

21803

~~SECRET~~

Ref to D/Pup 64

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 October 1950

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO: 338

SUBJECT: Propaganda Aspects of the German Situation Since 15 October 1950

THE MAJOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ISSUES
REQUIRING PROPAGANDA TREATMENT IN GERMANY

I. Western Germany: Major Issues.

A. Political.

1. Reunification of Germany: The recent Prague proposal for the establishment of a German Constitutional Council with equal representation of East and West Germany marks a new effort in Soviet propaganda for the unification of Germany. This propaganda will continue to hold a certain degree of appeal to some West German groups which are willing to achieve such a goal at any cost. On the other hand, the widespread public fear and distrust of the USSR will cause most West Germans to forego the immediate attainment of German unification in favor of a policy of closer West German integration into the west European community.

2. Integration of West Germany into the West European Community: Soviet stress that the Western allies are formalizing the split of Germany will not, as stated above, meet with great success. West Germans are anxious to regain as quickly as possible a prominent role in west European affairs, and will realize that this can best be achieved at present by closer integration with the west European powers and with the US.

3. Remilitarization of West Germany: The USSR will continue to stress that West Germany is being thoroughly rearmed by the US and the western Allies, as a part of US imperialistic aims in Europe. In view of West German sentiment against rearmament, Soviet propaganda may meet with some success, and intensive counter-propaganda will be necessary.

4. Neutrality and Third-Force Sentiment: Soviet propaganda media have not placed great stress recently on this theme; Communist propaganda has shifted its emphasis to disavowal of neutrality and concentration on requiring an all-or-

Note: This memorandum was prepared at the request of the Interdepartmental Foreign Document Information Staff. It has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force.

~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFIED

Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763

~~SECRET~~

Date: 6/1/78 By: []

nothing support of the USSR and its policies. Neutrality and Third-Force sentiment is strong enough, however, to warrant propaganda treatment by US media.

5. Communism in West Germany: Soviet propaganda attacks on West German efforts to suppress Communist illegal activities will also meet with limited success, in view of strong popular feeling against the Communists and their tactics. These attacks will have limited influence, however, in convincing some Germans to insure their future by indicating friendliness toward the Communists and giving some financial support to the Party and its press. Some of the recent restrictions imposed upon Communist activity in West Germany are regarded with mixed feelings by many West Germans who see in these measures an unwarranted Allied interference in internal German affairs and a threat to civil rights. An intensified information program to meet this criticism seems indicated.

6. Chauvinism/Extremism, neo-Nazi Influence: The rise of chauvinist-extremist neo-Nazi groups in West Germany (the Bruderschaft, etc.) does not present the USSR with a worthwhile propaganda objective at the present time, in view of the current negligible strength of these groups.

7. The Oder-Neisse Line: Soviet propaganda emphasis of this issue has incensed the West Germans; it presents a good subject for US media.

B. Economic.

1. East-West and Interzonal Trade: The great opportunities for trade with East Germany and the rest of the Soviet orbit will remain one of the most effective Soviet propaganda lines, because of the natural appeal it holds for many West German business interests. In view of standing Soviet allegations that the breakdown of interzonal trade negotiations is due to allied pressure, Soviet obstructions to the resumption of trade negotiations in Berlin will not interfere with Soviet propaganda efforts to any appreciable degree. However, the USSR now needs western goods while pressure on West Germany for markets elsewhere is eased by the world situation.

2. The Schuman Plan and Closer Economic Integration with the West: The USSR will probably have limited success in pointing up the differences which occur between the Germans and the other west Europeans in the negotiations for closer economic cooperation, and in emphasizing the advantages of interzonal trade and trade with the East.

3. Living Conditions: With this theme which stresses the rise in the cost of living in West Germany and the low prices in HIO stores in East Germany, the Soviets are likely to meet with less success, at least for the present, in view of the relatively good living conditions in western Germany.

~~SECRET~~

4. Relaxation of Controls: Relaxation of occupation controls will tend to reduce the effectiveness of Soviet claims that Allied control measures, such as the Ruhr Authority, are harsh.

5. Dismantling and Reparations: This field will present the USSR with ineffective opportunities for propaganda, in view of the virtual termination of dismantling activity by the western Allies and the poor Soviet record in East Germany.

6. Occupation Costs: Soviet and East German propaganda will dwell heavily on the alleged substantial rise in occupation costs necessitated by the increase in Allied forces in Germany and will compare it unfavorably with the steady decrease in Soviet occupation costs. This propaganda is likely to meet with some measure of success among the German public. Extensive treatment of all facts of the costs of "German Security" by US media seems necessary.

C. Social.

1. Refugees: This is an important issue which is not extensively dealt with in Soviet propaganda, but which could be stressed by US media. Despite the troubles of the refugees, they are largely impervious to Soviet propaganda in view of their extreme hatred for the USSR.

2. POW's in the USSR: This issue is another example of Soviet vulnerability, and is a field in which Soviet propaganda, consisting of weak denials of Allied allegations that thousands of German POW's are still being held in the USSR, has been scornfully rejected by the Germans.

II. East Germany: Major Issues.

A. Political.

1. Reunification of Germany: Soviet propaganda in this field will obviously meet with more success in East than in West Germany, and will attract many who, despite their distrust of the GDR, will be willing to follow the National Front line in order to achieve the reunification of Germany.

2. The GDR Government: The Soviets are likely to meet with gradual success in obtaining East German popular support for the government of the GDR. Nevertheless, the undemocratic features of the government present good propaganda for US media.

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

3. Remilitarization in East Germany: This is an issue which is obviously not the subject of Soviet propaganda, but it presents one of the best opportunities for US media.

4. The Oder-Neisse Line: This issue is one of the most unpopular issues emphasized in Soviet propaganda and should be extensively exploited by US propaganda.

5. Elections: The East German elections furnished another field in which the Soviets are vulnerable to attacks by US media, in view of the undemocratic nature of the single-list elections, the suppression of the minority parties, the purges of all party leaders, etc.

B. Economic.

1. East-West and Interzonal Trade: As in West Germany, this issue is one in which the USSR is likely to have considerable propaganda success.

2. Living Conditions: Soviet allegations in their propaganda that living costs are rising in West Germany, in contrast to reduced prices in HO stores in East Germany, are likely to meet with increasing success. US propaganda, however, should point out continuously the relative scarcity of consumer goods, the high price levels, and the generally low standard of living in East Germany, as contrasted with the situation in the West.

3. Exploitation of East German Labor: In contrast to glowing Soviet propaganda accounts of labor's achievements and the 5-Year Plan in East Germany, US media should stress the exploitive character of Communist labor policy, poor safety conditions (especially in the uranium mines), and the continuation of Soviet reparations.

C. Social.

1. POW's in the USSR: This issue will continue to be a difficult one for Soviet propaganda to deal with, and has incensed large numbers of East Germans as well as those in West Germany. It is an issue which can still be emphasized to good advantage by US media.

2. Struggle Between Church and State: The increasing attempts by the GDR to control the activities of the Church in East Germany will be a difficult issue for Soviet propaganda to handle, and is one which US media should exploit.

3. Children in the GDR. The campaign of the GDR and the USSR to win the children away from the influence of the family has met with popular resistance, and is an issue which should be stressed by US media.

REACTION OF WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO GERMAN ISSUES*

BENELUX

I.A.2. The Belgians and Luxembourgers still have reservations about how much cooperation can be expected from the West Germans. Information on concrete evidence of West Germany's desire to enter wholeheartedly in integration measures and of progress made in establishing democratic processes in West Germany would probably be of some value.

I.A.3. The Netherlands has advocated for some time the controlled renilitarization of West Germany. Although Belgium and Luxembourg are less enthusiastic, they accept the necessity for rearming West Germany to be a buffer between them and a Soviet invasion. Reassuring evidence that West Germany is not motivated by ultra-nationalistic militarism in joining in Western defense measures might be useful.

I.A.6. The Beneluxers will watch closely for the development of any neo-Nazi groups in West Germany but would not be particularly influenced by Soviet propaganda on the subject. The continuation of a democratic Government in West Germany and its actions will be more reassuring to the Benelux people than anything else.

I.B.1. Business groups in the Benelux countries are interested in trading with East Germany and would resent any greater freedom granted West Germany than their own Governments allow them. There seems to be little opportunity for effective propaganda treatment because of the informal nature of their Governments' control over export of strategic materials.

I.B.2. A small group in the Benelux countries would be slightly susceptible to Soviet propaganda on lack of West German cooperation or ulterior West German motives in joining in economic integration measures. Generally, however, the people are convinced of the necessity of West German participation.

I.B.4. The Benelux countries are more concerned with the maintenance of a minimum of controls to prevent an independent West Germany acting contrary to Western European interests.

* Reactions numbered according to headings in the first section of this paper.

~~SECRET~~

II.A.3. The Benelux people are well aware of East German remilitarization and would not be influenced by Soviet propaganda on the subject.

II.A.5. The Benelux people are well aware of the nature of the East German elections, and no special treatment seems necessary.

II.C.2. Because of the importance of religion and religious institutions in the Benelux countries some treatment of this subject might be useful.

ITALY

I.A.3. Soviet propaganda alleging rearmament of West Germany for US purposes of aggression would cause apprehension among many people (besides the Communists) who though looking with favor upon the active reentry of Germany into the European economy, are disturbed by the rehabilitation of the Germany military. US propaganda could influence this group.

I.D.1. If Soviet propaganda on East-West trade in Germany is extended to include allegations of general blocking of natural lines of East-West trade in Europe, this theme might find sympathetic reaction among workers and even among non-Communist businessmen in Italy. If treated in this way, the theme should be countered by the US.

FRANCE

I.A.3. The USSR will continue to stress the revival of German militarism. This line is likely to meet with considerable success as long as France is militarily weak and economic integration of West Germany into the Western European Community is still being negotiated.

I.A.4. Although not openly encouraging neutrality sentiment, Communist propaganda has promoted neutrality through its peace campaign. Although neutrality sentiment has not grown recently, French popular opinion is susceptible to this type of Communist propaganda.

I.B.2. The French Communist Party is planning to initiate a campaign against the Schuman Plan. This type of propaganda in conjunction with an over-all Communist campaign to arouse labor's discontent is likely to meet with considerable success this fall.

- 6 -

~~SECRET~~

AUSTRIA

I.A.3. Emphasis should be made that any German army will be but a component part of a larger controlling group.

I.A.6. Attempt might be made to allay Austrian Socialist suspicions that ex-Wehrmacht generals are gaining influence in the Adenauer Government.

I.B.1. This situation also exists in Austria and any propaganda treatment by the US of this problem would be of equal interest in Austria.

I.B.2. Some effort might be made to allay Socialist fears of cartels.

I.C.1. Austrians are sensitive about refugees in their country and any attempt to arouse sympathies for Germany's problem in this respect would antagonize the Austrians who want the most sympathy and relief.

I.C.2. Austrians would like inclusion of their own POW's in any treatment.

SPAIN

I.A.5. Soviet propaganda on this subject will not find a receptive audience in Spain--unless the issue is enlarged and slanted so as to identify it with the political suppression of the Franco regime.

I.B.1. In view of the Spanish Government's known interest in trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe, this line would be effective in some Government circles--especially among Falangists.

I.C.1. Because of the large number of Spanish political refugees, this topic would have considerable appeal to the Spanish people.

I.C.2. Spanish "Blue Division" prisoners and a number of Spanish Loyalists are still held in the USSR. Soviet denials that German POW's are still held in the USSR would receive little credence.

II.A.2. US propaganda on this subject would find a receptive audience, whereas the Soviet line would not be effective.

II.A.3. US propaganda on this subject would be effective and would be paralleled by the Spanish Government's propaganda.

II.B.3. US propaganda on this subject would be effective among Spanish labor, in view of similar conditions existing in Spain.

II.C.2. US propaganda on this subject would be effective in Spain, despite widespread anti-clericalism stemming from identification of the Spanish Church with the regime.

~~SECRET~~

FUNDAMENTAL SOVIET PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND THEMES
WITH RESPECT TO GERMANY

The following objectives and themes are grouped according to their geographical applicability. Within the geographical groupings, the order of listing is determined by the relative emphasis placed on them by Soviet media.

I. Fundamental Soviet Propaganda Objectives and Themes in Germany.

A. To All of Germany.

1. Objective: To obtain German sympathy and support for the goals, purposes and ideology of the Soviet Government.

Themes: (a) The USSR is Germany's friend. The USSR was never against the German people but only against the Nazis. Stalin has always been the friend of the German people.

(b) The USSR is strong (all powerful).

(c) Germany's historic (political and commercial) interest lies in the East. Germany's cause can best be furthered by collaboration with the USSR.

(d) The USSR favors an early German peace treaty, withdrawal of occupation troops and reunification of Germany.

(e) The USSR favors participation of Germany in European and particularly Satellite affairs, on a basis of equality.

(f) The USSR heads the "peace" camp.

2. Objective: To alienate the Germans from the Western Powers, especially the US.

Themes: (a) The US does not want a German peace treaty, does not want to withdraw occupation troops from Germany, does not want to see Germany unified.

(b) The US wants to exploit Germany for its own monopolistic, capitalistic ends.

(c) England and France want to eliminate German competition from world markets.

(d) The US is weak in relation to the overwhelming strength of the "peace" camp.

- 8 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- (e) The US wants to plunge the world into another war.
- (f) The US is remilitarizing Germany.

3. Objective: To obtain German acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line.

- Themes:
- (a) The Oder-Neisse frontier is a "peace frontier."
 - (b) Those who want to change the Oder-Neisse frontier want to plunge Germany into another war.
 - (c) Revision of the Oder-Neisse frontier means war.

B. To East Germany.

1. Objective: To obtain complete popular support of the East German Government.

Themes: (a) The Government of the GDR is the legally recognized Government of Eastern Germany.

- (b) All political opposition to the East German Government (opposition parties) is unpatriotic and plays into the hands of the Western warmongers.
- (c) A "united front" (of all political elements) is required.

C. To West Germany.

1. Objective: To obtain sympathy for the GDR Government.

Themes: (a) the GDR Government can bring about the unification of Germany.

(b) The GDR Government can obtain an all-German peace treaty and withdrawal of occupation troops.

(c) The GDR Government is an all-German Government.

(d) Collaboration with the GDR Government will result in better economic conditions in West Germany since the GDR can obtain trade treaties with the East (China, Satellites).

(e) An "all-German Constitutional Council" should be formed to prepare for an all-German Government.

- 9 -

~~SECRET~~

2. Objective: To undermine the authority of the Bonn Government.

Themes: (a) The Bonn Government is the tool (puppet) of the US aggressors. The Bonn Government consists of traitors.

(b) The Bonn Government will embroil Germany in another world war.

(c) (Covert theme spread by word of mouth:) The USSR will eventually occupy all of Western Germany and those now cooperating with Bonn and the US will be punished.

3. Objective: To prevent West German sympathy for participation in a European Union and/or any Western military pact.

Themes: (a) Germany's participation will only mean another war.

(b) Germany is only to provide the infantry ("cannon fodder") for the West.

(c) Cooperation with the US will result in Germany's physical destruction.

II. Fundamental Soviet Propaganda Objectives and Themes with Respect to Germany in Europe.

A. Satellites.

1. Objectives: To make the GDR acceptable to the Eastern European Satellites.

Themes: The Nazis have been eliminated in the GDR and the German people have become "democratic", "peace" loving and anxious to cooperate with the "peace camp."

B. Western Europe.

Note: Germany is not a major propaganda topic in Soviet output to Western Europe or in Western European Communist media. Only in and to France and occasionally in the Low Countries does Germany enter as a topic of Soviet propaganda.

Objective: To cause distrust and disagreements among Western European countries and between Western European countries and the US.

Themes: (a) German rearmament will endanger the security of France (Belgium, Holland, Denmark).

(b) The French and German leaders are working contrary to the interests of the French and German people (Schuman plan).