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National Identity Among the Soviet Uzbeks

A Research Paper

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National Foreign Assessment Center

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A Research Paper

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The author of this paper is [redacted] Office of Political Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to the Chief, [redacted]

It has been coordinated with the Offices of Economic Research, Geographic and Cartographic Research, and Central Reference, the Directorate of Operations, and the National Intelligence Officer for the USSR-Eastern Europe. [redacted]

National Identity Among the Soviet Uzbeks

Overview

The 12.4 million Uzbeks of the Soviet Union are by far the most numerous of the non-Russian nationalities of Central Asia. Their identity is founded in common racial, historical, linguistic, and religious characteristics, as well as a common core of customs and values. In the recent past, they identified themselves by place of residence, clan affiliation, or simply as "Muslim," but now they refer to themselves as a nation. The Uzbeks' ethnic self-assertiveness and national consciousness is in part the outcome of Soviet policies aimed at establishing separate nationalities among the Central Asian population and in part reflects a historical process of ethnic consolidation.

These Soviet policies that have emphasized ethnic national identity are having some unintended consequences. As Uzbek national self-assertion emerges, so do tendencies toward Russian-Uzbek friction, rivalry, and animosity. There is no widespread political protest or dissent among the Uzbek people, however, and the Soviet regime remains firmly in control. In general, Uzbeks express a quiet optimism and confidence that is bolstered by a burgeoning Uzbek population and an emerging native elite. This elite has taken the lead in many of the religious, cultural, and technical developments occurring among the non-Russian nationalities of Soviet Central Asia.

Over a million Uzbeks in Afghanistan share many social and spiritual values with the Uzbeks of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, important cultural and economic differences between Soviet and Afghan Uzbeks have emerged since the beginning of the Soviet regime. We know little about the current status and nature of ties between the two groups. On the surface, Soviet Uzbeks are relatively indifferent to the Islamic revolution in Iran and to the Muslim resistance in Soviet occupied Afghanistan. We cannot, however, predict how the Uzbeks may eventually respond to these events.

Note: This paper is part of a larger study on the Soviet Muslim minorities. It has been issued separately because of the interest generated by recent developments in the Muslim border areas of the USSR. Component papers on the other Muslim minorities of Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus are forthcoming, to be followed by a paper addressing the broader implications of Muslim minorities in the Soviet Union.

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Uzbek People in the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and China



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Geography

The Uzbek SSR, home to over 10 million Uzbeks, is a land of vast deserts and fertile oases. It has an area of 447,440 square kilometers, about the size of Sweden. Two of the region's major rivers, the Amu Darya in the southwest and the Syr Darya in the northwest, form natural boundaries. Afghanistan lies on the southern border of the republic. The Uzbek SSR has an unusually diversified economy. It ranks third among the world's cotton producers, has extensive reserves of natural gas, and has one of the world's largest gold mines. Most Uzbeks, however, work as cotton growers.

National Identity Among the Soviet Uzbeks

Emergence of National Identity

Shared physical appearance, history, language, and religion and a common core of custom and values contribute to contemporary Uzbek identity. These elements underlie the Uzbek perception of themselves ("us") delineated from others ("them"), the latter, for example, including Russians, Ukrainians, and fellow Muslims as well. Contemporary Uzbek identity, however, is not just a homogenous amalgam of national characteristics. An Uzbek of former years would have identified himself in terms of his place of residence or clan affiliation. He may also have called himself simply "Muslim," using that single word to describe an aggregate of cultural, psychological, and social traditions, attitudes, and customs. While some Uzbeks may still emphasize particular clan or linguistic affiliations and a few others may perceive themselves in terms of a broader Islamic community, most Uzbeks today probably identify themselves exclusively as Uzbeks.[1]

The Soviet regime's encouragement of the rise of an Uzbek nationality has meant the emergence of an Uzbek national consciousness, national self-assertion, and expression of national pride. Uzbek national identity is nourished by the fact that Uzbeks are by far the most numerous and most developed group among Soviet Central Asians. Furthermore, almost all the important cultural and historical cities of Central Asia—such as Bukhara, Khiva, Kokand, Samarkand, and Tashkent—are situated in the Uzbek SSR, or Uzbekistan. Uzbeks claim as their own the heritage of Central Asia's leaders, scholars, poets, and writers, such as Ibn Sina, Ulugbek, Timur, and Ali Shir Navai. The Uzbeks are a significant force in the Central Asian intelligentsia, and the most important universities and educational institutions—secular and Islamic—are in the republic. Increasingly, the Uzbeks view themselves as responsible for the cultural development of Uzbekistan. Condescending at times even to Russians, the Uzbeks often assume the role of "elder brother" to other Central Asian groups.

[1] Each of two subgroups, the Khorasanis in the western part of Uzbekistan and the Ferganis in the east, views itself as the "purer" Uzbek. Each group has its own dialect, history (they were ruled by different khans), and measure of social cohesiveness.

The young and old of Uzbekistan

Uzbek national consciousness is furthered by their rising levels of education, attainment and technological proficiency.[2] Uzbeks now contribute substantially to the leadership cadres of Central Asia. For example, Uzbek engineers and instructors are found in numerous enclaves throughout the area, often with their own Uzbek schools and newspapers.[3] Within the Uzbek republic, other nationalities (for example, Crimean Tatars, Kipchaks, and even some Tadzhiks) sometimes attempt to "pass" as Uzbeks by speaking Uzbek in order to gain the preference Uzbeks enjoy for jobs and educational placement.[4]

[2] According to Soviet sources, the total number of "scientific workers" in the Uzbek SSR grew from 10,000 to over 25,000 between 1960 and 1970. Among this group, Uzbeks increased from an initial 3,552 to over 11,000 (while the number of Russians rose from 3,971 to 7,692). Soviet sources indicate that the number of "specialists" in Uzbekistan with secondary and higher special education grew 2.5 times in agriculture and 2.2. times in industry between 1965 and 1975.

[3] See table 4 in appendix for a list of Uzbek newspapers published outside the Uzbek SSR.

[4] See table 3 in appendix for non-Uzbek nationalities claiming Uzbek as first language.

The recently constructed "under dome market" in Bukhara reflects Uzbek traditional architecture

Elements of Identity

Contemporary Uzbek identity and self-assertion are the products of both internal ethnic developments and policies of the Soviet regime. Although Soviet policies on nationalities sought to emphasize and utilize salient Uzbek characteristics, some policies unintentionally increased ethnic friction and animosity toward Russians.

Racial and Physical Unity. Uzbeks tend to share similar physical characteristics, suggesting some racial delineation from other Central Asian people. Stress upon unique "national" dress further separates Uzbeks from other groups.

The distinctive physical appearance of the Uzbeks does not alone serve to legitimize Uzbek claims to ethnic identity, but it has come to be recognized as one of the component elements of this identity. Uzbeks are less Mongoloid in appearance than the neighboring Kazakh and Kirgiz people, although they are similar to the minority Tadzhiks of the plains. They are typically round-headed, of medium stature with dark eyes and hair. In general, they show an even mixture of Mongol and Caucasian elements. Those Uzbeks whose recent ancestors were still seminomadic show more Mongoloid characteristics than those whose ancestors have long been settled and have intermarried to some extent with Caucasians.

Educated Uzbeks and those who work or live in cities tend to wear Western-style clothing. In contrast, the rural population frequently wears the traditional Uzbek dress. For men, it is a robe striped with bright colors, tied with a kerchief at the waist; for women, it includes bright silk dresses with a shawl over the head. The traditional black and white patterned skullcap, the *duppi*, is still worn by many Uzbek men even in urban areas.

Historical Heritage. Uzbeks claim as part of their history such figures as Tamerlane (a corruption of the name Timur the Lame), the self-proclaimed descendant of Ghenghis Khan, who unified Central Asia under his iron rule in the 14th century, and Timur's grandson Ulugbek, who presided over many creative and scientific achievements during the 15th century. Both men are honored as national heroes today. The Uzbeks, however, had no ethnic cohesion until early in the 16th century when Mohammed Sheibani Khan united people of Iranian, Turkic, and Mongol origin. These Sheibani Uzbek tribes are viewed by some as the

last invaders of Central Asia before the Russian conquest in the late 1800s.[3] (

More recent Uzbek history includes anti-Russian activity, but references to this are rarely made, in order to avoid inflaming Soviet sensitivity. Uzbeks, for example, were predominant among the Central Asian component of the late 19th century Muslim reformist movement called *dzhadidism* (from the Arabic word, in Russian transliteration, *dzhadid*, meaning new) which sought to modernize education and revitalize Islam. The dzhadids, however, also took part in considerable anti-Russian political activity. After the Russian revolution, Uzbeks participated in a clearly anti-Russian movement whose participants were called *Basmachi* (meaning raider or marauder). The amorphous movement erupted in the Fergana region in reaction to the harsh local repercussions of the 1917 Russian revolution—dislocations of the cotton economy, famine, and a direct attack on the Muslim religion by the Tashkent Soviets—and developed into a religiously influenced, protonationalist revolt that was not quelled until the 1930s.

The Uzbeks take pride in recalling that they were pastoral nomads in their early history.[4] From the 16th century, nomadic Uzbeks were gradually drawn to settle in oases, taking up agriculture and later engaging in craft manufacturing and in trade. Once settled, most Uzbeks became subject to the culture of the oasis and to Persian ideas and influence, mainly Islam. Unlike the Persians, however, Uzbeks spoke a Turkic language that they retained along with the memory of their earlier nomadic life. That early, essentially nomadic tribal structure survives today among some Uzbeks in the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) system and in the generalized practice of *mesnichestvo* (localism). Often denounced in the Soviet press, *mesnichestvo* consists of favoring kinsmen in the selection of Uzbek government, managerial, and even Communist Party cadres. Clans function today in such activities as housebuilding and ceremonials, and clan leaders may still be found heading *kolkhozes* and local *soviets* (councils). (

Language. Despite intense russification, Uzbeks are still strongly attached to their language, which belongs to the Turkic family of Altaic languages.[5] Nearly all Uzbeks (over 98 percent, according to the 1979 census) claim Uzbek as their mother tongue. Many urban and educated Uzbeks are bilingual, with knowledge of Uzbek and Russian. The latest census data show a dramatic increase in the number of Uzbeks listing Russian as their second language (from 1.3 million or 14.5 percent in 1970 to 6.2 million or 49.3 percent in 1979). This is true mostly among the young Uzbeks who have studied Russian in schools and in the military and especially among those who live in urban areas. Russian is required in academic study from an early age and is increasingly a language learned by an Uzbek, mostly male, professional work force. Many rural Uzbeks, however, still have only minimal proficiency in Russian. (

Uzbeks are often outnumbered by Russians in the major cities, which Russian and Soviet governments have used as controlling outposts. The city of Tashkent, for example, was less than half Uzbek in 1970.[6] Because there have been more Russians than Uzbeks in Tashkent, bookstores in that city contain predominantly Russian-language books, and the majority of the city's cinemas show mostly Russian-language films. In addition, for many children and young adults of the Uzbek middle and upper classes of Tashkent, the Russian language is viewed as necessary for career advancement and for access to scientific and technical knowledge. The Uzbeks are gaining ground among the urban population in the republic, however, and the Uzbek language may well displace Russian in many aspects of city life.

[3] Afghan Uzbeks are a branch of the nomadic Uzbek tribes who have been in Afghanistan since the 16th century. In Afghan history, however, the role of the Uzbeks is frequently ignored, misrepresented or presented negatively. (

[4] The nomadic herdsmen of Central Asia had more prestige than settled farmers.

[5] Following several orthographical and lexical experiments, the Uzbek literary language has been based since 1937 on an Iranicized Tashkent dialect. The literary language is only a distant relative of Old Uzbek, Chagatay, a Turkic language in common use throughout Central Asia during the 15th through 19th centuries. Uzbek first employed an Arabic, then a Latin, alphabet. The Cyrillic script was introduced in 1940-41, but the basis of the literary language remained unchanged. Spoken Uzbek has two main groups of dialects: Central and Northern. (

[6] See table 2 in appendix for Tashkent demographic data.



The Registan Mosque

Uzbek women are generally oriented to child rearing and home life, and are thus less likely to have either the ability or inclination to speak Russian at home. In most Uzbek homes, Uzbek is the language of everyday use.

The majority of the newspapers in the republic are in Uzbek, and there are Uzbek-language textbooks in such fields as higher mathematics and nuclear physics. Advanced education through the university level is available in the Uzbek language. The recent publication of an Uzbek encyclopedia, written by Uzbeks with emphasis on native topics, is viewed as a major achievement by those Uzbeks seeking to preserve their linguistic integrity.*

* Soviet policy regarding the Uzbek language has differed markedly from the policy followed by the government of Afghanistan, which has not recognized minority languages. The dominant Iranian-speaking Pashtuns feel that the country is mainly theirs. No publication or broadcasting in languages other than Dari or Pashtu occurred until recently. In 1972 Afghan radio, after a long parliamentary debate, introduced a radio program in Uzbek. In 1974, without explanation, the programs were abolished by the Daoud regime.

Religion. The vast majority of Uzbek Muslims are Sunnis of the Hanafi school. There are only small colonies of Shia Muslims in the cities of Samarkand, Bukhara, and Tashkent. Official Islamic institutions are better represented among the Uzbeks than among any other Soviet Central Asian people. In Uzbekistan there are some 150 functioning "Friday" Mosques (*masjid jaame*), probably at least one in every town except in the south (where former nomads are less Islamicized).[10] The only two *medressehs* (higher religious schools) in the Soviet Union are in Uzbekistan: Mir-i Arab of Bukhara and Imam Ismail al-Bukhari of Tashkent. The periodical *Muslims of the Soviet East*, published in Tashkent, may well be considered propaganda, but it does deal with religious subjects and is the only Muslim periodical in the USSR to do so. The Mufti of Tashkent, Ziyautdin Khan bin Ishan Babakhan, acts as the official leader of Soviet Islam. The Muslim Spiritual Board of Tashkent, part of the

[10] There are at least 12 Friday mosques in Tashkent and, according to the official press, 100 small mosques. The Soviet press reports 10 small mosques in Samarkand. Andizhan has two mosques, as does Namangan. (Before 1917 there were 330 mosques in Namangan.)

"public face" of Islam in the USSR, is responsible for numerous religious shrines throughout Uzbekistan.

The Islamic religion is practiced openly throughout Uzbekistan. According to a number of observers, attendance at Friday services is respectable with even some young people participating, despite the propaganda and the modernizing trends that tend to discourage such observance. Muslim traditions regarding circumcision, marriage (such as early marriage of young girls), payment of the *Kalym* (bride money, now often in the form of a present to the bride's father), and burial at a Muslim cemetery are all extensively observed by Uzbeks. Not all religious regulations are followed by the faithful; many urban Uzbeks may drink alcoholic beverages and some Uzbeks may eat pork. Many Uzbeks, however, do observe the dietary regulations, for example, eating meat only if it has been slaughtered according to Islamic rules.

Another side of Islamic practice—rooted in religious currents of centuries past—is the legacy of the ascetic-mystical and secretive movement in Islam—Sufism—which grew out of loose and voluntary associations into an organized popular movement of brotherhoods (*tariqat* or orders). Some observers see a basis for organized resistance to Soviet rule in the Sufi Orders." While these secret orders still exist, their influence among the Uzbeks seems insufficiently strong to serve as a basis for any real oppositional movement.

Values. Traditionally, Uzbek life has been oriented to the family. Uzbek homes were built behind high walls of sun-dried bricks with no windows facing the streets. Today, the family remains a very important part of the Uzbek value system. For example, in defining the idea of the "good life" most Uzbeks interviewed in a recent Soviet survey responded a "happy family life," followed by "interesting work, including in this concept prestige of occupation rather that high earnings." Soviet investigators have found traditional family relations (multigeneration extended families) to be very strong. These findings have been confirmed by visiting Western scholars.

A revealing episode was described in a May 1979 newspaper article written by an Uzbek regional Communist party official. When a new silk combine was opened and employees were being sought, a delegation of old men from the surrounding rural areas came, apparently to see if the plant was a suitable place for their children and grandchildren to work. When the men were then invited to discuss their concerns with party officials at a nearby *chaikhana* or tea house, their main concern proved to be that their children would become subject to bad influences. Most importantly, they needed reassurance that transportation would be arranged so that their children and grandchildren could continue to live at home.

The *chaikhana* is an important social institution for the Uzbeks. Since ancient times it has filled a role as a kind of club, a place to get together and talk about the affairs of daily life over a cup of tea. Muslim preachers have long used the *chaikhanas* to spread Islam. Soviet officials have also used the *chaikhanas*, assigning agitators to them as well as installing television sets and movie screens to spread propaganda.

Traditional attitudes toward women persist. A recent article in the Soviet press commented that even "professional" Uzbek men consider it shameful to go out visiting with their wives or to go to a movie, theater, or a party with them. In some Uzbek families, the paper lamented, women cannot be present when guests are received, their only role being to prepare food. On the whole, however, Uzbek society is no longer completely male dominated. Women who were formerly secluded and not respected for being active (even in dance the woman was trained to move slowly and deliberately) are now participating in education and the professions.

" The Sufi Orders of Nakshbandiya, Kubraviya, Yasawiya, Kadiriya, and Kalendariya were all active among the Uzbeks. There are many "holy places," that is, shrines and tombs of Sufi saints, throughout the republic. Many holy places were converted to secular museums during Nikita Khrushchev's antireligious campaigns, but many still attract pilgrims. In addition, some surviving Muslim ilds may be controlled by Sufi Orders. This is the case, for instance, of Tashkent taxi drivers, whose patron saint is the Prophet Daud.

Uzbeks get together at a chaikhana (tea house) in Bukhara

The status of women is improving, at least according to official statistics. The Soviets contend that female education has increased, particularly for younger women. The Soviets report the percentage of Uzbek women aged 20 to 29 who in 1970 has completed 10 years or more of education was almost identical to that of Russian women—53.5 percent for Uzbeks and 55.8 percent for Russians. The Uzbek rate surpassed that of the Kirgiz, Tadzhiks, and Turkmen. Preliminary data from the Soviet census of 1979 indicate that 63.9 percent of the population of the Uzbek SSR that is 10 years of age and over had either all or part of a higher and secondary education. According to the 1979 census, the Uzbek ratio is the highest of the five Soviet Central Asian republics.

Some Problems and Prospects

The development of Uzbek identity and ethnic self-assertion understandably has led to ethnic friction, rivalry, and some animosity toward Russians, other Europeans, and even some other Muslim groups.[12]

Cultural Issues. The issue of language, a key element of the Uzbek identity, has produced much animosity between Russians and Uzbeks and is a potential cause of further antagonism. Recent census data show that

[12] The interethnic problems and prospects resulting from the development of "national" identity and ethnic self-assertion can only be highlighted in this series on individual ethnic groups. A detailed discussion appears in the final paper of the series.

Uzbek Population by Republic: 1959 to 1979



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Demography

The 12.4 million Uzbeks are the second largest non-Russian population in the Soviet Union (after the Ukrainians). Most of the Uzbeks reside in Uzbekistan in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. Roughly 15 percent of the total Soviet Uzbek population lives outside Uzbekistan, mostly in Tadzhikistan, to a lesser extent in Kirgizia and in still smaller numbers in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. There are possibly as many as 1.6 million Uzbeks in the northern provinces of Afghanistan and perhaps 15,000 in Xinjiang in China.

The Afghanistan Uzbeks live in the Provinces of Baghlan, Balkh, Fayab, Jowzjan, Qonduz, Samangan, and Takhar. Mazar-e-Sharif, a major urban area in the north, has a majority Uzbek population. Most Afghan Uzbeks live some 48 or more kilometers to the south of the Amu Darya border, rather than along it. They have become Afghanistan's professional and entrepreneurial class, even while the country is dominated by the Pashtuns.

During the 1959-79 intercensal period the Uzbek population grew a striking 51.7 percent, reflecting the high Uzbek fertility rate. Uzbek family size had increased remarkably during the 1959-70 intercensal period. According to 1979 Soviet studies, Uzbek women have the highest average number of children, 6.08, among married women in the Soviet Union. Uzbeks tend to live in rural areas and despite a number of incentives, are reluctant to move to cities. They rarely migrate from Central Asia.

Population of the Uzbek Republic: 1959 to 1979



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Comparison of Uzbek and Russian Growth in the Soviet Union: 1926 to 1979



[1] 1926 figure for Uzbeks includes Uighurs.

[2] 1939 figure estimated for Russians.

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Gross Reproduction Rate in USSR, RSFSR, Uzbek SSR[1]



[1] Defined as the number of females to be born to 100 women during their reproductive lifetimes if a given set of birth rates by age of mother remains in effect.

Birth Rate Dynamics in Uzbek SSR, RSFSR, USSR[1]



[1] Average number of children, born or expected per married couple.

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Uzbeks are willing to learn Russian, but they are evidently unwilling to forsake their native tongue in the process. Russians and other Soviet European nationalities, however, seemingly expect Uzbeks and other Central Asians to speak Russian and sometimes are uncomfortable in a totally Uzbek-speaking environment. The regime seems aware of Uzbek sensitivity regarding language and has urged Russians and other European nationalities in Uzbekistan to learn Uzbek.

For Uzbeks themselves, the emergence of a sophisticated, urban literate class raises another important cultural issue. This group, which dominates Uzbek-held administrative and cultural posts, faces a range of choices on whether to modernize or to preserve traditional values. If they lose touch with the majority of the Uzbeks in the rural and smaller urban areas they risk the severance of their "native" roots. If, on the other hand, they become too insistent in their advocacy of traditional values, they may run afoul of the Soviet regime.

Social Relations. It is rare for an Uzbek woman to marry a non-Muslim, and the rate of intermarriage between Russians and Uzbeks is low. This reflects some distance between Russians and Uzbeks. Parental influence on the choice of a marriage partner remains strong (a recent Soviet survey indicated that 88 percent of urban Uzbeks and 92 percent of rural Uzbeks believed it necessary to have parental consent to marry). Uzbeks take moral pride in the difference between the Uzbek female, who is relatively isolated from social currents, and the Russian female, who has much sexual freedom. Uzbeks generally oppose divorce; they are inclined toward large families and few abortions; and they do not consistently use contraception to limit the number of children.[11]

[11] Growing statistical data on the Uzbek family indicates that it is decreasing in size over the long term, in association with such modernizing trends as female employment, increased education, and urbanization.

Political Issues. Until recently the political culture of the Uzbeks was preponderantly inward looking and parochial. Political issues were defined in grass-roots terms; local institutions were the focal points of native political participation; and the Slav-dominated central policy apparatus in Moscow seemed remote and inaccessible.

Recently, however, more natives have risen to strategic posts in the provincial and republic bureaucracies. Although Uzbeks are still underrepresented in the party, they are joining in increasing numbers and thereby becoming eligible for broader incorporation into the ranks of the republic's ruling elite.

Uzbeks also are extending their interests and ambitions to the USSR as a whole. Members of an increasingly cosmopolitan and self-confident native elite no longer believe that a career in Moscow is beyond their reach, and some show signs of anticipating an authoritative role in federal decisionmaking and policy formation. Such a role is likely to seem not only legitimate, but indispensable, thanks to the growing importance of local and regional issues. These issues include investment, labor policies, and the allocation and distribution of resources which cannot be resolved at the local level.

Rising levels of education and increased foreign contacts are among the factors that are helping to make Uzbeks less insular. Uzbeks are now more aware of foreign affairs, including such events as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The political consequences of such awareness are as yet uncertain.

Thus, the policies of the Soviet regime that have sought to emphasize Uzbek national identity have also given rise to an assertive, sophisticated native leadership. Like other ethnic elites in the Soviet Union, the Uzbek elite probably perceives that its interests are served best by learning to manipulate the system to their own advantage. Should it be frustrated in gaining its ends by working within the system, national protest could result. For the present, however, there is no widespread dissent or political protest among the Uzbek people, and the Soviet regime seems firmly in control.

Appendix

Table 1

Comparative Family and Fertility Data

Average Size of Uzbek Family, 1970 [1] (by Republic)

Uzbek SSR	5.9
Kazakh SSR	6.1
Kirgiz SSR	5.8
Tadzhik SSR	6.0
Turkmen SSR	6.0

Family Size, 1979 (in Percent)

Number of Family Members	USSR	Uzbek SSR
2	29.7	13.4
3	28.9	14.3
4	23.0	16.3
5	18.4 [2]	12.5
6	No data	11.1
7 or more	No data	32.1

Comparison of Marriage Age With Coefficient of Birth Rate, 1970 [3] (by Republic)

	Percentage of Brides Up to 20 Years of Age	Children Born per 1,000 People
Uzbek SSR	34.3	33.6
RSFSR	15.9	14.6

Birth Rate, Death Rate, and Natural Population Growth, (by Republic)

	Births per 1,000 People	Deaths per 1,000 People	Natural Growth
1970			
USSR	17.4	8.2	9.2
Uzbek SSR	33.6	5.5	28.1
RSFSR	14.6	8.7	5.9
1975			
USSR	18.1	9.3	8.8
Uzbek SSR	34.5	7.2	27.3
RSFSR	15.7	9.8	5.9

[1] For single nationality families.
[2] Includes families with five or more members.
[3] These rates are declining over time.

Table 2

Population of Tashkent [1]

Nationality	1959	1970
Uzbeks	307,879	512,962
Russians	400,640	564,584
Tatars	64,242	98,934
Jews	50,445	55,758
Ukrainians	24,562	40,716
Armenians	10,500	13,364
Kazakhs	8,158	15,231
Tadzhiks	4,585	7,999
Belorussians		5,924
Mordves		9,343
Uighurs		5,884
Bashkirs		3,806
Azerbaydzhanis		3,411
Karakalpaks		1,488

[1] The total population of Tashkent was 911,930 in 1959; 1,384,509 in 1970, and 1,785,000 in 1979. The ethnic breakdown of the population for 1979 is unavailable.

Table 3

Minorities of the Uzbek Republic Who Speak Uzbek as Their First Language

Minority	1959	Percent of Total	1970	Percent of Total
Tatars	444,810	2.3	573,733	1.2
Kazakhs	335,267	1.8	476,310	1.5
Tadzhiks	311,375	4.4	448,541	3.2
Kirgiz	92,725	7.2	110,726	8.8
Turkmen	54,804	6.5	71,041	3.9
Azerbaydzhanis	40,511	4.0	38,898	2.5
Uighurs	19,377	37.0	23,942	36.9
Ossetians	8,755	74.2		
Ironis			15,457	79.0
Bashkirs			20,761	2.2

Table 4

Uzbek Language Newspapers Outside the Uzbek Republic (1970)

Kirgiz SSR (426,000 Uzbeks in 1979)	*Lenin Yuli* (Osh)
Kazakh SSR (263,000 Uzbeks in 1979)	*Mehnat Bayroqi* (Chimkent) *Kommunistik Mehnat*
Tadzhik SSR (873,000 Uzbeks in 1979)	*Mash'al* (Buston) *Kommunizm Sari* (Naw) *Proletar Tongi* (Proletarsk) *Lenin Yuli* (Regar) *Baroyi Kommunizm* (Sovetskiy) *Rohi Kommunizm* (Uru-Tube) *Bo rohi Lenini* (Leninabad) *Oktyabr'* (Shayartuz) *Sovet Tadzhikistoni* (Dushanbe) *Mash'ali Kommunizm* (Kanibadam) *Zarafshon* (Panzhikent) *Shuhrati Asht* (Shaydon) *Bayragi Leninizm* (Gissar) *Zardbor* (Zafarabod) *Haqiqat* (Leninskiy) *Haqiqati Kolkhozabod* (Kolkhozabod)
Turkmen SSR (234,000 Uzbeks in 1979)	*Pakhtakor* (Tashauz)