


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


Director of Central Intelligence

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

Wednesday, 12 February 1992



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DATE: MAY 2004




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
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## Special Analysis

**NORTH KOREA: Options for Thwarting Nuclear Inspections**

*North Korea can use several approaches to minimize the effect of IAEA or South Korean inspections on its nuclear weapons program.* [redacted]

A growing body of evidence indicates North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear weapons program. [redacted] P'yongyang last month may have conducted the first high-explosive test since 1988 at its Yongbyon nuclear center and suggests that preparations for cold testing may have begun at the reprocessing plant there. [redacted]

Despite its promises to the contrary, P'yongyang could indefinitely delay ratifying the IAEA safeguards agreement it signed last month. Even after ratification, North Korea could delay negotiating the details of inspections. P'yongyang used the presence of US nuclear weapons in South Korea as an excuse to delay signing a safeguards accord for several years, and its recent claims that Japan is developing nuclear weapons suggest P'yongyang may be preparing a similar strategy now. [redacted]

Somewhat as Iraq did, the North might allow IAEA inspections but not declare such facilities as the reprocessing plant, which is banned under the North-South nonnuclear accord signed at the end of last year. The IAEA normally inspects only declared facilities, but it is exploring ways of getting around that limitation. [redacted]

P'yongyang could continue its nuclear weapons program even after opening all its facilities at Yongbyon to IAEA inspectors, simply by moving the program to a new, clandestine facility. The North could also covertly produce plutonium at Yongbyon between IAEA inspections, as Iraq did before the Persian Gulf war. [redacted]


The North is having some success with the South in delaying bilateral nuclear inspections and almost certainly wants to make them as nonintrusive as possible. It has refused Seoul's request to accelerate the formation of the joint nuclear committee the bilateral accord calls for. Once the committee is formed, the North probably will try to delay or limit bilateral inspections. P'yongyang may also hope that

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IAEA inspections and agreement to progress on other North-South issues will further weaken Seoul's resolve to press for tough bilateral inspections. [redacted] CIA, DIA-



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