

PREPARED TESTIMONY OF
GEORGE TENET
DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT - DCI STATEMENT ON THE BELGRADE
CHINESE EMBASSY BOMBING

THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1999

Introduction

Mr. Chairman, Dr. Hamre and I are here today to explain how a series of errors led to the unintended bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade on May 7th.

We will try to describe to the best of our ability - in this open, public session the causes of what can only be described as a tragic mistake. It was a major error. I cannot minimize the significance of this. The ultimate responsibility for the role of intelligence in this tragedy is mine. I've told my own people that we will not hide behind excuses such as stretched resources or time pressures. It is precisely when the pressure is intense-life or death decisions are being made-that the President and the American public expect us to provide the best intelligence in the world. Clearly, in this case we failed to do that.

But before we tell how this happened, I think it is important to provide some perspective. Dr. Hamre will tell you that the United States and our allies flew thousands of sorties and struck many hundreds of targets over 78 days with very few errors.

America's success, in this as in previous conflicts, owes much to the extraordinary work of our intelligence services. The specifics of our contributions cannot be made public Mr. Chairman, but as this committee knows, we provided our forces detailed knowledge of the enemy, his intentions, his dispositions, and his weapons.

Mr. Chairman, the nature of warfare has changed. When cities were struck in past wars, none doubted that civilians, embassies, hospitals, and schools would be in harm's way. Today, our ability to strike precisely has created the impression that sensitive sites can be safe in the middle of a war zone. Our desire to protect innocents in the line of fire has added an enormous burden on all of us that we

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accept. It is our job to do our best to ensure that only appropriate targets be struck.

I think it is useful to note that this episode is unusual because the CIA does not normally assemble, on its own, target nomination packages containing the coordinates of specific installations or buildings. The targeting support typically provided by CIA is usually at the strategic and planning level, such as analytical judgments on the kinds of targets that are the most important, commentary or specific information concerning targets selected by the military or others, and information that assists the military in identifying future targets.

In addition to describing how this mistake happened, I will also outline the corrective actions that we are taking within the government to ensure that- as far as humanly possible - that there is no repeat of this type of incident.

The attack was a mistake. Let me emphasize, our investigation has determined that no one -- I repeat no one -- knowingly targeted the Chinese Embassy. Speculation to the contrary is simply unfounded. No one, at any stage in the process, realized that our bombs were aimed at the Chinese Embassy. There were three basic failures. First, the technique used to locate the intended target- the headquarters of the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement (FDSP) - was severely flawed, Second, none of the military or intelligence databases used to validate targets contained the correct location of the Chinese Embassy. Third, nowhere in the target review process was either of the first two mistakes detected.

The unintended attack happened because a number of systems and procedures that are used to identify and verify potential targets did not work.

Chronology of Events

To help understand the circumstances which led to the mistaken bombing, let me offer a brief chronology of events.

In March of this year, U.S. intelligence officers began considering the FDSP headquarters as a potential target for NATO ALLIED FORCE strike operations. The FDSP was a legitimate target given its role in support of the Yugoslav military effort.

We had the street address of the FDSP headquarters as "Bulevar Umetnosti 2" in New Belgrade. But military forces require precise

geographic coordinates to conduct an attack. During a mid-April work-up of the target, three maps were used in an attempt to physically locate the address of the FDSP headquarters: two local commercial maps from 1989 and 1996, and one U.S. government map produced in 1997. None of these maps used had any reference to the FDSP building. None accurately identified the current location of the Chinese Embassy.

Please keep in mind that the location of the Chinese Embassy was not a question that anyone reasonably would have asked when assembling this particular target package. This package was intended to strike the FDSP headquarters and nowhere else. In an effort to pinpoint the location of the FDSP building at Bulevar Umetnosti 2, an intelligence officer used land navigation techniques taught by the U.S. military to locate distant or inaccessible points or objects. These techniques are known as "intersection" and "resection." They can be used for general geolocation, but should not be used for aerial targeting because they provide only an approximate location. Using this process, the individual mistakenly determined that the building which we now know to be the Chinese Embassy was the FDSP headquarters. The true location of the FDSP headquarters was some 300 meters away from the Chinese Embassy. This flaw in the address location process went undetected by all the others who evaluated the FDSP headquarters as a military target.

A critical lesson that emerges from this event is that particularly when providing targeting nominations in urban areas, it is important to provide an accurate appreciation of our confidence in the location of a target, and the evidentiary basis for how that location was determined.

The incorrect location of the FDSP building was then fed into several U.S. databases to determine whether any diplomatic or other facilities off-limits to targeting were nearby. We try to avoid damage to sensitive facilities like embassies, hospitals, schools and places of worship and look to see what risk to them a nearby strike might pose. Moreover, satellite imagery of the target provided no indication that the building was an embassy--no flags, no seals, no clear markings.

Location of Chinese Embassy

Multiple databases within the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense all reflected the Embassy in its pre-1996 location in Belgrade. Despite the fact that U.S. officials had visited the Embassy on a number of occasions in recent years, the new location

was never entered into intelligence or military targeting databases. If the databases had accurately located the Chinese Embassy, the misidentification of the FDSP building would have been recognized and corrected.

Why wasn't the Chinese embassy correctly located? It is important to understand that our ability to locate fixed-targets is no better than the data bases, and the data bases in this case were wrong. Further, it is difficult---actually it is impossible---to keep current. databases for cities around the globe. The data bases are constructed to catalog targets not non-targets. In general, diplomatic facilities---our own being an exception because of the need to plan for evacuation---are given relatively little attention in our data bases because such facilities are not targets. Military targets are the top priority because of the danger they pose to our own forces.

In this context I would add my belief that too much public emphasis has been given to the fact that the 1997 US Government map did not reflect that the Chinese Embassy had moved. This criticism overstates the importance of the map itself in the analytic process. Maps of urban areas will be out of date the day after they are published. What is critical is having accurate data bases.

We have subsequently found maps which show the correct current location of the Chinese Embassy although there are others, including some produced after 1996 by the Yugoslav government, which do not.

Some of our employees knew the location of the Chinese embassy. But keep in mind that we were not looking for it. None of these individuals was consulted as the target was selected and reviewed and, as a result, we lost the opportunity to learn that the building targeted was not the FDSP headquarters. We have also found one report from 1997 that gave the correct address of the Chinese Embassy but that information was ancillary to the focus of the report and unfortunately the address was not entered into the data base.

Late Concerns About the Target Very late in the process, questions were raised by an intelligence officer as to whether the building targeted was in fact the FDSP headquarters or might be some other unidentified building. At no time was there any suspicion that the building might be an Embassy. This officer had become aware of the nomination by chance, and remembered having seen information a few years earlier that the FDSP building was located a block away from the location identified. Although the matter had nothing to do with his usual responsibilities, this officer registered his concern and sought

to clarify the facts by contacting, or attempting to contact, other working level officials who were involved in the preparation of the nomination package.

On Tuesday, 4 May--three days before the bombing occurred--this officer telephoned an officer responsible for the target at the Joint Task Force NOBLE ANVIL in Naples. He told him that he believed the FDSP headquarters building was a block away from the identified location and said that he was trying to resolve this discrepancy. That evening, he obtained information that tended to confirm his belief that the building had been mislocated. Due to a variety of circumstances, this officer was unable to relay this. . . information before departing for training 6-7 May. At that time this officer was unaware that the FDSP headquarters was on the target list. On his return to his office on Friday afternoon, 7 May, the officer learned to his surprise that the FDSP building was on the target list for bombing that night. He attempted without success to re-contact the officer in Naples with whom he had spoken earlier in the week concerning the "discrepancy." He raised his concerns with another officer at Naples and learned that the aircraft was already en route to the target. He tried to convey his concern that the building targeted may not have been the FDSP headquarters. Those in Europe state that they believed that he was trying to convey that while it might not be the FDSP headquarters, it was still a legitimate FDSP target. While recollections differ of exactly what was said and what was heard, there is no doubt that no one knew that the facility in question was an Embassy. The strike took place shortly thereafter.

Throughout this series of missed opportunities, the problem of identification was not brought to the attention of the senior managers who may have been able to intervene in time to prevent the strike. What Went Wrong?

At this point, I would like to identify the principal shortcomings that caused this accident to take place.

First, the approach used to determine the location of the FDSP headquarters was inappropriate for targeting. There were three meetings at CIA that reviewed the target nomination. The method of identification was not briefed, questioned, or reviewed. Therefore, the initial misidentification took on the mantle of fact. The absence of discussions on this matter resulted in a target package that contained no cautionary language on the location of the FDSP headquarters. Absent cautionary language, reviewers at EUCOM and the Joint Staff mistakenly assumed the location was accurate. This made it

unlikely that they would focus on the need to re-validate the target's identification.

Second, within CIA there were no procedural guidelines for the officers involved in targeting to follow, and there was little senior management involvement in guiding the targeting process. Although our military support organization had been involved in targeting matters, they had not previously been involved in the approval of target nomination packages unilaterally proposed and wholly assembled at CIA. This occasion was precedent-setting.

No institutional process existed within CIA for ensuring that all resources were brought to bear on the FDSP nomination.

Third, reviewing elements at EUCOM and in the Joint Staff did not uncover either the inaccurate location of the FDSP headquarters or the correct location of the Chinese Embassy was the result of both data base shortcomings and procedural errors. The data base reviews were limited to validating the target data sheet geographic coordinates with the information put into the data base by the NIMA analyst. Such a circular process did not uncover the original error and made us susceptible to a single point of data base failure. While collateral damage assessments were performed and indicated there were no sensitive facilities in the area, these assessments were based on incomplete data on the location of those sensitive facilities.

Individuals in both CIA and the DoD who knew the correct location of the Chinese Embassy should have been consulted.

Fourth, the critical linchpin for both the error in identification of the building and the failure of the review mechanisms is the inadequacy of the supporting data bases and the mistaken assumption the information they contained would be necessarily accurate. The misidentification of the targeted building as the FDSP headquarters would not have occurred had the data bases had the correct location of the Chinese Embassy. All the data bases that contained information on the Chinese Embassy placed it at its original, pre- 1996 location some four miles away. Thus, the question of possible damage to the Embassy was never a consideration.

US officials who had served in Belgrade were aware that the Chinese Embassy had moved sometime in 1996. The information, however, was not entered into the data bases we rely on for our targeting and mapping. In this context I would add my belief that too much public emphasis has been given to the fact that the 1997 NIMA map did not reflect that the Chinese Embassy had moved.

This criticism overstates the importance of the map itself in our analytic process. Maps of urban areas will be out of date the day after they are published. What is critical is having accurate data bases. Data base maintenance is one of the basic elements of our intelligence effort, but it is also one that has suffered in recent years as our workforce has been spread thin. Some have suggested that this failure is the consequence of resource shortfalls. A more fundamental problem is not the absolute level of resources, but the application of resources at our disposal. We have diverted resources and attention away from basic intelligence and data base maintenance to support current operations for too long.- Data base production and maintenance has been routinely accorded a low priority and often overlooked in production planning and scheduling.

- Data base production is often the first activity curtailed when resources are tight.
- Data base production is widely viewed as low visibility, unrewarding, and unappreciated.
- Leadership attention and emphasis on data base production is infrequent, episodic, and essentially reactive.

Corrective Actions Taken

We are continuing our in-depth review of this tragic incident. Based on our initial findings, it is clear that this mistake occurred not because of just one organization, or because of one individual. Nevertheless, I am evaluating our performance in this instance to assign individual responsibility and identify procedural reforms.

Our goal is to ensure that such a mistake does not happen again. To this end, we are implementing corrections to prevent such mistakes in the future.

In addition, the following near-term corrective actions are already being implemented: - DIA and NIMA have established rapid response procedures for critical database updates.

- We are strengthening our internal mechanisms and procedures for selecting and validating targets and we are increasing the priority placed on keeping databases current.
- The Community and other government agencies will explicitly report whenever foreign embassies move or are built. This information will then be forwarded and incorporated into our intelligence and military

databases.

- In future conflicts, we will contact other governments to help identify and locate their facilities.

Experience tells us that humans err. Knowing that, we constructed elaborate procedures to check and double-check our work. In this specific case, the checks and balances failed. The President of the United States has expressed our sincere regret at the loss of life in this tragic incident and has offered our condolences to the Chinese people and especially to the families of those who lost their lives in this mistaken attack.

HEARING OF THE HOUSE SELECT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: NATO BOMBING OF THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN BELGRADE

CHAired BY: REPRESENTATIVE PORTER GOSS (F-FL)

WITNESSES:

CIA DIRECTOR GEORGE TENET AND
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE JOHN HAMRE

2118 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC

10:02 A.M. (EDT)
THURSDAY, JULY 22, 1999

THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.

REP. GOSS: (Bangs gavel.) Ladies and gentlemen, the committee will come to order. (Off mike) -- before us today. We welcome you here. On behalf of the committee, I'd like to welcome Mr. George Tenet, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Dr. John Hamre, deputy secretary of defense, to this hearing on the circumstances that led to the mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force.

The investigation into the destruction of the Chinese embassy and the resulting loss of life is a matter that this committee has taken very seriously and continues to take very seriously. This is actually the third full committee meeting devoted to the issue. Both Director Tenet and Dr. Hamre have appeared before the committee in closed session, and we appreciate their cooperation.

In addition, committee staff has conducted interviews, sorted through the results of the various agency investigations, and reviewed the original documents used in the targeting. The intent in holding this open hearing is to provide, to the very greatest extent possible, a chance to put the facts on public record. As we say in Florida, "To let the sun shine in to our oversight process." We believe in government in the sunshine, we think it's in the people's interest.

And despite the fact that some details -- names of people, for instance, some places -- must remain classified, the real substantive issues, the mistakes and the flawed processes that contributed to the

destruction of the embassy, can and will be discussed here today.

From my perspective, there are three key issues to be addressed: the intelligence failure that led to the mistaken labeling of the building that turned out to be the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as the headquarters for the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement; The flaws in the targeting process that allowed this initial intelligence failure to escape detection; and third, the broader question of whether or not the United States intelligence community is prepared for the kind of wars and other conflicts that our armed forces are likely to fight in the future.

It seems clear that this process began with a critical intelligence failure. In essence, while developing a legitimate target during Operation Allied Force, an intelligence officer at the CIA translated the address of the target, the FDSP headquarters, onto the wrong coordinates. I hope that the witnesses will address how this mistake was made and why it was able to escape detection within the CIA.

However, the Department of Defense also shares responsibility, since the target package that came from CIA was reviewed by elements of the DOD and approved. The processes that are supposed to ensure that proposed targets are valid, did not pick up on the mistaken identification of the FDSP building.

In addition, what has been referred to as the "no-strike process" that is in place to guard against unintended consequences, such as civilian casualties or damage to diplomatic facilities, failed us. No alarms went off, signaling that this proposed target was in fact the Chinese embassy.

At this point, I would like to address a topic that is I believe well understood by our members. That is the issue of the phone calls between an intelligence officer at CIA and military personnel at the European Command concerning the location of the FDSP target. These calls took place three days prior to and the day of the strike.

This has proved to be a compelling issue for the speculation in the press and elsewhere, because these phone calls might have proved a serendipitous opportunity to avert disaster almost at the last minute. I say "serendipitous" because the CIA officer involved was not involved in the targeting of the FDSP building, only learned about it by chance, and was in contact with the military personnel in the European theater for unrelated purposes.

Because there is some inconsistency in stories about what exactly was said in these phone calls, the committee has independently interviewed the CIA officer who made the calls, as well as the EuCom officers who received them. At this point in the committee's review, it appears we are dealing with simple miscommunication. That said, at no time did anyone involved believe the target was the Chinese embassy. That is a critical point.

And for this committee, the bottom line is that this episode is not related to those mistakes and deficiencies that are the direct cause of this terrible error, although they do deserve further looking into, which indeed we are.

Finally, I think it is most important that we look to the future. In the short term, this means correcting the flaws in the intelligence and targeting processes that have been highlighted by this unfortunate incident. Looking out a little further, this means asking ourselves some very tough questions. Have we adopted a philosophy of warfare that is dominated by the use of position-guided weapons? If so, what additional intelligence requirements does this reliance on such weapons generate for us?

Is it true that smart bombs, without good intelligence to guide them, are actually nothing but "dumb bombs"? What kinds of future missions are the U.S. armed forces likely to become involved in? How many more Kosovo situations will we encounter? And does the United States government, especially the intelligence community, have the necessary resources, processed and management structure to meet these needs?

Director Tenet has said that he will not hide behind excuses, such as stretched resources or time pressures. But given the incredible amount of intelligence it takes to conduct a precision stand-off bombing campaign, it is reasonable to ask ourselves if we have the requisite resources for the jobs we're being asked to do in the intelligence community.

For instance, do we have enough resources devoted to creating and maintaining our databases? The evidence in this case would suggest not.

Of course, just possessing the right intelligence resources is not good enough. The management structure must be in place to ensure those resources are used to their best purpose. In the intelligence

world, resources are often moved en masse from crisis point to crisis point, with almost everything else accorded a lower priority. Add to this the fact that once you allocate current resources between the most difficult long-term intelligence targets and the most emergent tactical requirements, there is virtually nothing left for predictive strategic intelligence network, which is arguably the intelligence community's most important role.

This includes the critical but mundane task of keeping databases up to date in areas that are not necessarily on the scope right now, but could be in a matter of hours. As the committee has been arguing for the past several years, if you look at many of the places that have become crisis areas in this time period -- Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Bosnia, now Kosovo -- it is clear that this current strategy of resources roulette will not sustain our national security in the future.

Before giving the floor over to our two distinguished witnesses, I yield to my friend, the ranking member, Mr. Dixon of California for any opening comments he would choose to make.

REP. JULIAN DIXON (D-CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly join you in welcoming Mr. Tenet and Dr. Hamre, and thank them also for their cooperation.

As you've indicated, Mr. Chairman, we are here today to make good on a promise the committee made some weeks ago: to present a public explanation of the mistakes that resulted in the bombing of the embassy of the People's Republic of China in Belgrade. The United States dispatched a senior diplomat to Beijing to explain the cause of this event to the Chinese government, and I believe it is appropriate that a similar explanation be provided to the American people by senior officials of the organizations involved.

The time and attention we focus properly on the Chinese embassy bombing issue should not be mistaken as a lessening of the pride Americans should feel about the way our armed forces and intelligence community personnel performed their missions in the Kosovo conflict. That we acknowledge mistakes so that we can correct their causes is a strength, I believe, in our system.

Despite the care that our military forces apply to preventing innocent casualties, some unintended damage is probably inescapable. There were a few such tragedies in the Kosovo conflict. However, I think it is important to distinguish between mistakes made under the

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stress of executing a tactical mission on a mobile battlefield, and mistakes made in the much more deliberate process of planning a strategic bombing mission.

A mistake which causes a harried pilot who has to make life or death decisions in the split second, while maybe being shot at, to drop ordinances on what turns out to be a civilian target, is fundamentally different from a mistake made in identifying a target over the course of weeks of planning. The first instance obviously arouses our compassion, the later demands that we do better.

It is therefore extremely important that this matter be thoroughly understood. It seems clear that the most fundamental error -- misidentification of the embassy building -- was made within the intelligence process. But that certainly does not mean that the exclusive responsibility to investigate and explain the error falls to the director of Central Intelligence. Management of most intelligence matters is a shared responsibility between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense. But direct intelligence support to military operations ultimately must be under the control of the military chain of command.

Based on the information provided to the committee in other sessions, it seems clear that this process utilized to coordinate target selection did not work in this case. We need to be assured that shortcomings in that process have been made or will be made to identify and corrections made.

The president and the Secretary of Defense have to be confident that target selection has a solid procedural foundation. My focus during this hearing is on the institution and procedural problems that led to the bombing mistake. Let me stress a point that you made, Mr. Chairman, in your opening comments.

I believe it is essential to keep in context an aspect of this affair that has already generated considerable interest and attention: an intelligence officer, as you've indicated, assigned to duties in the CIA, had information that led him to question whether the building that was being bombed was in fact the headquarters of the Yugoslavian Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement.

Over a number of days prior to the bombing, this officer and those he contacted came tantalizingly close to discovering that this building had been misidentified. However, this officer's involvement with this target came almost by chance. His duties did not include

targeting. His actions and the reactions of those he contacted have nothing to do with the underlying mistake that led to the misidentification of the embassy in the first place, and are irrelevant to findings and correcting problems in the targeting process.

Even if the intelligence officer had succeeded in stopping the bombing, it would not have served as a validation of the system that was not functioning properly.

Finally, it is quite important to note that there are significant factual disputes about what this intelligence officers and other said and did. It is a completely open question at this point whether there was individual failings for which it is appropriate to assign individual responsibility. Precisely to attempt to answer this question, Mr. Tenet, the DCI, has initiated a personal accountability process, which I hope he will describe carefully.

The Department of Defense has yet to produce its standard after-action reports on the Kosovar operation, either. For these reasons, I believe our interest today is in conveying to the Congress and the American people a sense of why the embassy was mistakenly targeted, and what can be done to prevent a tragedy of this in the future.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take this opportunity to convey to our audience that the committee, in agreement with the administration, intends to avoid using the names of individuals and the names of specific organizations within the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense, both in the Pentagon and in Europe. I'm confident that these restrictions will not impede our effort to provide the American people and our colleagues with a full and understanding account of this unfortunate accident.

REP. GOSS: Thank you very much, Mr. Dixon. At this time, we welcome the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Tenet. The floor is yours, sir.

MR. TENET: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Dixon. Dr. Hamre and I are here today to explain how a series of errors led to the unintended bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade on May the 7th. We will try to describe, to the best of our ability in this open public session, the causes of what can only be described as a tragic mistake. It was a major error.

I cannot minimize the significance of this. The ultimate

responsibility for the role of intelligence in this tragedy is mine.

I've told my own people that we will not hide behind excuses, such as stretched resources or time pressures. It is precisely when the pressure is intense, life or death decisions are being made, that the president and the American people expect us to provide the best intelligence in the world.

Clearly in this case, we failed to do that. But before we will tell how this happened, I think it is important to provide some perspective. Dr. Hamre will tell you that the United States and our allies flew thousands of sorties and struck many hundreds of targets over the 78 days with very few errors. America's success in this, as in previous conflicts, owes much to the extraordinary work of our intelligence services.

The specifics of our contributions cannot be made public, Mr. Chairman, but as this committee knows, we provided our forces detailed knowledge of the enemy, his intentions, his dispositions, and his weapons.

Mr. Chairman, the nature of warfare has also changed. When cities were struck in past wars, none doubted that civilians, embassies, hospitals and schools would be in harm's way. Today, our ability to strike precisely has created the impression that sensitive sights can be safe in the middle of a war zone. Our desire to protect innocents in the line of fire has added an enormous burden on all of us that we accept. It is our job to do our best to ensure that only appropriate targets are struck.

I think it is useful to note that this episode is unusual, because the CIA does not normally assemble, on its own, target nomination packages containing the coordinates of specific installations or buildings. The targeting support typically provided by CIA is usually at the strategic and planning level, such as analytical judgments on the kind of targets that are most important, commentary or specific information concerning targets selected by the military or others, and information that assists the military in identifying future targets.

In addition to describing how this mistake occurred, I will also outline the corrective actions that we are taking within the government to ensure that as far as is humanly possible, that there is no repeat of this type of incident. The attack was a mistake. Let me emphasize our investigation has determined that no one -- and I

repeat, no one -- knowingly targeted the Chinese embassy. Speculation to the contrary is simply unfounded. No one at any stage in the process realized that our bombs were aimed at the Chinese embassy.

There were three basic failures, Mr. Chairman. First, the techniques used to locate the intended target, the headquarters of the Yugoslav Federal Directorate for Supply and Procurement, the FDSP, were severely flawed. Second, none of the military or intelligence databases used to validate targets contained the correct location of the Chinese embassy. Third, nowhere in the target review process was either of the first two mistakes detected. The unintended attack happened because a number of systems and procedures that are used to identify and verify potential targets did not work.

To help understand the circumstances which led to the mistaken bombing, let me offer a brief chronology of events.

In March of this year, U.S. intelligence officers began considering the FDSP headquarters as a potential target for NATO Allied Force strike operations. The FDSP was a legitimate target, given its role in support of the Yugoslav military efforts. We had the street address of the FDSP headquarters as (Boulevard Umatnosti 2 ?) in New Belgrade, but military forces require precise geographic coordinates to conduct an attack. During a mid-April work-up of the target, three maps were used in an attempt to physically locate the address of the FDSP headquarters: two local commercial maps from 1989 and 1996, and one U.S. government map produced in 1997. None of these maps used had any reference to the FDSP building. None accurately identified the current location of the Chinese embassy.

Please keep in mind that the embassy of the -- the location of the Chinese embassy was not a question that anybody reasonably would have asked when assembling this particular target package. This package was intended to strike the FDSP headquarters, and nowhere else.

In an effort to pinpoint the location of the FDSP building at (Boulevard Umatnosti 2 ?), an intelligence officer used land navigation techniques taught by the U.S. military to locate distant or inaccessible points or objects.

These techniques are known as "intersection and resection." They can be used for general geolocation, but should not be used for aerial targeting because they provide only an approximate location. Using this process, the individual mistakenly determined that the building

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which we now know to be the Chinese embassy was the FDSP headquarters. The true location of the FDSP headquarters was some 300 meters away from the Chinese embassy. This flaw in the address location process went undetected by all others who evaluate the FDSP headquarters as a military target.

The critical lesson that emerges from this event is that, particularly when providing targeting nominations in urban areas, it is important to provide an accurate appreciation of our confidence in the location of a target and the evidentiary basis for how that location was determined.

The incorrect location of the FDSP building was then fed into several U.S. databases to determine whether any diplomatic or other facilities off-limits to targeting were nearby. We try to avoid damage to sensitive facilities like embassies, hospitals, schools and places of worship and look to see what risks to them a nearby strike might pose. Moreover, satellite imagery of the target provided no indication that the building was an embassy -- no flags, no seals and no clear markings.

Multiple databases within the intelligence community and the Department of Defense all reflected the embassy in its pre-1996 location in Belgrade. Despite the fact that U.S. officials had visited the embassy on a number of occasions in recent years, the new location was never entered into intelligence or military targeting databases. If the databases had accurately located the Chinese embassy, the misidentification of the FDSP building would have been recognized and corrected.

Why wasn't the Chinese embassy correctly located? It is important to understand that our ability to locate fixed targets is no better than databases and the databases, in this case, were wrong. Further, it is difficult -- actually, it is impossible -- to keep current databases for cities around the globe. The databases are constructed to catalogue targets, not non-targets. In general, diplomatic facilities, our own being an exception because of the need to plan for an evacuation, are given relatively little attention in our databases because such facilities are not targets.

Military targets are the top priority because of the danger they pose to our own forces.

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did not reflect that the Chinese embassy had been moved. This criticism overstates the importance of the map itself in the analytical process.

Maps of urban areas will be out of date the day after they are published. What is critical is having accurate databases.

We have subsequently found maps, which show the correct and current location of the Chinese embassy, although there are others, including some produced after 1996 by the Yugoslav government, which do not.

Some of our employees knew the location of the Chinese embassy. But keep in mind that we were not looking for it. None of these individuals was consulted as the target was selected and reviewed. And as a result, we lost the opportunity to learn that the building targeted was not the FDSP Headquarters.

We have also found one report from 1997 that gave the correct address of the Chinese embassy, but that information was ancillary to the focus of the report, and unfortunately the address was not entered in the database.

Very late in the process, Mr. Chairman, questions were raised by an intelligence officer as to whether the building targeted was, in fact, the FDSP headquarters or might be some other unidentified building. At no time was there any suspicion that the building might be an embassy. This officer had become aware of the nomination by chance and remembered having seen information a few years earlier that the FDSP building was located a block away from the location identified.

Although the matter had nothing to do with his usual responsibilities, this officer registered his concern and sought to clarify the facts by contacting or attempting to contact other working-level officials who were involved in the preparation of the nomination package. On Tuesday, the 4th of May, three days before the bombing occurred, this officer telephoned an officer responsible for the target in Naples. He told him that he had believed the FDSP headquarters building was a block away from the identified location and said that he was trying to resolve this discrepancy. That evening, he obtained information that tended to confirm his belief that the building had been mislocated.

Due to a variety of circumstances, this officer was unable to

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relay this information before departing for training on the 6th and 7th of May. But it is important to note that at no time -- that at the time, this officer was unaware that the FDSP headquarters was on a target list. On his return to his office on Friday afternoon, the 7th of May, the officer learned to his surprise that the FDSP building was on the target list for bombing that night.

He attempted without success to recontact the officer in Naples with whom he had spoken earlier in the week concerning the discrepancy. He raised his concern with another officer at Naples and learned that the aircraft was already enroute to the target. He tried to convey his concern that the building targeted may not have been the FDSP headquarters. Those in Europe state that they believe that he was trying to convey that while it might not be the FDSP headquarters, it was still a legitimate FDSP target.

While recollections differ of exactly what was said and what was heard, there is no doubt that no one knew that the facility in question was an embassy. The strike took place shortly thereafter. Throughout this series of missed opportunities, the problem of identification was not brought to the attention of the senior managers who may have been able to intervene in time to prevent the strike.

What went wrong, Mr. Chairman? After listing this chronology, I want to identify the principal shortcomings that caused this accident to take place. Some of it is redundant but important. First, the approach used to determine the location of the FDSP headquarters was inappropriate for targeting. There were three meetings at CIA that reviewed the target nomination. The method of identification was not briefed, questioned or reviewed. Therefore, the initial misidentification took on the mantle of fact.

The absence of discussions in the matter resulted in a target package that contained no cautionary language on the location of the FDSP headquarters. Absent cautionary language, reviewers at (UCOM?) and the joint staff mistakenly assumed the location was accurate. This made it unlikely, in my view, that they would focus on the need to revalidate the target's identification.

Second, within CIA there were no procedural guidelines for the officers involved in targeting to follow, and there was little senior management involvement in guiding the targeting process. Although our military support organization has been involved in targeting matters, they had not previously been involved in the approval of target nomination packages unilaterally proposed and wholly assembled at CIA.

This occasion was precedent-setting. No institutional processes existed within the agency for ensuring that all resources were brought to bear on the FDSP nomination.

Third, reviewing elements at UCOM and in the joint staff did not uncover either the inaccurate location of the FDSP headquarters or the correct location of the Chinese embassy was the result of both data base shortcomings and procedural errors. The data base reviews were limited to validating the target data sheet, geographic coordinates with the information put into the data base by the (NEMA?) analysts.

Such a circular process did not uncover the original error and made us susceptible to a single point of data base failure. While collateral damage assessments were performed and indicated there were no sensitive facilities in the area, these assessments were based on incomplete data on the location of those sensitive facilities. Individuals in both CIA and the Department of Defense who knew the correct location of the Chinese embassy should have been consulted and were not.

Fourth, the critical linchpin for both the area and identification of the building and the failure of the review mechanisms is the inadequacy of the supporting data bases and the mistaken assumption that the information it contained would be necessarily accurate. The misidentification of the targeted buildings as the FDSP headquarters would not have occurred had the data bases had the correct location of the Chinese embassy. All the data bases that contained information on the Chinese embassy placed it at its original pre-1996 location, some four miles away. But the question of possible damage to the embassy was never a consideration.

U.S. officials who have served in Belgrade were aware that the Chinese embassy had moved sometime in 1996. The information, however, was not entered into the data bases we rely on for our targeting and our mapping. In this context, I would add my belief, as I stated previously, that too much public emphasis has been given to the fact that the 1997 NEMA map did not reflect the Chinese embassy had been moved. This criticism overstates the importance of the map itself in our analytical process.

Data base management, Mr. Chairman, is one of those basic elements of our intelligence efforts, but it is also one that has suffered in recent years as our workforce has been spread thin. Some have suggested this failure is the consequence of resource shortfalls. A more fundamental problem is not the absolute level of resources but

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the application of resources at our disposal. We have diverted resources and attention away from basic intelligence and data base maintenance to support current operations for too long.

Data base production and maintenance has been routinely accorded a low priority and often overlooked in production, planning and scheduling. Data base production is often the first activity curtailed when resources are tight. Data base production is widely viewed as low visibility, unrewarding and underappreciated. The leadership attention and emphasis on data base production is infrequent, episodic, and essentially reactive.

We are continuing our in-depth review of this tragic incident. Based on our initial findings, it is clear that this mistake occurred not just because of one organization or because of just one individual. Nevertheless, I am evaluating our performance at CIA in this instance to assign individual responsibility and identify procedural reforms as they may be warranted.

Our goal is to ensure that such a mistake does not happen again. To this end, we are implementing corrections to prevent such mistakes in the future. In addition, the following near-term corrective actions are already being implemented. DIA and the National Imagery & Mapping Agency have established rapid response procedures for critical data base updates.

We are strengthening our internal mechanisms and procedures for selecting and validating targets, and we are increasing the priority placed on keeping data bases current. The community and other government agencies will explicitly report whenever foreign embassies move or are built. This information will then be forwarded and incorporated into our intelligence and military data bases. In future conflicts, we will contact other governments to help identify and locate their facilities.

Experience tells us, Mr. Chairman, that human beings make mistakes. They err. Knowing that, we constructed elaborate procedures to check and double-check our work. In this specific case, the checks and balances failed. The president of the United States has expressed our sincere regret at the loss of life in this tragic incident and has offered our condolences to the Chinese people, and especially to the families of those who lost their lives in this mistaken attack.

Mr. Chairman, that completes my prepared statement.

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REP. GOSS: Thank you very much, Mr. Tenet. We will now have the statement of Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. John Hamre. And then we will proceed for members' questioning. And I will be recognizing members this morning on the basis of seniority.

Dr. Hamre, the floor is yours, sir.

MR. HAMRE: Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dixon. Thank you for inviting me to participate along with Director Tenet this morning for this very important hearing. I intend to significantly summarize the statement, so I might ask that it might be included in its full script in your official record, sir.

REP. GOSS: Without objection, the full statement will be included in the record, Dr. Hamre.

MR. HAMRE: Thank you. We're here today to discuss a very painful subject, and that was the accidental bombing of the embassy of the People's Republic of China in Belgrade, Yugoslavia on the 7th of May. Frankly, all war is a painful subject. War involves the intentional destruction of things in order to change the policies and the actions of an opponent.

We absolutely did intend to destroy the infrastructure of violence and coercion in Yugoslavia that was being used for the repression of the people of Kosovo. We never intended to destroy anything that was not directly related to that war effort. Unfortunately, we made mistakes. This is not uncommon in warfare. And I would like to discuss with you what that meant for us.

Now, Director Tenet said that he feels that this accidental bombing was the product of failures inside the intelligence system. We in the Defense Department don't look at it quite that way. We're in the business of dropping bombs and winning wars. And if there is a failure, it is our failure. We greatly appreciate the tremendous support that we got from the intelligence community throughout Operation -- (inaudible). We could not have done our job without it.

And I think it was and history will judge it to have been an enormously successful operation. We flew over 9300 strike sorties. We attacked over 900 targets. We lost only two aircraft. Fortunately, not a single NATO combatant was killed in the operation. And we went to extraordinary pains to minimize collateral damage, the damage that we didn't intend to inflict. And I think history will

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judge that this was a very careful effort on our part.

Unfortunately, we did make mistakes. And Mr. Dixon cautioned me in his opening statement. He sees this as separate and different from the normal collateral damage that occurs in warfare, that in many instances -- and we have approximately 30 of them where we created unintended damage, things that we did not want to do. Out of the 9,300 strikes, we had 30 where we killed people where we didn't intend to do that.

This was unique, as Mr. Dixon properly points out. It wasn't the product of human error, of a tense pilot who is under fire, who misidentifies a target. And it wasn't the error of hardware, that it just simply went to the wrong place. In this case, the hardware worked just as we wanted it to work. The pilots were cool and they did exactly what we asked them to do. And unfortunately, we destroyed the wrong thing.

And so I think this gets to a deeper question that we have to answer, and that is, why did this happen? Could it happen again? What can we do about it so that we don't have another incident like this? Are there steps that we can take to prevent it in the future? Those are the questions you're asking of us. Those are the questions that Secretary Cohen asked of me and of General Ralston when he put us in charge of the after-action review process in the department.

We will look at all of the instances where we had unintended damage. In addition, we will look at a much wider range of issues that came about because of the war, things that we need to understand ourselves. But he did tell us to be responsive to you and try to answer this question early, because it is so important and it does raise so many questions.

I believe that there are three key questions that I will have to answer to the secretary when we produce our after-action report, and I'd like to report on them today. First, as Director Tenet said, human beings will make mistakes. Where those mistakes appear to be intentional, where someone is intentionally doing wrong, then we have absolute obligation to punish those individuals.

I have reviewed the record very carefully. I've read thousands of pages of material. I've interviewed dozens of people to make sure I understand this. And I believe there's absolutely no evidence in the record or in human recollection that anyone knew that this was the Chinese embassy. No one had any inclination at all that we were

striking an embassy. No one, I feel, willfully made a mistake or willfully took an action that caused this outcome.

So we have a very different problem on our hands. We have a situation where it appears -- and I'll describe it shortly -- where the system that we put in place, which is designed to try to catch human error, didn't in this instance. We have an absolute obligation to correct that so that we don't have this kind of a phenomenon in the future.

Now, as I said, I think there are three questions that I'm obligated to answer to the secretary and feel obligated to answer to you. First, is it too easy in our system to put something on a targeting list and then to attack it? The second question is, can the secretary of Defense, since he has to get permission from the president for many sensitive targets, can the secretary of Defense with confidence trust the system that locates a target on the ground? And the third question is, is our no-strike process valid? Can we trust the no-strike process that in this instance failed, and failed very seriously?

In order to answer those three questions, I need to take a minute to describe the process of targeting. Obviously, I can't go into all of the details on how we do the precise process, but I can describe them in general terms, well enough that explains where it failed here.

There are four basic subprocesses to the targeting process. The first is the guidance process. This is where the president, as the commander-in-chief, gives specific instructions to us in the Defense Department how to fight the war. He and his senior advisers sit down and they lay out the ground rules for us -- what to strike, what not to strike, what authority a field commander has to act on his own, what things must he come back and get follow-up permission before he can act on it. Those are laid out very carefully in advance.

I've reviewed the record here very carefully, and I'm absolutely convinced that there is nothing in the guidance part of the process that contributed to this accident. There was no question that no one was authorized to strike at an embassy. Everybody knew it, and no one thought they had the authority to do it. So it wasn't a failing in that part of the targeting process that contributed to this accident.

The second part of the process is the target development part of the process. Here it begins with a concept, and it begins with the concept, how are we trying to fight this war? How does this target

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that we want to hit relate to our opponent's war-fighting activities? If we were to destroy it, what would it do to those activities? That sort of thing. So it starts with the concept, and then analysts gradually build up what we call a target folder.

Now, target folders are developed along two different lines. One, they're developed in the field by our field headquarters; in this case, at the European Command. The other is that they're developed here in Washington in the national security establishment. In this instance, this target was developed here in Washington in the national security establishment. Our process for both is to have them reviewed by the joint staff when it is in a target class that requires permission from the president or by the secretary of Defense.

In this instance this is where the primary failing occurred. The target development process did not bring forward in the target folder the methodology that was used by the analyst to locate the target, its geo-location -- where on the earth it is located. Had we known that the method was used was not one that is reliable for targeting, precise targeting in urban areas, we would not have executed the target with that target folder; we would have gone back and tried to look at it in another way and to get a better idea of its precise location. But because that data was not in the target folder we did not catch it during the target approval process.

Now, the third process is, as I said, the target approval process. And this is the part of the process where all of the important questions get asked. Is this a legitimate target? How does this target, how does this organization fit in with our opponent's war-fighting activities? If we were to knock it out, how would it affect the war? Can we limit the damage when we try to destroy this target, and minimize the damage to things around it? Are there ways that we could adapt the target -- time of day that we strike it or the direction of the attack -- in order to minimize that collateral damage. All of those important questions get asked in the approval process, and they were asked in this specific instance.

This approval process does not normally ask the question, Do you have the precise coordinates on the ground? Now, we have learned that that's a mistake. That's something we now need to do. Now, it isn't uniform that we have to do it on every target. If we are trying to strike an oil refinery -- there are very few things in the world that look like oil refineries, so we don't have the inherent uncertainty that you have when you look at an oil refinery that you have when you are looking at an office building in a city. We now know we are going

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to have to ask for greater detail on the targeting methodology, the siting methodology, when we build target folders and then when we approve targets.

The final stage in the targeting process is actually the execution phase, and this is the instance where you give the precise coordinates to the crew and they bomb the target. In this instance the crew did exactly what they were told to do; they had absolutely no knowledge that this was anything other than a legitimate target, and they did their job. Nothing in the execution phase contributed to this error.

So the error occurred in the target development process and in the target approval process, and the interrelationship of those two sub-phases.

Now, with that background let me very briefly go to the three questions that I think we have to answer. First, is it too easy to put a target on a targeting list? Here I think we have to remember that what we were trying to hit we should have hit. We were trying to knock out an office working for the Yugoslav government that was directly tied to the repressive actions in Kosovo. We should have destroyed that target. Unfortunately we had it located in the Chinese Embassy. It was a terrible mistake. I don't think this mistake means that the way we go about developing and approving a target was wrong; indeed, all of the right questions were asked: Can we limit the collateral damage? We did extensive collateral damage limitation for this target. We looked at it, we saw that there was a nearby athletic facility, so that's one of the reasons why we attacked at midnight, to make sure no one was in that nearby athletic facility. So we did that part right.

But it leads you to the second question: Can you trust the system we have for locating targets for targeting purposes? Here I think we have to say the answer to that is no. Right now this system failed us. Now, it worked correctly for 99.9 percent of the targets that we hit. So I think it's very important to say that. But it failed spectacularly in this case.

That means we have got to change things. And I think that while we will bring forward the formal recommendations when we submit our after-action review, and that will be sometime later this summer or early fall, I think it's very clear now we know what we are going to recommend to the secretary. We have to have a process when we submit a target folder. That folder has to indicate the method that was used

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for geo-locating a target, and the confidence that the analysts have in the location of that target when it deals with inherently uncertain targets. As I say, I don't think this is a problem for railroad-switching line yards, I don't think it's a problem for transshipment points on a river. It is clearly going to be something we look at when we are doing precise targeting in an urban setting. We are going to have to do that.

Now we get I think to the third question, and to me that is -- this is a very hard one -- is our no-strike system adequate? Well again I think we have to say no. It isn't adequate, because right now the no-strike process rests largely on databases that, as Director Tenet said, are not as accurate as they need to be. May I say that we need to explain the no-strike process is not just a static list that you hang on the board in the command center and everybody looks at it once a day, and say, Okay, (we're doing that work ?). The no-strike list changes every single day. It changes as the direction of the campaign changes. It changes as the next phase of operations proceed. There are very clear guidelines that go into the no-strike process. You know, we never strike religious sites. We never go after cemeteries or historical sites of great cultural significance to the population. We stay away from hospitals. And you can see we did have an instance where we hit a hospital -- it was totally an accident. In this case that was human error that led in this instance where we hit a hospital. But the no-strike list is very clear on broad principles on what we should do. And then every day we bounce that up against the plans, the next day's plans and the day after that plans for the airstrikes.

We are very dependent, as Director Tenet said, on databases and the accuracy of those databases, and clearly we didn't have accurate databases here. I find it embarrassing that we didn't have in our databases the precise location of the Chinese Embassy, and that did contribute to this failure where we didn't catch the mistake and possibly could have. We know that now, and we are going to have to prevent that in the future. We are going to have to spend a fair amount of attention I think coming to grips with the requirement -- we have to have significantly more attention to the quality and the accuracy of the underlying data.

Now, may I say one last thing -- and Director Tenet mentioned this in his testimony. I would like to speak just for a second about the National Imagery and Mapping Agency. There has been an awful lot of criticism of NIMA in newspaper articles and editorials about NIMA, that NIMA was the cause of this failure. That's not the case. I

think people who say that either don't know the facts here or they have a different agenda, frankly. The people at NIMA produced over 12 million maps for our operation. They did a splendid job helping us fight this air operation in Kosovo. In this instance a map was used -- it wasn't designed for the purpose that it was used, when it was used to develop the target, and an inappropriate technique was used on that map. And the checks and balances in the system that hopefully could have caught this error were not NIMA's responsibility. We have to make changes, and NIMA admits they've got things they've got to do. But they were not the cause of this accident. It was a much deeper cause in this interaction between a development and an approval process we had in the department.

And I would like to let you know that we have great confidence in Lieutenant General Jim King and all of the folks out at NIMA, who have done a terrific job helping us in this operation and in every other operation the department had since it was formed.

Sir, let me conclude -- and I apologize for going on so long, but I would -- if I may conclude to say we are very regretful that this happened. We are very proud that America can now fight a way with such precision and such care that we can have so little unintended damage when you undertake such an extensive operation as this. As I said, we attacked over 900 targets, and we had 30 where we had damage we hadn't intended. That isn't to excuse this error. And where we know we make a mistake we will have to correct that. There were systems failures here. We will correct those mistakes; it is our obligation to do that, and we have to assure you we will do that. We will never have this mistake happen again under these circumstances. I cannot promise you that we won't have mistakes again. War frankly is a tragic thing, and it does have mistakes that occur -- innocent mistakes that occur in warfare. We will do our absolute best to improve on this record so that we minimize any collateral damage in the future.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Dixon, for inviting me to be here.

REP. GOSS: Thank you very much, Dr. Hamre. And, Director Tenet, I very much appreciate the candor and cooperation that you gentlemen have given us through our oversight responsibilities on this matter, which of course are not entirely concluded with this public hearing.

I think some very fine questions have been raised, and I think that we have heard some conversation about what went wrong, the

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explanations of why that happened, which seems to be somewhat rational, and steps we can take to preclude that.

I will say that if my scheduler came to me and said, "Porter, you are going to be taking 50 flights this coming year, and 49 of them are going to land safely," it would raise my apprehension level. So I suspect we want to be very sure that we are doing the 100 percent goal, not the 99.9 percent goal that we are talking about here. But that takes nothing away from the extraordinary record of our armed service personnel, who really did conduct this campaign with extraordinary professionalism. And please understand that this hearing is not in the area of criticism; it is in the area of attempting to create solutions to those few problems that turned out to have dramatically negative consequences for the United States of America.

Having said that, I wanted to address the question of degree of certainty of targets. You both addressed it in your testimony. And I take it there is some receptivity in the process now to include some questions about degree of certainty about the target. And again I want to specify in this narrow type of warfare we are talking about here; I am not expecting in a tank battle or an air-to-air combat that we are going to stop and clear the targets with Washington; we all understand that. But we are talking about this type of a campaign. Is that a fair conclusion I've drawn?

MR. HAMRE: Absolutely.

REP. GOSS: Director Tenet, do you agree with that? Having said that then, there was some talk that this was innovative, or a first-time precedent for CIA to participate in the target nomination package. And I want to ask the question, because it goes to another of our responsibilities, which is trying to provide the wherewithal to the intelligence community through the normal authorization and appropriations process. The question is simply this: How does the intelligence community measure and report its readiness for operational support? How do you know that you have got what you need to develop what you are being asked under your target guidance conclusions as you go into your target development and target approval? That is an area of some concern.

MR. TENET: Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, we are constantly engaged. We change your priorities, you move your capabilities, you move from one particular crisis to the support of war. So there is no easy way to tell you how ready we are at any given moment in time.

All I can tell you is that in this instance -- for example, if you look at Kosovo on the Balkans and the priority we have attached to support here, it has been very, very high throughout, going back to the Bosnian situation. So our analytical support, collection effort, focus of our clandestine efforts has been very, very high, and I would say in this instance when you surge to crisis in war, we have anticipated and been fully involved in this process.

Now, it's -- I don't assign some rating to myself in terms of how ready I am; I make decisions about how to allocate my resources and make collection decisions every single day given the priorities we face. So I don't have a very easy answer to you for that.

MR. HAMRE: Mr. Chairman, the Defense Department has a very extensive readiness rating system, and our intelligence units have to rate their readiness, and are evaluated on their readiness inside DOD systems. So every quarter each commanding officer for an intelligence unit has to identify their war-fighting readiness, and this means do they have their personnel on hand, do they have the equipment on hand? Is it -- their training, are the people that are on hand trained in their MOS? That sort of thing. So this is a very explicit readiness rating system for all military intelligence units. ...

And, as Director Tenet said, we try to size ourselves to be able to fight two nearly simultaneous wars, while the intelligence community is at war all the time. I mean, so we are -- the readiness is happening every day. And then when something like Kosovo comes along, you are adding the second MRC for our intelligence community.

REP. GOSS: That really leads me to my basic question -- and I thank you for your answers on that. The purpose of that intelligence community is that we not have any surprises. We can't always deal with an issue, but we certainly don't want to be surprised by it. So that -- accepting that, I want to ask the question about when you are in the target guidance part of the process does intelligence get a fair shake in consideration of the process? And the way I would put it was if this was what we wish to do to further the national security interests of the United States of America, when we are reviewing our capabilities, our tanks and our ships and our aircraft, are we also reviewing appropriately our intelligence capabilities to provide the answers to the type of information we are going to need to successfully achieve that guidance?

MR. TENET: Well, I believe that we do, and we do so consciously, Mr. Chairman. I think the secretary in reviewing our budget

submissions has in mind the level of support that we are going to provide to meet his needs and objectives. So this is a conscious look at how well couldn't we support not just war, but crises around the world. In fact, we plan -- attempt to plan for the worst-case constituency in meeting the objectives that the Department of Defense may have.

Now, they're are just one customer. We have a lot of customers. But certainly when -- certainly when you get the crisis or the war, the highest priority you have is to support the men and women in uniform. And that's the way we try and gear our budget allocations and our collection strategies is to ensure that when the secretary and the chairman deploy troops, we have maximally utilized all of our resources to ensure there is no loss of life, there is no surprise. Indeed, I would say if you look at the record in Bosnia for example, where force protection has been our number one priority for a number of years, we haven't lost an American man or woman in uniform because of a failure in intelligence to anticipate threats against those men and women. It's been a very robust collection effort. Now, you and I have talked in the past about what are the implications for the rest of the world and what you have to cover. And we know that we have to consciously make priorities and allocate resources every day to meet changing circumstances and conflicts, because there is no certainty in providing constant coverage of the entire world on a continuing basis. We are not resourced that way -- we will never be resourced that way -- and we have to make those judgments each and every day.

REP. GOSS: Dr. Hamre, did you want a piece of that answer?

MR. HAMRE: I have been involved in a number of episodes in the last two years while in this job, where one of the key questions is do we know enough, is do we have adequate intelligence to undertake the operation. And every time we have had to go to war we have had to go to war we have said, Yes, we do know. So I really do think that's a very explicit part of the national guidance part of the process when they give us instructions.

They're never going to tell us to go off and do things, not knowing exactly what we're trying to do when we start.

REP. GOSS: I conclude, then, that that part of it works, but we also have to understand that there is a price, because there may be a diversion of assets from some other targets.

MR. HAMRE: Yes.

Thank you. Mr. Dixon.

REP. DIXON: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Tenet, did I understand you to say that you do not have a readiness status or report similar to the DOD?

MR. TENET: I don't have a readiness rating for CIA each and every day. I am -- my assessment of where we are is you're engaged and ready each and every day in the community. John's got different needs. But in terms of my ability to search and meet resources, I'm moving things every single day. So I don't have a readiness stand.

REP. DIXON: I would assume that in the future, your agency will be involved in targeting. And my question is twofold. One, if you are, would it be wise to have a readiness rating? And in your testimony and on other occasions, you've indicated this was a unique event. And if you could tell us how far up that your chain of command the approval was given for this unique package.

MR. TENET: I don't know that I want to be in the business of providing myself a readiness rating. It's something I haven't thought about and I'd like to think about some. In fact, you know, we have previous -- as I said, this was precedent-setting in the following context.

When we supported the effort in Iraq, or supported the effort against the Osama bin Laden targets in Afghanistan, largely what we do is provide our knowledge and experience about these targets and strategic-level planning. In this instance, we actually developed a package and put a coordinate number on it, and moved it forward.

So, I think that it was precedent-setting in that regard. I think in the future, one, I think that we would -- I think that the secretary would say that our previous relationship here over the last few years has been very close and very responsive to the needs of the military.

And I would say that we have to stay in the targeting business, and I would say that we need to ensure that if we're going to be in that business, we talk to the Department of Defense about what the precise needs that they have as the package goes forward to ensure they are reflected in our process and our procedures, and that the validation process at the other end evaluates what we've provided them.

In this instance, this target package came up to the associate deputy director of Central Intelligence for Military Support. He was brought forward a package. And as I said, you could have brought the package to me, Mr. Dixon, and I would have assumed that all the questions that I indicated in my statement had been asked at the working level, and had sort of worked through all these problems, and I would have approved this same package.

So, in hindsight, I would have taken no different action in this regard.

REP. DIXON: No, perhaps you misunderstood me, Mr. Tenet. I'm saying before embarking on the development of the package, how far up the chain of command was the approval given to start this endeavor?

MR. TENET: In this instance, as I said, the ADCI for Military Support was witting of the fact that a process had begun. Indeed, our inspector-general report indicated that indeed there was discussion about formalizing a process to deal with this unique situation that unfortunately never occurred. That is a shortcoming we have to redress.

REP. DIXON: Let me ask if either one of you can put to rest comments that have been made in the press concerning that there was a flurry to obtain more targets, and therefore, you engaged in this endeavor.

MR. HAMRE: Mr. Dixon, the air operation was unfolding as throughout this entire period. Yes, of course we were trying to find additional targets, because we were trying to find additional leverage places where we could try to bring the Yugoslav government to a point where it couldn't continue to prosecute this violence against the people of Kosovo. So yes, we were looking for additional targets in our effort to try to find a way to stop it.

REP. DIXON: Mr. Tenet, let me kind of rephrase my question. How early on did you start to engage in the process of putting the target together?

MR. TENET: What do you mean by "how early on," Mr. Dixon?

REP. DIXON: I mean when did the discussion start, how did it start, that you were going to put together the entire package?

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MR. TENET: I think sometime in the March time period, the command indicated that it was looking for targets.

REP. DIXON: Right.

MR. TENET: We have an ongoing relationship with the command, and our people started to engage with the command in an effort to identify additional targets that would be relevant given the guidance that had been provided in terms of the kinds of targets we were interested in. And as a consequence, the fax indicated it started sometime in March. And through the April time period, this FDSP target was identified as a potential source of interest.

REP. DIXON: And at that point in time, were you aware that in fact you were going to put together -- your agency was going to put together -- the entire package?

MR. TENET: No, I was not.

REP. DIXON: And at what level was there an awareness below you that this was going to occur? That's the thrust of my question.

MR. TENET: It is difficult at this point and in terms of my process in looking at all this, to determine at what point in time, for example, the ADCI for Military Support was aware. I don't know the answer to that question at this point.

REP. DIXON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GOSS; Thank you, Mr. Dixon. Mr. Gibbons.

REP. JIM GIBBONS (R-NV): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Hamre and Director Tenet, welcome. I think the American people appreciate the opportunity to have a little sunlight cast upon this very serious question. No doubt about it, America feels very regretful as a whole that this mistake occurred.

And I think, from reading both of your testimony, there's enough blame to be cast around to both sides of the issue throughout the mistakes that were made, throughout the chain of command in deciding this target, and putting this target on the list.

I guess my question is, and maybe it's one which I would like to address to you gentlemen both. It seems to be no surprise that our database is flawed. And that information is one which we've carried

with us for a great deal of time. It has been a concept that we've had for a number of years, and presumably through a number of conflicts.

Yet, we continually rely on the database. And I'm wondering just exactly -- Dr. Hamre, when you look at current targeting today, many of those targets that are in that database, have the same source of location -- in other words, a map location that we're talking about today.

Is there a process by which we can go back and make sure that we update those databases to ensure that the accuracy that we need to really on when it comes to using those databases can be improved?

MR. HAMRE: Mr. Gibbons, I think there probably are a number of things that we could do. And because we're in the realm of intelligence programs, I think it would probably be better for a more explicit discussion to be in a different forum to talk about that.

I think, in general -- first, if I might say, there's really an inherent problem associated with this. We have expectations of our intelligence community to be really omniscient in a very complicated world. I don't know -- we might, two days from now, have a hostage incident in a country we don't -- I couldn't even find on the map right now, if you asked me where it was, and we had to get Special Operations Forces there within 18 hours. And to say, to anticipate that our databases are going to have to be exactly accurate, where some hotel is, is really a very high challenge.

So, I think what we need is both routine, steady quality database development, something that the department -- or something that the intelligence community has done in the past, it's hard to do that now, when the intelligence community is responding so much operationally on a day-in and day-out basis -- and then the ability to very quickly adapt to evolving circumstances.

There's lots of information in the world. Internet is giving us tremendous tools. You know, half the time you can find things by calling up people's home pages, you know. So there are clearly lots of ways we could get at that. But I'd ask you to also recognize there are very serious challenges you've put to our community, which is to try to be able to anticipate anything anywhere where it could happen. And I'm shocked at how many different things come up almost every day that the director has to put resources on to get a fast response.

To your specific question, yes, I think there are some things we could do where we could be more cost-effective in providing quality input on a more steady basis into the databases. And I think we should probably follow up in a different setting to talk about some of those methods.

REP. GIBBONS: Well, I'm certain that had it not been for the Chinese embassy incident that the highlighting of our defective database and the concerns we have now with it would probably not be the focus of this committee hearing, as we see. But I think maybe if I could turn to Director Tenet for a question, I know that up to this point in time, your internal investigation revealed that you didn't have a true process of targeting, and how the process worked within your group.

And I would like you maybe to explain just to the committee and maybe to the people as a whole, the nominating process of this target went two directions. It went to the European command in one arm, and it went to the Pentagon in the other arm. And it seems that the Pentagon arm -- and that would be Dr. Hamre's responsibility as well as EuCom.

But the Pentagon responsibility didn't go anywhere. It was the EuCom people that picked up this target and carried it to its actuality. Dr, -- Mr. Tenet, how is it that the CIA managed to send it to two agencies?

MR. TENET: Well, I think that what happened here, in reviewing this, is essentially we sent it to the Pentagon, and also sent it to the DCI representative at the command as a matter of information. No one intended to circumvent a process, everybody understood the targeting process. And what you had is they were both shipped out, because there was an interest in the command and there were discussions with the command about this target.

So in essence, this went out simultaneously to inform both places about this target and its nomination. And there was nothing nefarious about it, no one intended to circumvent the rules. And certainly everybody understood how the targeting process worked.

REP. GIBBONS : And that's a normal procedure?

MR. TENET: Well, I don't know that it's normal that you send it out simultaneously. But in this instance, it may have added to the confusion. But I believe, that in terms of the target development

process, this process was fully known and understood in terms of how a target should evolve.

MR. HAMRE: Mr. Gibbons, this was really an unintended outcome for a system we wanted to have happen. We would like to have both the headquarters as developing targets be aware of what's going in Washington, and vice-versa. I mean, sharing a common understanding of the objective and the battle space is a goal we've been after for years.

And so, we wanted that to happen. Where it broke down in this instance, is that the review process that should have occurred here in Washington, did not occur. At the same time that what looked like a complete target package came forward from the field, and people took it at face value, and as I said in the approval process, did not go back and review the siting methodology. And they should have.

So, this is clearly one of the things we're going to have to fix. We have given very explicit instructions. There is no target folder that goes forward to the approval process that has been nominated in the Washington area that hasn't been carefully reviewed -- every single one -- carefully reviewed by the joint staff.

REP. GIBBONS: So this was simply a breakdown in that overarching connectivity between Pentagon and EuCom with the determination of whether or not that target --

MR. HAMRE: I think it was -- it was not such much a breakdown in connectivity as they assumed things when it came forward that we should have second-guessed.

REP. GIBBONS: Okay. Let me ask you each in the few seconds that I have remaining here, to look into your crystal ball. And as the nature of war has changed, as you've indicated earlier today, and that we require ourselves to have more accuracy, less collateral damage.

As the nature of weapons change, as we get smaller warheads with more defined results, how is that going to impact on the demand as we look at future operations on both the military and the intelligence capability in providing the resources, so that we not only avoid this, but we narrow the collateral damage issue as well, and narrow the focus of what we want to do in an intended strike?

Would you address both the need for resources on the --

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MR. TENET: I think from my perspective, Mr. Gibbons, it's going to mean that what we have to do is anticipate where future crises and wars are likely to occur, and assume that's going to be an analytical judgment that we make, could be wrong.

And then where we have issues like databases, where you have to allocate scarce resources to specific places, we're going to have to sit down and think through the precise locations that we want to ensure that databases in Washington and in commands -- their integrity is absolutely at the highest level, recognizing that that data's going to change constantly.

Then we have to look very carefully at how the input of that data has to occur in a modern technological environment in a way that there's an automaticity about which data is provided so that you're not relying on the physical human entry. It seems to me we have to move forward, not backwards, in terms of how we think about these things.

At the end of the day, you will not have a world map of every city in the world whose integrity is at 100 percent. That won't be possible. Neither the intelligence community or the Department of Defense will be a perfect information almanac, but we're going to have to make choices, we're going to have to ensure that critical places -- their integrity is absolutely assured. We're going to have to make sure that people are devoted to these tasks, and that it is not episodic, and that leadership attention is focused on ensuring that the mission is accomplished.

I think we would all agree that we've known about these shortcomings and now have to understand that we have to ensure that the attention that they deserve is accorded at all levels.

MR. HAMRE: Mr. Gibbons, I'd also say this is a problem that is most unique when you're talking about trying to strike things in urban settings.

REP. GIBBONS: Right.

MR. HAMRE: Again, this isn't a problem when we're looking at oil refineries, and it's not a problem for shipyards or rail switching lines, that sort of thing.

Where it's very clear, it's unambiguous, and we know exactly what it is when we're looking at it. But when you're having to ask yourself

can I locate an organization that's operating inside a building, and I'm not exactly sure where that building is, in an urban setting, there's an inherent uncertainty with that that's going to require a higher standard for us. That's going to be a challenge, and we're going to become more cautious in the process. But we will probably have some mistakes in the future. We'll do everything we can to avoid tragedies like this.

MR. TENET: I also think that with regard to this urban targeting environment that John talks about, I think it's absolutely essential that people who had eyes on this target must be involved in validating, when someone shows you a piece of imagery, that this is what someone who put a coordinate on a building says it is. And, I think in this instance we know that there are people in my establishment and at the Department of Defense who had an intimate understanding of the Belgrade environment, and they were not consulted in this process. And we have to ensure that that part of the business is actively involved in putting their eyes on and validating the target, particularly in urban environments. Otherwise, all this sophisticated technology and best work possible will continue to fail, I believe, periodically.

REP. GOSS: Ms. Pelosi.

REP. NANCY PELOSI (D-CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and Mr. Dixon for having this open hearing. I think it's very important for the American people to have an explanation of what happened, and I appreciate the testimony of our two witnesses here this morning, Mr. Hamre and Mr. Tenet.

Mr. Hamre, you said war is a tragic thing. I think that is absolutely right. And I think it should be an obsolete thing, especially urban warfare because the collateral damage is a reality, and as you said, there is absolutely no way you can guarantee that such mistakes cannot happen in the future. We're responsible for what is predictable. What is possible is just too much to cover.

But I have a little problem, as sympathetic as I am to the process that you describe -- and my colleagues have asked questions about improving the database and the approval process, and the review process, and I know that that will all happen. I see, anyway, the plan for it. But I am concerned when I hear you say things like "We can't anticipate everything happening anywhere in the world, and some hostage taken in some remote country someplace," because this is a place where we had made a decision to go in. In our investigation of

our committee, one agency reported that the database on Yugoslavia was deficient, because Yugoslavia was treated at the lowest intelligence priority. And I'd like your response there. And Mr. Milosevic has certainly been creating problems for at least ten years. And we have troops in part of the former Republic of Yugoslavia, and again, we were going in to engage in war. Would you agree or disagree with the assessment that Yugoslavia is a low intelligence priority?

MR. TENET: I vehemently disagree. The Balkans and Kosovo has been at the top tier of our activity for the last few years. And in closed session I'd like to go through the collection priority, the human priority, the analytical priority, the existence of a task force. I don't agree. We did have a shortcoming in this database. But, to say that this is accorded a low priority is simply not factually.

REP. PELOSI: So that you would obviously refute that characterization?

MR. TENET: Yes, I would.

REP. PELOSI: I appreciate that. I don't know whether that's good news or bad news, now knowing that it's a top tier priority and this database was sufficient gives me other cause for alarm.

The other question -- as I said earlier, and as our chairman and ranking member have said, that the American people should know in open hearings what happened. I think the American people should also know what Secretary Pickering told the Chinese, to the extent that you can discuss that in open hearing. I think this is a terrible tragedy. When I heard that the Chinese Embassy had been bombed, I couldn't even believe that that could possibly be so. And so I'm sympathetic to the concerns of the Chinese government that they wanted an explanation, but I think it's important for the American people to know what happened from our perspective and what we told the Chinese Government.

MR. TENET: Ms. Pelosi, what Secretary Pickering told the Chinese is largely mirrored with some great precision what I told you in my opening statement. The State Department has put what he told the Chinese on their website. He's briefed the chairman and ranking member of this committee of his meetings with the Chinese. I believe he's provided the script of what he's told the Chinese. I would say to you that there is nothing in what Dr. Hamre and I have said that in any way, shape or form diverges with what they were told when Secretary Pickering was in Beijing.

REP. PELOSI: I appreciate that. And I have read Secretary Pickering's report. But I wondered if you could just be a little more specific, because -- in other words, everything you've said here today he --

MR. TENET: Yes.

REP. PELOSI: -- everything you've said here today is in the public domain, so that information is available --

MR. TENET: Well, I think, if I can summarize it -- he told them that the target was misidentified, and how it was misidentified, and walked them through the methodology by which it was misidentified. He told them about our database shortcomings. He told them about the fact that people with human eyes on the ground were not consulted in this process. He talked about all of the procedural shortcomings in the evaluation of the target that Dr. Hamre and I have talked about. He walked through each area where mistakes were made and how this occurred, and those were the major areas.

REP. PELOSI: Well, is there anything that he told them that you cannot tell us at this open hearing? I mean, I know that you're not going to tell us what it is, but --

MR. TENET: No, not really. Not to my -- I don't think there's anything that he told them that I -- that he may have had sidebar discussions that I'm not aware of, but with regard to the facts presented here today, there is nothing that he told them that I wouldn't tell the American people.

REP. PELOSI: I appreciate that answer. Dr. Hamre, do you have anything to add to that?

MR. HAMRE: No, I agree completely. I mean, I'm working off of the same evidentiary base that Tom Pickering had when he developed the talking points that he used to discuss it with him. I know of no additional facts that were not available to him, and I know of no difference in any detail between what we've said. We've probably indicated a little more in the closed session with you about methodology where the mistakes occurred. I think that Tom Pickering talked about faulty checks or something -- it was a term of art he used -- and of course, we indicated more precisely which offices and individuals and that sort of thing. But it doesn't change any of the quality of the facts. You know more, obviously because we were able

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to talk in a classified venue for that. But, the conclusions are identical.

REP. PELOSI: The -- forgive me if this was contained in the opening comments that I missed; I tried to read the statements, but I may have missed it -- given that -- Dr. Hamre, this will be directed to you. I understand that Secretary Cohen has asked you to co-chair the After Action Review with the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Has this process started? And when do you expect it to be complete.

MR. HAMRE: It has started. There are three things that we need to do with this process -- and I say this because the answer may be a bit confusing. The first thing is we need to know what we have to do improve our operations. And that's the immediate task. We are supposed to report back to the secretary late summer/early fall. I'm shooting for around the first of September to be able to give him a briefing.

Second, I need to get as much data from this as possible to help inform how we build this next budget. We will be putting a budget together this fall. The program review will conclude in October, and the budget review starts in October for the budget we submit in January, so I need as much of it as possible to know how I need to change the budget that we're going to submit to you in January.

And then, third, we are laying the foundation for what will be the next quadrennial defense review -- longer term changes that we need to contemplate in light of this operation. Is our force structure right? Do we have enough reconnaissance assets compared to strike assets? How good is our communications security? Things of this nature. They're very long-term in nature.

So, the process has started. The initial report will be in September. We will have an on-going process that will probably take us a year and a half before it's finally concluded.

REP. PELOSI: I appreciate that, because I think that's very important. This is not -- this open hearing is not about recriminations and finger-pointing, but about how we go from here into the future. And I know it will have budget consequences, so I appreciate your response.

Thank you, Mr. Tenet. Thank you, Dr. Hamre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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REP. GOSS: Mr. LaHood.

REP. RAY LaHOOD (R-IL): I don't have any questions, Mr. Chairman. But I just want to say that I think it should be refreshing to the American people who will watch this or read about this that there are high government officials who are willing to go public and say that they made -- that mistakes were made, and admit mistakes, and, hopefully, to say that we're going to learn from those mistakes. I can't think of any question that has not been asked either in the private hearing or private briefing, or in this hearing. And if the purpose of this is to give the American people the notion that we're trying to bring this out into the full light of day, so be it. But, I do applaud these two officials that are, high government officials that are here today for their testimony, their statements, their admissions, and the fact that they want to find a way to correct whatever mistakes were made.

REP. GOSS: Thank you very much, Mr. LaHood. Mr. Sisisky.

REP. NORM SISISKY (D-VA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to both of you gentlemen. I just applaud what Mr. LaHood said -- most of my questions have been answered. But, there was something that bothered me in your testimony. Both of you said it, and I don't know why you -- don't hold NEMA, don't blame them wrongfully, I think, was the statement. But that's where the accident happened, isn't it?

MR. TENET: No, sir. I --

REP. SISISKY: I mean, the database, but they're the ones that prepare the maps.

MR. TENET: In any moment in time now, Mr. Sisisky, I think the point that we would both make to you -- the map is a reflection of the database. The map is a reflection of all of the information you've been able to put together and then map. If the underlying information is not there, then I think you're imposing a burden on the map maker that is unfair. So, in that sense, there's been a lot made of the maps, and there has been a lot of reporting that indicates that the map is the proximate cause of what happened here. And I think the Secretary and I would say that's not true.

REP. SISISKY: Well, I believe you do agree on that from your statements. And I appreciate the fact that, you know, we look to the future of how we can not have something like this cannot happen again.

But the true matter is that so much of this was just based on faulty assumptions, and that's what happened from time to time, I guess. I don't know how you prevent that, because certainly the CIA thought that DoD, you thought that one -- you know, and I just don't think that that will be preventable. But we've learned something and you should use what we learned. And maybe a more often review of the maps would be a reasonable --

MR. HAMRE: Sir, I think you're exactly right. It was in the assumptions we made of each other where this problem occurred. And I think what we now need are processes that challenge us to look at our assumptions over and over again, to make sure that doesn't happen again. And I think you're right.

REP. SISISKY: Thank you very much.

REP. GOSS: Thank you. Ms. Wilson.

REP. HEATHER WILSON (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Tenet, I understand that there were some questions that were asked of Ambassador Pickering by the Chinese government. And I want to ask them of you to the extent you may know the answers.

Why was this, or was this the only target selected by the U.S. that used this questionable parallel street numbering method?

MR. TENET: Well, it was the only, it was the only target we nominated. And as a consequence, it was the only target that this individual, you know, the individual who applied this methodology to. And when we came forward in the review process, what happened was is no one ever questioned what the methodology was. So, we asked questions about collateral damage, and we asked questions about the appropriateness of the target and the legality of the target. So, what happened is that essentially no one asked the question any place in the process: How did we divine the location of this particular target? And it was, this initial misidentification took on the mantle of fact, took on the mantle of fact throughout the target review process. There was no cautionary language associated with it. There was no confidence level associated with our knowledge of what the target may look like as the package went forward. And I think, quite frankly, everybody assumed someone else would validate it. Everybody assumed that there would be another check someplace else. And that's how it happened. It was unique in the case of this individual target because of the process that didn't work inside my own building.

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REP. WILSON: So, it's my understanding then that this method of targeting, the method itself, was not approved within you agency, or known --

MR. TENET: It would not have been a method with the proper checks and balances that anybody in the targeting process would have used to precisely geo-locate a target in an urban environment. That's correct.

REP. WILSON: Thank you. I understand that another question that they raised that I would like to ask you to answer for the record if you can is, and I am just repeating this question -- the NEMA director has said publicly that it's maps were not wrong. Is that correct?

MR. TENET: Well, as I've just said, as I just said, the maps are at any moment in time a reflection of the data that the maps are based on. So in that sense, he was producing maps that were based on the best available data in the database, and that means that the data was wrong. And as a consequence, you did not have an accurate location of an embassy on a map.

REP. WILSON: One final question, and I guess it may relate to that, to the fact that this was the only target that was put forward by the CIA. And it gets to the issue of time pressure, when people often don't check their work because they're under the pressure of time and the urgency of the situation. Was there pressure or a demand, or a request, repeated request to come up with more targets and to nominate targets?

MR. HAMRE: Yes. We were very much looking for additional targets because had hoped that the air campaign would have brought the Milosevic government to a realization that this was a losing cause earlier. And it went longer than we thought. Yes, we were looking for additional targets, because we wanted to try to stop the war effort. This was a very important and legitimate for trying to stop the war effort. This organization was buying the things that they were putting into the field that was being used to, frankly, the genocide that was undertaken against the Kosovars. And so, yeah, we were looking for additional things. It would be going on right now, and we'd be looking for more targets. Thank goodness it ended.

REP. WILSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time.

REP. GOSS: Thank you. Mr. Roemer.

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REP. TIM ROEMER (D-IN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first of all, I just want to concur with your decision and the ranking member's decision to having a public and open hearing. I believe it's important to explain to the degree that we can what happened, why it happened, explain it to the American public, and explain it to the world. And the second step is for there to be some ownership of this, and I have the highest respect for George Tenet and you, Mr. Hamre, for taking responsibility for this, and saying mistakes were made. And this was a tragic accident, encompassing colossal failures, and we're not going to let it happen again to the degree that we can institutionally address the processes here and correct the mistakes.

Now, I think everybody agrees, there were individual mistakes made. There were institutional mistakes made. There were deficient databases. There were deficient no-strike lists. And, we had a colossal accident. I think it's also clear that nobody targeted the Chinese Embassy, that this was the result of this string and this series of failures on our part.

Let me ask a question: Given that string of failures, are you surprised at all that more mistakes were not made, that we were somewhat fortunate?

MR. HAMRE: If I may, Mr. Roemer, I think -- we check very hard, and in this instance it was -- and I'm very saddened by it because we could have avoided this had we known now, known back then what we know now. But, by and large, I mean, I think we did a very good job. I mean, to my knowledge, we had a couple others -- as I said, we hit a hospital. We didn't want to do that. That was a case of the pilot got confused and he was off by about a mile in what he thought was his coordinates. We had an instance, you will recall, where we hit that train. And that was an instance where we wanted to destroy the bridge, and we had no idea that train was going to race right into the way of the bomb.

But, by and large, it's because we check and recheck and check again. Here the failing was that the guys that are in the targeting business didn't know the method that was used to physically locate it on the ground. They kept asking all the right questions, but not that one question. I wish we had known that. We will not let that happen again.

REP. ROEMER: Dr. Hamre, do you think that if a higher priority had been assigned to Yugoslavia earlier, that this is part of the way to address this? And I know Director Tenet, who I have the highest

respect for and a personal friendship with, has said that the highest priority was put on Yugoslavia.

And without getting into that here, I would like to follow up with the director in closed session, because we do have some conflicting data in our investigation with the main organizational agency responsible for collection of this kind of data base who has reported that that high priority was not, in fact, put on Yugoslavia and it was a low priority until a few months before the bombing began. And I think we just need to see if we make this kind of priority with the warning signs that we had internally in Yugoslavia a higher priority more quickly, then maybe that would help prevent this kind of mistake or failure in the future.

MR. HAMRE: Sir, I'll let Director Tenet speak to the way in which the priority process works and what was done for the Balkans. In July of last year, our highest priority was frankly in the Balkans itself because we were trying to implement some of the domestic conversion. In the fall, our highest priority --

REP. ROEMER: Dr. Hamre, whose highest priority?

MR. HAMRE: DOD. I'm speaking for DOD in this case.

REP. ROEMER: Okay.

MR. HAMRE: And then our highest priority all of a sudden became Osama bin Laden and his terror organization. In December, our highest priority was being able to carry on the strikes, you know, to try to get the U.N. back, UNSCOM back into Baghdad. And our priority shifts all the time because of the operation we have to have. George's challenge is every time we turn to him, we need help. And the question is, how does he allocate those resources. I don't think that was that we were accorded a low priority, and I don't think that's what happened here. But I'll let Director Tenet speak to --

MR. TENET: I think one of the things -- and I would like to talk about this -- I think one of the things we need to take a look at is, as I have said fairly categorically, in terms of national requirements for political and military issues, Yugoslavia and the Balkans had an enormously high priority. Question: Did the data base production have an equally high priority in the context of that very high priority we accorded it? And that's what we need to go take a look at it.

And when we raise things to that level, the question is, what management attention was devoted to ensuring that the data bases were accorded the same level of priority? Now, that may be an important distinction in what we've just talked about, but I think it's worthy of our discussion and very worthy of the kind of fix we need to put in place when we raise these priorities to ensure that the whole continuum is matched up in terms of its priority.

REP. ROEMER: I think that there might be some confusion in distinguishing there between the data base and the higher and lower priorities there, and that might be part of the problem as well, too. Finally, let me ask, while nobody suspected that this was ever going to be the Chinese embassy, the bombing took place on May 7th. At what point, Director Tenet, was there any kind of internal discussion within CIA that it might not be the original target, that there might be some confusion or discussion or debate upon whether or not this was, in fact, the FDSP original target?

MR. TENET: Well, Mr. Roemer, I think you know from our inspector general report -- and I don't have the time frame in mind -- but before the strike, there was a fair amount of give-and-take as to the accuracy of the location of the FDSP headquarters. And so there was some back-and-forth. And remember, in some initial conversations that was reflected.

So that -- but remember, the individual involved, and in particular the individual who was contacting the military official overseas, had those concerns. But he remained outside of this targeting process, which became part of the problem at the end game. And his translation of his concerns up the chain of command also never occurred.

So we've got apples and oranges in terms of did these concerns manifest themselves inside the process where the designation occurred? Answer, no. Do we have an individual who, outside of the process, had a different view of the location of this target? And then the translations of these conversations, as we've talked about, are very imprecise, and I think created a lot of ambiguity. And the final punchline is, of course, no one came upstairs to say, "What does this concern manifest itself into in terms of can you turn this off?" So I think --

REP. ROEMER: I don't disagree with anything that you just said, Director Tenet. My question was, at what point -- was it a week before May 7th that there was this back-and-forth?

MR. HAMRE: Sir, I think it was on the 4th of May. I think it was three days before. I don't think that there was a wide-ranging debate going on in the agency. I think this was an exchange of conversation between an analyst and a mid-grade officer in one of our headquarters, and it was really about -- the first conversation was about the label that was on the target folder, not about whether this was a legitimate target. There's no evidence at all anybody even thought it was the Chinese embassy. So it was a very mechanical exchange on the 4th of May. And then, as we said, he then called on the 7th of May, the very day --

REP. ROEMER: Of the strike.

MR. HAMRE: -- of the strike; talked with somebody else. And at that stage, again, he indicated he didn't think we had the best target. But the conversation on the receiving end was not that it was an inappropriate target or that we should stop anything. So neither of them, either on the military side, hearing the call, or the analyst side, where he placed the call, neither of them went up the chain to try to turn off the strike, because they didn't think they needed to.

MR. TENET: And you'll recall, Mr. Roemer, that on the 4th of May, when he made the call, he had no idea that this building was on the strike list. He did not know that. So that's also another issue.

REP. ROEMER: So the discussion within CIA was never whether it was an appropriate target. I completely agree with that. It was whether it was the original target, the FDSP facility that they first targeted as a warehouse. Correct?

MR. TENET: Headquarters.

REP. ROEMER: Right. Thank you.

REP. GIBBONS: Thank you, Mr. Roemer. Mr. Hastings.

REP. ALCEE HASTINGS (D-FL): Thank you very much, Mr. Gibbons. And I'd like to add my thanks to the chairman and ranking member, Mr. Dixon, for allowing that we have this experience, and also associate myself with the remarks of Mr. LaHood and Mr. Sisisky with reference to the fact that we are bringing sunlight to an extremely painful process, both for the functionaries and policymakers in this particular matter.

Critical to all of this is the fact that appropriate apologies have been afforded. And I, for one, have said that I think that we as policymakers need to add our remarks in that regard. And I don't hesitate to say that I feel that the Chinese government needs to know that there are those of us that are policymakers that feel remorse for the families and for their losses, and at the same time are mindful of their responsibilities in mutually allowing that we come to some understandings with reference to this matter.

I think it's more than commendable that you gentlemen, who I've heard in closed hearings and now in public hearing, have been as forthcoming as you have been. And the public needs to know that basically the remarks that you have made here and the offering of Ambassador Pickering parallel pretty much all of the information that is out there that's accessible to those of us as policymakers exercising our oversight responsibility.

Segueing off of Ambassador Pickering's visit to China, that took place June 17th. And in the body of his report and assessment at that time, he said the following: "We are continuing our internal reviews of the causes of accidents. And when these reviews are completed, we will determine whether any disciplinary action is called for."

To either of your knowledge, Dr. Hamre or Director Tenet, do you know if there is a timetable for further reporting to the Chinese government? And I don't hold that either of you have that as your portfolio or responsibility. But to your knowledge, is there any such time frame set?

MR. TENET: Not to my knowledge, sir.

REP. HASTINGS: And let the word go forth that as we gather information -- and I would, through you and this public hearing, offer to the executive branch that they should be busy about their business as you all collect information. Now, your direct responsibilities, as I understand them, Dr. Hamre -- my belief is that Secretary Cohen has asked you to co-chair the after-action review with the deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Has that process started? And, if so, when do you expect that it should be completed?

MR. HAMRE: Mr. Hastings, it has started. We have fairly extensive panels that are underway right now. There are lots of dimensions to the after-action review. Part of it is targeting and part of it is collateral damage. But that's only one section of it. We will get a briefing to the secretary, I think around the first of

September. But that will not be the end of the process. We also need to extend the after-action review, carry it into the way we build our budget. We'll be submitting a budget to you in January, and we want it to incorporate as many of the lessons as possible.

And then we'll also have a much longer-term focus, because the next quadrennial defense review will begin in a year and a half. We need to make sure that we've learned things and we bring them into that process as well. And that's all the big questions that many people have been asking. Can we do two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies? Is our force structure properly structured? Do we have enough reconnaissance assets, intelligence assets? Those are all very large questions we'll have to undertake for that review.

I say to give you this report. We will have an initial report to the secretary this fall. The ongoing after-action review process is going to take at least a year and a half. And we will be glad to come up at any time to give you a report on what we've learned.

REP. HASTINGS: All right. Director Tenet, we were told last month that you had appointed an accountability board. And my question to you is, when will that board report to you? And is there in their portfolio the ability to recommend disciplinary action?

MR. TENET: I've not imposed a time frame on -- they have met. As you know, we had an inspector general put together a comprehensive assessment of what happened inside CIA. That is the factual basis upon which the board will proceed. It's chaired by the executive director of CIA. They've had a number of working sessions. I'm going to let them work through this in a timely manner.

They will make recommendations to me as to whether or not there should be disciplinary action, and I will undertake to make a determination as to whether they've made sound recommendations or not. I don't prejudice their work at this moment. I have no preconceived notions about what should or should not happen. But it will come to me in a matter of due time.

REP. HASTINGS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'd just like to state the obvious. This is a work in progress, and there's more information to come. Thank you.

REP. GOSS: Thank you, Mr. Hastings. Governor Castle.

REP. MICHAEL CASTLE (R-DE): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

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And I apologize; I had to leave for a while, and I hope I don't duplicate too much in the questions, because I do have a lot of interest in this subject in a variety of ways.

I know, Mr. Tenet -- I heard your whole statement, but I know in your statement you mentioned that there was an individual who apparently thought he had some knowledge within the system but not directly in the line of chain of command, who thought that he had some knowledge that perhaps the building that was identified was -- I don't think he thought it was the Chinese embassy, but it was not the building that was being targeted. And he apparently made some effort to communicate that, and for whatever reason that did not succeed.

I'm not interested in developing a case against that person or even all the details of that. But I am interested in -- maybe both of you can answer this -- but I am interested in, as you set up a system -- because you both have critiqued the system to some degree -- as to whether or not you're allowing for some methodology for somebody who might have some coincidental knowledge in being able to input.

And I'm not suggesting anybody should be able to stop a bombing strike or anything of that nature, but this was a person who apparently, you know, had some knowledge, and in this case obviously probably should have been listened to. In the future, if we do all this, is there some way that we can address that?

MR. TENET: I think that internally, as I established my --

REP. CASTLE: And I mean internally. I don't mean you put it on the Internet or something like that.

MR. TENET: No, no. I think internally, as I put together a series of procedures and thorough understandings about if you're in the target nomination business, where does the focus of accountability lie, who is in charge, what actions are being taken, who do you go speak to, how do you input the process, and make that clear to everybody in the building, I think that we can minimize this. I think people who have knowledge should be able to come forward. I also think the process itself should be agile enough to know where those pockets of knowledge are and draw it in. So I think there are obviously things we can do to do a lot better than we did this time.

REP. CASTLE: Dr. Hamre.

MR. HAMRE: Mr. Castle, we have very explicit procedures where

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individuals can stop a strike. And we had a number of those during the air operation where an anomalous data came forward at the end. It caused a senior officer to say, "We'd better hold off on this." It may be evidence that it may conflict with one of the guidelines that's used to develop a no-strike list or something.

So we have a number of instances where we do pre-position the authority down the line to stop something. We don't give anybody authority down the line to start something, but we do give them the authority down the line to stop something if it looks like it's in conflict with guidance that everybody understands should guide the military activity. In this case, they had the authority at the headquarters to stop it if the evidence was there that we had something that was genuinely amiss. Nobody felt that that was being presented to them, and so we didn't stop it.

REP. CASTLE: Well, thank you for that. I'm going to sort of change the questioning for a moment. I do not like warfare any more than you all do, and you've expressed that; at least Dr. Hamre expressed it in his statement. But at times it's necessary. And when there's ethnic cleansing and other things going on, I understand that. And I think I was as supportive as anybody in Congress of what we had to do, not what we wanted to do. I'm also aware that when you have warfare, you're going to have collateral damage. I mean, it is going to happen. And quite frankly, it sort of keeps everybody on their toes.

I think this all really started in the Persian Gulf War, and now it's to the point where, if there's any collateral damage at all, people scream that "How can you do this?" or whatever. I mean, you're in harm's way sometimes when you're in the area where unfortunately a form of warfare is taking place. I'm not excusing in any way what happened in the Chinese embassy. I wish it had never happened, and we should apologize forever to those people and their families and whatever it may be. But I understand that that is something that you're never going to get rid of entirely. It's never going to be a perfected system.

And you've said this, Mr. Tenet, but I just want to make absolutely sure. You both are totally confident; you've checked in every way possible that there is no conspiracy, no disgruntled people, no element, no suspicion whatsoever that anything other than a plain, basic mistake was made here with respect to the bombing of this embassy? Can you confirm that for me?

MR. TENET: Absolutely.

MR. HAMRE: Absolutely, sir.

REP. CASTLE: Okay. Mr. Tenet, again, in your discussion -- and I've heard you discuss this more than once now; several times, as a matter of fact, and read about what you've said also -- it is clear that the CIA has sort of taken on a different role than it has before. I think you said in your statement -- I wrote it down -- CIA does not normally determine sites. Usually you provide sort of more general information, if you will.

And so I assume that you're in a little bit of -- while you're not breaking totally new ground, you're sort of, in a sense, taking on procedures that were a little more specific in terms of recommendations of these things than you have before. First of all, I assume that's correct. If it's not, then straighten me out on that.

But if it is correct, do you feel comfortable now that you have refined these procedures so that if we were to have another event such as this, that you would be more comfortable in the management aspects of those decisions, and if Dr. Hamre is comfortable with what you all are doing with respect to that, too?

MR. TENET: I think -- I am much more comfortable today. I think John and I will be much more comfortable as we refine this process. And I think the guidance that we're laying down internally in terms of how, if we're in the target nomination business -- and I believe we will stay in the business to support the military -- how it's going to work, the precision with which we expect the management oversight that must be there, the confidence with which we assess the package that we're sending forward to the military, because when it comes down to the Central Intelligence Agency, you and the American people should assume that it doesn't just take on the mantle of fact; that it is fact. And I have to ensure that when it goes forward that it is factual and the best possible work has been provided, and I have a high confidence that we'll get that done.

MR. HAMRE: I'm confident we won't make this mistake again.

But I also have every reason to believe we will probably make other mistakes. We will absolutely do our best it will never happen -- and this one won't happen again, because we know where it happened, we know -- we have already taken steps to make sure that the forces, the underlying factors are corrected and checked here.

But, sir, war is about violence, it's about destruction, and unfortunately it's also about accidents, and I can't tell you that we won't have them again.

REP. CASTLE: No, I understand that. And I thank you gentlemen. I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.

REP. GOSS: I understand that Mr. Roemer had a brief follow-up question, which we would be very happy to permit because of the time situation. And, Mr. Dixon I understand had possibly a follow-up remark, and I have a closing remark. And we promised we would try to have this concluded as close to noon as possible, and I think we are going to be close. Mr. Roemer?

REP. ROEMER: Director Tenet, you said in your testimony on page 8 -- which again I completely concur with and agree with -- at the bottom, individuals in both the CIA and the DOD who knew the correct location of the Chinese Embassy should have been consulted. How do we bring our personnel who may have known about the more updated locations of Belgrade facilities at that point, and they are obviously kicked out, or we bring them out of our embassy when we go to war -- how do we then bring them into the process institutionally to bring in their eminent knowledge of the latest details and relocations of these facilities, so that they can contribute in a fundamentally important way to a no-strike list so that these kind of things don't happen again? How have you improved your processes to do that?

MR. TENET: I think it's actually fairly simple, that it is absolutely a statement of policy that the chief of station, the defense attache and all those with knowledge of a particular urban environment that you are about to strike have to put their eyes on this targeting package, and must -- must -- sign off on what a satellite picture says a site is or isn't -- fairly straightforward. And we have to then state that confidence to the targeting process to say this is how we came to this conclusion, and here is our level of confidence based on what we know and based on eyes on the ground validating this target. There is nothing confusing about that.

REP. ROEMER: So in the future, as we all agree, that the CIA should be involved in packaging these targets, and we will bring those people in early in the process --

MR. HAMRE: Could I say -- oh, absolutely. And we have to have

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the CIA and the other partners in the national security establishment to have to help us. That's no question. But -- and I don't -- and I don't mean to condition anything that Director Tenet just said, but when we get into a war -- when we were doing the Operation Desert Storm we were processing 2,000 strikes a night. Now, it's going to be a lot harder in a big war to be able to have eyes on absolutely every target. So I just have to say we are going to have to draw some parameters around what we will do.

REP. ROEMER: Certainly you would agree that it should be -- the participation should include the no-strike list?

MR. HAMRE: Absolutely --

REP. ROEMER: Maybe not eyes on every single target is put together, but initially compiling a no-strike list?

MR. HAMRE: Absolutely, sir.

MR. TENET: Yes, sir.

REP. ROEMER: Finally, Mr. Chairman, you and our ranking member I believe sent a letter of deep concern that I believe the entire committee concurred with about leaks that have been taking place where we were reading about this story and other stories for weeks in the press. And this is our first public hearing on this particularly sensitive topic. And I just want to say to Director Tenet that we want to do all we can to work with you and to encourage you to help us address these leaks that take place, whether it be on this story or other stories that may hurt the public safety and the national security.

MR. TENET: Well, Mr. Roemer, I just want to tell you, and I am sure I speak for Dr. Hamre here, and everybody who works in the intelligence business and the defense business, that the nature of the leaking that is going on in this town is unprecedented. It is compromising sources and methods. It is jeopardizing American security. And there are people in our government who think they have some free pass to do this for their own pleasure.

I want to catch somebody more than anybody else in this government, because what it does to the men and women of our intelligence community and how it abuses the security of Americans. And sooner or later we will catch somebody, and we will fire them or

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prosecute them. But what they are doing is devastating to the security of this country. It's shameful, and we are doing everything we can to catch them. And your -- the devotion that this community has to maintaining security practices, to ensuring the confidentiality of our discussions, has been very, very high.

I would say to all of my colleagues in the executive branch that 95 percent of what leaks comes out of the executive branch of government, because people believe they have some free right to disseminate this information, and we have to get our house in order and get -- and we are all working hard -- the secretary of State, the secretary of Defense, the chairman and I -- with the attorney general, recognize that this is a very difficult problem that we have to solve.

REP. ROEMER: Dr. Tenet, I just want to conclude by saying thank you again for the great job you are doing at the CIA. And again, going back to my initial remarks, my opening remarks, thank you for practicing Harry Truman's "the buck stops here," in you saying the responsibility is with you, with us as the oversight committee, and trying to prevent processes and an institutional way of not repeating this mistake in the future. Thank you again.

REP. GOSS: Thank you very much. I want to thank the staff and the members of this committee for helping us prepare what is somewhat unusual for this committee, which is a public hearing.

I conclude that this has been useful, after listening. Obviously members were given the prepared statements of Dr. Hamre and Director Tenet before and had a chance to review them because of security aspects. And I believe there has been an extraordinary amount of cooperation and candor, and I am grateful for that. I think it does speak to the trust that exists.

I am well aware that this committee has responsibilities of oversight in the intelligence community, and I think the American people need to be reassured on that point. This is a bipartisan committee, as everybody can see. Mr. Dixon and I have an extremely close working relationship. We do our very best to treat national security for what it is: a very important part of our responsibility here in Washington for the well-being of all Americans. And we are very grateful for the work that Americans in the intelligence community do, as well of course as the armed service piece of that to be sure.

And it is also true that we have an advocacy role for

intelligence -- because of the nature of intelligence we don't talk about all of the aspects of it. I hope people are reassured that we are able to make the distinction between advocacy and oversight on this oversight committee. Indeed I think we do a fair job of that.

The last conclusion I would make, in addition to expressing my gratitude for your time -- I know the extensive amount of preparation and the work that is ongoing to get to the bottom of what actually happened to make sure we don't have this problem again. My conclusion is that there is a dilemma, and it is a legitimate dilemma. We are in fact the world's dominant power. I think the director has said that the idea that anywhere, anything, anytime is beyond our means is the world's dominant power. We just can't do all that. We have a problem of understanding what it is we can't do as well as what it is we can do.

And I think that the question of the connection between the policymakers on our national security side and the people who have to execute needs to be reexamined in some depth. This is not a new statement for me; I've said that many ways before. I think it is extremely important that that happen. I am well aware that the intelligence community had provided our national security policymakers good information about what was going on in the Balkans, about the possibility of ethnic cleansing getting out of control. I also know that the intelligence community was providing additional information about other very egregious sore spots -- troubles that were going on in the world simultaneously. I could mention terrorist opportunities and activities; I could mention proliferation of nuclear weapons and dissemination capabilities, or chemical or biological warfare; I could mention the regrettable problem in the trend of drug use, particularly heroin in this country. These transnational (types ?) as well as the rogue state problems. These affect the quality of life and the security of Americans home and abroad. All of these things warrant attention by our national security policymakers.

The dilemma that we have today is what triggers action: Which will get the priority today, and do we have the capability to do the maximum possible good for the American national security interests when that trigger is pulled, because we are so in fact engaged on every subject? That is an area that deserves further attention, and I think we have heard testimony today that if we can't do it all then we darn well better decide what it is we can't do and what we can do, and get the processes in place to accomplish that. I want to thank you for helping us achieve what I think is a step forward on that, and I would welcome your comment on that.

MR. HAMRE: Thank you for that. I had a very different comment I wanted to make, which was the last time I appeared before this committee it was on the matter of encryption. As I said at that time, we had 1.4 million men and women in our armed forces that are around the globe protecting this country every day. The director has agents all around that are protecting this country everyday. There are policemen and firemen, everybody else trying to protect this country. And when it got tough and when the shooting was heavy, and when somebody had to step into the breach, this committee stepped into the breach, and I want to thank you.

REP. GOSS: Thank you. And I am glad you were able to find a segue into encryption. (Laughter.) We will be talking more about that. I thank you all. The committee hearing is adjourned. (Sounds gavel.)

END

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