends on the importance of the tasks to be accomplished, the availability of forces and means, and other conditions. The highest operational formation of the Ground Forces is the front. It is intended for fulfilling operational and strategic tasks. |

A combined-arms army is an operational formation of the Ground Forces and it usually enters the complement of a front for the accomplishment of operational tasks, as a rule, within the framework of a front operation.

A combined-arms army has three to four motorized rifle divisions, one to two tank divisions, an army missile brigade, an army gun artillery brigade, a tank-destroyer regiment, units of air defense troops, units of engineer, chemical, and communications troops, and rear services units and facilities. Sometimes the army may have army corps. | *6 div*



Attached to the army may be large units and units of the front and of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command -- artillery, helicopter, engineer, radiotechnical, repair-and-restoration, and other units.

For the operation of an army operating on a main axis, up to 100 and sometimes more nuclear warheads may be allocated.

Combat capabilities of a combined-arms army

By combat capabilities of an army is understood the capability of its troops to defeat a definite grouping of the enemy and take important areas of the terrain.

The combat capabilities of a combined-arms army are characterized by the capabilities for hitting the enemy by fire and for warding off his strikes from the air, for withstanding the strikes of nuclear weapons and for carrying out movement.

Underlying the combat capabilities of an army are such combat properties as its great fire power and striking power, high mobility, and ability to withstand enemy nuclear strikes.

A combined-arms army consisting of five divisions is capable, with one launch of tactical and operational-tactical missiles to a depth of up to 250 kilometers, of hitting up to 24 battalion-type targets with losses of 40 to 50 percent or of inflicting damage on two enemy divisions. Having in its composition around 1,600 tanks, over 700 guns and mortars, 439 antitank means, and over 400 armored personnel carriers, an army is capable, with the fire of conventional means, of inflicting damage on and routing two or three divisions of a first-echelon army corps of the enemy and up to a division of his operational reserves.

With organic troops and army means of air defense, an army is capable, in only one firing cycle under the conditions of a complex radioelectronic situation, of destroying up to 20 or 25 enemy aircraft.

A combined-arms army possesses high stability against nuclear strikes and strikes of the air enemy, due to the considerable number of tank regiments and tank battalions in it and to the shelter of the personnel of the motorized rifle units by the armor of the infantry combat vehicles and armored personnel carriers.



The capability of the army to carry out movement is characterized by its capabilities to perform long marches over distances of 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers with an average daily rate of 300 kilometers or more and an average speed of 20 to 30 kilometers per hour with the maintenance of high combat readiness for impending combat actions.

The place and mission of the combined-arms army

The combined-arms army can be employed in both the first and second echelon of the front, on the axis of the main or secondary attack of the front. A combined-arms army of a front's first echelon is intended for routing the opposing grouping of the enemy and destroying his nuclear means in its zone, for swiftly developing the offensive, as a rule, to the depth of the immediate task of the front, for taking important areas (installations), and for consolidating the success achieved.

An army of a front's second echelon is intended for developing the offensive on the axis of the main attack and for delivering attacks on new axes.

2. Objective, tasks, and scope of an offensive operation


Objective and tasks of the operation

For an army the objective of the operation and the tasks for participation in the initial nuclear strike of the front are determined and immediate and subsequent tasks are set.

The objective of the operation of a combined-arms army of the first echelon of a front may be the rout of the opposing grouping of the enemy and the seizure of his vitally important installations and areas to the depth of the immediate task of the front.

The task of the army for participation in the first nuclear strike of the front consists in the destruction of the operational-tactical means of nuclear attack of the enemy and the inflicting of damage to the main groupings of his ground forces, air defense, and major control posts.

The immediate task of the army includes destruction of the means of nuclear attack, rout of the opposing grouping and immediate operational reserves of the enemy, and seizure of important areas and lines in the depth of the operational disposition of his field army.



Its depth may reach 120 to 150 kilometers.

The subsequent task of the army may consist in development of the offensive, destruction of newly detected nuclear means, rout of the operational reserves of the enemy, and seizure of important areas and installations at the line of the immediate task of the front.

The depth of the subsequent task may be 130 to 200 kilometers.

Scope of the offensive operation of an army

The scope of the offensive operation of an army is characterized by such indicators as depth, width of the zone, duration, and average daily rate of advance. The numerical values of these indicators are determined as being the same both in an offensive with the use of nuclear weapons and in one without.

Having an influence on the indicators of the scope of the operation will be such factors as the grouping of the enemy, the place and role of the army in the operation, the condition and combat readiness of the troops of the army, and the physical geographical conditions of the theater of military operations.

The depth of the offensive operation of an army, as a rule, coincides with the depth of the immediate task of the front and may be 250 to 350 kilometers.

The width of the offensive zone of an army is determined on the basis of its capabilities and terrain conditions. Under the conditions of the Western Theater of Military Operations, the width of the offensive zone of an army when there are three or four divisions in the first echelon may reach 60 to 80 kilometers (on the calculation of an average of 20 kilometers per first-echelon division).

Such a zone provides for the dispersal of troops and their maneuvering, as well as the breakthrough of the enemy defense without the use of nuclear weapons in two sectors equal to eight and four kilometers.

The duration of the operation may reach six to seven days or more.

The average daily rates of advance may be 25 to 30 kilometers per day when breaking through a prepared defense, and when developing the offensive, 40 to 60 kilometers and sometimes more.



Methods of conduct of an offensive operation by an army

By methods of conduct of an operation is understood a definite procedure of employing the forces and means of the army to defeat the main forces of the enemy in the offensive zone to the entire depth of the operation. Underlying any method of conduct of an operation are the hitting of the enemy and troop actions, including fire, swift attack, or maneuver.

The factors which determine the choice of one method or the other of the conduct of the operation are:

- the strength, position, and nature of actions of the enemy;
- the objective and tasks of the army in the operation of the front;
- the strength and combat capabilities of the army;
- the place of the army in the operational disposition of the front;
- the physical geographic conditions of the theater of military operations and the nature of the operational axis.

Depending on these factors, a combined-arms army can conduct an operation by such methods as:

- delivery of nuclear strikes and a rapid offensive of troops on several very short axes;
- delivery of nuclear strikes and an offensive of troop groupings on converging axes for the purpose of encircling the main forces of the enemy;
- delivery of an attack to cut off a grouping of the enemy;
- a combination of the above methods.

3. Conditions of the successful conduct of an operation and the operational disposition of the combined-arms army

Conditions of the successful conduct of an operation and the axis of the main attack

Successful conduct of the operation of a combined-arms army is ensured by the fulfilment of the following conditions: concentration of efforts to fulfil the most important tasks, on the accomplishment of which the success of combat actions on the whole depends; timely destruction of the enemy's means of nuclear attack and achievement of fire superiority over him; simultaneous action by the means of destruction and attacks by groupings of troops to the entire depth of the enemy disposition; display of creative initiative in the fulfilment of combat tasks; appropriate choice of targets



to hit; quick exploitation by troops of the results of destruction by fire; use of extensive maneuvering and conduct of combat actions at high speeds; imposing one's will on the enemy and preempting him in destruction by fire; organization and conduct of continuous combat actions day and night; precise cooperation of troops in the operation and timely buildup of efforts on the main axes; dependable coverage of troops and rear installations against strikes from the air; continuous implementation of measures to maintain the high survivability of troops and speedily restore their combat effectiveness; effective implementation of measures for all-around support and stable control of troops in the operation.

Among all these conditions an especially important place belongs to the concentration of the main efforts and the creation of the necessary grouping of forces and means on the axis of the main attack.

The axes of the main and secondary attacks of the army are selected as the same regardless of the possible conditions of the start of the first operation. Therefore, it is advantageous to employ the divisions of the attack grouping of the army on the axes where conditions are created to carry the offensive rapidly into the depth, where the maximum exploitation of their maneuver capabilities is ensured.

Scout

The axis of the main attack is determined, as a rule, to the depth of the immediate task. During an operation the axis of the main attack may change in keeping with the developing conditions of the situation.

On the axis of the main attack, superiority in forces and means, especially nuclear weapons, is established and constantly maintained.

This is achieved by: concentration of the main efforts of the rocket troops, artillery, and supporting aviation to hit the main enemy groupings; formation of an attack grouping consisting predominantly of tank divisions; and the buildup of efforts of the troops by extensive maneuvering of forces and means during the operation. All of this must be reflected in the operational disposition of the army.

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The operational disposition of a combined-arms army

For carrying out the operation, the decision of the commander determines the operational disposition of the troops of the army, which consists in forming the necessary grouping of forces and means which is intended for accomplishment of tasks in the operation.



The grouping to be formed for an offensive must ensure: the constant readiness of troops to conduct a decisive offensive and the flexibility to deliver a powerful original attack under conditions of the use of nuclear or only conventional weapons; the most effective employment of all means of destruction and the fullest exploitation of the results of destruction; convenience of cooperation of troops in the operation and suddenness of action and intensification of efforts on decisive axes; capability of maneuvering forces and means along the front and from the depth; implementation of speedy restoration of combat effectiveness; and also the conduct of highly mobile actions during the entire operation.

The operational disposition of the troops of the army must correspond to the concept of the operation and the set tasks. It is formed the same for actions with and without the use of nuclear weapons. The grouping formed before the start of the operation may be changed in conformity with the conditions of the situation.

The operational disposition of an army in an offensive operation may include: first-echelon tank and motorized rifle divisions; second-echelon tank and motorized rifle divisions or a combined-arms reserve; a grouping of rocket troops and artillery and air defense troops; reserves of special troops, a mobile obstacle detachment, and an antitank reserve.

The composition of each of the elements of the operational disposition is determined in keeping with the concept of the operation, the strength and possible nature of actions of the opposing enemy, as well as with the combat strength of the army. In determining it there must be no cut-and-dried approach.

The first echelon of an army usually is made up of three to four divisions and is intended for the rout of a definite enemy grouping and rapid development of the offensive into the depth.

The depth of disposition of the first echelon may be within the limits of 40 to 50 kilometers.

The second echelon may be made up of one or two divisions. It is intended for development of the offensive on the main axis or for the delivery of attacks on new axes.

The combined-arms reserve of the army is intended for the buildup of the efforts of the first-echelon troops, replacement of first-echelon large units, consolidation of captured areas and installations, annihilation of



separated groupings, airborne landing forces, and airmobile units, and the fulfilment of other tasks suddenly arising during the operation.

The grouping of rocket troops includes the army missile brigade, which is intended for the destruction of nuclear means, control posts, and other important enemy targets, as well as for hitting the main groupings of his troops.

The missile brigade is deployed at a distance of 40 to 60 kilometers from the forward units of the first echelon.

The artillery grouping consists of the army artillery group (AAG), which may have four to five battalions. It is intended for reinforcing the fire of the artillery groups of the first-echelon divisions operating on the axis of the main attack, and for accomplishing fire tasks according to the plan of the army; the army artillery group is deployed at a distance of six to eight kilometers from the forward units of the first echelon.

The grouping of air defense troops includes the surface-to-air missile regiment of the army, attached surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery regiments, as well as air defense radiotechnical units, and it is intended for coverage of the main grouping of the army and of control posts against strikes of the air enemy.

The reserves of special troops include the reserves of engineer as well as chemical troops.

In an army, one or two mobile obstacle detachments may be formed.

In a combined-arms army, an army antitank reserve is formed from the tank-destroyer regiment.

The overall depth of the operational disposition of an army in the departure area for an offensive may be within the limits of 130 to 180 kilometers.


This depth is the sum of the following indicators.

The first-echelon divisions, taking into account the depth of disposition of subunits and units as well as the intervals between the first and second echelons of up to six or eight kilometers in regiments and 15 to 20 kilometers in a division, may have an overall depth of up to 40 or 50 kilometers.



The second echelon of an army usually is deployed at a distance of 50 to 80 kilometers, having a depth of disposition of up to 40 or 50 kilometers.

Hence the overall depth of the operational disposition of an army may reach 130 to 180 kilometers. But taking into account the forward detachments to be allocated from the first-echelon divisions for operational coverage of the frontier at a distance of 20 to 40 kilometers from the waiting areas, the depth of disposition of an army may be within the limits of 150 to 200 kilometers.



Operational disposition of an army

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LEGEND

1. First-echelon divisions
2. Second-echelon divisions (reserve)
3. Forward detachment
4. Forward detachment - tank regiment
5. Motorized rifle division
6. Army artillery group
7. Forward command post of army
8. Tank regiment
9. Tank division
10. Motorized rifle regiment
11. Surface-to-air missile regiment
12. Separate air defense radiotechnical battalion
13. Command post of army
14. Army missile brigade
15. Reserve of engineer troops
16. Mobile obstacle detachment No. 1
17. Mobile obstacle detachment No. 2
18. Helicopter regiment
19. Reserve of chemical troops
20. Antitank reserve
21. Rear control post of army

4. Operational coverage of the national frontier
and of the deployment of troops

Operational coverage of the national frontier includes the system of measures coordinated by objective, place, and time that are directed toward precluding a surprise invasion by the enemy and toward creating favorable conditions for the deployment of troops and the effective employment of the forces and means of the formation at the start of combat actions.

Coverage is carried out both in peacetime and with the start of combat actions in the entire zone of the army and front. The strength of the covering forces and means, as well as their tasks, are determined by the commander of the front on the basis of the objective and concept of the front operation, the conditions of the location of one's own troops, the strength of the enemy, his intentions, and the possible nature of actions.

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For operational coverage there can be allocated: units of rocket troops and aviation, of air defense troops, radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance units, and others assigned to combat alert; specially formed covering units and large units, as well as combined-arms units and large units. In a combined-arms army, for coverage of the frontier, there may be allocated a few regiments and battalions of the first-echelon divisions, and for coverage of the most important axes, a motorized rifle division.

The main tasks of the forces and means allocated for operational coverage may be: disruption of possible provocations undertaken by the enemy at the national frontier immediately before the start of war; repulse of the attack of an enemy invading across the frontier and the inflicting of maximum losses on him; firm holding of advantageous lines in the frontier zone, prevention of an enemy advance into the interior, support of the deployment of the main forces of the army and of their organized commitment to the engagement.

Operational coverage of the national frontier in the assigned zone is organized by the commander of the army on the basis of the orders of the commander of the front and in complete conformity with the decision on the first offensive or defensive operation of the army.

5. The essence and content of combat readiness of an army

By the essence of combat readiness of the troops of a combined-arms army is understood such a condition of its large units and units given which it is capable in the established time of setting about the fulfilment and successfully fulfilling the set task under the most complex conditions of the situation, i.e., a definite quantitative and qualitative condition of the forces and means of the army that characterizes their readiness to fulfil the combat tasks entrusted to them.

The content of combat readiness of an army is: full authorized personnel strength of the troops, full provision of the large units and units with the prescribed weapons and combat equipment in good technical condition and with the necessary reserves of materiel; a high level of training and teamwork of large units and units, faultless knowledge by personnel of the equipment and armament assigned to them and skilful mastery of it; the ability of commanders and staffs to exercise firm control of troops under any conditions of the situation.

Measures are carried out in peacetime to maintain the high combat readiness of the troops of an army. The chief of these are: purposeful



daily combat training and political training of troops; efficient organization of troop duty, warning and communications; advance planning of the bringing of the army to full combat readiness, secret familiarization of the commanders and staffs of large units and units with the areas of concentration upon combat alert and with the combat tasks; planning and organization of the combat alert of air defense means according to the orders of the senior commander; organization and conduct of secret preparation and maintenance of movement routes under the guise of combat training measures; construction of storage places that ensure the dispersed and concealed storage of delivery missiles and warheads and of tactical supply reserves for the large units, units, and subunits; systematic inspection and preparation of combat equipment, armament, and materiel reserves for combat use; advance engineer preparation of deployment areas of control posts.

The overall objective of these measures is maintenance of a high level of combat readiness of troops, reduction of the time necessary to bring them to full combat readiness, and preparation of the troops of the army for successful fulfilment of the tasks of an operation under complex conditions of the situation and with minimum losses.

CHECK QUESTIONS

1. Combat strength of a combined-arms army; its purpose and combat capabilities.
2. Objective, tasks, and scope of the offensive operation of a combined-arms army.
3. The operational disposition of an army; its elements and their purpose.
4. Operational coverage of the national frontier and of the deployment of troops.
5. The essence and content of combat readiness.

CHAPTER TWO

PREPARATION OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION OF A COMBINED-ARMS ARMY

1. Content and conditions of the preparation of an offensive operation

Content of the preparation of the operation

Vladimir Ilich Lenin attached exceptionally great importance in military matters to organizational activity. He wrote that "...every engagement includes the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no other means of reducing this possibility but organized preparation of the engagement."* This wise instruction of V. I. Lenin is unswervingly put into practice by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Our military science is guided by it. The vital importance of this instruction is confirmed by the whole course of military history and especially by the experience of the Great Patriotic War.

Preparation of the offensive operation of a combined-arms army includes the system of measures carried out by the command, staffs, party political organs, troops, and rear services organs for the planning, organization, and all-around support of combat actions.

The immediate preparation of the offensive operation of an army begins with the moment of the receipt of a combat task from the commander of the group of forces or district (front) and includes the following basic undertakings: adoption of a decision and elaboration of a plan of operation; preparation of forces and means for the delivery of nuclear strikes; maintenance of the constant combat readiness of troops to immediately go over to the offensive and disrupt the enemy offensive; organization and conduct of reconnaissance of the enemy; assignment of tasks to the troops and their preparation for combat actions; organization and implementation of operational coverage at the national frontier and the deployment of troops; engineer preparation of the departure area for the offensive, deployment of control posts and of the communications system; organization of the rear services, stockpiling and echeloning of reserves of materiel, and sheltering of these.

* Lenin, V. I. Complete Collected Works, Vol. 6, p. 137.



For the purposes of organized and timely execution of the measures for preparation of the offensive operation, the staff of the army works out a calendar plan of preparation of the operation. This plan reflects the main undertakings for preparation of the operation which are to be carried out by the field headquarters of the army and by the troops; and it defines the times to fulfil them, the responsible executors, and the monitoring procedure. The calendar plan of preparation of the offensive operation of an army may be worked out textually or in the form of a network (line) diagram.

Possible conditions of the preparation of an operation

The first offensive operation of a combined-arms army is prepared, as a rule, in advance, i.e., in peacetime. The preparation of a subsequent operation is done during combat actions, in the situation of completing the fulfilment by the troops of the army of the tasks of the preceding operation. However, under any conditions, the preparation of an operation must be done secretly and in an extremely short time.

The main preparation measures of the first offensive operation of a combined-arms army stationed in a frontier area, which are to be carried out in advance in peacetime, are: adoption of a decision, planning of the operation, preparation of forces and means for the delivery of nuclear strikes, organization of operational coverage at the national frontier; organization and conduct of reconnaissance (without crossing the national frontier); engineer preparation of routes and deployment sites of control posts, maintenance of high combat readiness of troops, and the stockpiling of materiel.

In peacetime, secretly under the guise of exercises, the probable axes of actions of the army are studied; and the practicality of operational calculations, the efficiency of cooperation of forces and means, and the reliability of the organization of troop control are tested.

With the acute aggravation of the military-political situation in the theater of military operations and the occurrence of the immediate threat of an enemy attack, the tasks of the combined-arms army may be refined or changed. This will entail the necessity of refinement of the previously adopted decision, planning of the offensive operation, and other preparation measures of the operation in a short time simultaneously with bringing the troops of the army to increased or full combat readiness.



In this period, for the purpose of supporting the operational deployment and creating advantageous conditions for the organized entry of the troops of the army into the engagement, by a decision of the commander of the group of forces (military district), the necessary forces and means for operational coverage of the national frontier may be moved forward from the combined-arms army.

✓ As is known, the probable enemies place their main stake in a future war on a surprise attack. In connection with this, completion of the preparation of an offensive operation in the army may be done under the conditions of combat actions already begun and under strikes of nuclear weapons and aviation and under conditions of the possible incursion of enemy attack groupings on separate axes.

Preparation of the offensive operation of a combined-arms army may proceed under the most varied conditions of the situation, but in all cases it must have a strictly purposeful character and ensure the high constant combat readiness of troops for immediate and decisive actions.

2. Adoption of the decision for an operation and the assignment of tasks to troops

Work procedure of the commander of an army when adopting the decision for an operation

The adoption of the decision for an operation is an extremely vital and complex creative process in the activity of the commander of an army. The decision most distinctly expresses the commander's understanding of the task received and his ability to find appropriate ways to fulfil it in any and all conditions of the situation. The decision must be adopted in good time and the combat tasks assigned to the troops in the shortest time periods.

The commander of the army personally makes the decision for the operation on the basis of his comprehension of the task received, assessment of the situation, and a comparative quantitative-qualitative analysis of the combat capabilities of the sides.



Adoption of the decision and planning of the operation are done according to the principle of unified planning of the operation. This means that within the framework of one concept there are determined the methods of routing the enemy grouping with the use of nuclear weapons or only with the use of conventional means of destruction, the same axes (for



nuclear and non-nuclear actions) of the main and secondary attacks, and a single operational disposition of troops.

The tasks for troops, the average rates of advance, the cooperation and deployment of troops, the measures for all-around support of the operation, and the system of troop control also are determined and reflected in the decision as the same [for nuclear and non-nuclear actions].

Timeliness in adopting the decision for an operation largely depends on the methods of working it out, which are determined by the availability of time and the conditions of the operational situation.

With limited time available for preparing an operation it is most advisable to employ a parallel method of work by the commander when making the decision; this ensures the almost simultaneous fulfilment of the measures for preparing the operation in the army and in the large units.

To achieve greater purposefulness and efficiency in work under the indicated conditions, a control center made up of the main senior command personnel of the army is formed at the command post, and the officers of the operations department are formed into three groups: planning, axis officers, and information. Here is performed all the work of making the decision, drawing it up, and delivering the combat tasks to the troops.

After receiving the directive on the preparation and conduct of the operation, the commander together with a member of the Military Council, the chief of staff, the chief of the operations department, and the chief of rocket troops and artillery set about studying it. While the directive is being studied, officers from the planning group plot on two maps simultaneously the tasks of the army and other situation data. This moment is in fact the beginning of the drawing up of the decision on the map by the operations department. In the process of studying the directive the commander determines the content and the fulfilment times (the duration) of particular tasks, as well as the content and volume of the data which the staff and chiefs of branch arms and services must prepare for him while the decision is being made. In addition, he makes an estimate of the time required to make the decision, deliver the tasks, and prepare the troops for the operation.

The chief of staff of the army or his deputy, after studying the directive, conducts at the prepared (second) map, parallel to the work of the commander, an operational briefing of the chiefs of branch arms,



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special troops, and services; not more than 15 to 20 minutes is spent on this. During the operational briefing are indicated: a brief assessment of the enemy grouping and the nature of enemy actions; the objective of the offensive operation and its scope; the content of the immediate and the subsequent task; the quantity of nuclear and special warheads to be allocated to the army and the flight resources; the means of reinforcement and the times of their arrival in the army; the targets on the axis of actions of the army to be hit with the nuclear means of the strategic rocket forces and the front; the time the troops of the army are to be ready for combat actions; the time estimate and orders of the commander of the army, including also an outline of the concept of the operation. Simultaneously, the axis officers work out preliminary instructions and the officers of the planning group set about working out the explanatory memorandum to the decision for the operation.

The chiefs of the branch arms, special troops, and services, after being briefed on the combat task received, organize the purposeful work of their own departments and prepare the necessary calculations and reference materials, and they also issue the necessary instructions on the preparation of the forces and means subordinate to them for the fulfilment of tasks in the operation.

The commander of the army with the previously mentioned senior personnel, after studying the directive, sets about an assessment of the most important situation data for the purpose of determining the concept of actions and the tasks for the first-echelon divisions. During this work he analyzes the results of the calculations on the assessment of the combat capabilities of his own troops and of the enemy, especially in respect to destruction by fire and then he draws up the concept of actions and the tasks for the troops. While the concept is being drawn up, the axis officers finish working out the combat instructions for the large units in readiness right after it is announced to deliver the tasks to the troops by all possible means in the given situation.

Calculations show that in one and a half to two hours the commander can announce the concept of actions for the operation and define the tasks for the first-echelon large units for the first day of the operation.

In this same amount of time the staff of the army can deliver the combat tasks to the first-echelon troops. As a result, from this moment (i.e., one and a half to two hours after the directive is received) the field headquarters of the army joins in the purposeful work to organize and plan the operation; and the commanders of large units, on the basis of the



tasks received, set about concrete work to prepare the troops and plan their combat actions in the impending operation. After this, the commander of the army and the chief of staff finish the work of a detailed assessment of all the elements of the situation on the basis of more detailed operational calculations prepared by the staff, and they work out in detail the measures for all-around support of the combat actions of troops in the offensive operation. At the end of this work, the previously outlined concept of actions in the operation and the combat tasks for the troops of the army can be refined.

Thus, with this method of work, the adoption of the decision, its drawing up, and the delivery of tasks to the troops are done almost simultaneously in the army and the subordinate large units and units, i.e., in parallel. This permits the commander and staff of the army to make a well-founded decision for the operation in the minimum necessary time, to get combat tasks to the troops in good time, and to draw up the decision completely. It was shown above that in one and a half to two hours after receipt of the directive the commander of the army announces the concept of actions in the operation and the tasks for the first-echelon troops for the first day of the operation, and during this same period of time they are delivered to the executors by the staff of the army. Then, in three to three and a half hours the commander of the army finishes the assessment of the situation in full and makes the decision, and at the end of three and a half to four hours he announces the decision to the command personnel of the field headquarters and signs the combat order worked out by the staff. At the end of five and a half to six hours the commander of the army with the help of his staff can assign the tasks to the troops in full and organize cooperation. 3

With sufficient time available to prepare and organize the offensive operation, the commander of an army employs a successive method of work to make the decision and plan the operation.

Upon receiving the operational directive of the military district (front), the commander of the army together with a member of the Military Council, the chief of staff, and the chief of rocket troops and artillery set about studying it. While studying the directive the commander of the army ascertains for himself what the task received is. After comprehending the task the commander of the army gives the chief of staff orders on the preparation of data necessary for making the decision and sets about assessing the situation for the purpose of working out the decision for the operation. For purposes of keeping the concept and plan of the operation in strictest secrecy, from the moment the task is received until the main 4



planning documents are worked out a strictly limited circle of persons, to be determined by the commander or chief of staff of the army, is included in the work of organizing the operation. No operational briefing is conducted within the field headquarters of the army. No preliminary instructions are issued to the troops.

The preparation of data and the working out of combat and planning documents are done by the deputy commander of the army, the chief of staff, the chiefs of the operations and intelligence departments, and the chief of rocket troops and artillery, with each of them preparing the data for making the decision only in the part that pertains to him. The adoption of the decision with this method of working may be preceded by reconnaissance of the terrain.

The planning of the operation begins with the adoption and drawing up of the decision in full.

The combat instructions for the troops, in which the tasks are assigned to them, are kept in the safes of the subordinate commanders and revealed upon the established signals.

By way of preparing for the operation, the questions of organizing and conducting combat actions are worked out in exercises with the troops, commanders, and staffs.

The above-described possible methods of working when making the decision for an operation should be employed by the commander of the army in strict conformity with the concrete conditions of the situation.

Under any situational conditions, the adoption of a thoroughly well-founded and most appropriate decision for the offensive operation of the army is possible only on the condition of an accurate understanding of the concept of the front offensive operation and the content and nature of the tasks assigned to the army, of a purposeful and thorough assessment of the situation, and of operational foresight. Therefore, the process of adoption by the army commander of a decision for an offensive operation includes comprehension of the task received, assessment of the operational situation, and -- on the basis of this -- determination of the concept of actions in the operation and of the other elements of the decision.

Let us examine successively the content and procedure of fulfilling each component of this process.

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Comprehension of the task

In comprehending the task, the commander of an army is obliged to understand the objective and concept of the operation of the front and the methods of achieving it, the axis of the main attack, the content of the immediate and the subsequent tasks of the front, as well as the planned rates of advance.

Then he studies the objective of the army operation and the content of the tasks of the army. As conclusions of his comprehension of the task the commander of the army establishes: the army's place in the operational disposition of the front and its role in the front operation, the scope of the operation of the army and the degree of exertion which is required of the troops in the operation; what results must be achieved by the troops of the army as the result of accomplishing the immediate and the subsequent tasks, the depth, duration, and average rates of advance of these tasks, and the methods of fulfilling them; the degree of effect of the nuclear strikes of the strategic rocket forces and the front and of the combat means issued to the army for accomplishing the assigned tasks; the conditions of cooperation with adjacent armies, aviation, and airborne landing forces.

On the basis of his comprehension of the task, the commander determines the outline of the concept (operational disposition, axis of the main attack of the army, tasks of the large units for the first day of the operation) and the measures which it is necessary to carry out immediately in the interests of preparing the operation. He also determines the time for making the decision, the deadlines for preparation and submission of the necessary data by the chiefs of branch arms and services, and the time for working out the plan of the operation and delivering the tasks to the troops.

After comprehending the task, the commander sets about an assessment of the situation according to its separate elements with regard for the effect of the military-political and economic factors on the given operational axis.

Assessment of the situation

An assessment of the situation is made in respect to the following elements: the enemy, one's own troops, adjacent troops, the radiation, chemical, and radioelectronic situation, and terrain.



When assessing the enemy, the army commander determines the composition of the grouping and the possible nature of its actions in the offensive zone of the front and especially in the offensive zone of the army, the degree of combat readiness of the enemy troops, and his capabilities to use nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction against the troops of the army. On the basis of the analysis of the enemy grouping and his strengths and weaknesses, the commander of the army determines the content of the particular tasks which must be accomplished while achieving the immediate task of the army.

In assessing enemy capabilities to employ nuclear weapons, one establishes the grouping of nuclear attack means, the number of delivery means on the whole and during the fulfilment of particular tasks, their degree of readiness, and the probability of the delivery of a massed strike against the troops of the army. Enemy capabilities to set up nuclear minefields in the frontier zone and in the depth of his territory also are studied.

As the result of his assessment of the enemy, the army commander determines the groupings on whose rout the success of the operation primarily depends, the degree of hitting them with nuclear weapons and conventional means, the axis of concentration of the main efforts of the army, and the possible areas which the large units of the army must subsequently take.

When assessing his own troops, the commander of the army determines the level of combat readiness and combat effectiveness of the troops of the army, the availability and capabilities of nuclear means, special weapons, and conventional means of destruction; he analyzes the probable nature of the radiation situation, the operational status of the troops of the army, and their condition and supply situation. Spt.

The commander analyzes the capabilities of the nuclear means of the army in respect to the number and yield of warheads issued for the operation, the times of their arrival, the expected losses, as well as the productivity of the missile technical units.

When assessing his own troops, the commander relies on the results of calculations the staff performs with the use of computer equipment. // //

In studying the operational status of the troops of the army, the commander establishes how far it corresponds to the successful accomplishment of tasks, what regrouping of troops is necessary, and at



what time it is advisable to carry this out.

When assessing adjacent troops, the commander determines the degree of effect of their actions on the fulfilment of the tasks of the army in the operation, the matters to be coordinated when organizing cooperation, and the additional data it is necessary to get about the adjacent troops.

In studying the radiation and chemical situation, the commander of the army ascertains the possible areas (boundaries) of radioactive and chemical contamination of the terrain and what effect it will have on the methods of action of the army troops in the operation.

On the basis of the assessment of his own troops (taking into account the assessment of the enemy and other data), the commander decides the procedure for employing nuclear weapons and conventional means of destruction according to tasks, allocates the nuclear warheads by tasks and among the divisions, and flight resources by tasks and days of the operation, refines the axes of the main and secondary attacks, and defines the operational disposition of the army, the tasks for the troops, the possible procedure for restoring combat effectiveness, the fundamentals of cooperation and all-around support of the operation, the procedure for operational deployment of the army troops and the measures to disrupt a possible surprise enemy attack, and the places and times of deployment of the control posts of the army and the large units.

Comparative analysis of the combat capabilities of the sides

In the process of assessing the situation, the staff makes a comparative analysis of the combat capabilities of the sides in the interests of having the commander make the optimum decision.

The calculation and comparative assessment of the combat capabilities of the sides can be done by the manual method with the use of tables, charts, etc., or with the use of electronic computers on the basis of solving the computational operational-tactical problems. }

Underlying the method of comparative analysis is calculation of the balance of forces and means before the start of the operation and during it, with regard for the qualitative indicators and interaction of the sides.

Comparison of the combat capabilities of the sides is done in respect to the combat readiness of troops, the number of combat and supporting





forces and means and the volume of tasks to be fulfilled by them, maneuverability and degree of protection of troops, morale and level of combat training of personnel, as well as the operational-tactical status of the troops.

The combat readiness of troops of the sides and the relationship of the indicators of this are determined in respect to rocket troops, ground forces units and large units, and aviation. Combat readiness is expressed as the time to bring them into a condition from which they can immediately set about the fulfilment of combat tasks.

The combat capabilities of the sides are compared on the basis of the number of nuclear warheads, means of delivering them, divisions, the availability of tanks, artillery, antitank means and air defense means, as well as with due regard for the number of aircraft and helicopters.

The quantitative calculation is supplemented by a comparison of qualitative indicators. This comparison can be done with the use of commensurability coefficients and in respect to the individual combat properties of the means of combat, the conclusions about which are taken into consideration when assessing the combat capabilities of the sides.

The balance obtained for the combat capabilities of the sides is compared with the balance that ensures successful conduct of an operation or accomplishment of particular tasks. While doing this, the measures necessary to maintain superiority in forces and means over the enemy are determined.

After comprehending the task and thoroughly assessing the situation, the commander of the army formulates the decision for the offensive operation, underlying which must be the use of nuclear weapons and resolute exploitation of the results of their action against the enemy by tank and motorized rifle divisions by means of a rapid offensive along the shortest axes.

The decision for the operation and the assignment of tasks to the troops

In the decision of the commander of a combined-arms army for an offensive operation are determined: the concept of actions in the operation, tasks, targets, and the procedure for employing nuclear weapons, tasks of the divisions, of the army missile brigade, and of aviation supporting the army; tasks of airborne landing forces, of air defense troops, and of reserves of the army, the procedure for the cooperation of

troops, the main measures for support of combat actions, and the organization of troop control.

The concept of the operation is the most important part of the decision; it expresses the idea of the army commander's decision for routing the main forces and means of the enemy and taking important installations or areas on his territory. In the concept of actions the army commander usually determines: what enemy grouping is the main one, where, with what methods, and in what sequence to defeat it in order to achieve the objectives of the operation; the targets of nuclear strikes and the yields and types of nuclear bursts; the axis of the main and the secondary attack and also where the main efforts of the air defense means are to be concentrated; and the operational disposition of the troops of the army. Also an integral part of the concept is the concept of radioelectronic warfare.

On the basis of the decision of the commander of the army, the staff works out the combat order, which is the main document on the organization of combat actions and the command of troops. Timely assignment of tasks to the troops favors their thorough preparation for combat actions in the operation.

The combat tasks are assigned to the commanders of the large units personally by the commander of the army or by the staff of the army over technical means of communications and also by the delivery of combat documents. Instructions issued orally by the commander of the army or transmitted by technical means of communications are formulated in writing by the staff and delivered to the subordinates.

3. Planning of the offensive operation of an army

Objectives and principles of the planning of an operation

The objective of planning consists in determining the sequence and methods of fulfilling the tasks assigned to the troops of the army with due regard for the expected results of the use of nuclear weapons by the means of the front and the army, in establishing a firm cooperation procedure, as well as in organizing all-around support of combat actions and control of the troops of the army. Along with the indicated objectives, which reflect the essence of planning, this work also provides for the systematization and detailed working out of all the orders of the army commander and the matters of the decision, as well as for their documentary formulation.

The main principles of the planning of an army offensive operation are:

- planning of the operation to its entire depth by tasks (immediate and subsequent);
- most detailed planning of the participation of the nuclear means of the army in the initial nuclear strike of the front and of the actions of the troops to the entire depth of the immediate task of the army and especially for the first day;
- unified planning of the operation both for conditions of its conduct with the employment of nuclear weapons and with the use of only conventional means of destruction.

The combat tasks to the depth of the immediate task are planned by days of the operation or by intermediate (particular) operational tasks, as well as by installations (areas) which are to be captured by a definite time. The actions of troops to the depth of the subsequent task are planned in less detail, inasmuch as it is complicated to foresee in all details the possible course of combat actions at a great depth.

The essence of unified planning of the operation consists in this, that the tasks and the operational disposition of the troops, the axes of the main and secondary attacks, the average daily rates of advance of troops and the deadlines for fulfilment of tasks, as well as all support measures, are determined as one and the same for both nuclear and non-nuclear conditions of the conduct of combat actions.

Work of the staff of the army to plan an operation

The work to plan an operation is performed by the staff of the army in conjunction with the chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services under the general direction of the chief of staff, who coordinates the activity of the entire field headquarters of the army. As this is done, the leading role in the performance of this work belongs to the staff of the army and -- in the staff -- to the operations department, since the planning group of this department works out the plan of the operation directly.

Usually, the decision of the commander of the army for the operation, which is drawn up graphically on a map, is developed into the plan of the operation. At the same time as the decision is being made and being represented graphically on the map, it is advisable to work out the combat order and prepare combat instructions for transmission by technical means



of communications. In other words, all these jobs must be performed in parallel, which is ensured by forming the above-mentioned groups in the operations department of the staff of the army.

As the final definition of tasks for the large units and army units and their graphic formulation on the decision map are done, these tasks are drawn up by the axis officers and delivered to the executors with the use of available means of communications with provision for security and preservation of military secrecy. Such a method of work of the field headquarters of an army ensures the greatest speed in work and additional time for the troops to organize combat actions. And the simultaneous formulation of the decision on two maps affords the opportunity for the commander of the army to work at one of them and permits the staff of the army at the same time to plan the operation on the other map with the decision.

In planning an operation, the staff of the army must ensure the most effective and coordinated use of all the forces and means of the army and, above all, of nuclear weapons.

Involved in the planning of the use of nuclear weapons are the operations and intelligence departments of the staff of the army, the chief of rocket troops and artillery, and other officers of the field headquarters according to the orders of the chief of staff of the army.

The chief of the operations department, together with staff officers of the rocket troops and artillery and the chief of the operations group of the air army, on the basis of the procedure for employing nuclear weapons established by the decision of the commander of the army and on the basis of the presence of detected or presumed targets for each particular task, assigns the targets in detail between the rocket troops of the army and aviation and also determines the number of nuclear warheads, types of burst, and yields necessary to damage each target to the required degree. As this is done, provision also is made for the possibility of allocating other fire means to hit the targets as well.

However, it should be taken into account that only for the first intermediate (particular) task is it possible to determine in greatest detail the procedure for delivering strikes against enemy targets. For the accomplishment of subsequent intermediate tasks, the procedure for delivering nuclear strikes, as well as air strikes with special and conventional bombs, is outlined in general terms. As for the planning of the use of the nuclear weapons of the army during the delivery of the



initial nuclear strike, this is done by the staff of the front (military district, group of forces). ?

The use of nuclear weapons is closely tied in with the use of other means of destruction, including special weapons, aviation, and artillery. In connection with this, in planning the combat actions of the army for fulfilling the first intermediate task, first of all the main and alternate targets for destruction with nuclear weapons are determined, the necessary degree of damage to the enemy is stipulated, and the number of nuclear weapons, their yield, the types of burst, the ground zero coordinates, and the time and procedure of delivering the strikes are established. Then the targets for neutralization by aviation, artillery, and missiles with special warheads are determined; and the procedure of conduct, time, and duration of preparatory fire and fire support of the offensive are established. ?

The tasks for the divisions (by days of the operation), for airborne landing forces, and for air defense troops are planned with due regard for the use of the means of destruction, and so is the procedure for support of combat actions until the total defeat of definite enemy groupings during the fulfilment of the immediate task by the army. The rates of advance of the troops of the army during the fulfilment of this task are determined in conformity with this.

The planning of the combat actions of the large units of the army is done with due regard for the necessity of their rapid penetration along independent axes to the most important enemy targets that have been hit with nuclear and special weapons or captured by airborne landing forces.

During the planning of the operation, the following are determined for each large unit of the first echelon of the army: a waiting (departure) area, lines of deployment (main and alternate), routes of movement out to these lines, the immediate task, subsequent task and task of the day, as well as approximate tasks for the second and following days of the offensive through to the fulfilment of the immediate task of the army, demarcation lines, and command post sites.

For second-echelon large units are designated: areas of location in departure position for the offensive, areas planned to be occupied during movement on the first and subsequent days of the offensive, times and lines of commitment to the engagement and routes for moving out to them; and the possible tasks upon commitment to the engagement are also determined. During the operation, the previously planned actions of the second-echelon



large units are refined.

The subsequent task, as already mentioned, is planned in less detail. First of all, the tasks for the use of nuclear weapons and the composition and offensive axes of the attack groupings of the army troops are determined approximately, the procedure for routing definite enemy groupings and the time for taking his important areas (installations) are outlined; the times and areas of committing the second-echelon large units or the reserve to the engagement and the procedure for restoring them during the operation, as well as the approximate distribution of the forces and means of the army by offensive axes and intermediate tasks are established, and so are the maneuvering of troops and missile means while fulfilling the subsequent task, the grouping of troops by the end of the operation, and the organization of control.

The plan of the operation

The plan of the operation is the army commander's decision worked out in detail and drawn up on a map with an explanatory memorandum and the necessary calculations and substantiations. On this map are plotted the following data: the grouping of forces and means of the enemy and the possible nature of his actions; the immediate and subsequent tasks of the army and its operational disposition; the axis of the main and secondary attack; the tasks of the adjacent troops and the demarcation lines between them; the tasks to be fulfilled by the forces and means of the front (first of all by nuclear weapons) on behalf of the army; the main and alternate targets to be hit with nuclear weapons; the number, yield, and type of nuclear bursts; the areas which the first-echelon divisions must take by the beginning of each day of the operation during fulfilment of the immediate task of the army; the areas planned to be occupied by the second-echelon division (combined-arms reserve) during movement on the first and subsequent days of the offensive; the lines and approximate time of its commitment to the engagement; the waiting areas of the first-echelon divisions and the routes of movement to them; the disposition area of the second-echelon division in departure position for the offensive; the tasks of the air defense troops; the tasks of the airborne landing forces and reserves of special troops and the methods and times of fulfilling them; the sites of control posts during the preparation and course of the operation. Besides what is indicated above, the map reflects the main matters of control, cooperation, and support of the operation.

Considering the great depth of the operational disposition and tasks of an army, for working out the plan of an operation it is advisable to use

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a map with a scale of 1:200,000.

Integral parts of the overall plan of an operation are the plans of combat employment of the branch arms and the plans of support of the operation, which are worked out by the respective chiefs of branch arms and by the appropriate departments. Thus, the political department of the army works out the plan of party political work; the rear staff of the army, the plan of rear services support; the operations department, the plan of operational coverage of the frontier and the deployment of troops, the plan of operational camouflage, the plan of employment of tactical airborne landing forces, the plan of protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction, and the plan of restoration of combat effectiveness; the intelligence department, the reconnaissance plan; the communications department, the communications plan, and so forth.

The explanatory memorandum, as a rule, is worked out in parallel with the drawing up of the map. In it are indicated: the assessment of the enemy and the possible nature of his actions; the objective and concept of the operation; the combat strength of the army; the main indices of the operation; the allocation of means of reinforcement; the availability, arrival times, and allocation of missiles with nuclear and special warheads by tasks of the army and among the large units; the destruction of enemy targets by the forces of the army missile brigade in the initial nuclear strike of the front; the allocation of flight resources of supporting aviation by tasks and days of the operation; the balance of forces and means and densities with due regard for the degree of damage to the enemy; the procedure for ensuring safety of troops during the delivery of nuclear strikes (safe distance lines for one's own troops, warning signals, procedure for the marking by troops of their own position); the availability, arrival, and distribution of materiel; the troop control signals.

From what has been set forth, it follows that as a whole the plan of an offensive operation is the sum of the planning documents in which are specifically determined the procedure and methods of fulfilling the tasks assigned to the troops of the army, the methods of combat employment of the large units and the units of branch arms, and the measures for support of the troops in the operation and for troop control.

With the parallel method of work of the commander and staff, the planning of the operation of an army can be completed in 10 to 12 hours from the time the directive for the operation is received.

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The plan of the operation is signed by the chief of staff and the chief of the operations department and approved by the commander of the army. The plans of the combat employment of the branch arms and special troops are signed by the respective chiefs of branch arms and special troops and also approved by the commander of the army.

With a surprise enemy attack or the receipt of an order to bring the troops to full combat readiness, changes are introduced into the plan worked out earlier in keeping with the concrete situation that has developed by this time. Sometimes the situation may develop in such a way that it requires working out a new plan of the operation.

4. Planning of the restoration of combat effectiveness

Essence and procedure of the planning of the restoration of combat effectiveness

The essence of the planning of the restoration of combat effectiveness consists in determining the array of measures, the time of carrying them out, and the allocation of forces and means necessary for the performance of restoration operations.

The initial data for the planning of the restoration of combat effectiveness are the decision of the commander of the army for the operation, as well as the instructions of the superior staff. In its instructions the superior staff may determine the main measures to be carried out in the interests of restoring the combat effectiveness of subordinate troops as well as the forces and means to be allocated for this with an indication of the times of their arrival.

The staff of the army, on the basis of the decision and the instructions received, does the planning of the restoration of the combat effectiveness of subordinate troops. It is advisable to do this planning for the entire depth of the operation (of combat actions) in respect to the following main elements: restoration of the system of control; restoration of the attack grouping of troops and of the combat effectiveness of tank and motorized rifle large units and units; restoration of the combat effectiveness of rocket troops and artillery; restoration of the air defense system; restoration of the combat effectiveness of special troops and of the working capacity of the tactical and army rear services; elimination of the aftereffects of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction; party political work during the restoration of combat effectiveness.

It is advisable to begin the planning with a determination of the probable nature and degree of enemy action against the troops of the army with weapons of mass destruction and a forecast of the possible losses. The scale and nature of losses in personnel, combat equipment, and armament are determined on the basis of a study of the capabilities of the probable enemy to use weapons of mass destruction, as well as an estimate of losses as a result of their use.

In planning it is advisable to examine only those variants of losses which present difficulties in the performance of restoration operations and require the conduct of army measures.

After establishing the possible degree and nature of losses, there is determined the total requirement in forces and means to restore control, restore the attack grouping, the combat effectiveness of tank and motorized rifle large units and units, rocket troops and artillery, the air defense system, and the working capacity of rear services units and facilities. After this, the restoration operations to be carried out by the means of the senior commander on behalf of the army are determined. For the remaining undertakings, army means and responsible executors are designated.

In determining the times for carrying out the measures to restore combat effectiveness, one should take into account the time necessary for making the decision and assigning the tasks to subordinate troops, as well as for the preparation of the immediate executors to fulfil the task received. All the undertakings to restore combat effectiveness are gathered into one document -- the plan of restoration of combat effectiveness.

The plan of restoration of combat effectiveness

The plan of restoration of combat effectiveness is worked out textually. Its main sections may be: assessment of the possible state of combat effectiveness of the troops after enemy use of means of mass destruction; restoration of the system of control; restoration of the attack grouping and of the combat effectiveness of tank large units and units; restoration of the combat effectiveness of rocket troops and artillery; restoration of the air defense system; restoration of the combat effectiveness [sic] of the rear services; elimination of the aftereffects of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction; party political work during the restoration of combat effectiveness.

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In each section of the plan it is advisable to show: the presumed nature of losses; the main measures to restore combat effectiveness; the forces and means to be allocated by the decision of the commander of the army for restoration of combat effectiveness and separately by the instruction of the senior commander; the times for carrying out the main measures and the responsible executors.

The plan of restoration of the combat effectiveness of the army troops is worked out by the operations department under the direction of the chief of staff. Involved in the working out of the plan are the chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services and officers of the political department and of the rear staff. The plan is signed by the chief of staff and the chief of the operations department and approved by the commander of the army.

Subordinate commanders and staffs must be acquainted with the content of the plan of restoration of combat effectiveness. To this end, the measures worked out can be delivered to the troops as an extract of the plan of restoration of combat effectiveness or in the form of orders of the commander.

The matters of the restoration of the combat effectiveness of the branch arms are also reflected by the appropriate chiefs in the plans of combat employment of these troops.

5. Organization of cooperation and troop control

Principles of cooperation

Cooperation of the troops of a combined-arms army in an offensive operation consists in the coordinated actions of all the branch arms and means of destruction according to tasks, axes, lines, targets, and time in the interest of the most successful fulfilment of combat tasks by the combined-arms large units. Cooperation is organized in greatest detail to the depth of the army's immediate task, which is in turn divided into a series of particular tasks determined by the concept of the offensive operation.

The accomplishment of each particular task is connected with the rout of this or that grouping of troops and means of nuclear attack of the enemy and with the achievement of definite operational-tactical or operational results.



Particular tasks of a combined-arms army which it may accomplish during the fulfilment of its immediate task may be: annihilation of enemy means of nuclear attack and defeat of the grouping of enemy troops in the frontier area; defeat of advancing operational reserves of the enemy in a meeting engagement or neutralization of their resistance at intermediate lines of defense; assault crossing of large water obstacles and rout of the enemy groupings defending them; relentless pursuit of the enemy; capture of important installations and areas, and so forth.

The content of the particular tasks and the sequence of their fulfilment by the troops of the combined-arms army will depend on the conditions of the operational situation in which the offensive operation is conducted. However, in all cases, the fulfilment of each particular task usually must be done with one system of cooperation and in one operational disposition of the troops of the army.

The initial data for organizing cooperation of the troops of a combined-arms army are, besides the decision for the operation, the orders of the commander of the front on cooperation with the rocket troops of the front, aviation, airborne landing forces, and adjacent armies.

Procedure of work of the commander and staff of the army to organize cooperation

The procedure of work of the commander to organize cooperation of the large units and units within the army largely depends on the time available for preparation and planning of the operation.

In the case where the commander and staff of the army have enough time, the organization of cooperation is done as an independent stage of the work to prepare the operation, in a specially established time after the delivery of combat tasks to the troops and adoption of a decision by the subordinate commanders.

With limited time for preparation of the operation, the organization of cooperation can be done by the issuing of orders on cooperation by the commander of the army right after assigning the combat tasks to the troops and by the sending of written orders of the commander of the army on cooperation to the troops.

The degree of detail of the orders on cooperation issued by the commander of the army right after the assigning of combat tasks to the troops depends on in how much detail the commander and staff of the army

can, in the available time, coordinate and prepare the basic data on questions of cooperation.

In a number of cases, because of the time limitation, the commander of the army, when organizing cooperation right after the assigning of tasks, may issue brief orders with disclosure of only the main measures for cooperation and the time for performing them.

During the conduct of the operation, as the army is accomplishing this or that particular task, questions of cooperation may be refined or organized anew, depending on the developing conditions of the situation.

In all cases, the work procedure of the commander and staff of the army to organize cooperation must be extremely flexible and respond to the concrete conditions of the situation to the maximum degree.

The methods of organizing cooperation, as well as the work procedure of the commander, depend on the nature of the impending combat actions, the availability of time, and on the degree of readiness of the commanders of the large units and chiefs of branch arms for work on cooperation.

In keeping with this, the commander of the army may carry out the organization of cooperation by:

- the method of issuing orders on cooperation personally from beginning to end;
- the method of issuing orders with the simultaneous involvement of the chiefs of branch arms, chiefs of staff departments, and commanders of the large units to coordinate the problems of the actions of forces and means during the fulfilment of the most important tasks by the troops;
- the method of successive playing out of the possible nature of impending combat actions with detailed coordination of the actions of forces and means by objective, time, and place.

The orders on cooperation, to be issued in a definite sequence by the commander of the army for each particular task, must include:

- the grouping of the enemy and the possible nature of his actions;
- the objective of the actions of the troops of the army and the methods of achieving it;
- the forces and means to be allocated to accomplish the particular task;
- the procedure for hitting the enemy with nuclear and special



weapons and conventional means;

- the procedure and methods of action of the troops, forces, and means of the army when fulfilling the particular task;
- the locations of control posts and the procedure for relocating them.

In the conclusion the commander of the army must determine the measures for support of the combat actions of the army troops (organization of reconnaissance, especially reconnaissance of enemy means of nuclear attack; protection against weapons of mass destruction; measures for warfare against enemy radioelectronic means; operational camouflage measures; engineer support; materiel-technical support).

An important part of the organization of cooperation is the work of the army commander and other commanders on the terrain and on the relief plan, which, as the experience of exercises shows, must be done without fail when organizing the breakthrough of a prepared enemy defense.

A large role in the organization and maintenance of continuous cooperation belongs to the staff of the army. In conformity with the decision of the commander, the staff works out the cooperation measures in detail, prepares the data for work on the terrain and on the relief plan, delivers the necessary orders to the troops, gives them assistance in organizing cooperation, monitors the performance of the measures, and takes steps to restore disrupted cooperation and communications between staffs during combat actions.

As the main document determining the responsibility of each large unit commander and staff on matters of cooperation, there is worked out in the staff of the army a cooperation plan or table.

The troops are sent extracts of these, or the main points of the table are transmitted to them by technical means of communications.

In the cooperation plan (table), on the basis of the concept and deep foresight, must be reflected concretely and in the necessary detail the substance of the organization of cooperation of forces and means, i.e., coordination of the tasks and methods of action of the elements of the operational disposition of the army, large units and units of branch arms and special troops according to tasks of the operation, axes, lines, targets, and time.

Organization of control

Dependable organization of control of the troops of a combined-arms army in an offensive operation to a considerable degree depends on a well thought-out system of control posts, their timely deployment and speedy, organized relocation during the operation, as well as on the stability of a previously established system of communications.

For control of troops of a combined-arms army during the preparation and course of an offensive operation there are deployed a command post, a forward command post, and a rear control post. These control posts possess high mobility and resistance to the effects of nuclear weapons and they ensure continuous control of troops on the march. In addition, the forward command post and the rear control post are equipped with the appropriate technical means of control in order to take over control of troops if the command post goes out of operation.

The command post of an army is set up on a site of 15 to 20 square kilometers at a distance of no more than 20 to 40 kilometers from the front line.

The forward command post is set up on a site of six to ten square kilometers at a distance of ten to 15 kilometers from the front line.

The command post of the army is relocated with permission of the staff of the front; and the other control posts, by decision of the commander of the army. In cases where surprise enemy actions have caused an immediate threat of the capture of a control post or of its being put out of operation, its relocation to an alternate area is done on the decision of the officer in charge of that control post, with a report on command.

Relocation of the command post of an army is organized by the chief of staff of the army. He gives the chiefs of the staff departments and the chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services the necessary orders on the procedure for relocating and maintaining communications during the relocation.

The chief of staff of the army immediately reports to the staff of the front on the beginning of the relocation and on the arrival at the new location, and he informs the staffs of subordinate and cooperating large units and units and of adjacent troops.



6. Organization of support of an offensive operation

The purpose of support of an offensive operation is to bring about for the troops favorable conditions for sudden and effective use of all means of armed conflict, for a rapid offensive in the wake of fire and air strikes, for preservation of the combat effectiveness of the large units, units, and subunits, as well as to make it difficult for the enemy to use his forces and means, especially his weapons of mass destruction.

Support is organized on the basis of the army commander's decision for the operation and his orders, and in conformity with the instructions of the staff of the front.

Detailed working out of support measures is the responsibility of the staff and the chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services, who work out the appropriate plans and instructions for the troops.

The main types of support are reconnaissance, protection against weapons of mass destruction, engineer support, chemical support, operational camouflage, radioelectronic warfare, hydrometeorological, topogeodetic, and rear services support. The organization of only a few of these is examined in this text.

Organization of reconnaissance

// Reconnaissance is the most important type of support of the combat actions of the troops of an army in an offensive operation. It is organized for the purpose of discovering the grouping, intention, and possible nature of actions of the enemy, establishing the targets for destruction by nuclear weapons and conventional means, obtaining data on the terrain, the political mood of the local population, and the economic and sanitary-epidemiological condition of the offensive zone of the army, as well as of establishing the results of the delivery of nuclear strikes. //

The most important tasks of reconnaissance are determined by the commander of the army. Usually he indicates what tasks to concentrate the main efforts of reconnaissance on accomplishing, what data about the enemy it is necessary to have by what time during the preparation and course of the operation, what forces and means of reconnaissance to use before the start of combat actions and in what order; and he also establishes the procedure for final reconnaissance of the targets of nuclear strikes.



The organization of reconnaissance includes: determination of the specific tasks and targets of reconnaissance; allocation of the forces and means necessary for the fulfilment of reconnaissance tasks; planning of reconnaissance and coordination of the efforts of all its types, forces, and means by tasks, targets (areas), and time; assigning of the tasks to the executors and all-around preparation of reconnaissance forces and means for the fulfilment of the tasks assigned; organization of communications and continuous control of reconnaissance forces and means; rendering of assistance to subordinate staffs and reconnaissance units and subunits in the organization of reconnaissance; organization of monitoring of the conduct of reconnaissance; organization of the assembling and processing of the reconnaissance data obtained and of the reporting of them to the commander of the army and the staff of the front; and also the informing of the troops and adjacent forces.

In the organization of reconnaissance for the first offensive operation under peacetime conditions, the command and staff of the army devote their main attention to the constant study, collation, and systemization of the incoming data on the armed forces of the probable enemy and the preparation of the theater of military operations, as well as to the all-around and purposeful training of reconnaissance forces and means and their maintenance of constant high combat readiness.

On the basis of the available data about the grouping of the enemy and taking into account the possible variants of its operational deployment, the intelligence department of the staff of the army determines the tasks which reconnaissance will have to accomplish in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, and it also plans the possible variants of putting into action and employing the reconnaissance forces and means of the army.

For the operation the intelligence department of the staff of the army works out a graphic or textual plan of reconnaissance. In it are indicated: the objective and main tasks of reconnaissance; the zones, areas, axes, or targets of reconnaissance; the forces and means to be allocated for conducting it and their distribution by reconnaissance tasks, as well as their main and alternate areas of disposition; the methods of conducting reconnaissance; the times for fulfilling reconnaissance tasks and the responsible executors; the procedure for final reconnaissance of targets of nuclear strikes; areas of the terrain of which aerial photography must be done by the forces and means of the front at the request of the army; the reserve of reconnaissance forces and means; the organization of control of reconnaissance forces and means; and the



procedure for submitting reconnaissance information. For subunits and groups operating in the enemy rear there usually are indicated, in addition, the methods and time of transfer to the rear and of returning or joining up with their own troops, as well as the procedure for removal from areas against which our nuclear strikes are being delivered.

The reconnaissance tasks to be determined by the chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services are reflected in the plans of combat employment of the branch arms and services, and when there is time available for the preparation of the operation -- in the reconnaissance plan of the combined-arms army.

Organization of protection against weapons of mass destruction

// Protection of troops against weapons of mass destruction is organized for the purpose of preventing their destruction by nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons or minimizing the effects of these weapons, maintaining the combat effectiveness of the troops, and ensuring successful fulfilment of the tasks confronting the army. In view of the constant threat of enemy use of weapons of mass destruction also in an operation conducted with the use of only conventional means of destruction, the whole array of measures for protection must be carried out in full, just as it is during the conduct of combat actions with the use of nuclear weapons.

Effectiveness of protection against weapons of mass destruction is achieved through fulfilment by the troops of the following basic protection measures: timely detection and destruction of the nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons of the enemy; radiation, chemical, bacteriological, and engineer reconnaissance; notifying troops of the immediate threat of use by the enemy of weapons of mass destruction and warning them of radioactive, chemical, and bacteriological contamination; dispersal of troops, exploitation of the protective features of the terrain, camouflage and engineer preparation of the areas occupied by the troops; ensuring safety of personnel during actions on contaminated terrain and in zones of destruction and fires; elimination of the aftereffects of an enemy nuclear attack.

The planning of protective measures is done by the staff and reflected in the plan of protection of troops of the army against enemy weapons of mass destruction.

Organization of radioelectronic warfare

Radioelectronic warfare is one of the most important types of operational support, and it represents the array of measures aimed at disrupting the operation of the radioelectronic troop and weapons control systems of the enemy, at counteracting his radioelectronic reconnaissance, and also at ensuring the stable operation of one's own radioelectronic means under conditions of enemy action. It is organized by the staff under the direction of the commander of the army.

In the process of work to comprehend the task, assess the situation, and make the decision for the operation, the commander of the army simultaneously examines the questions of radioelectronic warfare personally or he brings in the chief of the radioelectronic warfare service of the army for this.

The planning of radioelectronic warfare is based on an assessment of the radioelectronic situation, which is carried out in the following sequence: the grouping, composition, and condition of the radioelectronic troop and weapons control systems of the enemy (in so doing, it is necessary to discover the peculiarities of employing them at different stages of the operation on the basis of the expected grouping of the enemy and its possible reinforcement); the position and condition of one's own radioelectronic forces and means, and their capabilities to ensure fulfilment of the specific tasks assigned to the troops of the army; the degree of effect of the forces and means of the front and adjacent troops during the fulfilment of the tasks of radioelectronic warfare in the operation; the effect of terrain and weather conditions on the organization of radioelectronic warfare.

After the assessment of the situation, the commander of the army makes the decision. Reflected in the decision on matters of radioelectronic warfare are the following matters:

- the objective of radioelectronic warfare in the operation;
- the concept of the conduct of radioelectronic warfare (where and when the main efforts are to be concentrated and with what tasks, in conformity with operational tasks with and without the use of nuclear weapons);
- the tasks for reconnaissance of the radioelectronic systems of the enemy in keeping with the overall plan of the operation and the tasks of radioelectronic warfare;
- the tasks of the forces and means of destruction and



radioelectronic neutralization with an indication of the concentration of main efforts and the procedure for cooperation according to specific tasks, time, and place;

-- the tasks and main measures to ensure stable control of one's own troops and weapons, taking into account the radioelectronic countermeasures of the enemy;

-- the organization of control of the forces and means of radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance and radioelectronic countermeasures, and the steps to ensure cooperation among them;

-- the measures to counteract enemy radioelectronic reconnaissance and ensure electromagnetic compatibility.

The planning of radioelectronic warfare is done by the staff of the army on the basis of the decision of the commander, the instructions on radioelectronic warfare of the staff of the front, and the orders of the chief of staff of the army, and it must correspond to the concrete situation in which the offensive operation is being conducted.

The plan of radioelectronic warfare in the army is worked out by the radioelectronic warfare service of the army. Officers of other departments and staffs of the field headquarters of the army participate in working out the plan. It is compiled on a map with a scale of 1:200,000 with an explanatory memorandum. The plan is signed by the chief of the radioelectronic warfare service and the chief of staff and approved by the commander of the army.

The organization of operational camouflage

Operational camouflage during the preparation and course of an army offensive operation is carried out for the purpose of deceiving the enemy as to the intention of the actions being prepared, the grouping and condition of the forces and means of the army, and the axis and time of delivery of the main attack.

The main methods of operational camouflage during the preparation and course of an offensive operation are: concealment of troops, nuclear means, control posts, and other important installations, as well as of the nature and intention of the impending actions; simulation of disposition areas of troops, nuclear means, control posts, and other important installations; demonstration actions on false or secondary axes; disinformation of the enemy as to the forces and means of the army, their condition, and intentions. //



Concealment consists in the elimination or reduction of the giveaway signs characteristic of given installations and measures being conducted. It is achieved by the careful organization and constant skilful conduct of all types of camouflage: optical, radio and radiotechnical, radar, thermal, radiation, magnetometric, and acoustical. Only with the employment of all types of camouflage is it possible to conceal the position, regroupings, and intentions of one's own troops from the enemy. Camouflage is carried out according to the instructions of the commanders (chiefs) of all levels, and it is one of the most important methods of reducing the losses of one's own troops. } 22P

Simulation consists in the creation of false targets and a false situation by employing dummies, radioelectronic, pyrotechnic, smoke and other means. The purpose of simulation is to divert enemy reconnaissance from genuine targets and force him to expend means of destruction on areas not occupied by troops. Simulation must be plausible and designed for all the means of reconnaissance of the enemy.

Demonstration actions are the deliberate showing of activity of real troops by means of their relocation, concentration in definite areas, and conduct of combat and other actions. They are carried out for the purpose of diverting the attention of the enemy, his reconnaissance means, and reserves from the axis where the main efforts of the troops are concentrated.

Disinformation of the enemy includes the issuing of false orders and the dissemination of false information using radiotechnical and wire means of communications, the press, television, documents, agents, deserters, and the local population.

The organization of operational camouflage is carefully planned.

The plan of operational camouflage of the army is worked out by the operations department under the direction of the chief of staff of the army on a map with a legend or textually, and it is amended in accordance with a change in the situation. Involved in its compilation are the chief of staff, the chiefs of branch arms, special troops, and services, and other generals and officers according to the orders of the commander.

In the plan of operational camouflage are indicated: the objective and concept of the task of operational camouflage during the preparation of the operation and during combat actions; the measures for concealment of troops and important installations, for creating false groupings and



targets, for disinforming the enemy, and for conducting the demonstration actions; the forces and means to be allocated to carry out the operational camouflage measures; the readiness times and performance time of the camouflage measures; the persons responsible for implementing the outlined measures and the procedure for monitoring fulfilment of the plan of operational camouflage.

The troops who fulfil the operational camouflage measures are assigned tasks by means of the appropriate instructions. These indicate what must be done and determine the forces and means to be allocated, the procedure and time for preparing and conducting operational camouflage measures, and the times and methods of submitting reports. The instructions must not reveal the general concept of operational camouflage.

7. Organization of the operational deployment of troops

The content of the operational deployment of troops for going over to the offensive includes: organization of the bringing of the troops and various means to full combat readiness and of their rapid movement out of points of permanent location; organization of the deployment of rocket troops in siting areas and of air defense forces and means in positions to ward off enemy air raids; organization of the movement of the first-echelon tank and motorized rifle divisions to the departure area for going over to the offensive or to the area (line) of probable encounter with the enemy, and of the movement of the second-echelon divisions (combined-arms reserve) to the determined areas, and also organization of the deployment of various support forces and means in the interests of fulfilment of the assigned tasks.

During organization of the deployment of troops two matters must always be at the center of attention of the commander of the army: the struggle to shorten deployment times and the maintenance of the combat effectiveness of troops so that they are able to join in the engagement immediately from the march. For this the commander and staff of the army must be sure to previously determine and prepare the troop movement routes, organize alternate crossings over water obstacles, designate bypasses around possible demolitions of road junctions, large populated areas, and passes, and thoughtfully determine the disposition of troops on the march (during the movement forward) in conformity with the plan of the operation; precisely calculate the schedule of movement of the troops; and organize control, air defense, protection against weapons of mass destruction, and efficient provost and traffic control service.



The commander's decision on the deployment of forces, means, and troops is an integral part of his overall decision on the offensive operation. This being the case, in respect to matters of troop deployment the commander determines: the procedure, methods, and times of the deployment of troops in the departure areas for going over to the offensive (at the line of probable encounter with the enemy); the organization of control and all-around support.


On the basis of the commander's decision, the staff of the army plans in detail the procedure of movement and deployment of the troops of the army in the departure area for the offensive or at the line of probable encounter with the enemy.

During the planning of the movement forward and deployment of the troops of the army for the offensive, it is necessary to provide for various conditions of the situation: with a surprise enemy attack -- for troops going over to the offensive with incomplete deployment in the departure area for the offensive; when there is a period of threat -- for troops going over to the offensive with the preliminary arrival at and occupation of the departure area for the offensive (the waiting areas for the divisions).

A special concern of the commander and staff of the army in organizing the deployment of troops for going over to the offensive is engineer preparation of the departure area for the offensive. It can begin before the arrival of troops in the departure area and be completed with their arrival in this area. The degree of engineer preparation of the departure area must ensure the highest possible protection of troops against nuclear weapons strikes, which will greatly contribute to the improvement of their survivability as well as to the repulse of the enemy offensive.

All matters connected with the deployment of troops are reflected in the plan of operational deployment of troops.

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CHECK QUESTIONS

1. Measures for preparation of an army offensive operation.
2. Content of the plan of the army offensive operation.
3. Principles of planning; essence of the unified planning of an army offensive operation.
4. Objective and types of support of the offensive operation of an army.

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CHAPTER THREE

CONDUCT OF THE OFFENSIVE OPERATION OF A COMBINED-ARMS ARMY

1. Deployment of the troops of the army

Content and conditions of the deployment of the troops of the army

The operational deployment of the troops of the army includes: bringing of the large units and units to full combat readiness and their movement out of permanent location points to the established areas and in the established times; deployment of the rocket troops in siting areas and of air defense forces and means in positions for warding off the raids of the air enemy; concealed movement of the first-echelon tank and motorized rifle divisions to the waiting areas or toward the line of probable encounter with the enemy and movement of the second-echelon divisions (combined-arms reserve) to the designated areas, and movement of support forces and means to the areas of fulfilment of the assigned tasks.

The operational deployment of the army troops can be done under conditions of a surprise outbreak of military actions or before they begin, i.e., beforehand under conditions in which there is time to occupy a departure position.

Deployment of the troops of the army with the surprise outbreak of military actions

With the surprise outbreak of military actions, all the troops of the army are put on combat alert and they set about the fulfilment of assigned combat tasks.

The surface-to-air missile and antiaircraft artillery units immediately get ready to cover the rocket troops and main forces of the army while they are being put on combat alert and then on the routes of march while they are moving forward and deploying to go over to the offensive.

The missile brigade of the army is quickly moved into the siting area and brought to readiness to conduct launches on signal from the front.

The motorized rifle and tank divisions leave the places of permanent location and concentrate by companies at assembly points one or two kilometers from the vehicle parks. From there they move forward at maximum

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speeds toward the line of forming up into battalion columns, which is designated at five or six kilometers from the military posts.

Regimental columns are formed while moving forward by increasing or somewhat lowering the movement speeds of subunits. A brief stop is permissible only when the battalions reach the established line for forming up into regimental columns. At this line, armament and firing and observation devices are brought into readiness for the conduct of fire; a checkout inspection of all combat equipment is conducted and defects discovered during the movement are eliminated; the issuing of individual means of protection and equipment to personnel is completed; and combat tasks are refined or new ones are assigned.

The line of forming up into regimental columns is designated at a distance of up to 20 kilometers from the place of permanent location. Such a distance allows the regimental column (columns) to be formed during the process of moving forward.

The first-echelon divisions assume the final march formation at the line of forming up into division columns at a distance of up to 40 kilometers or more from permanent location points. By the moment of departure from the indicated line, a grouping of forces and means that corresponds to the concept of the impending battle is formed in the divisions. At this line the preparation for combat actions is completed and efforts are coordinated for routing the enemy in the frontier area.

Deployment of troops of the army when there is time available to occupy a departure position

The deployment of troops can be done beforehand when there is time. In this case the large units located at a distance of 100 kilometers or more from the national frontier are first brought to full combat readiness and moved up to the areas of concentration upon combat alert, and the rocket troops and air defense troops are moved into the siting areas. Then the large units and units are successively and secretly moved into the waiting areas designated for them according to the plan of the operation and they are kept in readiness to go over to the offensive and ward off a possible attack of superior enemy forces.

The large units located near the national frontier can move into the waiting areas without stopping off in an area of concentration upon combat alert, i.e., they are moved into the waiting areas directly from permanent location points. As this is done, the main work for bringing the large

units to full combat readiness must be done secretly in the permanent location points so that the troops start moving out of these points in a formation that corresponds to the decision of the commanders for routing the presumed grouping of the enemy.

The deployment of the main grouping of the army is supported by the timely movement forward and deployment of covering units, forward detachments, reconnaissance subunits and other support forces and means.

2. The going over of troops of the army to the offensive

Conditions of the going over of troops of the army to the offensive

The troops of the army can go over to the offensive under various conditions of the operational-tactical situation.

The army can begin an offensive with the rout of the enemy who has gone over to the defense in the cover zone and on the forward defense line. Also possible are such conditions wherein the offensive begins with a meeting engagement in the frontier area with an enemy grouping moving forward to deliver an attack. Nor is it out of the question that the going over of the army to the offensive will take place in the course of repelling the attack of an invading enemy grouping.

Consequently, a modern offensive operation of a combined-arms army may begin with:

- negotiation of the national frontier in the cover zone while the enemy is going over to defensive actions;
- a meeting engagement in the frontier area with an enemy grouping that has gone over to the offensive at the same time;
- repulse of an attack of superior enemy forces with a subsequent going over to the offensive.

In all cases combat actions may begin under conditions of unlimited use by the sides of weapons of mass destruction or with the use of conventional means alone.

Under conditions of the use of conventional means of destruction, combat actions will immediately acquire an exceptionally fierce character. Troops will be operating under conditions of the constant threat of nuclear attack. In order to reduce the nuclear capabilities of the enemy, the sides will endeavor to inflict damage on the means of nuclear attack with



air and artillery strikes and with the actions of sabotage-reconnaissance groups. After this, airborne landing forces may be landed in the basing areas of missile/nuclear means, and the main efforts of the groupings of ground forces may be directed at these areas. The mutual endeavor to get to the basing areas of missile/nuclear weapons the fastest will lead to meeting encounters of the sides. Consequently, a meeting engagement under conditions of the use of only conventional means of destruction will be the most characteristic type of combat actions of the troops of the army in the frontier area.

If combat actions begin with nuclear strikes by the sides, the troops of the army, even before meeting with the ground forces grouping of the enemy, may sustain considerable losses in personnel and combat equipment. When this happens, many means of reconnaissance and other sources of information from which situation data could be obtained are themselves subjected to strikes. Staffs and communications centers and means may also go out of operation. Consequently, one cannot count on the commander's getting exhaustive data on what has happened to subordinate troops, much less on what is going on among the enemy. Most likely he will have to make a decision and act under conditions of fragmentary, contradictory, and incomplete information about the situation.

At the same time, with both sides using nuclear weapons, the opposing enemy may suffer no less damage and for this reason also find himself in difficult circumstances.

In this situation, success will attend the side which has the higher political morale, which is able to get to the area of its own nuclear strikes faster with forces which, though limited, have maintained their combat effectiveness, completes the rout of the opposing grouping, and thereby ensures the achievement of assigned tasks. Maximum determination, broad showing of initiative, and aggressiveness in action will be required of troops, commanders, and staffs.

Negotiation of the national frontier and cover zone when the enemy goes over to defensive actions

The probable enemy plans to go over to the defense in the event that we preempt his troops in deploying and going over to the offensive. In addition, on those axes where the enemy sustains heavy losses and cannot advance he will likewise be forced to go over to the defense. Nor can it be ruled out that the enemy will deliberately go over to the defense at advantageous lines in order to attempt to inflict considerable losses on

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our troops and then go over to the offensive.

In all these cases the offensive operation of the army will begin with an offensive against a defending enemy, and the troops of the army will most often be forced to negotiate a national frontier and a cover zone. FA

The national frontier is negotiated by forward detachments of the first-echelon divisions, usually after brief but powerful preparatory fire, during which fire strikes are delivered against the covering troops of the enemy and against the nuclear land mine detonation control posts.

The forward detachments, with the support of artillery fire and air strikes, attack from the march and destroy the opposing covering units of the enemy, seize the placement areas of the nuclear land mines and destroy them, and develop the offensive toward the forward defense line.

Tactical airborne landing forces, having been landed within the boundaries of the cover zone, quickly move into and seize the areas assigned to them, destroy the nuclear land mine detonation control posts, the nuclear land mine security force, and the nuclear land mines and hold the areas till the approach of the forward detachments.

The main forces of the first-echelon divisions negotiate the national frontier and the cover zone, as a rule, in columns or approach march formations. Exploiting the results of nuclear strikes, artillery fire, and the actions of the forward detachments, they overcome the opposition of the covering troops and negotiate the lines of mixed minefields from the march. When necessary in order to rout the covering troops, part of the main forces of the first-echelon divisions can be deployed.

In a case where the enemy manages to partially or fully activate nuclear minefields, the commander of the army assesses the nature of the opposing enemy's actions, of the radioactive contamination, and of demolitions, and organizes negotiation of the zone of radioactive contamination and demolitions which has formed, along the axes with the lowest levels of radiation. As this is done, each first-echelon division is assigned a zone for negotiation in which two or three axes are prepared.

On those axes where, as a consequence of the enemy's activation of nuclear minefields, a zone with exceptionally high levels of radiation is formed, it is negotiated after waiting for a drop of the radiation level to tolerable norms. Some divisions can maneuver part or all of their forces to a new axis.

The movement of the main forces of the first-echelon divisions to the forward defense line is carried out in columns over the greatest possible number of routes (axes) in order to ensure, if the situation requires this, their rapid deployment to rout the covering troops as well as their arrival at the forward defense line on a wide front.

If the breakthrough of the forward defense line is carried out under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons, or in case the enemy hastily takes up the defense with the use of only conventional means of destruction, its breakthrough is carried out from the march on several axes as the large units and units approach the defense line. The troops on the offensive must operate in the wake of the nuclear strikes in the direction of the most damage to the enemy and bring about conditions to complete the rout of his opposing grouping. The attack of the units under conditions of the use of conventional means of destruction is preceded by a brief but powerful artillery strike or preparatory fire to be organized by the commanders of the large units.

If the enemy, under the conditions of the use of only conventional means of destruction, has preempted us in the deployment of his forces and organized a defense, time will be required for the careful and all-around preparation of a simultaneous attack of our forces with the conduct of general, powerful preparatory fire. The breakthrough of the defense will be carried out with preparation of the attack in a short time. In this case, the main forces stop in waiting areas 10 to 20 kilometers from the forward defense lines in dispositions that ensure their rapid movement up to the breakthrough sectors, and they stay in them until the organization of the breakthrough is completed.

The meeting engagement in a frontier area

In the beginning of a war such a situation can develop whereby the enemy also goes over to the offensive on a number of axes. Under these conditions the army troops moving forward on these axes will be routing the enemy in meeting battles and engagements.

The rout of the enemy in a meeting engagement in the frontier area is carried out by inflicting damage on him with the strikes of nuclear weapons and conventional means. Following these actions of the forward detachments, the enemy should be forced to deploy on a line disadvantageous to him, and his combat formations should be broken up and an attack delivered by the main forces.

The commander of the army, without waiting to receive complete data on the situation, on the basis of an analysis of the available reconnaissance data on the enemy as well as of the capabilities and operational status of his own troops, makes a decision in such a way as to preempt the enemy in delivering a strike with nuclear weapons and aviation, to create the necessary grouping of troops and assign tasks to them during the movement forward, and to preempt the enemy in taking advantageous lines for supporting the commitment of the main forces to the engagement. As this is done, special attention is paid to timely readiness of the rocket troops and aviation for delivering nuclear strikes and also to the reinforcement of the air defense of the troops.

Going over to the offensive while repelling a strike of superior enemy forces

Nor can one rule out such a variant of the beginning of military actions whereby the troops of the army, as a result of the first enemy nuclear strike, sustain great losses in personnel and combat equipment and are not able to rout the invading grouping of the enemy in a meeting engagement. In this case, it may be advantageous to delay the enemy with a stubborn defense at advantageous lines, inflict losses on him, and then go over to the offensive with the approach of reserves.

Preparation of an offensive under these conditions will be carried out during the defensive engagement, which requires of the commander and staff great efficiency in working.

During the defensive engagement it is necessary to take steps to stockpile nuclear warheads and other materiel.

The regrouping, concentration, and deployment of troops for the offensive is carried out secretly, in a short time, and with dependable coverage from the air.

The going over of troops to the offensive begins with nuclear strikes in conjunction with air strikes and artillery fire against groupings of enemy troops, reserves, missile positions, and control posts.

Once begun, the offensive is conducted at high speed and continuously day and night. The first-echelon divisions rapidly break through to the depth of the enemy disposition and, upon getting to the flank and rear of his groupings, split them up and destroy them in detail.

3. The offensive against a defending enemy

Routing a defending enemy under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons

In an offensive operation, a combined-arms army may encounter an enemy defense also in the depth of his territory. Just as at the forward defense line, this defense will be heavily saturated with antitank means, tanks, armored personnel carriers, infantry combat vehicles, and other means. To rout a defending enemy requires reliable preliminary destruction of his antitank means and tanks; the nuclear means of the enemy must be destroyed without delay.

The enemy will try, while our troops are still approaching, to inflict maximum losses on them with strikes of nuclear weapons and aviation and to disrupt the organized attack of the forward edge. Therefore, during the approach of the troops of the army to the defense line, it is necessary to use all types of reconnaissance to establish most completely the grouping of the defending enemy forces, the locations of his means of nuclear attack, main groupings of troops and control posts, the presence of gaps in the defense, as well as the extent of damage to enemy troops and installations as the result of our initial nuclear strike.

The commander of the army, during the approach to the defense line, organizes destruction of the surviving means of nuclear attack of the enemy and the hitting of his troop groupings, and pinpoints the offensive axes of the first-echelon divisions, directing their actions toward the gaps and intervals in the combat formations of the enemy or toward axes where his troops have lost combat effectiveness as a result of our nuclear strikes.

The breakthrough of a defense begins with preparatory fire. Exploiting the results of nuclear strikes and preparatory fire, the success of the forward detachments, as well as the gaps in the battle formations of the enemy, the first-echelon divisions attack his defense from the march. Negotiation of the enemy defense through gaps in the areas of nuclear strikes and weak enemy resistance can be carried out in approach march formations.

On separate axes where the enemy has set up a strong defense, the attack is also carried out from the march, but in battle formations with the motorized rifle subunits dismounted.

With the start of the attack, the commander of the army concentrates the strikes of the missile units and aviation on enemy installations and groupings which can offer opposition to the attacking troops. Newly detected nuclear means and reserves of the enemy in the depth, especially groupings of his tank troops, are hit first.

The actions of the troops of the army when negotiating the defense line are directed toward the quickest penetration to the depth and the disposition areas of his reserves and toward their final defeat in the wake of the nuclear strikes.

To destroy the nuclear means of the enemy, prevent the maneuvering of reserves, and fulfil other tasks, tactical airborne landing forces can be landed in the rear of the enemy already at the very beginning of the negotiation of the defense; after landing they quickly take the assigned targets and areas, repel the attacks of the enemy, or attack his troops who are advancing toward them.

In support of the combat actions of the landing forces, nuclear strikes as well as air strikes can be delivered against the enemy groupings most threatening to the landing forces. The large units of the army direct their efforts toward the quickest arrival in the areas of actions of the landing forces and toward the final defeat of the opposing enemy in cooperation with them.

To restore a lost position, the enemy may deliver counterattacks with reserve forces, exploiting gaps and exposed flanks in the disposition of our troops.

The rout of the counterattacking immediate reserves of the enemy, as a rule, is carried out by the forces and means of the first-echelon divisions on the offensive. To rout the deep reserves of the enemy in a number of cases may require the delivery of nuclear and fire strikes against them and the commitment of the second echelon or combined-arms reserve of the army to the engagement.

Under attack of the reserves, any one first-echelon division may slow down the rate of advance and in an unfavorable situation it will be forced sometimes to repel the counterattack with fire from fixed positions. At this time the other first-echelon divisions, as well as the second-echelon or reserve large units being committed to the engagement, must, with rapid actions of the forward detachments, resolutely push through to the depth, to the rear of the counterattacking grouping, thereby facilitating the

capture of the most important areas in the depth before the enemy manages to organize a defense at the next intermediate lines. Behind the forward detachments the main forces of the army's first-echelon divisions push through on separate axes.

During the successful development of the offensive, the enemy, with his retreating groupings and newly approaching reserves, may try to go over to the defense from the march at important natural lines. Such a defense will be set up not on a continuous front, but by axes, with the presence of separate defensive areas and centers and with an insufficiently organized system of fire and limited engineer preparation of the terrain.

In all cases it is necessary to endeavor not to give the enemy time to take up the defense. For this, one should beforehand, even before the approach of the advancing troops to the defense line of the enemy, disrupt his measures for going over to the defense and bring about conditions for negotiating it from the march. On those axes where a prepared defense is encountered which it does not seem possible or expedient to bypass because of time, it is broken through by the first-echelon large units.

To disrupt the enemy's going over to the defense, it is necessary to inflict damage on his main grouping with strikes of nuclear and special weapons and conventional means before it gets to the intended line of defense, to preempt it in getting to this line, and to complete the defeat of the enemy with rapid actions of the advancing troops and airborne landing forces.

If the enemy manages to organize a defense, then its negotiation is carried out from the march in the wake of nuclear strikes on a wide front without stopping in front of it. The troops, exploiting gaps and intervals in the enemy battle formations, sectors where nuclear strikes have been delivered, as well as exposed flanks, quickly complete the defeat of the main forces of the enemy and rapidly push through to the depth, disrupting his counterattacks and counterthrusts.

Breakthrough of an enemy defense with the use of conventional means of destruction

The breakthrough of an enemy defense without the use of nuclear weapons is also carried out from the march. The forward detachments, pursuing the enemy, get to the line of defense under cover of artillery fire and air strikes, attack the enemy from the march, and exploit the gaps in his disposition and sparsely occupied sectors to penetrate to the depth.

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With successful actions of the forward units, the main forces of the divisions build up the force of the attack and develop the breakthrough into the depth and toward the flanks. Under these conditions it is not advantageous to wait for the approach of all the large units of the army to the defense line, since a simultaneous attack of all the large units does not always compensate for the loss of time and surprise.

If the enemy has previously taken up the defense, then the army carries out a breakthrough of it by preparing an attack in a short time, as a rule, in two sectors. In this case two or three divisions can be deployed on the axis of the main attack, with a total breakthrough sector of up to eight to twelve kilometers. On the other axis the breakthrough can be carried out by one division in a sector up to four kilometers wide.

To carry out a breakthrough of the enemy defense requires the formation of strong attack groupings with a high degree of massing of forces and means and the allocation of a large amount of artillery.

The density of artillery must reach 80 to 120 gms per kilometer of breakthrough sector. This ensures sufficiently dependable fire damage to the enemy and a three- to fourfold superiority in artillery. Here the duration of preparatory fire for the successful fulfilment of fire tasks must be not less than 40 to 50 minutes.

The density of tanks in the first-echelon battalions must be 20 to 30 or more tanks per kilometer of front. And the total density in the breakthrough sector of a division may reach 50 to 60 tanks per kilometer of front; this ensures nearly a threefold superiority in tanks over the enemy.

In respect to motorized rifle troops, it is desirable in the attacking echelon to have a motorized rifle battalion per kilometer of breakthrough sector. When this is done a motorized rifle battalion will be attacking a defending motorized infantry company, creating a threefold superiority over the enemy in motorized infantry.

The fundamentals of the organization of a breakthrough of enemy defense lines are placed in the commander's decision for the offensive operation, and the refinement of this decision and the detailed planning of the breakthrough usually are done during combat actions, in particular during negotiation of the forward security zone. Preparation of a breakthrough includes: reconnaissance of the enemy defense; refinement of the decision for the breakthrough or adoption of a new one; planning of fire damage to the enemy; the actual formation and deployment of attack

groupings of troops in keeping with the decision for the breakthrough.

The divisions of the first echelon of an army, when breaking through intermediate defense lines during an offensive operation, usually are assigned an immediate task and an axis of further offensive; when breaking through a prepared defense they are assigned an immediate task, subsequent task, and task of the day.

4. Defeat of enemy reserves by the troops of the army in a meeting engagement

Possible nature of actions of the reserve grouping of the enemy

During the development of an offensive by the army, the enemy will endeavor to inflict maximum damage on it and not allow it to push through to the depth. To this end he may deliver massed strikes of nuclear and chemical weapons on the troops of the army and move large reserve groupings up from the depth and from other axes to the axis of its actions to deliver counterattacks.

The large reserve groupings of the enemy may have various compositions. In some cases they will consist of separate armored (tank) and motorized infantry (infantry) divisions. In a number of cases the reserve large units of the enemy may be united by the headquarters of an army corps reinforced with airmobile units and army aviation. For reinforcement or joint actions with such a reserve grouping, airborne landing forces will often be employed. The enemy, using such reserves, will endeavor to achieve the set objectives by employing nuclear weapons and by a resolute offensive of troops. Therefore, the defeat of the reserve grouping of the enemy will, for the army, most often take the form of a meeting engagement, which will be characterized by a number of peculiarities.

Nature of the meeting engagement

A meeting engagement is characterized by the availability of limited time to organize combat actions, by the rapid closing in of the sides and their entry into battle from the march; by an intense struggle to seize and hold the initiative; by drastic changes in the situation; by the development of combat actions on a wide front; by the presence of considerable gaps between units and large units and of exposed flanks allowing freedom of maneuver.

Success in a meeting engagement is achieved by: continuous conduct of reconnaissance of all types; advance establishment of the necessary grouping of forces and means; preemption of the enemy in the delivery of nuclear and air strikes, in the opening of artillery fire, in the deployment of attack groupings, and in their going over to the offensive; resolute execution of troop maneuvering and delivery of attacks on the flanks and rear of the enemy groupings; persistence in achieving the set objective and the manifestation of broad initiative by commanders of all levels; and the execution of stable control of troops.

Preemption of the enemy in the delivery of nuclear and fire strikes, as well as in the deployment of the main forces and in their going over to the attack is ensured by the speedy adoption of a decision by the commander and the quick delivery of tasks to subordinates, by the constant readiness of the missile brigade and artillery to deliver nuclear and fire strikes against the enemy, and readiness of the control posts and means of communications to provide control of the large units.

Operational disposition of the army and the tasks of troops in a meeting engagement

The grouping of army troops to be formed for conducting a meeting engagement must ensure: quick exploitation of the results of the use of nuclear weapons; the delivery of powerful attacks against the flanks and rear of the main forces of the enemy; the execution of maneuvering from the depth and along the front to the decisive axes; readiness to repel strong enemy attacks, especially tank attacks, as well as strikes from the air against troops already on the approach to areas of deployment and entry into the meeting engagement.

The operational disposition of the army in a meeting engagement may be in one or two echelons and it may have groupings of rocket troops and artillery, air defense troops, as well as an army antitank reserve and an army mobile obstacle detachment.

Operating in the first echelon on the axis of the main attack must be the most combat-effective divisions, first of all the tank divisions. Here it is more advisable to use the tank divisions of the combined-arms army on those axes which allow them to penetrate as deeply as possible into the disposition of the enemy, rout the advancing reserves, destroy the detected means of nuclear attack, frustrate the maneuvering of his troops, disrupt his control and supply, and quickly take important areas in the depth.

For a meeting engagement the first-echelon divisions are assigned an immediate task and an axis of further offensive. The content of the immediate task is the rout of the main forces of the opposing enemy division, destruction or capture of the means of nuclear attack and artillery, and seizure of a line (area) that ensures advantageous conditions for development of the offensive.

The decision on the meeting engagement

The commander of the army, without waiting to get full data about the situation, must, on the basis of an analysis of the available reconnaissance data about the enemy as well as of the capabilities and operational status of his own troops, make the decision soon enough to preempt the enemy in the delivery of strikes with nuclear weapons, aviation, and long-range artillery; form the most advantageous grouping of troops, assign the tasks to them, and organize cooperation and support ahead of time; preempt the enemy in taking advantageous lines and thereby provide favorable conditions for the entry of the main forces into the engagement. Special attention must be paid to the timely readiness of rocket troops and aviation for the delivery of nuclear strikes as well as to the strengthening of the air defense of the troops.

In his decision on the meeting engagement, the commander of the army determines: the concept of the meeting engagement; the targets, procedure, and time of delivery of strikes by rocket troops, aviation, and artillery; the combat tasks for the troops; the procedure for cooperation of the troops and the measures to support combat actions during the engagement; the deployment sites of control posts.

In the concept of the meeting engagement it is necessary to establish the procedure for the delivery of preemptive strikes with nuclear and special weapons and the sequence of routing the enemy grouping; the form of maneuver and the axis of the main attack; the operational disposition, as well as the forces and means it is necessary to employ on the main and containing axes.

Methods of troop actions in a meeting engagement

The main methods of army troop actions when routing enemy reserves in a meeting engagement can be:

-- attack with the main forces on the flank and rear of the main enemy grouping;

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- attack on both flanks of the main enemy grouping;
- attack with tank (motorized rifle) large units to split up the main enemy grouping or cut part of it off.

Underlying any method of actions of the army when routing reserve groupings in a meeting engagement must be preemptive strikes against the enemy with nuclear and conventional means of destruction.

Depending on the situation, the strikes of the nuclear means of the front and army can be delivered both simultaneously and successively as the groupings close in and the forces and means of the enemy are detected. On targets not being hit with nuclear weapons, strikes are delivered by aviation with the use of conventional and special munitions.

The strikes of nuclear weapons and conventional fire means are directed first against the main forces of the enemy -- the means of nuclear attack -- and against the tank (armored) large units of the enemy.

Depending on the conditions of the situation and chiefly on the extent of damage to the meeting grouping of the enemy by nuclear weapons, the minimum necessary forces should each time be allocated to complete its defeat, with the other forces of the troops of the army being sent to develop the offensive into the depth.

The rout of enemy reserve groupings of lesser strength and size by an army can be accomplished with grouped and single nuclear strikes delivered by the means of the front and army or with army means alone, and a subsequent attack of part of the forces of the first-echelon large units using one of the methods of action considered.

After the delivery of a massed or grouped nuclear strike, the forward detachments of the army's first-echelon large units, acting swiftly, penetrate between the columns of the enemy, split them up, and seize the important targets and areas in the depth, supporting the actions of the main forces and large units in columns or approach march formations.

The main forces of the first-echelon large units, rapidly pushing forward through gaps in the disposition of enemy troops and across the areas subjected to nuclear strikes, deploy when necessary in battle formations and complete the defeat of the enemy. In doing this, only the necessary forces must be deployed for battle; the main efforts of the large units of the army must be directed toward the depth to seize the important targets and areas in the rear of the reserve grouping.

Under conditions of the conduct of combat actions without the use of nuclear weapons, the commander of the army, even before the deployment of the main forces of the army, with preemptive air strikes and concentrated artillery fire, carries-out the neutralization and destruction of the nuclear means, artillery, and advancing (deploying) columns of the enemy for the purpose of inflicting losses on them and preventing their quick arrival and deployment at advantageous lines. To this end tactical airborne landing forces are landed on the approach routes of the enemy groupings.

The main efforts of all the forces and means of reconnaissance under these conditions are concentrated on detecting the means of nuclear attack and artillery of the enemy and the axes of his approach, especially of his tank groupings, and on finding the flanks and boundaries between formations. With the forces of forward detachments and advance guards, the army's first-echelon divisions penetrate between the enemy columns and, in cooperation with the tactical landing forces, seize advantageous lines and areas, ensuring favorable conditions for an attack by the main forces of the first-echelon divisions on the enemy flank, rear, or the gaps and formation boundaries.

With the joining of battle by the forward detachments, the artillery of the first-echelon divisions and the aviation supporting the army continue to deliver strikes against the newly detected means of nuclear attack, the deploying troops, the control posts, and reserves of the enemy.

The main forces of the first-echelon divisions, exploiting the results of artillery fire, air strikes, combat actions of the forward detachments, and also the gaps in the disposition of enemy troops, deliver attacks from the march on the flanks of the opposing grouping, split it up, and develop the offensive into the depth.

A meeting engagement must end in the complete defeat of the main forces of the enemy. With an attempt by him at the beginning or during the course of the meeting engagement to go over to a defense, the efforts of the troops of the army must be directed toward not allowing the enemy to occupy advantageous lines in an orderly manner, form a defensive grouping, or organize a system of fire. To this end the advancing large units destroy the covering troops of the enemy, break in from the march to the lines being occupied by him, or bypass them and rapidly push through to the depth.

In case of an enemy retreat, the army's first-echelon divisions immediately go over to pursuit for the purpose of routing his main forces.

Should the meeting engagement develop unfavorably for the troops of the army on any axis, it can temporarily go over to the defense with part of its forces in order to stop the offensive of the enemy on this axis, weaken his forces, and then, going over to resolute actions, rout him.

5. The assault crossing of water obstacles by army troops

Possible conditions and methods of an assault crossing

During an offensive operation, the troops of an army will have to overcome enemy resistance at a considerable number of water obstacles.

The enemy, exploiting water obstacles as natural advantageous lines for a defense, will try to gain time, draw up reserves from the depth, transfer means of mass destruction, and set up a stable defense. The high mobility of enemy troops and the availability to him of nuclear weapons and sufficiently strong aviation allow him to offer strong resistance at such lines to troops on the offensive.

It should also be taken into consideration that the enemy will try to create additional difficulties for the advancing troops of the army as they approach the river, stepping up the actions of his troops, setting up zones of demolitions and radioactive and chemical contamination and sectors of engineer obstacles in order to slow down the progress of the advancing troops, force them to crowd their battle formations together, and then inflict decisive damage on them with nuclear strikes.

Therefore, an assault crossing from the march on a wide front will be the main method of negotiating water obstacles by troops of the army during the operation. If the operation begins with immediate contact with the enemy at the water obstacle, the army will cross it after systematic preparation.

The main conditions that ensure a rout of the enemy at water obstacles and the assault crossing of them from the march by the large units of the army are: conduct of active reconnaissance of the water obstacle and of the enemy; advance adoption of a decision, working out of a crossing schedule, and also the assignment of combat tasks to troops for the crossing before they arrive at the water obstacle; destruction of the enemy on the approaches to the water obstacle and on the opposite bank; taking of

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crossings and suitable sectors for the assault crossing by forward detachments and airborne landing forces; timely movement of crossing means up to the water obstacle, rapid preparation of crossings, skilful maneuvering of crossing means, and also the establishment of passages through obstacles on the banks and in the water; rapid, surprise assault crossing of the water obstacle on a wide front and development of the offensive on the opposite bank without stopping; precise organization of provost and traffic control service; dependable air defense of troops and crossings; extensive use of smoke devices.

Adoption of the decision and tasks of troops during the assault crossing

The commander of the army makes the decision for an assault crossing in advance, during the preparation of the operation, and he refines it during the operation. During the approach to the water obstacle the following are refined: the nature and condition of the water obstacle; the sectors most suitable or advantageous for an assault crossing; the nature of actions of the enemy troops on the opposite bank -- his forces, groupings of troops, siting areas of missile troops and artillery, control posts. The decision on the assault crossing is refined on the basis of an assessment of the actual developing situation.

In his decision on the assault crossing of a water obstacle from the march, the commander of the army determines:

- the concept of the rout of the enemy grouping on both banks of the water obstacle;
- the procedure for hitting the enemy with nuclear and special weapons as well as with air strikes and artillery fire;
- the tasks of the first-echelon divisions with an indication of the reinforcement with crossing means, the sectors of the assault crossing, the task on the opposite bank, and the time to be ready for the assault crossing of the water obstacle;
- for the second echelon (combined-arms reserve): the departure area, the time and procedure for moving up to the water obstacle and the crossings over it, the possible tasks on the opposite bank;
- for the army missile brigade: the targets for destruction, the types and ground zeros of bursts, the yields of the nuclear warheads (the expenditure of missiles with special warheads), the readiness times, the siting area, and the procedure for crossing over the water obstacle;
- the tasks for the army artillery group (if one is formed);
- the tasks for the air defense troops;

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-- the tasks for the tactical airborne landing force -- the task, readiness time, and procedure for landing and cooperation with forward detachments;

-- the tasks for the front aviation allocated for support of the troops of the army;

-- for the antitank reserve (mobile obstacle detachment): the tasks, crossing procedure, relocation axes, and possible firing lines (minefield boundaries);

-- for the engineer troops: the places of the army crossings, their readiness times, and the procedure for using them;

-- the procedure for cooperation of the troops;

-- the places for deploying control posts.

The combat tasks for the troops during the assault crossing are determined depending on the grouping of the enemy and his actions on the opposite bank, the combat strength of one's own troops, and other conditions of the situation. In general, during the assault crossing of water obstacles, a division can be assigned a task that is the same in respect to depth as during an offensive under ordinary conditions.

This means that if the enemy has managed to set up a prepared defense on the opposite bank, then an immediate task, subsequent task, and task of the day are determined for the first-echelon divisions. Under conditions wherein the enemy hastily goes over to the defense of the opposite bank or delivers a meeting attack, an immediate task and an axis of further offensive are indicated for the division.

Nature of actions of the troops of the army during the assault crossing of a water obstacle from the march

The assault crossing of a water obstacle from the march usually is carried out in the grouping in which the troops have been conducting the offensive. Organization of the assault crossing is done during the offensive without stopping the troops before the water obstacle.

During the approach of the first-echelon large units to the water obstacle, the commander of the army concentrates the strikes of the army missile brigade and aviation on destroying the means of nuclear attack of the enemy and preventing his organization of a defense at the water obstacle and on hitting the grouping of troops already taking up the defense as well as the approaching reserves.



For the quick arrival of troops at the water obstacle, for preventing the enemy from taking up the defense on the opposite bank, and for seizing the available crossings and sectors of the opposite bank, strong forward detachments are sent out and tactical airborne landing forces are landed. Usually tank or motorized rifle regiments (battalions) reinforced with crossing means operate as the forward detachments.

To seize the main bridges on the water obstacle, special detachments can be formed predominantly of tank subunits reinforced with self-propelled crossing means.

The forward and special detachments, operating on a wide front without engaging in drawn-out battles, rapidly move up to the water obstacle. Exploiting the results of the strikes of nuclear weapons and aviation, they seize the available crossings in cooperation with airborne landing forces or make an assault crossing of the river and take advantageous sectors on the opposite bank.

When the forward detachments seize sectors of the opposite bank, the laying of floating bridges and the construction of underwater and low-level bridges begins. The troops set about the erection of bridges as soon as the forward detachments or advance guards reach a distance that ensures the safety of the bridgelaying from enemy machinegun fire. To maneuver the crossing means, especially when the roads have been destroyed or there are zones of radioactive contamination, helicopters are employed extensively.

To ensure timely fire support of the troops during the assault crossing, artillery is moved up to the water obstacle behind the forward detachments and advance guards. By the time the main forces of the army begin the assault crossing of the water obstacle, artillery must be deployed in firing positions and ready to deliver fire. The hitting of the enemy with artillery fire during the assault crossing of a water obstacle from the march is organized by the division commanders. The army artillery group is used to hit tactical nuclear means, artillery, control posts, and other military installations of the enemy.

Exploiting the success of the forward and special detachments as well as that of the airborne landing forces, the main forces of the army make an assault crossing of the water obstacle over the captured bridges and crossings and on amphibious crossing means and ferries.

The number of crossings per first-echelon division is determined by its battle formation and the availability of crossing means and sectors



suitable for an assault crossing. Usually in the offensive zone of a division, for the assault crossing of a water obstacle, amphibious and ferry crossings plus tank fording and underwater crossings are organized. With the capture of the opposite bank, a bridge crossing is organized. Axes are also designated for the airlifting of troops.

The available amphibious crossing and pontoon bridge means afford an army the capability of carrying out the assault crossing of water obstacles of average width with the forces of two or three divisions in approximately the following times: the forward detachments in one to 1.5 hours and the remaining forces of the divisions in three to four hours, provided that two bridges are laid in the zone of each division, and in five to six hours with the laying of one bridge in the zone of a division.

The first-echelon divisions, as they cross to the opposite bank, immediately rush into the depth of the enemy disposition without engaging in the consolidation of bridgeheads. Modern means of destruction permit the enemy, in case the troops stop on the bridgeheads, to deliver nuclear strikes against them and destroy them together with the crossings. Therefore, during an assault crossing only the immediate development of the offensive into the depth without any delay on the bridgehead can ensure both a successful assault crossing and the further development of the offensive.

After the crossing of the main forces of the first-echelon divisions, control of the crossings, primarily the bridge crossings, is centralized at the army level.

The second echelon and reserves of the army can cross on the bridge crossings that have been laid. To shorten the times of crossing and in the interests of dispersal of troops during the crossing of the second echelon and reserves it is advisable to also use ferries and table of equipment crossing means, and for some of the tanks to cross under water.

The assault crossing of a water obstacle with systematic preparation

When organizing an assault crossing with systematic preparation, careful reconnaissance of the enemy and the water obstacle is conducted. On the basis of the reconnaissance data and the reconnoitering done, the commander makes a decision, assigns the tasks to the troops for the assault crossing, and organizes cooperation.



The duration of the organization of the assault crossing is determined by the expenditure of time for final reconnaissance of the enemy and the water obstacle, preparation of the fire of all means, and formation of the grouping of troops.

The assault crossing of a water obstacle after systematic preparation begins simultaneously with all the forces of the first echelon of the army on a wide front following preparatory fire. Preparatory fire during the assault crossing of a water obstacle has a number of peculiarities. It begins not later than when the heads of the columns of subunits of the first echelon of the main forces cross the line of departure. It ends with the arrival of these subunits at the water's edge.

The beginning of the movement of the first-echelon units toward the water obstacle is determined on the basis of the established time of the beginning of the assault crossing and the time necessary to negotiate the distance from the line of departure to the water's edge.

The beginning of the assault crossing (H) is considered to be the moment the subunits push off from their own bank.

The tanks equipped for crossing under water move up to their axes as the opposite bank is seized and crossings become ready.

The first-echelon divisions, exploiting the results of preparatory fire, rapidly cross the water obstacle and develop the offensive on the opposite bank without stopping.

Fire support of the assault crossing usually begins when the first-echelon subunits push off from their own bank, and it continues without interruption until the taking of the defense areas of the first-echelon battalions of the enemy, and sometimes even to a greater depth.

The crossing of artillery, rocket troops, and air defense troops is done in such a way as to ensure continuous support and coverage of the troops on the offensive by the greater part of the forces and means. The tank-destroyer artillery and the antitank guided missile subunits cross first. The regimental artillery groups negotiate the water obstacle behind the first-echelon battalions; the division artillery groups and subgroups of the army artillery group cross with the second echelons of the regiments and behind the first echelons of the divisions.



The tactical missile battalions cross behind the main forces of the divisions, using ferry and bridge crossings.

The second echelon and reserves of the army can cross over the bridge crossings that have been laid. After crossing to the opposite bank, the second-echelon large units are committed to the engagement for rapid development of success to the depth of the enemy defense. To expand the captured area toward the flanks and roll up the enemy defense at the water boundary, an attack is delivered with part of the forces along the bank of the water obstacle. At the same time, in anticipation of an enemy counterattack, steps are taken to consolidate the captured lines.

CHECK QUESTIONS

1. Procedure of actions of the troops of an army during deployment under conditions of a surprise enemy attack and when there is time to occupy a departure position.
2. Breakthrough of an enemy defense with the use of conventional means of destruction: width of the breakthrough sector, necessary density of forces and means, procedure for hitting the enemy with fire.
3. The meeting engagement: concept, conditions for achieving success, methods of routing the enemy.
4. The assault crossing: conditions ensuring success of the assault crossing, nature of actions and tasks of the troops of the army during an assault crossing from the march.



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


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