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DIRECTORATE OF
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Intelligence Report

The KGB's Role in Soviet Politics

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

THE KGB'S ROLE IN SOVIET POLITICS

MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS

This study permits a number of judgments to be advanced, for the first time, concerning the KGB's role in Soviet politics.

The study confirms that the maintenance of domestic political security is -- far and away -- the KGB's priority mission. Further, the KGB is not an invisible government, but a multi-purposed instrument responsive to the Party's Politburo and especially to its General Secretary, Leonid Brezhnev. The KGB is a definite force in the constant ebb and flow of policy/personal competition among top Soviet leaders: the KGB's domestic and foreign activities reflect these tides, and in turn affect them. All in all, the KGB appears to be a professional arm of the ruling Party, fairly well-controlled if not always well-behaved, and thoroughly enmeshed in the fabric of that Party's politics.

To some degree this status is a constant, reflecting the KGB's sensitive powers and institutional strength. A variable which significantly enhances this status at present is the stature and personal influence of the KGB's current Chairman, Yuriy Andropov. Long a senior political figure in the Party, this study reveals him to be tough, pragmatic, intellectual, and by Soviet standards a relative moderate. Andropov is in essence both a key advisor to the Politburo and effective overseer of the KGB who seems to enjoy Brezhnev's confidence, and who also seems presently content not to contest Brezhnev's primacy.

We wish to acknowledge the assistance which a number of other CIA offices, the Clandestine Service in particular, have brought to the preparation of this study. Its judgments have met general agreement within CIA, but the inconclusive nature of available evidence on certain points necessitates that judgments concerning them be advanced cautiously. The paper incorporates information available through 1 February 1972. Comments on this study are welcomed and should be addressed to its author,

Chief, DD/I Special Research Staff

THE KGB'S ROLE IN SOVIET POLITICS

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Clearly, the political power of the Committee of State Security (KGB) in the USSR derives fundamentally from the fact that the CPSU hierarchy needs its support to remain in power. The KGB's most important function thus remains the control of the Soviet population on the Party's behalf.

There is also clearly a leadership consensus that the KGB must be kept firmly under Party control and never again allowed to become an independent force capable of being wielded by some Stalin against the Party apparatus itself. Within this very general guideline, however, available evidence indicates that the issue of Party control of the KGB comes down in practice to the question of whose Party among the ever-contending Politburo leaders. The pattern is that those with the upper hand in the Politburo have sought to obtain the KGB's exclusive loyalty, while the dominant group's more transient allies, and especially its opponents, have tried to limit the ascendant faction's control of the KGB sufficiently to protect their own minority interests and guarantee their political survival. While the post-Stalin KGB has never had the power itself to depose a reigning Party head -- that power remaining a prerogative of the top Party leadership, no such Politburo decision could probably be carried out unless the key men in the KGB were willing to guarantee it.

The question of who these key KGB men shall be is thus at all times crucial, and Soviet contenders for power see the manipulation of personnel appointments as the main battleground in the struggle over the KGB. Since control of key appointments is also the chief method used to ensure the KGB's loyalty to the Party as a whole, the weighing of these appointments is the

most critical aspect of Party supervision of the KGB. Accordingly, each of the Party's most recent heads, Khrushchev and Brezhnev, has acknowledged the importance of the KGB to his personal political power by seeking continuously to oversee the most significant KGB matters himself. Each has also delegated more routine KGB supervisory matters to lieutenants on the Party Secretariat. In the case of Khrushchev, this question of delegated KGB powers helped lead to his downfall, for such responsibility came to be so diffused that Khrushchev lost effective control of the KGB: indeed, two among the Party Secretariat lieutenants to whom he had delegated some KGB responsibilities, Brezhnev and Shelepin, were leaders in the October 1964 coup that overthrew Khrushchev -- and they enlisted the KGB in support of the ouster.

By mid-1965, by which time Shelepin had emerged as Brezhnev's principal rival for supreme Party leadership, influence over the KGB had become a major battleground in their power struggle. The outcome was in doubt until May 1967, when Brezhnev was at last able to move directly against Shelepin's political support in the KGB: this took the form of a Politburo appointment of a new KGB Chairman, Party official Yuriy Andropov, in the place of Vladimir Semichastnyy, a longtime close professional colleague and political ally of Shelepin.

Beyond the fact of the end of a Shelepin-dominated KGB, the choice of Andropov was itself a rather accurate reflection of the mid-1967 leadership balance of power, which revealed the limitations on as well as the strengths of Brezhnev's authority at that time. Andropov has appeared to be a Brezhnev ally, but he is not dependent on the General Secretary in the sense of a career patronage client, and he seems to have relatively broad political support among Party leaders. Andropov's longest and closest career ties are to Suslov, the veteran and highly influential Party ideologist and foreign affairs specialist who is a senior independent figure in the Politburo and Secretariat -- and whose support

was probably as necessary to Andropov's 1967 appointment to the KGB as was that of Brezhnev and his close supporters.

Andropov's Chairmanship is significant also in the implications of his own high position in the Party for Party-KGB relations. When Andropov became Chairman he was a Party Secretary as well as Chief of the Central Committee's Bloc Department (which handles relations with Communist countries). A month after moving to the KGB he left the Party Secretariat, but was simultaneously promoted to alternate membership on the Politburo -- the highest Party rank held by any KGB Chairman since Stalinist times. The primary consequence of Andropov's Party rank appears to have been more direct and continuous supervision of the KGB at the highest Party level, probably principally by Brezhnev himself. Andropov has seemed sensitive to leadership wishes, especially Brezhnev's, and the General Secretary has appeared to accept him as an important advisor as well as a political ally.

Andropov's experience and broad political connections had given him significant influence on foreign policy as a Party Secretary and Bloc Department Chief, and since becoming KGB Chairman he appears to have kept this policy influence no less than his high political standing. He has continued to perform some purely Party functions, and it is doubtless primarily as a respected Party official, and only secondarily as KGB Chairman, that his opinions are heard in Politburo and other leadership councils. There have been many occasions involving important and contentious policy matters, where available data do not make clear whether Andropov was acting essentially as a Party leader, or KGB Chairman, or some mixture of the two. This suggests that his Party and KGB roles do in fact merge.

Andropov's personal policy views seem to be mixed. Two basic convictions emerge clearly which represent "conservative" aspects of his outlook. First, Andropov is one of the Soviet leaders who is most strongly committed to the struggle to maintain CPSU primacy in the Bloc and in the world Communist movement. This view is a natural enough consequence of his many years of Party responsibility for relations with Communist countries. He is also unusually sensitive, again even in a Soviet context, to internal security matters affecting the Party hierarchy. His KGB responsibilities have accentuated this defensiveness.

If such views were the whole essence of Andropov's outlook, he could simply be described as a dogmatic Party type in the tradition of many past KGB Chairmen. But Andropov's views are modified, sometimes sharply, by two other factors: his intelligence, and his pragmatism.

For a number of years Andropov has been close to a group of Party-apparatus intellectuals with relatively pragmatic or moderate views.

have persistently emphasized Andropov's "realism" and have additionally characterized him as reform-minded. Some of these observers have been Soviet dissidents. Their continuing description of Andropov as a moderating influence in the leadership is eloquent in view of the KGB's important role over the last few years in the Party's general crackdown on intellectual and political expression.

The significance seems to be that Andropov is among those Soviet officials who feel that the Party must reform to some degree to retain its pre-eminence, that the USSR cannot be run effectively without its intellectual elite, and that unimaginative and uniformly repressive tactics toward the disaffected are counter-

productive. Andropov has probably also been influential in determining the complex, and intermittently more sophisticated, mixture of internal security tactics the KGB has employed in recent years. It goes without saying that in any direct confrontation between Party authority and reformist ideas Andropov can be expected to be staunchly on the side of authority, although he would seem to prefer that the Party preempt reform where possible, and seek to head off confrontations requiring ultimate choices between orthodoxy and effectiveness.

Andropov's personal policy influence aside, the KGB itself has some built-in institutional advantages which allow it to affect Party policy, since the Party is dependent internally upon KGB coercion to support Party rule, and externally the KGB holds a senior position among Soviet foreign affairs organs. Sometimes the KGB may influence the thinking of policy-makers through significant bias in its reporting. There is evidence that 1967-68 KGB reporting from Prague was tailored to an alarmist view of the erosion of Czech and Soviet Party control there; such warnings may have helped reinforce the prejudices and fears of the Politburo. In the Middle East, at least some KGB reporting has contradicted Foreign Ministry reporting by emphasizing the dangers, rather than the advantages, that a peaceful solution would mean for Soviet interests in the area. In any event, by supporting or opposing the positions taken by different policy advocates in the Soviet leadership, such reporting on major issues can also have an indirect effect on the balance of power in the leadership.

Additionally, any extraordinary KGB actions contradicting policies already determined by the Party leadership constitute a direct and drastic kind of KGB influence on Soviet power struggles. Such actions opposing existing policy appear to be rare. Most cases of KGB activity in apparent contradiction to established

Party policy are ultimately traceable either to shifting directions in policy itself, or to the Party's having levied on the KGB responsibility for executing policies with which the Party leadership may not wish officially or publicly to be associated. Even on occasions when KGB activity has in fact been an embarrassment to the Party leadership, most such cases have involved KGB operations, properly coordinated in advance with the Party, which have evoked a stronger reaction from the target individual or government than anticipated, and which have then unexpectedly escalated the affair into the policy sphere.

There have nevertheless been a few instances in which KGB activity appeared deliberately intended to sabotage existing policy. In 1964, in the final months of the Khrushchev era, the KGB took actions which contradicted Khrushchev's policy of rapprochement with West Germany. These steps were probably undertaken at the instigation of the Politburo group then actively undermining Khrushchev's power. A second case seems to have occurred in mid-1965, when the KGB appeared to help start or fan rumors of an imminent Shelepin takeover from Brezhnev, the new Party head. This episode was probably an example of even more direct participation in a leadership power struggle by the Semichastnyy KGB than was its intervention against Khrushchev's German policy the year before. Such KGB activity contravening the policy or undermining the political power of the Party's official head has only been identifiable in periods when a Party leader or faction was still striving for, or already losing, ascendancy. Available evidence is incomplete, but it suggests that clear cases of the KGB working at cross purposes with the ostensibly dominant Party leader or faction are themselves indicative of periods of high instability in the ongoing Party leadership power struggle.

There have been no discernible such cases, however, under Andropov's Chairmanship. Andropov's sensitivity to general Party interests is now the most important factor inhibiting the KGB from acting at cross purposes with leadership policy, just as Andropov's present apparent loyalty to Brezhnev as Party head seems to minimize the possibility that the KGB might connive with Brezhnev's leadership opponents to undermine his power.

There is no available evidence at present which casts doubt on the present or short-term viability of this Brezhnev-Andropov alliance. But Kremlin alliances are pragmatic and subject to change. Andropov's continued support is probably dependent on Brezhnev's success in maintaining his primacy without so alarming his leadership colleagues that they would place the threat of his power above their various mutual differences. Also, the very extent to which Brezhnev's power has now been consolidated, manifested in his increased confidence and prominence since the 24th Party Congress of March 1971, has in a sense created new risks for him. For Khrushchev's experience suggests that the further the Party leader has gone out in front of the collective leadership, the more sensitive his colleagues have become to the potential hazards to themselves. While Andropov has neither the Party cadres patronage base nor apparently the motivation to build toward Party leadership himself, his basic outlook and broad leadership ties might under some circumstances attract him to a potential coalition of Brezhnev opponents.

For his part, Brezhnev has thus far shown considerable skill in sensing the permissible limits of power. The General Secretary has also been successful in packing several key KGB positions just below Andropov with appointees closely tied to himself. Almost immediately after Andropov had replaced Semichastnyy, in fact, Brezhnev began to fill the other most politically

sensitive KGB positions with new appointees more directly tied to him by political patronage than is Andropov, and by late 1967 or early 1968 the political balance among the very top KGB officials had shifted sharply away from the old Shelepin group.

The most significant cases of Brezhnev patronage at the top level appear to be those of First Deputy Chairman S.K. Tsvigun and Deputy Chairmen V.V. Chebrikov and G.K. Tsinev. Other important KGB personnel changes just under this very top level have continued to date. Changes at KGB Headquarters and among the KGB Chairmen of the Soviet Republics have also shown Brezhnev influence, though in general it has been both less direct and less strong, and enclaves of some political ties to other leaders, including Shelepin and Suslov, appear to exist at these second and third level KGB positions.

Even if Brezhnev surmounts all the political hazards to his power, his age -- now 65 -- raises the possibility of a succession question in coming years. In the long term, Andropov's own preference for a successor to Brezhnev will probably be influenced by intervening Politburo retirements and other changes. In the near term, Brezhnev's most likely immediate successor would be his general deputy Kirilenko; the relationship between Andropov and Kirilenko has appeared sufficiently close to make Andropov's support of Kirilenko probable. In the event of a succession struggle, Andropov might well seek to influence leadership thinking in advance, although he leaves the net impression of a man far more likely to enforce than to challenge the judgment of a Politburo consensus once that emerges. And if he remained KGB Chairman at the time, he would be likely to seek to ensure that the KGB accepted the choice of the Politburo majority.

Should the short-term future bring a change in KGB Chairmen, whether caused by a new power struggle crisis, a more orderly reshuffling of Party portfolios, or whatever, the choice of a new KGB Chairman will certainly be influenced by leadership political factors -- as yet unknown, even to the major participants. One strong possibility common to most foreseeable political circumstances, however, is that the new Chairman would be another Party official rather than a KGB professional. In the meantime, the KGB will remain an indispensable, highly politicized, and formidable Party instrument -- whose dangerous potentials necessitate continuing Party control.

THE KGB'S ROLE IN SOVIET POLITICS

I. THE BACKGROUND

The Stalin-Beriya Heritage

One of the lessons of the Stalinist era which all subsequent Soviet leaders have taken to heart, to varying degrees, is that intolerable excesses were committed against the Party leadership itself -- because the security organs were allowed to become the personal power instrument of one man, unhampered by any broader responsibility either to collective Party leadership or to "socialist legality." Since Stalin, there has been a leadership consensus that the Stalinist police's power had been too dangerous for the Party hierarchy to tolerate again.

This lesson was reinforced by Lavrentiy Pavlovich Beriya's bid for power in the months following Stalin's death in March 1953. Following a purge of top state security leaders who had themselves helped direct the massive Party, government and military purges of the mid 1930s, Stalin in 1938 had brought Beriya from the state security chairmanship in Georgia to head the entire central state security apparatus. Even after his elevation to the Party Politburo in early 1946, Beriya remained influential in security affairs. Soon after Stalin's death Beriya engineered a merger of the then Ministry of State Security (MGB) with the uniformed police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). He became head of the combined Ministry, which retained the MVD designation, undertook an extensive reorganization, and larded its personnel rosters with individuals loyal to him. His activities and apparent ambition to inherit

Stalin's power alarmed Beriya's Politburo rivals, principally G.M. Malenkov, V.M. Molotov and N.S. Khrushchev, who arranged Beriya's arrest in July 1953. He was subsequently executed. The combined uniformed police and security services Ministry was again broken up in March 1954, with the state security functions, foreign and domestic, vested in a Committee of State Security (KGB), nominally under the Council of Ministers but actually responsible to the Party Presidium and Central Committee.

The KGB and Khrushchev Politics

The post-Stalin leadership has therefore striven to ensure that the KGB remains firmly under Party control, and does not once more become an independent political force capable of being wielded against the Party apparatus itself. Since the arrests of security czar Beriya and henchmen in the aftermath of Stalin's death, there appears to have been a tacit understanding that the upper reaches of the Party are to be a sanctuary immune from the political arrests which the KGB is still expected to perform as needed against other Soviet citizens. As a result, despite all the various upheavals, purges and demotions that have occurred in the Party since Beriya's time, there is no evidence that any Central Committee member has ever been arrested or imprisoned.

Also since Beriya's time, a professional security officer has not been allowed to establish a significant personal power base in the KGB independent of Party leadership patronage. But given these basic guidelines, the issue of Party control of the KGB has in practice, of course, tended to be a question of "whose Party": that is, which of the contending Politburo groups or individual leaders has been in ascendancy. The refurbished

1954 Committee's first Chairman was Ivan Aleksandrovich Serov, a personal friend of Khrushchev's as well as an associate dating back to Serov's 1939-41 service as Ukrainian Commissar of Internal Affairs while Khrushchev was First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party. [redacted] has reported hearing in 1957 from a senior officer involved that Khrushchev used the KGB to gather "evidence" against his opponents, the so-called "anti Party group" leaders Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov.*

[redacted] said that once Khrushchev had consolidated his power he oversaw the more important aspects of the KGB's activity personally, acting usually through the Chairman. [redacted] believed that another member of the Central Committee Secretariat probably handled the more routine aspects of the Party supervision of the KGB and did preliminary work on important matters for Khrushchev.[redacted]

The KGB is part of what in CPSU parlance is known as the "administrative organs"-- that is, the organs of coercion. Besides state security, these include the uniformed police, the military and the courts. The Party Secretariat supervises all of them through an Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee apparatus. Evidence of who in the Party Secretariat assisted Khrushchev in the late 1950s and early 1960s in supervising the KGB and other administrative organs is incomplete. What evidence there is indicates that Khrushchev reassigned this function several times and to various people, probably in accordance with his tactic of protecting his power by playing off his

principal Party lieutenants against one another. Two Party Secretariat lieutenants sharing administrative organs responsibility under Khrushchev --Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev and Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shelepin -- emerged as principal rivals for supreme Party leadership after Khrushchev's October 1964 fall, and their respective influence in the administrative organs field, especially over the KGB, became a key aspect of their power struggle.

There are some indications that during the later part of his first (1956 to 1960) period of service in the Party Secretariat, Brezhnev had responsibility under Khrushchev for part of the more routine supervision of the military aspect of administrative organs.* There is also at least one example of possible Brezhnev influence in a KGB appointment during this period, the transfer of Semen Kuz'mich Tsvigun from Moldavia to Tadzhikistan in about January 1957.**

*One of the few routine reporting clues to Secretariat responsibility for this sensitive and hence largely hidden Secretariat brief is press reporting on official occasions involving the administrative organs. Thus Pravda on 3 November 1957 reported that Brezhnev had "recently" addressed a meeting of the Party Aktiv of Soviet Armed Forces in Germany which had discussed the Central Committee Plenum decision to remove Marshal G.K. Zhukov from his Party and Government positions. In February 1958 Brezhnev was the Party Secretary addressing the 4th All-Union DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation and Navy) Congress. In August 1958 Brezhnev and Suslov from the Secretariat attended graduation exercises at the Lenin Military-Political Academy. This kind of responsibility would have fit logically with Brezhnev's wartime background in military political work, and his 1953-54 service as Chief of the Navy's Main Political Administration.

**See p. 58.

But one late 1950s appointment in the administrative organs field of more general significance in which Brezhnev probably was influential was that of Nikolay Romanovich Mironov, brought in mid 1959 from the KGB Chairmanship in Leningrad to become Chief of the Central Committee Administrative Organs Department. Mironov's early career closely paralleled Brezhnev's in both wartime army political work on the Southern and Ukrainian fronts, and in immediate postwar Party work in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast.* Khrushchev of course relied heavily on Ukrainian cadres to staff key Moscow positions and undoubtedly approved the Mironov appointment, but Mironov's early career shows more specific ties to Brezhnev. As events turned out, however, Mironov was killed in a plane crash a few days after the Khrushchev ouster, thus depriving the new First Secretary Brezhnev of an important source of potential support in his coming struggle with Shelepin for control over the KGB.**

*In 1946 Mironov completed the Dnepropetrovsk State University course he began in the 1937-41 period and interrupted for wartime political work in the army. From 1945 to 1947 he worked in the apparatus of the Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Party Committee, and from 1947 to 1949 he was First Secretary of a rayon committee in the city of Dnepropetrovsk. Brezhnev was Party First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast from 1947 to 1950. Mironov went into state security work in 1951, as of late 1955 was a Colonel in the KGB's Third Directorate (counter-intelligence in the military,) and about January 1956 was named to the KGB Chairmanship in Leningrad.

**Following Shelepin's November 1961 appointment to the CPSU Secretariat and subsequent sharing of responsibility for administrative organs, he would of course have worked closely with Central Committee Administrative Organs Department Chief Mironov. No information is available,

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Brezhnev probably could not have had direct influence on the KGB or other administrative organs from July 1960 to July 1963, when he was serving as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and was not a member of the Party Secretariat. After his return to the Secretariat in mid 1963, however, Brezhnev was again active in the administrative organs sphere. In April 1964 was told by that Brezhnev's responsibilities included "agriculture and the KGB."*

Shelepin's involvement in administrative organs under Khrushchev was in many respects more direct than Brezhnev's, but it was also at a more junior Party level. Shelepin had succeeded Serov at the KGB in 1958, becoming the first Chairman since the mid 1930s who was a career Party official rather than a professional state security officer. He gave up the KGB job upon his promotion into the Party Secretariat in October 1961.

(footnote continued from page 5)
however, on the nature of their relationship, and there is an absence of earlier Shelepin-Mironov career ties such as existed between Brezhnev and Mironov.

*( )
Additionally, the Soviet press reported Brezhnev from the Party Secretariat addressing a March 1964 conference on crime, another administrative organs function, although not a KGB one.

By May 1962 Shelepin's public activities indicated he had some Secretariat responsibility for supervising administrative organs, and he intermittently discharged public duties of this sort up through Khrushchev's ouster.* Moreover, Shelepin's successor as KGB Chairman, Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastnyy, was a close personal friend as well as long-time associate. Available coverage does not indicate to what degree Shelepin continued to share Secretariat responsibility for the KGB in the 1963-64 period, however, once Brezhnev had returned to the Secretariat and assumed some KGB supervisory functions. At this time Brezhnev outranked Shelepin in the Party hierarchy.**

In any case, Brezhnev and Shelepin were political associates in 1963 and 1964. Both were key members of the coup group that ousted Khrushchev in October 1964.

*In May 1962 Shelepin was the Secretariat's representative at the 5th All-Union DOSAAF Congress. In February 1963 Shelepin joined F.R. Kozlov and V.N. Titov from the Secretariat at a meeting of Soviet paramilitary units. In June 1963 Shelepin and Titov represented the Secretariat at the annual graduation reception of Soviet military academies.

**Brezhnev and Shelepin's disparity in rank is relevant to the entire question of their 1963-64 relative influence in administrative organs matters. Brezhnev had remained a full Presidium member all during his 1960-63 absence from the Secretariat; thus on his return to the Party Secretariat he became a "senior Secretary," the term designating a Soviet leader holding simultaneous membership in both the Politburo and the Secretariat, the two organizations exercising supreme Party power. Shelepin was only a junior Secretary, as he did not achieve Presidium membership until November 1964.

Gradually, in the early 1960s, Khrushchev had apparently allowed effective control of the KGB to drift from him, partly through overconfidence and partly because policy problems and Presidium dissatisfactions had eroded the loyalty of the Party lieutenants who were nominally supervising the KGB on his behalf. Although policy issues were important in cementing the coup group that overthrew Khrushchev, probably the overriding cause was his arbitrary, highhanded, "non-collective" method of operating. The isolation from his Presidium colleagues caused by Khrushchev's high-handed style allowed them to conspire without his knowledge to end his power. Khrushchev's loss of effective control of the KGB as a result of this isolation proved a vital factor in the coup group's plans and success.

II. BREZHNEV VS. SHELEPIN AND THE KGB

A long series of complex and often indirect political maneuvers transpired before Brezhnev, the apparent instigator and organizer of the coup against Khrushchev and his immediate successor as Party First Secretary, began to emerge as the clearly dominant figure of the new collective leadership. Brezhnev's moves to wrest eventual control of the KGB from his principal Politburo rival, Shelepin, were an important element in this process.

With his November 1964 elevation to full Presidium membership, Shelepin had become a senior Secretary. For some time after the Khrushchev ouster, Shelepin also appears to have retained some Secretariat responsibility for supervision of administrative organs.*

Of equal significance for the Brezhnev-Shelepin struggle, however, was the fact that within the KGB itself the key positions continued in 1965 to be staffed by Khrushchev and Shelepin appointees whose political allegiances, in the most significant cases, were apparently to Shelepin, not Brezhnev. In terms relevant to

*E.g., in April 1965 it was Shelepin from the Party Secretariat who addressed a conference of heads of Republic Central Committee Administrative Organs sections and Republic chiefs of the Ministry for the Maintenance of Public Order (MOOP).

Kremlin power struggles the most important KGB Headquarters positions would appear to include, in their approximate order of political sensitivity:

The Chairman

The Chief and Deputy Chief of the Ninth (Guards) Directorate, responsible for the personal security of the Soviet leaders and their offices, homes, travel, etc.

The First Deputy and other Deputy Chairmen

The Chief of the Second Chief Directorate (internal USSR security and counterintelligence)

The Chairman of the Moscow City and Oblast KGB (not strictly a Headquarters position, but obviously closely related)

The Chief of the Third Directorate (military counterintelligence within the USSR's armed forces personnel)

The Commander of the Border Guards Troops

The Chief of the First Chief Directorate (espionage abroad and foreign intelligence collection)

In addition, Chairmen of the KGB in the USSR's, 14 Republics outside the RSFSR and of other important RSFSR areas outside the capital, particularly Leningrad City and Oblast, are obviously the key provincial

jobs from a political standpoint. Collectively, the jobs named embody the more important command and control functions within the KGB. They also comprise the majority of what is known as the Collegium, a collective review and decision making body.*

As of 1965, the incumbents of the first six of these politically most sensitive KGB positions -- the Chairman, the First Deputy and three other Deputy Chairmen, and the Ninth Directorate Chief -- had all been promoted into these jobs during Brezhnev's 1960-63 absence from the Party Secretariat. There is evidence that four of the six additionally had political loyalties to Shelepin.

Chairman Semichastnyy's close relationship to Shelepin has already been noted. The First Deputy Chairman, Nikolay Stepanovich Zakharov, was basically a Khrushchev protegé. A long time Ninth (Guards) Directorate officer who rose to become its Chief and arranged Khrushchev's security on numerous trips abroad, Zakharov was promoted in 1961 to one of the three KGB Deputy Chairman jobs. Then, in late 1962, he became Semichastnyy's

* [redacted] reported that the Collegium now consists of the KGB Chairman, his Deputy Chairmen, the heads of all Chief Directorates, the deputies of the First and Second Chief Directorates and the Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Directorate "S" (Illegals,) important regional KGB Chairmen (presumably at least Moscow, Leningrad and the Ukraine,) a representative of the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department, and various KGB specialist consultants as needed. [redacted]
It is likely that chiefs of other important KGB Directorates, the Secretary of the KGB Party Committee, and the head of the Chairman's Secretariat remain
(footnote continued on page 12)

First Deputy. Zakharov's Deputy Chairman job went to Sergey Grigoryevich Bannikov, who had been transferred in 1959 or 1960, soon after Shelepin became Chairman, from the Chairmanship of the Turkmen SSR KGB to Headquarters, and made a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. Lev Ivanovich Pankratov, brought into the KGB in 1959-60 by Shelepin as another Second Chief Directorate Deputy Chief, and described as having previously been a Party worker, was also promoted under Semichastnyy in early 1963 to a KGB Deputy Chairmanship.

has described Bannikov and Pankratov as among those KGB officers he considered most loyal to both Shelepin and Semichastnyy.*

did not mention the remaining Deputy as of 1963, Aleksandr Ivanovich Perepilitsyn, as particularly allied with Shelepin and Semichastnyy. He was, however, made a Deputy Chairman during Shelepin's Chairmanship, probably in about May 1961. Originally in Party work in Belorussia, Perepelitsyn became Belorussian MVD Chief in 1953, and then was made Chairman of the Belorussian KGB after the 1954 reorganization. He was released from that job in November 1959 for "transfer to

(footnote continued from page 11)
Collegium members as they have been in the recent past.

other duties," and presumably spent the 1959-61 period during the Khrushchev-Shelepin reorganization at KGB Headquarters before becoming a Deputy Chairman.

The position of Chief of the Ninth (Guards) Directorate probably has a sensitivity in Party leadership power struggle terms second only to that of the KGB Chairman himself. The Ninth Directorate is in charge of all the leaders' travel, providing drivers and bodyguards as well as vehicles and route and area protection, and of the security of their offices, apartments and dachas. Very detailed information on the leaders' activities and habits, and constant access, is required to protect them adequately. The Ninth Directorate is so ubiquitously a part of their daily lives that it is a constant, intimate observer as well as a protector. In a very practical sense the Ninth Directorate's loyalty is fundamental to the retention, no less than the seizure, of power. As of 1965 its Chief was Vladimir Yakovlevich Chekalov, who had previously been Zakharov's Deputy when the latter headed the Ninth Directorate. Chekalov had been a friend of Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey since their World War II military service together.

The 1965 Shelepin Boom

The hazards for Brezhnev of a KGB staffed with key officials of whose political loyalty he was dubious were probably underscored by the 1965 Shelepin "boom." By the summer of 1965 numerous rumors were circulating in Moscow predicting early changes in the leadership. Their content varied, but the most usual themes were that the post coup collective leadership was temporary and was proving too indecisive, and that a "talented," (or, variously, "coming", "brillant," "impressive" and "gifted") Shelepin would replace Brezhnev -- pictured as vacilating, a typical functionary, not of First Secretary stature, and neither well liked nor respected.

The ultimate source of many of the rumors was impossible to discern. Some, although by no means all, were or seemed to be traceable to KGB sources. Others were or appeared to be traceable to the Chinese, to Eastern European sources, or to the CPSU apparatus itself. The atmosphere of the initial post-Khrushchev months, with its rather dramatic change from Khrushchev's flamboyant style to the more cautious behavior of his successors, was a natural breeding ground for this kind of rumor. 1965 was also in fact a time of uneasy political maneuvering, and Brezhnev was by no means confident of his leadership position. Some of the Shelepin takeover reports probably simply derived from his spectacular career to date and his reputation for both ambition and competence.

Evidence that Shelepin was planning a power move in mid-1965 is limited. The very persistence of rumors of a Shelepin drive to replace Brezhnev and their multiple sources, however, suggest they may have had some factual basis. That Shelepin himself was behind a large portion of the rumors seems plausible, though not proveable, from their content, which was useful to fanning a Shelepin bandwagon situation. Brezhnev, Shelepin's most serious obstacle, was the main target. The other qualified First Secretary candidates, Kosygin and Suslov, whose acquiescence if not support Shelepin would need in any bid, were treated relatively gently in the rumors, and reported as uninterested in the top job themselves, or too old or ill to aspire to it.

The slippage in discipline signaled by the prevalence in official Soviet circles, apparently including the KGB, of rumors so crassly disparaging the Party First Secretary and his political future itself demonstrated the intensity of the struggle for power in mid 1965, and the tenuousness of Brezhnev's hold on power at this time. The precise role of the KGB as an institution in initiating or fanning the

rumors of a Shelepin takeover is unknown. The KGB definitely did appear to be involved to some degree however. To the extent that it was, the episode is a case in which the KGB's institutional political power was enlisted on behalf of a Party leader who was opposing the Party's official head.

In the event, however, Brezhnev was able after the fall of 1965 to forestall any Shelepin bid by gradually encroaching on his bases of power and support throughout the Party and government hierarchy. At the December 1965 Central Committee Plenum, the Party-State Control Commission, of which Shelepin had been Chairman, was abolished, and Shelepin was given a full-time job in the Party Secretariat, relinquishing in the process his government job as Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. For the next year and a half Shelepin continued to have considerable Party authority, but his activities were necessarily less diverse than they had been and also more closely under Brezhnev's scrutiny.

Preliminary Brezhnev Security Moves

It was to be some time before Brezhnev apparently felt that his overall political position was strong enough to move against the Shelepin men at the head of the KGB. During 1966, however, Brezhnev took two preliminary steps in the direction of eliminating Shelepin's influence and political power base in the security field.

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Brezhnev closes the 23rd Party Congress, April 1966, as his then principal rival Shelepin (left, first row) looks on.

Administrative Organs Supervision: One of these moves was quite direct. Sometime in 1966 Shelepin seems to have lost his remaining Secretariat responsibility for the supervision of the administrative organs, probably largely to Brezhnev himself. Shelepin has not subsequently been reported undertaking administrative organs related activities.

Although Brezhnev probably had sufficient influence by late 1966 to have the Administrative Organs Department supervised primarily out of his own office, the Department itself existed in something of an internal personnel limbo during this period. Nikolay Ivanovich Savinkin, the Department's First Deputy Chief when Mironov died in October 1964, had become its Acting Chief. This situation was to continue until shortly before 5 May 1968, when Savinkin was finally identified in Pravda as the Department Chief. The fact that the Administrative

Organs Department Chief issue remained unresolved for almost four years indicates that the Politburo was unable to agree on a permanent solution earlier. It further suggests that Brezhnev was unable to work his will, whether that may have been to confirm Savinkin sooner or to bring in another client candidate of his own.

There is no particular reason to connect Savinkin to earlier Brezhnev patronage. Whatever Brezhnev's and Savinkin's relationship may have been at the start of Savinkin's long term as Acting Chief, however, his ultimate designation as Chief suggests he had in the interim performed generally to Brezhnev's satisfaction.*

*Additionally, one 1966 personnel change in the Administrative Organs Department appeared possibly influenced by Kirilenko, whom Brezhnev had brought into the Party Secretariat at the 23rd Congress in April. Following the dissolution of the Central Committee's RSFSR Bureau at this same Congress, the Bureau's Administrative Organs Sector Chief, Vasiliy Ivanovich Laputin, moved into the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department as a Deputy Chief. This shift returned Laputin to where he had worked earlier, from at least 1959. He had then been transferred to the RSFSR Bureau's Administrative Organs Sector in April 1963, or only a few months after Kirilenko's control of the Bureau had been strengthened in the wake of Khrushchev's November 1962 general Party reorganization, an upheaval which had sidelined the influence of Kirilenko's several competitors in the Bureau. The timing of both Laputin's 1963 and 1966 moves so soon after advances in Kirilenko's political fortunes suggests Laputin may well have had Kirilenko's patronage. To the extent that Laputin did have patronage ties with Kirilenko, the latter's support of Brezhnev would presumably thus have carried with it indirect Administrative Organs Department benefit to the General Secretary from Laputin's 1966 return to an important post there.

The Shchelokov-MOOP Appointment: A more indirect maneuver, which nevertheless also had the effect of enhancing Brezhnev's and diminishing Shelepin's influence in the security field, occurred in connection with the July 1966 restoration to the internal uniformed police of a Ministry at the All-Union level. In 1960, when the uniformed police had still been called the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the overall All-Union Ministry had been abolished and its functions given to the various Republic MVDs. Decentralization had been followed in 1962 by a name change to the Ministries for the Maintenance of Public Order, (MOOP), in keeping with the emphasis at the time on police roles in fighting crime and protecting citizens rather than suppressing subversion. Now, in July 1966, a MOOP Ministry was re-established at the All-Union level. Vadim Stepanovich Tikunov, a Shelepin man who had been a KGB Deputy Chairman in 1961 and then from 1961 to 1966 Minister of the RSFSR MOOP, was the most logical candidate for the new USSR MOOP chief, and had been widely regarded as a near certainty for the post. After a two month delay, itself suggestive that the appointment was contentious in the Politburo, the post went instead in September to Nikolay Anisomovich Shchelokov, a veteran Ukrainian and Moldavian Party and industrial administrator with no previous police experience but with extremely close career ties to Brezhnev.* With the Shchelokov

*They attended the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute at the same time, Shchelokov graduating in 1933, Brezhnev in 1935. In 1938 Shchelokov became First Secretary of Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon Party Committee in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast while Brezhnev was head of a Department of the Oblast Party Committee. The following year, when Brezhnev became a Secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk City Executive Committee, Shchelokov became

(footnote continued on page 19)

appointment Brezhnev succeeded in putting an evident protegé at the head of an institution which is in some respects a counterpart to the KGB. Although in general MOOP's functions involve the more routine aspects of police work, with the KGB responsible for the more sensitive or political aspects of internal security, there is close coordination between the two and some overlap. Thus the Shchelokov appointment was an oblique advance on Brezhnev's problem of KGB control.

(footnote continued from page 18)
Chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk City Executive Committee. Both men spent the war years in political work in the army, serving together at least at its end. In 1945-46 Shchelokov was Secretary of the Party Committee of the Carpathian Military District; as of December 1945 Brezhnev was identified as Chairman of the Political Administration and a member of the Military Council of the Carpathian Military District. In the early postwar years both returned to Party work in the Ukraine, although in less immediate proximity than before, Brezhnev serving from 1947 to 1950 as First Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Oblast and Shchelokov from 1948 to 1951 as Chief of a Department in the Ukrainian CP Central Committee. In January 1951, just six months after Brezhnev had been named First Secretary of the Moldavian CP, Shchelokov was brought to Moldavia as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Shchelokov remained in Moldavia until his September 1966 appointment as MOOP Minister.

Semichastnyy Ousted

When the main blow fell, and Pravda announced on 19 May 1967 the appointment of Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov as Chairman of the KGB, there followed a flood of speculation on the reasons for Semichastnyy's ouster. Most of it centered on possible immediate causes, ranging from alleged Semichastnyy failure to be vigilant enough against foreign spies and internal subversion to assertions that an early spring spate of publicized KGB reverses in Europe and the far more significant propaganda setback of the defection of Stalin's daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva had sufficiently embarrassed the leadership to change the KGB management.* Some of the proferred possible reasons may well have been part of the pretext used to induce the Politburo to approve the Chairman's removal. The fundamental motive for Brezhnev, however, was almost certainly his power struggle with Shelepin, which was to culminate several months later in the demotion of Shelepin to the Chairmanship of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) in July 1967, and his removal from the Party Secretariat, although not from the Politburo, in September.

Indeed, [redacted] said or implied as much. [redacted] Leonid Fedorovich Il'ichev, then a Deputy of the USSR Ministry of Foreign

*Apart from press commentary at the time, e.g. New York Times, 29 May 67, Peter Grose, see also, [redacted]

Affairs, who agreed that the Andropov appointment represented an increase in Brezhnev's strength. When suggested that it was also a decrease in Shelepin's influence, Il'ichev responded that that was "too much speculation."* told that the change was part of the Party's need to maintain effective control of the intelligence apparatus and that the Party may have thought Andropov a "better Party man" than Semichastnyy.

indicated that a "clique" had grown up around Shelepin whose members gave loyalty to the clique precedence over other responsibilities. The Shelepin clique included Semichastnyy, under whom, the KGB's efficiency had gone down. The clique members supported one another's ideas and recommended one another for jobs. "Matters began to bypass official channels when they were involved," When this happens at such a high level, he explained, something must be done right away; there was an investigation, and the Politburo decided action must be taken. That matters had begun

[redacted]

to "bypass official channels" would of course have constituted a particularly ominous threat to the official Party head and his supporters. Brezhnev could scarcely have ignored the implications for his own power of a KGB whose top management was loyal to a rival who was showing signs of acting outside the framework of official Party control procedures.

This last report also implied that the official excuse presented as part of the Politburo decision to oust Semichastnyy, whatever its particulars may have been, involved charges of inefficiency and inadequate results in both foreign intelligence collection and the countering of foreign or domestic subversion, i.e., some version of the "shortcomings" that are an ubiquitous excuse in Soviet power-struggle-related demotions. [redacted] reported that while the actual reason for Semichastnyy's removal was his close personal and political relationship with Shelepin, the [redacted] in connection with which Semichastnyy was accused of unwise and unprofessional decisions.*

[redacted]

[redacted]


LEADERSHIP–KGB RELATIONSHIPS
Party
Government
Politburo
Full Members
Secretariat
Chairman Presidium
of Supreme Soviet
BREZHNEV
BREZHNEV
General Secretary
PODGORNYY
PODGORNYY
Council of Ministers
KOSYGIN
KOSYGIN
MAZUROV
MAZUROV
1st Deputy Chairman
POLYANSKIY
POLYANSKIY
1st Deputy Chairman
KIRILENKO
KIRILENKO
SUSLOV
SUSLOV
KULAKOV
KULAKOV
SHELEPIN
VORONOV
PELSHE
SHELEST
KUNAYEV
GRISHIN
SHCHERBITSKIY
SHCHERBITSKIY
SOLOMENTSEV
Candidate Members
KGB
ANDROPOV
ANDROPOV, Chairman
ANDROPOV
(1 of 85 Members)
USTINOV
USTINOV
TSVIGUN, 1st Deputy
DEMICHEV
DEMICHEV
SOLOMENTSEV
KATUSHEV
Deputy Chairmen
MASHEROV
PONOMAREV
CHEBRIKOV
RASHIDOV
KAPITONOV
TSINEV
MZHAVANADZE
MALYGIN
PIROZHKOV
PANKRATOV
Central Committee
Administrative
Organs Department
Directorates,
Departments, etc.
KGB Officers
Legend
Simultaneous membership
Command authority
Pro Forma Authority
SECRET

III. CHAIRMAN ANDROPOV'S RELATIONS WITH THE POLITBURO AND HIS PERSONAL POLICY INFLUENCE

Brezhnev doubtless approved and supported Andropov as Semichastnyy's successor, even though the new Chairman did not seem to be tied to Brezhnev in the dependent sense of a patronage client. Andropov appeared to have significant additional political ties among the leadership, and these were probably almost as necessary to his KGB appointment as Brezhnev's own endorsement. In the 1967 Soviet leadership power context, in which the General Secretary's* authority had definite limitations imposed by the independent strength of some of his Politburo** colleagues, an appointment as highly sensitive as the KGB Chairmanship doubtless required the support of a majority of the collective leadership.

The new KGB Chairman whom the Politburo approved on 18 May 1967 was a considerably more senior Party official than had been either of his two immediate predecessors, Shelepin and Semichastnyy, when they were

*At the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966 the designation for the head of the Party had reverted to the old style of General Secretary, instead of the First Secretary style adopted in 1952.

**Also at the 23rd Congress the Presidium reverted to its old, pre-October 1952, name of Politburo. Its function, the highest policy making body of the Party, remained essentially unchanged.

YURIY VLADIMIROVICH ANDROPOV

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successively installed as head of the KGB.* Andropov had been a member of the Party Secretariat since November 1962. He had also been Chief of the Central Committee Department

*Shelepin had been First Secretary of the All-Union Komsomol at the time he became KGB Chairman. Semichastnyy had been the Party Second Secretary in Azerbaydzhan.

for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (hereafter in this paper called the Bloc Department) for the ten years preceding his move to the KGB. A month after becoming Chairman Andropov was promoted to an alternate member of the Politburo, though at the same time he left the Party Secretariat.*

Andropov is the first KGB Chairman since Beriya to have a place on the Politburo, albeit as a non-voting alternate member. To take this as evidence that the KGB has vastly increased its own institutional political power, however, is to overlook the fact that Andropov is a career Party official rather than a career state security officer. The very seniority of Andropov's Party rank, compared to his two KGB Chairmen predecessors', and the apparent breadth of his leadership

*Undoubtedly involved in Andropov's move from the Secretariat to the Politburo was the leadership balance of power, probably including a desire of Brezhnev and his supporters, and possibly others, to avoid demoting Andropov politically. Continued Secretariat membership would probably have been politically unacceptable in the Soviet context, since it would involve the KGB Chairman's being simultaneously a part of the organ which supervises him. Putting Andropov on the Politburo also had the effect of enhancing direct access to the Chairman by all Politburo members, not just those also sitting on the Secretariat.

ties, serve to strengthen the Party's control of the KGB, although Andropov's Politburo alternate membership does have some by-product effect of promoting the political status of the KGB Chairmanship, as well as of Andropov himself.

It is not known who among full Politburo members voted to replace Semichastnyy with Andropov.* Andropov's early career, before his 1954 appointment as Ambassador to Hungary, contains no firm evidence of ties to any of the full members of the May 1967 Politburo. (See Appendix.) He may well have developed good working relationships with a number of them, however, during his 10 years after 1957 as head of the Bloc Department. This job entails extensive Politburo contact even in the normal course of the regular exchanges of visits between CPSU and Bloc Party leaders. Even closer contact was involved during the various crisis periods of the struggle for leadership of the world Communist movement that beset Andropov's tenure. More important, Andropov

*Full Politburo members as of May 1967 were Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Mazurov, Pelshe, Podgornyy, Polyanskiy, Shelepin, Shelest, Suslov and Voronov.
One samizdat item reported that Shelepin was hospitalized for a few days and therefore not present at the 18 May Politburo meeting that approved Semichastnyy's ouster (Political Diary, Issue No. 33, June 1967.) The validity of this report is unknown.

had served for varying overlapping periods on the Party Secretariat with five Secretaries who were also voting Politburo members at the time of his appointment to the KGB.*

Available evidence suggests that Andropov has been on consistently good working terms with a significant portion of the leadership. [redacted] has characterized Andropov as absolutely devoted to the Party and sufficiently trusted by a majority of the Politburo that he was selected for the KGB job as a reliable organizer, loyal, and likely to support the Party leadership.

Andropov's Relationship With Brezhnev

While there is no evidence of early Andropov patronage ties to Brezhnev, the new Party head would have had particular opportunity to take Andropov's measure during the intensive CPSU maneuvers within the Bloc and the world communist movement against the Chinese after Khrushchev's ouster. The focus of the

*Brezhnev had returned to the Secretariat in July 1963, Suslov and Shelepin had served on it during the entire period of Andropov's time there, Kirilenko had been a Secretary since December 1965, and Podgornyy from June 1963 to April 1966.

CPSU Secretary and Bloc Department Chief ANDROPOV (front row, far left,) with BREZHNEV and East German leaders at East German 7th Party Congress, Berlin, April 1967.
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Soviet effort, in which Brezhnev was deeply involved, was the promotion of a new conference of world Communist Parties. As Bloc Department head Andropov had obviously also been a key figure in this effort and accompanied Brezhnev on a number of trips associated with it.*

*In July 1965 Andropov accompanied Brezhnev to Bucharest for the Rumanian Party Congress; in January 1966 on a prestigious Party and government delegation to Mongolia for talks on the Chinese problem; in September 1966 to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia for Party talks;
(footnote continued on page 29)

All indications are that Brezhnev has subsequently been satisfied with Andropov's loyalty and performance as KGB Chairman. Since the time of the Andropov appointment in 1967, Brezhnev has continued to consolidate his position, and by the period of the 24th Party Congress in 1971 both his prestige and his real power had increased measurably. Against this general political background, it is highly unlikely Andropov would have remained in the KGB job without Brezhnev's continued backing.

Andropov's high Party standing has doubtless facilitated the personal supervision of the more important KGB matters which Brezhnev has found prudent, resulting in more direct and continuous General Secretary-KGB Chairman contact than had been the case with previous KGB Chairmen of lesser Party rank.

Andropov, Brezhnev and The Administrative Organs Department

Andropov's Party rank and direct contact with Brezhnev have also presumably affected the KGB's relationship with the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department, which is itself probably directly subordinate to the General Secretary's office. While in a general sense

(footnote continued from page 28)
in November 1966 to the Hungarian Party Congress; in February 1967 to Czechoslovakia for Party talks; in April 1967, via a stop in Warsaw for Party talks, to East Berlin for the East German Party Congress, and thence to Karlovy Vary in Czechoslovakia for a consultative meeting of European Communist Parties.

Administrative Organs Department supervision of the KGB may thus be even closer than formerly, it is also probable that Andropov's own direct dealings at the level of Brezhnev and the other senior Secretaries limits Administrative Organs officials' personal contact with the current Chairman. Andropov's rank would suggest that Administrative Organs Department Chief Savinkin and his deputies would more normally deal with KGB Deputy Chairmen.

With this important new qualification in mind, the Administrative Organs Department's prerogatives in relation to Andropov's KGB nevertheless continue to appear extensive. [redacted] indicated that the Department had to approve all major administrative changes, including all personnel assignments, and would especially review those down to Deputy Chiefs of KGB Departments. The Administrative Organs Department could recommend improvements (usually after discussion with the KGB Chairman or his Deputies but sometimes solely at Khrushchev's request), and received rather complete reports on the KGB's foreign activities.*

There is no reason to believe that the Administrative Organs Department does not continue to review closely all KGB personnel changes at the Deputy Department Chief level and above. It is not known however, what level of KGB appointments are also reviewed in the Party Secretariat. From what is known in general of the current Party leadership-KGB relationship, it would be consistent to deduce that the Secretariat concerns itself especially with KGB appointments at the Deputy

Chief of Directorate level and above. Hard information is lacking, however.* Additionally, nothing is known about which levels of KGB personnel changes are originally proposed in, respectively, the Secretariat, the Administrative Organs Department, or the KGB itself.

Suslov

At the time Andropov took over the KGB, his longest and closest career ties among full Politburo members appear to have been with Mikhail Andreyevich Suslov. They not only served together on the Central Committee Secretariat after Andropov's appointment to it in November 1962, but, more importantly, Suslov was the senior Secretary primarily responsible for overseeing relations with foreign Communist Parties both during the entire 1957 to 1967 period when Andropov headed the Central Committee Bloc Department, and during the immediately preceding period of 1954 to 1957, when Andropov was Soviet Ambassador to Hungary.

*A former Party official who emigrated in the 1930s has recalled that the Party Secretariat in that era routinely approved appointments of leaders, deputies and members of the collegia of state committees. (Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus, 1966.) If so, Secretariat approval would be required for the KGB Chairman, its Deputies, and the chiefs of those more important directorates who are members of the KGB Collegium. However, this acknowledged recollection is dated. Additionally, the KGB's sensitivity may well evoke closer Secretariat attention than do other state committees.

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SUSLOV and ANDROPOV (6 and 7) watch the conclusion of one of many Moscow visits by fraternal parties. October 1966: Gomulka signing a declaration for the Poles, Brezhnev signing for the Soviets.

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named Suslov as the Soviet leader in overall charge of Hungarian matters, and commented that any important Foreign Affairs Ministry initiative or desire, for example, had been transmitted for approval through the Hungarian Party to Soviet Ambassador Andropov to Suslov in Moscow. also said that Andropov usually accompanied the Hungarian Party First Secretary or other Party Political Committee members on their periodic visits to Moscow.*

The events leading up to the Revolution itself, of course, received priority Soviet leadership attention, and Suslov went to Budapest at two critical junctures in July and again in late October 1956.

The growth of the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, and the Soviet sporadic campaigns since 1963 for a new world conference of Communist Parties, required that Suslov and Andropov continue a close working association on problems of priority concern to the Soviet leadership. It seems likely that Andropov would not have received the KGB responsibility without the endorsement of the veteran and highly influential Party leader who had been his primary supervisor for 13 years, and whose own fields of ideology and foreign affairs are closely related to KGB functions.*

Moreover, in 1967 there were indications that Suslov also had been delegated some portion of Secretariat responsibility for KGB affairs. In April, a month before the change in KGB Chairman, Suslov was the member of the Party Secretariat who attended a Moscow conference of administrative organs chiefs. Suslov's delivery of official Party greetings to the KGB at the 20 December 1967 Chekist 50th anniversary **

*Suslov has served in the Party Secretariat continuously since 1947, and in the Politburo continuously since 1955. His senior Secretary tenure is far and away the longest among Soviet leaders.

**The session was opened by Moscow Party First Secretary and Politburo alternate Viktor Vasilyevich Grishin, and the entire Politburo attended. (The Cheka was the name of the secret police in Lenin's time, and it is still used on occasion as a generic term for the state security organs.)

was an additional sign that at least in 1967 he shared with Brezhnev some supervisory responsibility for the KGB.

A Soviet [redacted] Central Committee [redacted] said that among those leading functionaries with direct KGB connections Suslov has had the greatest influence. The total accuracy of this statement is open to some question, given the influence Brezhnev has exerted in recent years in key KGB appointments, but it probably does accurately reflect an impression in higher Party and intellectual circles of considerable Suslov influence.

Kirilenko

Since Andrey Pavlovich Kirilenko began in late 1967 to emerge as Brezhnev's general Party second-in-command, Suslov has not been visible in a possible KGB supervisory capacity. From what is known about Brezhnev's overall delegation of Party responsibilities, and from one or two fragmentary hints in the sparse available reporting, it is possible that Kirilenko may now exercise, under Brezhnev, some Secretariat authority over the KGB. When the next all-Union conference of administrative organs personnel was held in June 1968, for example, it was Kirilenko and

Brezhnev and his Party deputy KIRILENKO act as the front bearers of the urn of ashes of a cosmonaut who died in Soyuz II, July 1971.
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Dmitriy Fedorovich Ustinov from the Secretariat who attended rather than Suslov.*

The origins of the Kirilenko-Andropov relationship itself are obscure.** Beginning with Kirilenko's appointment to the Party Secretariat at the 23rd Party

*Ustinov's apparent involvement with administrative organs responsibilities dates from 1967-68 and has seemed primarily to involve the military sphere. Some KGB supervisory responsibilities, are also implied from his May 1968 representation of the Party Secretariat at the 50th anniversary of the KGB Border Guards.

**It is possible, although not documented, that Andropov had known Kirilenko in Rybinsk in the mid-1930s. Andropov

(footnote continued on page 36)

Congress in 1966, however, they have had increasing occasion to work together. In late 1966 Kirilenko began to share some foreign affairs responsibilities with Suslov at the senior Secretary level. This was especially the case through the June 1969 convocation of a world Communist Parties conference, and especially in foreign affairs matters related to Bloc Parties (then Andropov's bailiwick), and to economic considerations, Kirilenko's own basic area of expertise. Their working relationship continued after Andropov became KGB Chairman in May 1967 and Kirilenko began later that year to emerge as Brezhnev's overall Party deputy.

In sum, Andropov thus apparently has good working rapport with the head of the Party, Brezhnev, with his general deputy and most likely short term successor, Kirilenko, and with a senior and highly influential leadership "independent" who is not closely tied politically to the Brezhnev group, Suslov. These are the three most senior members of the Party Secretariat.

Shelepin

At the same time, Andropov before his advent to the KGB had apparently also been on good terms with Shelepin, and while Shelepin can scarcely have welcomed the removal of his client Semichastnyy from the KGB post, from his point of view Andropov was probably by no means the worst possible replacement.

(footnote continued from page 35)
graduated from the Rybinsk Technical School of Water Transportation in 1936, the same year Kirilenko graduated from the Rybinsk Aviation Institute. Kirilenko had then been a Party member since 1931; Andropov was active in Komsomol work in Rybinsk in 1936-37.

[redacted] a consistent Shelepin booster in his conversations [redacted] described Andropov as a friend and advisor of Shelepin's. Available evidence for the years since Andropov's replacement of Semichastnyy as KGB Chief, however, leaves the net impression that Shelepin and Andropov are no longer -- understandably -- as close as they once were.

Andropov's Personal Influence on Policy

Just as Andropov has retained his high Party rank since becoming KGB Chairman, he also appears to have retained much of the policy influence that attached to his previous Party work. The degree to which the KGB may influence the formation of Party policy, or engage in activities at cross purposes with existing Politburo policy, has considerable significance for the Soviet power structure as well as the policy process. For, in addition to their intrinsic importance for policy itself, differences over foreign and domestic policy are also frequently the medium in which the Soviet leadership power struggle is enacted. Thus, any significant KGB influence on policy formation affects not only the substantive direction policy takes; the resources of the KGB are such that the power position of a leadership faction can be advanced or undermined by KGB advocacy of or opposition to a possible policy course, and even on occasion by KGB sabotage of established policy.

[redacted]

Influence on Party policy by the KGB as an institution is an ongoing possibility.* The fact that the present Chairman came to the KGB with greater policy influence as well as Party rank than previous Chairmen has, however, introduced an additional factor into the KGB-Party policy formation relationship.

Andropov has retained some strictly Party responsibilities since becoming KGB Chairman. On occasion, however, it has been difficult to tell whether Andropov was acting in his Party or his KGB capacity. This was particularly the case during the 1968 Czech crisis. Analysis for the 1968 period is additionally complicated by two facts. First, Eastern European Parties had been Andropov's Central Committee specialty. Second, the new junior Party Secretary overseeing the Central Committee Bloc Department, Konstantin Fedorovich Katushev, had come to this responsibility from the unrelated background of automotive design and Party administrative work in Gorkiy, arriving in Moscow in April 1968, or just as relations with the Czechs slid into the crisis stage. There was thus a gap in senior Party expertise on Eastern Europe which Andropov probably helped to fill during the crisis.

Andropov's entire background would suggest that his basic personal perspective remains that of a Party specialist in Bloc affairs. It is moreover undoubtedly primarily as a respected Party official and only secondarily as KGB Chairman that his opinions are heard in Politburo councils. Nevertheless, the very uncertainty about whether Andropov is acting in his Party or his KGB

*See below, Chapter V.

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

ANDROPOV directly behind BREZHNEV at the 24th CPSU Congress, March 1971

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capacity which attaches to reporting on many of his activities suggests that his Party and KGB roles have in fact merged to some degree. With the most direct managerial access to the KGB's extensive resources, as well as to its reports, Andropov could not help but bring to leadership policy making councils a point of view affected by his major current responsibility.

Andropov's Policy Views

Andropov's personal outlook and policy views are, however, difficult to pin down. Andropov is a self-contained man. His speeches and articles over the years contain little to differentiate his position from the current topical Party line. Reported impressions of foreign Communists or diplomats, and even an

occasional Soviet official's comment about him, all offer no more than an occasional insight into his personal substantive views.

Two firmly held specific convictions do come through, however. One of these involves a fierce regard for continuing leadership primacy of the CPSU in the world communist movement, a view doubtless inculcated during his long years in Bloc Party relations. The second amounts to a basic defensiveness about the power and security of the Soviet leadership, a readiness to read a possible political threat into cases of crime and disorder. This hypersensitivity over security appears to have been, not surprisingly, accentuated by Andropov's KGB responsibility. All Soviet leaders hold both these views to some degree; Andropov would fall toward the more intense end of a spectrum of leadership opinion in each case. These are both also "conservative" positions in the Soviet political context. In Andropov's case, however, these extreme positions are frequently offset by another fundamental aspect of his outlook, his apparently pragmatic approach to problem solving and his admiration for competence and effectiveness. Additionally, Andropov's sharp and subtle intelligence appears to be of the reflective and perceptive variety. The net effect is a complex man, whose opinions and actions are not accurately susceptible to neat classification as "hard" or "soft."

The 1956 Hungarian Revolution

Virtually nothing is known of Andropov's opinion of Soviet tactics before and during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, when he was serving as Ambassador in Budapest, and little is available on the specific role he played in executing them. It is certainly safe

to assume he felt the Hungarian heresy had to be controlled, especially its extra-Party and anti-Warsaw Pact aspects. A [redacted] commented in discussing Hungarian Party leaders that Andropov was probably one of the Soviets still opposed, in 1971, to Hungarian Premier Jeno Fock. While still Soviet Ambassador to Hungary but after the supression of the revolt, Andropov is alleged [redacted] to have told the new Hungarian Party First Secretary Janos Kadar of Soviet concern that Fock had been too closely tied to the revolutionary Imre Nagy regime, and warned Kadar to prevent Fock from getting too much power. [redacted] reported that while serving in Hungary Andropov formed a good relationship, which has endured, with Hungarian Politburo member Dezso Nemes. [redacted] characterized Nemes as an intelligent and ideologically authoritative pro-Soviet Communist, who is both dogmatic and critical of Khrushchev's permissive period of leadership.

This [redacted] was himself favorably impressed with Andropov. [redacted] Andropov took a keen interest in Hungary, studying its history, cultural and economic affairs and often questioning the source about Hungarian leaders. Andropov seemed to him to think slowly and deeply, to be cautious in drawing conclusions, quiet and unassuming, yet to have great responsibility.

[redacted]

The 1968 Czech Crisis

Andropov's Hungarian experience probably sensitized him to an early recognition that effective Soviet control in Czechoslovakia, over a decade later, was seriously threatened by liberalizing trends there. There is no reason to doubt that throughout the 1968 Czech crisis Andropov remained opposed to trends within Czechoslovakia which would undermine Party control or, especially, significantly weaken Soviet influence. As KGB Chairman Andropov personally oversaw at least the broad outline of KGB activities in Czechoslovakia in 1968. These included attempts, in the months preceding the invasion, to influence or intimidate Czech government, Party and security officials toward opposition to the "Prague spring," and later to underwrite and legitimize the Soviet-enforced "normalization." It was also the KGB that arrested and assaulted Aleksandr Dubcek and the other Czech leaders during the invasion and brought them to Moscow.*

*There is no information on whether the nature of the treatment of Dubcek and the others on their way to the Kremlin was specifically authorized from Moscow, or whether the KGB detachment was left to its own discretion regarding the exact conditions of custody until the Soviet leadership realized that a rump government could not quickly be installed, and that they would have to negotiate with the legal Czech leadership.

It is not known, however, whether Andropov supported or opposed the critical Soviet tactical decision to lead the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. As only an alternate Politburo member he of course had no formal vote, but available information indicates that all the Soviet leaders were involved in the intensive debate and decision making at the various critical junctures of the Czech crisis.

Other Bloc Quarrels

Regarding Andropov's dealings with the Rumanians and the Yugoslavs, there is some evidence that as Bloc Department Chief he had even more than the usual degree of Soviet difficulty. At the time of Andropov's 1967 appointment to the KGB, a Romanian said that Andropov had a "mean, unfriendly attitude" toward his country.* And during the January 1967 visit to Moscow of President Tito of Yugoslavia, Andropov was reported to have used such harsh language that Tito at one point left the room in anger. Brezhnev subsequently managed to smooth things over between Tito and Andropov,

** Also, the memoirs of Yugoslav party and trade union leader Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo contain an incident suggesting that Andropov may have been out of step with Khrushchev in the strength of his opposition to Yugoslav "revisionism." Vukmanovic claimed to have asked Khrushchev at a 1960 encounter why the then serious Soviet-Yugoslav rift

(footnote continued on page 44)

[redacted] Yugoslav [redacted] on the new KGB [redacted] was therefore perhaps not surprising. He described Andropov as "thoroughly corrupted, servile, capable of anything, but wily like a fox."

Views of the US Unknown

There is no good evidence of Andropov's personal policy views toward the United States. He did make reference to "peaceful co-existence" in two 1967 speeches, at a time when Soviet leaders' public references to this concept were rare. His views of peaceful co-existence, and also presumably of the current policy of limited detente with Western Europe and negotiation with the US, however, are likely to be qualified somewhat by Andropov's long-held and now professional concern for the integrity of the Soviet Bloc and the security of internal Soviet

(footnote continued from page 43)
continued if Khrushchev really believed every socialist country should construct socialism in its own way. Andropov, also present, allegedly replied that the Yugoslav Party program claimed that revision of the Marxist doctrine of the state took place in Stalin's time. Vukmanovic pointed out that the Soviets appeared to believe the same, considering the changes they had made in the state's role in the economy. Khrushchev nodded, according to Vukmanovic, but Andropov simply bowed his head. (Vukmanovic's version of the exchange may, of course, be somewhat self serving.)

[redacted]

political controls. Defensive preoccupations with the impact of any detente upon these Soviet interests were visible in both Andropov 1967 speeches -- his March USSR Supreme Soviet election address made before the KGB appointment as well as his December Chekist 50th anniversary speech afterward -- and the definition of peaceful coexistence presented on both occasions was hedged accordingly.

Preoccupation With Internal Security

Under Andropov's Chairmanship the KGB has continued to implement a post-Khrushchev leadership policy whose overall trend has been toward more rigid ideological orthodoxy and has involved crackdown on all forms of dissent. Indeed Andropov's Chairmanship has seen an apparent upgrading of the KGB effort in this area.

One of the most significant de-Stalinizing reforms of the 1959 Khrushchev-Shelepin reorganization of the KGB was the abolition of its Fourth, or Secret Political, Directorate that had been responsible for combatting domestic counterrevolution and subversion and for detecting and eliminating political dissidence among the Soviet populace. It had been especially notoriously associated with the various purges of the 1930s.* Following the

*The emphasis given the political power role of the KGB during the Khrushchev era in Chapter One of this paper should not be allowed to eclipse the very real substantive changes made under Khrushchev in the direction of increased Party control over the KGB, and shifts of emphasis in its activities corresponding roughly to overall de-Stalinization. In general, the KGB's work

(footnote continued on page 46)

Andropov KGB appointment, there were various indications of possible organizational changes upgrading KGB work against dissidents. An example was the March 1969 statement

(footnote continued from page 45)
as protector of the Soviet state and people from foreign "imperialist" espionage was emphasized, and its work in policing internal orthodoxy de-emphasized.

A number of 1959 and 1960 Khrushchev-Shelepin KGB organizational changes implemented the new look; abolition of the Fourth Directorate was one of the more important of these. Some Fourth Directorate functions continued however, and these were absorbed into several new components of the Second Chief Directorate (overall internal counter-intelligence and security.) A new Tenth Department of the Second Chief Directorate was responsible for the intelligentsia and Soviet contact with foreign officials, newsmen and delegations. Specifically this included: Soviet writers, artists (performing as well as visual,) members of the press and publishing enterprises, members of the medical profession, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Union of Friendship Societies, the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countires, trade unions, and the Directorate for Servicing the Diplomatic Corps (UPDK). The other Second Chief Directorate component created to perform some functions of the old Fourth Directorate was the Political Security Service, usually known simply as "the Service." Some of its components were geographic, responsible for various areas of the USSR. Some were functional, responsible for nationalities, religious groups, emigres, etc.

[redacted]

[redacted] that the KGB had organized a department for cultural affairs in order to cope with increased dissidence among Soviet intellectuals.* Then [redacted] reported the existence of a new Directorate responsible for counterintelligence among Soviet scientists and intelligentsia, the latter category including all Soviet journalists and members of the Writers Unions. [redacted], the new component has Chief Directorate status, is designated the Fifth Chief Directorate, and was not established until the first half of 1971. Staff for the new Chief Directorate, [redacted] was drawn from those Second Chief Directorate components which had inherited residual political dissidence counterintelligence functions after the 1959 KGB reorganization, and the Second Chief Directorate no longer has responsibilities in this area.** A KGB Fifth Directorate had formerly been responsible for political counterintelligence in a number of government ministries and other organs not under the old Fourth Directorate's purview, but this old Fifth Directorate had been abolished in 1959 at the same time as the Fourth. Whether a Fourth Directorate exists now or has existed at any time during Andropov's Chairmanship is not known; it is possible that the official concern for a relatively palatable KGB image, evident in recent years, argued for consigning the notorious Fourth Directorate designation to history.

[redacted]

[redacted]

A Moderate, Reformist Image

Despite these indications of Andropov's strong emphasis on internal political stability and orthodoxy, there have nevertheless been persistent reports from some in a position to have some feel for Andropov's outlook, that he is a reformer and a relative progressive in the Soviet context.

In June 1967 Soviet intellectuals spontaneously characterized the Andropov KGB appointment as "a very favorable development, especially for the intellectual world," describing Andropov as "an educated, intelligent and sympathetic man."* A couple of months later told that Andropov was highly intelligent, humane, personally courageous, and had well developed literary and artistic tastes. who knew Andropov fairly well in the mid 1950s has recalled him as more "democratic" and "humane" than the usual Soviet official. Most authoritatively of all,

identified with relatively "liberal" and flexible views, assessed the change in Chairmen as "a good thing," and characterized Semichastnyy as an old Stalinist and Andropov as reform-minded.*

It is noteworthy that reported Soviet characterizations of Andropov as a relative moderate have persisted in the face of what has definitely been a continuing overall crackdown by the regime and the KGB on all forms of intellectual expression and political unorthodoxy. reported that after the January 1969 Kremlin leadership assassination attempt, rumors circulated in Moscow intellectual circles that Andropov would be removed from the KGB job within six months because he was not enough of a hard-liner.** As recently as the weeks preceding the 24th Party Congress, rumors circulated in Moscow dissident circles that Andropov would be removed at the Congress. indicated was likely because of his views. characterized Andropov as a liberal by KGB standards, and said that Andropov had acquired a

** during a motorcade of cosmonauts and leaders on 22 January 1969, an attack was made on the lead car, apparently by someone among the Kremlin militia. Andropov's personal reaction to this most serious known threat to the leadership in recent years is not known.

sense of public opinion abroad from his Central Committee work with foreign parties. [redacted] then repeated a rumor that Andropov had once told the Central Committee that political trials are senseless things.*

This rumor of Andropov's alleged statement concerning political trials may be related to the assertion [redacted] Andropov is one of the leaders behind the current more flexible policy regarding Soviet Jews. [redacted] and was apparently well acquainted with other Moscow dissident circles [redacted], stated in [redacted] that the failure of the 1970 Leningrad trial of Soviet Jewish hijackers to intimidate Soviet Zionists, and the unexpected magnitude of foreign reaction, had allowed leadership "liberals" to press a more flexible Jewish policy on "neo-Stalinists." Controlled emigration was the most notable feature of the new policy, and these leadership "liberals," [redacted] committed their personal political prestige to it. Asked to identify members of this "liberal" faction, [redacted] replied that it

*Associated Press dispatch by Stephens Broening, Moscow, 29 March 1971. [redacted] also reported about the same time the existence of pre-Congress Moscow rumors that Andropov would be shifted to full time Central Committee duties. [redacted] did not comment on possible reasons.

might be difficult for Westerners to believe, but that "we" feel KGB Chairman Andropov is one of the "so-called liberals."*

Andropov's sharp intelligence is probably a relevant factor in explaining the apparent contradiction of a KGB Chairman who is strongly committed to strictly enforced political orthodoxy, but who also wins favorable comments from what must be considered liberal elements in Soviet society. It is enough of a novelty for Soviet intellectuals to find someone in the Party leadership, much less as KGB Chairman, who even understands the world of the intellectual, regardless of whether he agrees with their specific points of view, that this in itself can be some cause for encouragement. That this tough KGB boss is considered a relative progressive within the USSR, however, is of course also a comment on the nature of Soviet leadership.

Overall information available on Andropov suggests that realism and results temper his ideology, that he is comfortable with the more sophisticated element of the Central Committee's foreign affairs apparatus, and that he is a man impressed by competence, efficiency and effectiveness. It is thus probable that Andropov finds himself among those Soviet leaders who feel that the country cannot be run effectively without the services of its intellectual elite, much of which is to varying degrees disaffected, and that uniformly repressive tactics toward the disaffected are counterproductive.

[redacted] also included Shelepin in the group favoring a flexible policy toward Soviet Jews, adding that in his view Shelepin is using the issue of democratization in pursuit of his own political ambitions.

Apart [redacted] view of Andropov's support for a more flexible policy toward Soviet Jews, there is no information available on Andropov's personal role in the more complex mixture of repressive and relatively permissive tactics the KGB has in the last few years appeared to employ against actual or potential intellectual and political deviations. Selected arrests, trials and harsh sentences have alternated with dropped legal proceedings, milder sentences and exit permits; enough open opposition has been allowed to continue to serve both as a partial escape valve for protest and a check against more covert opposition less subject to control. What is known of Andropov's personality and outlook and of his approach to Bloc Party deviations, however, suggests that he bears considerable responsibility for the KGB's varied, and, (intermittently,) more sophisticated approach.

Subtler methods and tactical flexibility in pursuit of eventual political orthodoxy, whether in the world communist movement or in domestic Soviet life, do not necessarily, of course, result in more real tolerance on either front. Indeed, such tactics may prove more formidable than crude, simplistic repressive methods. In any conflict between Party leadership power and progressive ideas, Andropov could be expected to choose the former. His efforts, however, appear directed toward deriving the benefits of reform without its drawbacks by putting it to work under Party control and by avoiding, to the extent possible, those ultimate confrontations requiring the choice between Party power and reform.


SELECTIVE KGB ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Chairman
Y. V. Andropov
Secretariat
Collegium*
1st Deputy Chairman
S. K. Tsvigun
Deputy Chairmen
V. M. Chebrikov
G. K. Tsinev
A. N. Malygin
V. P. Pirozhkov
L. I. Pankratov
Moscow KGB, Chairman
V. I. Alidin
Other RSFSR KGB
Administrations
e.g. Leningrad
Other Republic KGBs
e.g. Ukraine
1st Chief Directorate
(foreign intelligence)
F. K. Mortin, Chief
V. A. Kryuchkov, 1st Dpty.
2nd Chief Directorate
(internal security &
counterintelligence)
G. F. Grigorenko, Chief
Border Guards
P. I. Zyryanov, Chief
9th (Guards)
Directorate
S. N. Antonov, Chief
3rd Directorate
(counterintelligence in
the Soviet armed forces)
Other Directorates
and Departments
Legend
lines of supervisory responsibility
lines of probable supervisory responsibility
(note: Although Chairman Andropov is only known to supervise the Ninth Directorate, KGB Chairmen have traditionally supervised personally the more important KGB components. As of 1961, e.g., Shelepin supervised personally the Moscow and Republic KGBs and the more important components of the First and Second Chief Directorates. It is likely Andropov has a similar arrangement. Which of the First Deputy and Deputy Chairmen supervise which other KGB components at this time is not known.)
*Current Collegium membership is believed to include the Chairman, First Deputy and Deputy Chairmen, most Directorate Chiefs, other KGB Chairmen of Moscow, Leningrad and the Ukraine, the Secretary of KGB Party Committee, and the head of the Chairman's Secretariat.

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IV. BREZHNEV'S EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE KGB

A. Restaffing the Top Level

Other key KGB personnel changes began almost immediately after Andropov had replaced Semichastnyy as Chairman. The sequence of purges and transfers has roughly followed the political sensitivity of the jobs involved, with the more critical positions being filled within the year or so after Andropov became Chairman, and other key Headquarters and provincial shifts continuing to the present time. Brezhnev's influence in these KGB personnel changes has not been all-pervasive, but it has appeared to dominate.

1. Leadership Protection: Antonov

The first KGB personnel change came shortly after Andropov was made Chairman. Not surprisingly, it involved command of the Ninth (Guards) Directorate, the organization charged with protecting the leadership. Directorate Chief Chekalov, a friend of the Khrushchev family, was replaced by Sergey Nikolayevich Antonov.

[redacted] reporting had placed Antonov as a Ninth Directorate Deputy Chief with the rank of Major General since 1965, but his earlier career shows an unusual variety of KGB experience

for a senior Ninth Directorate official.* Such officials are more typically promoted vertically from a career limited to VIP and related protection work. No information is available on Antonov career or patronage ties to any of the Soviet leaders. Given the high political sensitivity of the post of Ninth Directorate Chief, however, the approval of Brezhnev and the Party Secretariat to Antonov's appointment



S.N. ANTONOV
Chief Bodyguard

[redacted] reported that Antonov attended an advanced intelligence course at the KGB Institute in 1958-59, and then became Chief of the First Chief Directorate's First Department, responsible for operations against the US. In 1961 Antonov became Chief of the First Chief Directorate's Fifth (Mexico and South America) Department. In that job Antonov traveled widely on TDY, visiting Latin American countries and also parts of Europe and West Africa.

[redacted] reported that Antonov had a background in the Second Chief Directorate (internal counterintelligence). In October 1953 he was posted under First Chief Directorate auspices to the United Nations in New York, where he served under Trusteeship Council cover until June 1958, presumably working against American targets.

were undoubtedly required. Possibly Politburo approval was necessary as well, but there is no evidence on this point.*

2. A Brezhnevite Extra First Deputy Chairman: Tsvigun

Brezhnev's influence was more directly revealed in the third key KGB personnel change. Semen Kuz'mich Tsvigun became a First Deputy Chairman almost immediately after the May-June 1967 replacements of the Chairman and the Ninth Directorate Chief.

On 22 June 1967 Tsvigun was released from his duties as KGB Chairman in Azerbaydzhan, where he had served since October 1963. He probably was made a First Deputy Chairman at KGB Headquarters shortly thereafter, although he was not publicly identified in the job until December 1967.** Tsvigun had served in

*[redacted] information of the early 1960s indicated that the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department reviewed all KGB personnel appointments, with particular attention to those at the Deputy Department Chief level and above. [redacted] It is not known, however, what level of KGB appointments are also reviewed in the Party Secretariat. Overall information on current Party-KGB relationships would suggest the Secretariat may well concern itself especially with KGB appointments at the Deputy Directorate Chief level and above. Apart from approving the Chairman himself, the extent of Politburo involvement in KGB appointments is unknown.

**In a 20 December 1967 Red Star article commemorating the 50th anniversary of the state security organs.

unspecified KGB work in Moldavia during at least part of Brezhnev's 1950-52 First Secretary stint there. Tsvigun remained in Moldavia and gained membership in the Republic Party's Bureau during Brezhnev's early years in the central Party Secretariat in Moscow, when Brezhnev's patronage in Moldavia remained strong. By January 1957 Tsvigun had moved on to Tadzhikistan as KGB Deputy and in April he was identified as Chairman. This transfer to Tadzhikistan may be an example of an appointment in the state security sphere of administrative organs influenced by Brezhnev during his first (1957-60) period of service in the Secretariat.* Tsvigun's election in 1966 both as a voting delegate to the 23rd CPSU Congress and to the USSR Supreme Soviet may also have been due to Brezhnev patronage. Pre-24th CPSU Congress rumors circulated in the early spring of 1971 to the effect that Tsvigun is a relative of Brezhnev's. An associated rumor held that Tsvigun might replace Andropov as KGB Chairman at the

S.K. TSVIGUN
First Deputy Chairman

*See p. 4 above.

Congress.* This, of course, did not happen, but these rumors nevertheless suggested a widespread and apparently well-founded conviction in Moscow official circles that Tsvigun is Brezhnev's man. Another strong indication that this is indeed the case was furnished when Tsvigun was elected a candidate member of the Central Committee at the 24th Congress. KGB First Deputy Chairmen have rarely held this Party rank.**

The Tsvigun appointment also marked the first time the KGB has had two First Deputy Chairmen. Zakharov stayed on for almost three more years, apparently functioning with full authority. The unprecedented co-existence of two KGB First Deputy Chairmen throughout this period apparently represented a political expedient for Brezhnev until Zakharov could be eased out. In about April 1970, this was finally managed; Zakharov disappeared. A 29 April 1970 Associated Press story sourced to "Russian informants" claimed Zakharov was no longer second in command at the KGB, and that a number of his underlings had also been dismissed. Information is not available to confirm the latter portion of this report, but Zakharov's departure from the KGB must be presumed confirmed by his long complete absence in all reporting and his failure to gain

*There is no information confirming the relative report; full information is lacking, however, on both Brezhnev's and Tsvigun's families.

**The last to do so was Konstantin Fedorovich Lunev, KGB First Deputy Chairman from 1953 to 1959 and a Khrushchev protegé. He was elected a Central Committee alternate member at the 20th Party Congress in 1956.

election either as a Deputy to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1970 or as a voting delegate the next year to the 24th Party Congress. He had received both political honors in 1966.

N.S. ZAKHAROV
First Deputy Chairman
1963-70

His replacement, Tsvigun, is the most prolific author of the senior KGB officers. Tsvigun has but one basic theme, vigilance against internal and external subversion. He has been repeating this message with minimal variation since at least January 1958, or long before holding his present high position. All senior career KGB officers who write for publication stress the vigilance theme, but Tsvigun does it more persistently and crudely than most. He has also bitterly opposed artists and intellectuals out of step with orthodoxy, denouncing Nobel laureat Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn among others as "rejects of society." In general he is a model of the repressive and unimaginative, but also shrewd and able, type of KGB officer.

A Moscow dissident who told a Western journalist shortly before the 24th Party Congress than Andropov is a "liberal," by KGB standards, said of Tsvigun: "Andropov's Deputy (Tsvigun) is another matter. He is a Brezhnev man. His succession would mean a much more strict atmosphere."*

*Associated Press dispatch from Moscow by Stephens Broening, 29 March 1971.


KEY KGB PERSONNEL CHANGES SINCE MAY 1967
Job (in approximate order of political importance)
Chairman
Chief, Guards Directorate (9th)
First Deputy Chairmen
Deputy Chairmen
2nd Chief Directorate Chief (Internal Security)
Moscow KGB Chairman
Chief, 3rd Directorate (Armed Forces Security)
Chief, Border Guards
First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelligence)
Ukraine KGB Chairman
Leningrad KGB Chairman
Prior to May 1967
16 May 1967
June 1967
August 1967
October 1967
December 1967
1968
1969
Late 1969
April 1970
July 1970
Late 1970
by March 1971
by June 1971
ca. July 1971
Semichastnyy
Andropov
Chekalov
Antonov
Zakharov
Tsvigun*
Perepelitsyn
Chebrikov*
Bannikov
Malygin*
Pankratov
Pirozhkov*
Gribanov
Tsinev*
Tsinev
Grigorenko
Svetlichnyy
Lyalin*
Alidin*
(possibly Tsinev)
(possibly earlier)
Fedorchuk
Zyryanov
Chief Sakharovskiy
Mortin
1st Deputy Mortin
Kryuchkov
Nikitchenko
Fedorchuk
Shumilov
Nosyrev*
*Only approximate date of succession known
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3. New Deputy Chairman Chebrikov

The next important KGB appointment after Tsvigun's June 1967 move from Azerbaydzhan to Headquarters also showed Brezhnev's hand. Career Dnepropetrovsk Party official Viktor Mikhaylovich Chebrikov was not publicly identified as a KGB Deputy Chairman until October 1969,* but he probably went to KGB Headquarters soon after his October 1967 release from his duties as Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom Second Secretary "in connection with his leaving for a new post outside the Ukrainian SSR." It is quite likely that he became a KGB Deputy Chairman shortly thereafter. Two Deputy Chairmen jobs had become vacant in 1967. One Deputy, Perepelitsyn, died in August 1967 after a long illness, and another, Bannikov, was transferred in October to the USSR Supreme Court. Chebrikov's specific Deputy Chairman duties are not clear.**

*Izvestiya on 11 October 1969 listed Chebrikov as a KGB Deputy Chairman in reporting his presence among officials greeting Brezhnev and a delegation returning from East Berlin. The occasion for Chebrikov's press identification is somewhat unusual; KGB Deputies are normally identified in the press in connection with Chekist anniversaries or their election to Party or government posts. The context in which Chebrikov was surfaced served to underline his Party background and his ties to Brezhnev.

**On 11 September 1971 Chebrikov was noted in the Soviet press receiving an East German Border Guards delegation. He may thus supervise the Border Guards, but could of course have other duties as well.

Available information on Chebrikov dates back only to 1961, when, however, he was already Party First Secretary in Dnepropetrovsk City. In January 1963 he moved up to the Dnepropetrovsk Party Obkom level as Second Secretary. Chebrikov's long Party service in Brezhnev's old stronghold of Dnepropetrovsk presumably means he has the patronage of the General Secretary, and additionally of Politburo members Kirilenko and Shcherbitskiy, both of whom also have power bases in the Oblast. Chebrikov's high political standing was formalized at the 24th Party Congress when he was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee.

Tsvigun's and Chebrikov's Central Committee alternate memberships in one sense upgrade the political power and prestige of the KGB, since other recent KGB First Deputy or Deputy Chairmen had not held this high political rank. The important point, however, is that they are almost certainly Central Committee alternates because of their association with Brezhnev and his allies. Indeed, Chebrikov's KGB appointment from a career Party rather than state security professional background is a case of the state security bodies being "strengthened by cadres who are politically mature," a goal to which Brezhnev referred in his report to the 24th Congress.

4. Deputy Chairman Malygin:

The other new Deputy Chairman probably named in 1967 was General Major Ardalion Nikolayevich Malygin. It is not known whether he has political patronage ties to Brezhnev. He has, however, been reported to be a friend of [redacted] also said Malygin was "formerly" in Party work (capacity and date unspecified) in Moscow.*

Although not identified as a KGB Deputy Chairman in the press until 14 March 1968, the nature of a December 1967 Chekist 50th anniversary article by Malygin all but confirmed his KGB status, though this was not explicitly acknowledged. As of late 1968, Malygin was chief of the KGB Personnel Directorate as well as a Deputy Chairman.

The fragmentary information available on Malygin suggests he might have worked in the KGB for a number of years before 1967-68, perhaps since at least 1961 Even if Malygin has been in the KGB since the early 1960s, he could of course have known Andropov from earlier Party work.

There has been no reporting on Malygin's possible KGB duties apart from supervising personnel matters. His infrequent writings have stressed traditional KGB themes of citizen vigilance against foreign subversion, with emphasis on the dangers of its more subtle forms and on Soviet youth as a prime target group.*

*See "Knights of the Revolution," Komsomol'skaya Pravda, 29 December 1967, and Komsomolets Turkmenistana, 15 January 1970.

[redacted]

5. Brezhnev's Client Tsinev

G.K. TSINEV
Deputy Chairman

The 1967-69 double promotion of Georgiy Karpovich Tsinev is perhaps the clearest case of a KGB officer with career ties to Brezhnev receiving top KGB jobs.

[redacted] reported that as of 1968 Tsinev was Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. This Directorate is one of the largest of the KGB's components, and its mission, internal security and counter-intelligence, is the KGB's most important one. A December 1967 article by Tsinev on the Chekist 50th anniversary suggests he may well already have become Second Chief Directorate Chief by that time.** In late 1969, [redacted] Tsinev was further promoted to a KGB Deputy Chairmanship.

[redacted]

**"Fighters of the Invisible Front," Sovetskaya Rossiya, 20 December 1967, which lauded KGB vigilance against foreign subversion in the USSR. Both the content and the authoritativeness of the article suggest Tsinev was writing as Second Chief Directorate Chief.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Born in Dnepropetrovsk, Tsinev in 1939 became a Secretary in the city Party apparatus. Brezhnev was then a Secretary of Dnepropetrovsk Obkom, and Shchelokov, now MVD Chief, was then Dnepropetrovsk City First Secretary and thus Tsinev's immediate boss. Tsinev served in the notorious wartime military counter-espionage organization, "Smersh," and had a postwar tour in Austria.* From about 1954 to 1958 he was Chief of the KGB Third (counterintelligence in the armed forces) Directorate's Potsdam office with the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany.**

*reported that as of 1944-45 Tsinev was Chief of Smersh in one of the Soviet armies, and by the end of the war a Smersh Deputy Chief of one of the fronts. From about April 1946 until September 1951 Tsinev served in Austria, during the last two years as Deputy High Commissioner. Deryabin said that Tsinev was a protegé of Viktor Semenovich Abakumov, Chief of Smersh until he was rewarded with the State Security Chairmanship following his successful political attack on Beriya, Malenkov and their deputies in 1946. Tsinev fell into disfavor in 1951 when Abakumov in turn was ousted through Beriya and Malenkov's successful exploitation of the "Doctor's Plot" against him. According to Tsinev found refuge as chief of military counterintelligence in an (unknown) military district in the USSR, with the help of Petr Ivanovich Ivashutin, who by 1951 was Deputy Chief of the Third Directorate and Tsinev's colleague from earlier simultaneous service in Austria.

**Ivashutin, Tsinev's earlier angel, had become Third Directorate Chief in 1953. This job and Beriya's downfall put him in a position to aid Tsinev's

(footnote continued on page 68)

[redacted] suggest that Tsinev had retained his ties to Brezhnev, who in February of that year left the job of Kazakhstan First Secretary and became a member of the central Party Secretariat and an alternate member of the Party Presidium. [redacted]

[redacted] reported that from about 1960 to at least 1964, Tsinev, who already held the high rank of General Lieutenant, was Second Deputy Chief of the Third Directorate and simultaneously head of its own Special Directorate, created about 1960 and responsible for counterintelligence in the Soviet rocket forces and

(footnote continued from page 67)
career again if he so wished. [redacted]

*See p. 5 above. [redacted] had indicated Mironov, the future chief of the Central Committee Administrative Organs Department, was a Colonel in the Third Directorate as of October 1955, when Tsinev got together with him and his wife during a vacation trip to Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

[redacted]

at nuclear weapons sites. Tsinev may well have served for a time as Chief of the Third Directorate before taking over the Second Chief Directorate, although this is not definitely known.

Brezhnev's patronage doubtless played a role in Tsinev's various KGB promotions, and in his more recent 24th Party Congress political honor of election to the Central Auditing Commission. A KGB Deputy Chairman has not previously been accorded this political standing, which ranks just below Central Committee status.

The Late 1967 Altered KGB Political Profile

Thus, by the advent of Tsinev as Second Chief Directorate Chief in late 1967 or early 1968, the political balance in the top KGB Headquarters jobs had clearly shifted away from the Shelepin team. Tsinev joined a new Ninth Directorate Chief, Antonov; an extra First Deputy Chairman, Tsvigun; and two new Deputy Chairmen, Chebrikov and Malygin, replacing Bannikov and Perepelitsyn. Of the old team, only First Deputy Chairman Zakharov and Deputy Chairman Pankratov remained at this level. Three of the new team -- Tsvigun, Chebrikov and Tsinev -- had discernible career patronage ties to Brezhnev.

6. Postscript: The Sixth Deputy Chairman

In the four years since Brezhnev made this initial cluster of clear-cut gains at the top level of the KGB, the group of Deputy Chairmen has remained fairly stable. Two further changes apparently responsive to Brezhnev's interests have already been noted: the further promotion of Tsinev from Chief of the Second Chief Directorate to Deputy Chairman in late 1969, and the removal of First Deputy Chairman Zakharov in about April 1970. There has been one additional appointment in the last year. Elections to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in June 1971 disclosed the existence of another KGB Deputy Chairman, Vladimir Petrovich Pirozhkov.

Although the information on Pirozhkov is limited, his background is clearly that of a Party apparatchik rather than of a KGB professional. In February 1953 he was elected a Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of Altay Kray, where he was subsequently an activist in the Virgin Lands development campaign. As of January 1965 he had become Chief of the Kray's Party Organizational Work (cadres) Department. Pirozhkov had probably entered KGB work by November 1969. Nothing firm is known of Pirozhkov's political ties to the Party leadership, although his membership in the 1971 RSFSR Supreme Soviet, shared only by Tsinev among the other KGB Deputy Chairmen, suggests that Pirozhkov does enjoy some political patronage.

Apart from the unresolved question of Pirozhkov's political affiliations, the most notable aspect of the Pirozhkov appointment is that it adds a third new Deputy Chairman who had spent almost all his earlier career as a Party official rather than as a professional KGB officer. Pirozhkov joins Chebrikov and Malygin in this category. The trend evidences an apparent concensus in the Party leadership of a need to extend Party apparatus influence within top KGB management ranks.

Finally, if Pankratov, the last KGB Deputy Chairman holdover from the Khrushchev-Shelepin-Semichastnyy KGB, still retains this position,* there are now six KGB Deputy Chairmen: First Deputy Tsvigun and Deputies Chebrikov, Tsinev, Malygin, Pirozhkov, and Pankratov. This is an unprecedented number. The postwar years have normally seen four Deputy Chairmen (including the First Deputy), and occasionally five.

B. The Second Echelon: A Mixed Picture

Meanwhile, Brezhnev's transformation of the top level of the KGB has been matched by comparable turnover at the next echelon below, but here the evidence is much less firm on the degree of success Brezhnev has had in inserting personal adherents in key jobs. In part this may merely reflect the thinner political information available about lower-ranking individuals, at least some of whom are likely to be Brezhnev followers who have not had the opportunity to advertise the fact in the

manner of Deputy Chairmen Tsvigun or Tsinev. Moreover, at least two and probably three of the new appointees are believed to have ties with the close Brezhnev adherent Tsinev; to the degree that these appointments reflect any Tsinev influence they are all the more likely to mean gains for Brezhnev.

On the other hand, certain portions of the KGB -- notably the First Chief Directorate and a few of the republic KGB Chairmen -- apparently remain enclaves of some continued Suslov or Shelepin influence. In the case of the First Chief Directorate, which deals with foreign operations, this may reflect a recognized right of Suslov to be consulted on appointments affecting his sphere of responsibility. Thirdly, there is good reason to believe that at least one recent appointment represents primarily the desires and influence of Andropov himself, and only secondarily the wishes of his Party superiors. There are probably other such cases; it would be surprising if the KGB Chairman were not successful in making at least a few important appointments favorable to his personal interests, as Semichastnyy and Shelepin did before him.* Also, it must be assumed that many of the apparent Brezhnev KGB protegés are satisfactory to Andropov. And finally, of course, professional seniority is an important factor in key postings, although less important than politcal considerations. The present head of the First Chief Directorate, for example, was previously its deputy chief.

*At least two men who served under Andropov in Budapest when he was Ambassador to Hungary in the 1950s now hold key KGB positions: V.A. Kryuchkov, the First Deputy Chief of the First Chief Directorate, and G.F. Grigorenko, the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate. And as previously noted, one of the new KGB Deputy Chairmen, A.N. Malygin, is reported to be a personal friend of Andropov.

The roster of key jobs at the second level of the KGB will be surveyed in the rough order of their sensitivity.* The most important such post has already been discussed; as noted earlier, the chief of the Ninth (Guards) Directorate, which shepherds the Party leadership, was replaced shortly after Andropov took command.

1. The Second Chief Directorate After Tsinev

The next most important position at this level, the prime Soviet internal security job of Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, became vacant when the Brezhnevite Tsinev moved up to become a Deputy Chairman in late 1969. It is quite possible that Tsinev still supervises some KGB internal security and counter-intelligence activities at the higher level, and his Third Directorate background would also make some supervisory responsibility for counterintelligence in the armed forces logical. Given the importance of the Second Chief Directorate's internal security mission, however, it is probable that Andropov personally shares its supervision, as KGB Chairman Shelepin did as of 1961.

*The amount of information available on personnel changes in each of these KGB organizations is not proportionate to their relative importance. It is for this reason that much more detail will follow about appointments in the First Chief Directorate than in the Second Chief Directorate.

According Tsinev was succeeded as Second Chief Directorate head by Grigoriy Fedorovich Grigorenko. Although Grigorenko's early state security career had been in the Second Chief Directorate, his job from 1962 until at least 1968 had been head of Service Number Two (counterintelligence and security abroad) in the First (foreign) Chief Directorate. Grigorenko has career ties with Andropov which go back to common experience of the Hungarian Revolution. He served as KGB counterintelligence advisor in Budapest from about 1955 to 1957, when Andropov was Ambassador to Hungary.* Whether Grigorenko has additional political ties to the Party leadership is unknown, but his political standing seems evident from his election as a 24th Party Congress delegate in 1971. The KGB Second Chief Directorate boss had not been a delegate to the 23rd Party Congress in 1966.

*According Grigorenko had worked from the early 1940s until 1955 in the Second Chief Directorate becoming a deputy department chief. Within several months after returning to Moscow from Budapest in 1957, Grigorenko transferred into the First Chief Directorate. He headed its Department "D" (disinformation operations, later renamed Department and then Directorate "A,") until becoming Chief of Service Number Two in about February 1962. That Grigorenko retained his Service Number Two job until he became Second Chief Directorate Chief seven years later is suggested

2. The Moscow KGB

Probably the next most sensitive job is that of the Moscow City and Oblast KGB Chairman, who also was apparently replaced by sometime late in 1967. Mikhail Petrovich Svetlichnyy, the incumbent since the 1959 Shelepin KGB reorganization, was then succeeded by General Lieutenant Serafim Nikolayevich Lyalin, about whom little is known. By early 1971, however, General Major Viktor Ivanovich Alidin had become Moscow KGB Chairman, a further change probably reflecting the patronage of some part of the influential Ukrainian group in the central Party leadership.

Alidin's succession was implied by his election in February and March to the Moscow City and Oblast Party Committees and as a delegate to the 24th Party Congress, when Lyalin failed of re-election or election in all three. Alidin was then identified in the press as the Moscow City and Oblast Chairman on the occasion of his election to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in June 1971. A former Chief of the Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, Alidin's KGB career may go back as far as 1961.

identify Alidin as Chief of the Seventh Directorate from at least mid-1963 to at least July 1967. He probably remained in this position until moving to the Moscow KGB in 1971;

The factor most pertinent to Alidin's receipt of the Moscow KGB job in 1971 is his probable identity with Viktor I. Alidin, who as of August 1945 was Chief of the Organizational-Instruction Department of the Ukrainian Central Committee.* It is thus quite likely that Alidin had early career ties to one or more of the Ukrainian leaders in the Politburo (Brezhnev, Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, Podgornyy, Polyanskiy and Shelest.)

3. The Third Directorate - Source of Reliable Cadres

The KGB's Third Directorate is responsible for counterintelligence in the Soviet armed forces, and thus shares with the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense ultimate responsibility for the security and political reliability of the military. The Third Directorate has had three, and possibly four Chiefs since 1966-67. The rapid turnover has probably not resulted from political purging, but apparently instead from promotions or lateral transfers into other key KGB responsibilities.

*John A. Armstrong, "The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite," New York, Praeger, 1959, p. 86, quoting a 25 August 1945 Ukrainian press source. Alidin as the Ukrainian cadre specialist was then directly supervised by two Soviet leaders who have since risen and fallen: Khrushchev, who was then Ukrainian First Secretary, and Kirichenko, who was the Ukrainian Party Secretary in charge of cadres. If Alidin remained in his job another year, he must have taken some part in the July 1946 posting of Brezhnev as First Secretary of the Zaporozhe Oblast Party Committee -- an important step up for the future General Secretary.

As of early 1966, the Chief of the Third Directorate was still General Lieutenant Ivan Anisomovich Fadeykin, who had headed the Directorate since 1961. By 1967, Fadeykin had left Headquarters to become KGB Resident in East Berlin (i.e., chief of the large and important KGB field office there). If Tsinev served briefly as Chief of the Third Directorate for a time before becoming, by early 1968, head of the Second Chief Directorate, it would have been from 1966 or early 1967, when Fadeykin left for Berlin.

The next definite identification of a Third Directorate Chief is not until 1969, [redacted] reported that it was a General Lieutenant Fedorchuk. This is almost certainly General Lieutenant Vitaliy Vasilyevich Fedorchuk, whom [redacted] had previously reported was from at least 1952 to 1954 Deputy Chief of the KGB's 00 Unit ("Special Section," the designation of working level offices of the Third Directorate in the field), attached to the Soviet occupation forces in Baden, Austria.

Fedorchuk's articles and activities over the years indicate he remained in the Third Directorate after returning to Moscow.* [redacted] nas said he was sure Tsinev was a good friend of Fedorchuk's. [redacted] This friendship may have been partly responsible for Fedorchuk's politically important appointment to the Ukraine as KGB Chairman in July 1970, discussed below in the review of KGB republic chairmen. Fedorchuk's successor as chief of the Third Directorate has not been identified.

V.V. FEDORCHUK
Ukraine KGB Chairman

*Red Star on 19 December 1958 contained a Chekist anniversary article by General V. Fedorchuk called "The Army Chekists' Combat Path" and clearly about Third Directorate activities. In October 1962 General Major V. Fedorchuk addressed a conference of military propagandists at the Frunze military club. In the 1967 issue #24 of Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil. he had an article on the Chekists in the armed forces. In the 1969 issue #2 of the Soviet Air Defense journal, Fedorchuk, then a General Lieutenant, co-authored an article, "Poisonous Weapons of Imperialists in the Propaganda Field."

[redacted]

[redacted]

4. The Leningrad KGB

A new Leningrad City and Oblast KGB Chairman was appointed sometime late in 1970, removing a Shelepin protege, Vasiliy Timofeyevich Shumilov.* The removal of Shumilov followed close on the heels of the September 1970 replacement as Leningrad Oblast Party boss of V.S. Tolstikov, who had appeared in the middle and late 1960s to be allied with Brezhnev's opponents. It appears likely that Shumilov's removal, an apparent minor Brezhnev gain, was facilitated by the major Brezhnev gain, the Tolstikov removal.

There is, however, once again only very indirect evidence of a tie between Shumilov's replacement and the Brezhnev coterie. The new Leningrad Chairman, publicly identified in January 1971, is General Lieutenant Daniil Pavlovich Nosyrev. Almost nothing is known of his background except that he may have served previously in the KGB's Third Directorate. He is possibly identical with or related to a colleague and friend of Tsinev's from the mid-1970s. If so, he is yet another case of a man from this circle filling a top job under Brezhnev and Andropov's aegis.

*Before following Shelepin into the KGB in 1960 as Leningrad Chairman, Shumilov had served under Shelepin as Leningrad Oblast Komsomol First Secretary from 1953 to 1959, and was then briefly Party First Secretary of Vyborg Gorkom. Following his removal from the Leningrad KGB in late 1970, Shumilov has dropped completely out of sight.

(footnote continued on page 80)

5. Status Quo in the Border Guards

The Border Guards, intrinsically sensitive in the closed society of the USSR, have had an additional political importance since the March 1969 Chinese border clashes. The Border Guards troops did most of the fighting then, and now patrol the uneasy truce that accompanies Soviet-Chinese border negotiations. The current Soviet leadership has appeared satisfied with the man who has commanded the Border Guards since at least June 1957, General Lieutenant Pavel Ivanovich Zyryanov. [redacted] indicates he was still in this position as of mid-1971. Zyryanov has no known ties to the leaders but has had a long and distinguished career since 1957 in the border troops, and in uniformed state security troops in the interior of the USSR for ten years before that. Continuing Politburo confidence in him can be surmised from his

(footnote continued from page 79)

[redacted]

appointment with the rank of Deputy Minister to head the Soviet delegation sent in June 1969 to open talks with the Chinese on border river navigation. He was also a 24th Party Congress delegate in 1971.

6. The First Chief Directorate

Personnel changes at the very top of the KGB's First Chief Directorate did not come until 1971. Then, strong KGB professional continuity in the job of Chief was balanced with an important influx of Party influence in the appointment as First Deputy Chief of Andropov's own closest long-time aide, Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov. Any specific Brezhnev influence would seem to be only indirect, however.

The First Chief Directorate is responsible for foreign operations, including positive intelligence collection, counterintelligence operations and political action operations. Its mission is less closely related to the Party leadership's struggle to gain and keep power than is the work of other, internal security, KGB components. Hence the First Chief Directorate's key personnel appointments are of somewhat less direct political sensitivity to the leadership. However, the First Chief Directorate can have an indirect bearing on leadership power struggles through its performance. When its work is inadequate or embarrassing, the resulting foreign policy disarray can be used by opponents of the dominant Party leader or faction as ammunition in a policy debate aimed at undermining the political authority of the current leaders. For example, in the period leading up to the June 1967 Six Day War between the Arabs and Israelis Soviet intelligence services seriously miscalculated both the lengths to which Soviet goading would push the Arabs and the capacity

of the Arabs to hold out in the war that resulted. Shelepin and other opponents of Brezhnev used the Middle East fiasco in a serious challenge to the General Secretary's leadership at a June 1967 Central Committee Plenum.

Nevertheless, Colonel General Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Sakharovskiy, who had been head of the First Chief Directorate since sometime before July 1959,** remained its Chief under Andropov's regime until 1971, with Fedor Konstantinovich [illegible] serving throughout this period, as he had since 1963, as Sakharovskiy's First Deputy Chief. reported that Sakharovskiy had the reputation among KGB officers of being an individual who would tolerate no criticism or insubordination, did little work, showed no initiative, and was considered by many an ineffective head of the First Chief Directorate.***

**

have reported that Sakharovskiy's [illegible] as Chief of the First Chief Directorate was preceded by service before 1947 as head of the state security Austro-German section, a brief tour around 1948 as a deputy in the Scandinavian Department, and in the late 1940s a tour in Rumania as an intelligence adviser. Returning to Headquarters by 1952, Sakharovskiy in March 1953 became head of the Advisors (i.e. Bloc) Section, where he apparently remained until taking over the First Chief Directorate later in the decade.

F.K. MORTIN
First Chief
Directorate Chief

If this dubious view of Sakharovskiy's professional stature was even partially justified, his survival until mid-1971 suggests he has one or more highly placed patrons. Who that might be is unknown.*

reported that on or before 15 July 1971 Mortin replaced Sakharovskiy as head of the First Chief Directorate.** Mortin's apprenticeship had been a long one. A First Chief Directorate officer since about 1955, he had become a Deputy Chief of the

*Suslov would be a logical initial guess (but only that), because of his predominant influence for many years in foreign affairs. Suslov and Sakharovskiy are also close in age; Suslov is 69 and Sakharovskiy, according to clandestine reporting, is in his early 70s. Sakharovskiy was elected a 24th Congress delegate in March 1971, an indication of his then continued political good standing.

** It was rumored that Sakharovskiy had either retired or become a special consultant to Andropov. The former seems the more likely possibility. has reported that Sakharovskiy is now over 70, has twice been seriously ill in recent years, and as of mid-1971 was working only about one week a month.

Directorate in 1961, and was its First Deputy Chief by January 1964. As of late 1965 he was Acting Chief of the Directorate during a serious illness of Sakharovskiy's.*

has said that Mortin, who had been promoted to be a First Chief Directorate Deputy under Shelepin, was one of the senior KGB officers most loyal to the former Chairman.

Kryuchkov

If the report that Mortin was a Shelepin protegé is accurate, it sheds additional light on the choice of Kryuchkov to succeed him as the First Deputy head of the Chief Directorate. described Kryuchkov as a friend of Andropov's, a judgment abundantly supported

*Mortin once served in the Central Committee's Administrative Organs Department, probably in the early 1950s before moving to the KGB's First Chief Directorate. He has had a number of temporary duty assignments overseas, but is not known to have served a full tour abroad. has reported that from about 1967 to 1969 Mortin was on leave from the First Chief Directorate to serve as Chief of the KGB's Intelligence Institute, its advanced academy for senior, especially First Chief Directorate, officers.

by the two men's careers. They have been almost continuously closely associated since early 1957, about the time that Kryuchkov joined Andropov's Budapest Soviet Embassy staff as a Third Secretary. Kryuchkov remained in Hungary at least two years after Andropov returned in 1957 to head the Central Committee Bloc Department. By August 1961, when Kryuchkov was so identified in the Soviet press, he had himself become an advisor to a "sector" (principal subdivision) in an unspecified Central Committee Department. This was probably the sector of the Bloc Department responsible for Hungary, for in 1962 he published an article on Hungary.* By November 1973, Kryuchkov was probably chief of the Bloc Department's Hungarian sector.** Sometime during 1965 he became a principal aide to Bloc Department Chief Andropov.***

*"The Five Year Plan for Developing the Hungarian People's Republic, 1961-65," V.Kryuchkov, Planovoye Khozyaystvo No. 2, 1962.

**In November 1963 Kryuchkov was described in the Soviet press as head of a Central Committee sector; the occasion was his travel to Hungary with a high level CPSU delegation. Kryuchkov published at least three additional articles on Hungary in the 1963-65 period, mainly on economic subjects and all characterized by their notably authoritative Party line.

***As early as February 1965 Kryuchkov had been described in the Soviet press as a "responsible worker of the Central Committee," rather than associated with a particular sector.

Andropov took Kryuchkov with him to the KGB, probably to the Chairman's Secretariat. New KGB Chairmen have traditionally brought their own men to this very powerful and pivotal body.

said of the KGB Secretariat Chief that he has higher administrative rank than any of the Deputy Chairmen.

The appointment of Kryuchkov as second in command of the First Chief Directorate inserts Andropov's long time right hand man into a key role in KGB foreign intelligence collection and espionage. Mortin's succession as Directorate Chief probably means that the Brezhnev faction in the Party leadership cannot yet completely dominate all the key KGB personnel assignments, and it may also represent some remaining Shelepin influence.** If so, the relative political importance of the First Chief Directorate's First Deputy Chief slot would increase. Kryuchkov has no known direct ties to Brezhnev. However, the decision to place a man with Kryuchkov's level of Central Committee apparatus background, and with his close personal and professional ties to Andropov, into a key KGB Directorate level operational command job is a compelling illustration of the Party leadership's determination to extend general Party control further down into KGB management ranks.

**Mortin could, of course, have additional patrons in the leadership. In the last decade he could also have acquired political loyalties other than to Shelepin.

If Party concern with First Chief Directorate deficiencies of the sort evident in connection with the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was also one factor in the Kryuchkov appointment, it would underline the irony that this personnel change preceded by only a few months the most embarrassing incident in the Directorate's history. This was the September 1971 British expulsion of 105 Soviet intelligence officers, after the detailed revelations of a KGB defector concerning Soviet espionage in Britain had provided the last straw to several years of insultingly blatant Soviet intelligence behavior in the UK. The magnitude of the humiliation suffered by the Soviet Party and government in the British case certainly suggests that some First Chief Directorate policy and personnel changes are quite possible, whatever mixture of actual responsibility and scapegoat hunting these might in fact reflect.*

One First Chief Directorate Deputy Chief was reported [redacted] to have been downgraded from that position at Andropov's instigation by late 1971, although precisely when this occurred and whether it was connected with the British embarrassment is unknown. [redacted] This is Vasiliy Vladimirovich Mozzhechkov, whom Shelepin had brought into the KGB from the Central Committee Administrative Organs Department sometime before 1962. It is more likely, however, that Andropov wanted Mozzhechkov sidetracked either because of operational ineffectiveness or because of his ties to Shelepin, or both.

*The implications of the British expulsion are more fully discussed below in connection with the KGB's institutional relation to policy (pp. 124-25), and in connection with its possible effect on Andropov's position (pp.140-41).

7. The KGB Party Committee Secretary

The present occupant of one additional KGB Headquarters job of political importance is not known. This is the Secretary of the Party Committee, which oversees the Party organization within the KGB. Virtually all KGB officers are Party members, and the KGB's Party organization is an additional important channel of Party contact and control within the KGB at all levels. The KGB Party Committee, [redacted] has the status of an oblast Party committee, and its Secretary has the status of an oblast First Secretary.

At the time of the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, Grigoriy Ivanovich Vlasenko, a Congress delegate, was officially listed as KGB Party Secretary. There is no information on when he was first appointed, but [redacted] has reported that Vlasenko, a Major General, still served in the KGB Party Committee as of 1969. Vlasenko has not been noted since, however, [redacted] He was not elected a 24th Party Congress delegate in March 1971, nor re-elected to the Moscow City Party Committee job he had previously also held. He has thus presumably been replaced as KGB Party Secretary. Nothing is known of Vlasenko's early background or political affiliations, nor has his replacement been identified.

[redacted]

[redacted]

C. The Republics: Slower Going for Brezhnev

Changes in the fourteen republic KGB Chairmen have come more slowly than at Headquarters. They also have failed to show the degree of Brezhnev influence apparent in the Headquarters personnel shifts. Although we lack information about the extent to which republic Party first secretaries and members of their secretariats participate in the selection of their local KGB chairmen, it seems probable that these local hierarchies have some voice in the matter, and that this has been an additional factor diluting Brezhnev's influence in these appointments.

In brief, the picture is this: Between a few months after Khrushchev's fall and early 1967 there were no changes among the republic KGB heads. In the first months of 1967 preceding Semichastnyy's May 1967 removal, there were three such shifts, two of which showed Shelepin at least holding his own and possibly making small gains in a period when in the larger context Brezhnev was placing him increasingly on the defensive. These apparent small steps forward for Shelepin -- in Lithuania and Moldavia -- have not been reversed to the present day. On the other hand, since Andropov took over the KGB, Brezhnev has made two apparent major gains among the republic KGB chairman: one in Azerbaydzhan in June 1967, the other, with Suslov's evident cooperation, in the Ukraine in July 1970. Four other shifts -- two in succession in Tadzhikistan, one in Uzbekistan, and one in Belorussia -- have left no clear political imprint. Finally, other republic KGB chairmen have been left totally undisturbed; their political affiliations are also unidentified, although it is conceivable that two long-term Shelepin-Semichastnyy holdovers in Estonia and Latvia may, like their neighboring colleague in Lithuania, retain some Shelepin sympathies.

The Early 1967 Shifts

The first 1967 appointee, Yuozas Yuosovich Petkyavichyus, has strong career ties to Shelepin and Semichastnyy.* Named Lithuanian KGB Chairman in January 1967, he has remained in this post.

The second early 1967 shift, in March, may also have redounded to Shelepin's benefit rather than Brezhnev's. Petr Vladimirovich Chvertko was transferred from the Kirgiz KGB, where he had been Chairman since 1961, to the KGB Chairmanship in Moldavia. Brezhnev, who was Party First Secretary in Moldavia from 1950 to 1953 and retained considerable influence there in later

*A Secretary of the Lithuanian Komsomol Central Committee by July 1953, Petkyavichyus was elected Komsomol First Secretary in July 1954 and served thus until at least mid-1958. (Shelepin was All Union Komsomol First Secretary from 1952 to 1958.) By at least March 1963 Petkyavichyus had followed Shelepin and Semichastnyy's trail into the KGB; he was identified at that time as KGB Deputy Chairman in Lithuania, becoming Chairman four years later. His Party standing, however, is not what his predecessor's was; the former Chairman was elected to the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966, whereas Petkyavichyus was not a delegate to the 24th Congress in 1971. Petyavichyus' durability might be accounted for both by the protection of the Lithuanian Party leadership, which has appeared cool toward Brezhnev, and possibly additionally by the patronage of Suslov, who presided over CPSU pacification of Lithuania in 1944-45 and is still believed to have personnel influence in the Republic.

years, might have been expected to be able early on to influence the selection of the Moldavian KGB Chairman. Moreover, Ivan Ivanovich Bodyul, Moldavian First Secretary since 1961, has early career ties to Brezhnev and has in recent years been an outspoken supporter of the General Secretary.* Chvertko has no known patronage ties to the Brezhnev group, however. Moreover, as in the case of Petkyavichyus, this has apparently cost him Party political honors which his predecessor had received. He was not elected a delegate to the 24th Party Congress, whereas his predecessor had been to the 23rd, nor was he one of seven Republic KGB Chairmen honored with election in 1970 to the USSR Supreme Soviet rather than to their Republic Supreme Soviets the following year. Chvertko's Moldavian KGB appointment may well have been the work of Yuriy Dmitriyevich Mel'kov, who became Second

*The year after Brezhnev's arrival in Moldavia, 1951, saw Bodyul enter Party work in the Republic after some six years there in agricultural administration. In 1956, when Brezhnev became a CPSU Central Committee Secretary, Bodyul went to Moscow for two years in the Higher Party School followed by a year in the Central Committee apparatus. In 1959, when Brezhnev was still a Secretary and had cadres responsibilities, Bodyul returned to Moldavia as Second Secretary. Beginning in 1968, Bodyul's speeches have contained deferential references to Brezhnev's leadership, and by the 24th Party Congress period he had become one of Brezhnev's more notable public boosters.

Secretary (traditionally the cadres position), in Moldavia in February 1967, only a month before Chvertko's move there. Mel'kov appears to have career ties with Shelepin and Semichastnyy.*

Chvertko's March 1967 departure from Kirgizia was followed by the April appointment of Dzhumbek Asankulov to the Kirgiz KGB Chairmanship. Unfortunately nothing is known of his background or ties; he was elected a 24th Party Congress delegate and remains Kirgiz Chairman.

*In 1954, while a Komsomol Secretary for Molotovskaya (later Perm) Oblast, Mel'kov was elected to the All-Union Komsomol Central Committee. (Shelepin was then Komsomol First Secretary, succeeded in 1958 by Semichastnyy.) In March 1959, a month after Semichastnyy had become Chief of the CPSU Central Committee Party Organs Department, Mel'kov, who had remained in the interim in Komsomol work, was identified as an Instructor in the CPSU Central Committee Party Organs Department. By early 1964 Mel'kov had become a Sektor Chief in the same department.

While nothing is known of Chvertko's background before his July 1961 appointment to the Kirgiz KGB Chairmanship, that occurred during Shelepin's KGB tenure. An additional hint that Chvertko may be allied with Shelepin rather than Brezhnev supporters came with a spate of early 1970 Soviet press criticism of the state of law enforcement activities in Moldavia, notably including one article by ex-Moldavian Brezhnev protege and current USSR MVD Chief Shchelokov, Mel'kov's Second Secretary predecessor in Moldavia. One of Shchelokov's points was the lack of effective coordination among the Moldavian KGB, MVD, courts and state attorneys. (Col. General N. Shchelokov, "Strengthen Socialist Legality, Fight Law Violations," Kishinev, Kommunist Moldavii No. 2, February 1970).

Republic KGB Changes Since May 1967

Since Andropov became KGB Chairman in May 1967, five Republic Chairmen have been replaced, two of these more than once. Two of these changes appear to have brought important gains to Brezhnev.

The first was the promotion of the Azerbaydzhan KGB deputy head, Geydar Alirza Aliyev, to the Chairmanship there to fill the vacancy caused by Tsvigun's June 1967 departure for Headquarters. Subsequently, in a unique post-Stalin promotion of a provincial KGB official into a first-rank Party post, Aliyev in July 1969 was made First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhan Party, replacing the apparent Shelepin protege Veli Yusufovich Akhundov.* Within a month after becoming First Secretary,

*Akhundov rose to power in the Azerbaydzhan Party very shortly after Shelepin and then Semichastnyy became successive heads of the Central Committee's Party Organs (cadres) Department in 1958, and in August 1959, Semichastnyy went to Azerbaydzhan to serve with Akhundov as the Moscow Party apparatus' representative in the traditional Second Secretary position. Brezhnev's sharp change from understanding for Azerbaydzhan's agricultural difficulties at the March 1965 Plenum to denunciation of Azerbaydzhan's agricultural shortcomings at the May 1966 Plenum suggests that Akhundov had lined up on the Shelepin side during the 1965 Brezhnev-Shelepin power struggle. Akhundov's eventual removal was presaged by the May 1968 appointment of a Brezhnev-Kirilenko man, S.N. Kozlov, as Azerbaydzhan Second Secretary.

Aliyev initiated a wide-ranging purge of Azerbaydzhan officials. Although Aliyev has no known early ties to the General Secretary's faction,* he has become a supporter of Brezhnev's leadership and policies, enthusiastically implementing the July 1970 Brezhnev-instigated agricultural program and contributing to the late 1970 pre-Congress wave of statements by certain leaders boosting Brezhnev's cult and relative standing.

Aliyev was replaced as Azerbaydzhan KGB Chairman by Vitaliy Sergeyevich Krasilnikov, on whom no background information is available. Given the thoroughness of the Azerbaydzhan purge of the last two years and Krasilnikov's election in 1970 to the USSR Supreme Soviet,** however, it seems safe to assume his good standing with the Brezhnev faction of the leadership.

The second apparent Brezhnev gain among the Republic KGB chairmen was scored when Fedorchuk, the chief of the Third Directorate and good firend of Brezhnev's client Tsinev, was transferred to head the Ukrainian KGB in July 1970.

It is likely that the Fedorchuk transfer was approved if not instigated by Brezhnev and his closer supporters plus at least Suslov. It probably was not agreeable to Podgornyy, to whom the Ukrainian KGB

*Aliyev's career prior to his identification in 1965 as Azerbaydzhan KGB Chairman is completely unknown.

**This is not an automatic Party honor for Republic KGB Chairmen. Almost half of them have been elected in recent years instead to the less politically prestigeous Republic Supreme Soviets.

Chairman incumbent since 1954, Vitaliy Fedotovich Nikitchenko, had career ties. Nikitchenko's KGB career was preceded by two decades of work in the Party apparatus of Kharkov Oblast, Podgornyy's original political stronghold. The Fedorchuk appointment may also have displeased Ukrainian First Secretary Shelest, although this is less clear.*

told of a foray into the Ukraine in the spring of 1970 by Suslov and Boris Nikolayevich Ponomarev, Party Secretary and longtime head of the Central Committee International Department, to chastise the Ukrainian Party for ideological laxness, especially for allegedly failing to take proper measures against contamination from the Czechoslovakian brand of counter-revolutionary ideas. The KGB shift soon thereafter thus may have been triggered by a central Party leadership decision to organize ideological tightening up in the Ukraine. This crackdown may well have offered a pretext for the Brezhnev group to substitute a member of the Tsinev-Third Directorate circle for an entrenched

*[redacted] included hearsay that Shelest (a) had not been informed in advance about Nikitchenko's removal and Fedorchuk's arrival, and (b) considered the whole episode a personal affront [redacted] Indications of earlier Shelest patronage ties to Podgornyy rather than to Brezhnev in the Khrushchev era, and of more recent generally cool Brezhnev-Shelest relations, both lend some credence to the latter contention if not the former. It seems most unlikely that Shelest, a full Politburo member himself, would not have known of the change in advance. Nevertheless, if seems possible that Shelest did oppose the move but was unable to prevent it.

Republic KGB Chairman who had ties to Podgornyy and possibly to Shelest, and who was a holdover from the Serov-Shelepin-Semichastnyy KGB. The Ukraine is politically the most important as well as the largest Soviet Republic outside the RSFSR,* and was thus a logical target for a KGB personnel change to the liking of Brezhnev and his supporters as soon as an opportunity presented itself. In any case, Fedorchuk's arrival in the Ukraine has in fact been followed by a series of arrests and harassments of liberal intellectuals, dissidents, and nationalists. And although Shelest himself appears to have highly orthodox ideological views, some Ukrainian nationalist intellectuals of whom Shelest has been fairly tolerant as part of his struggle to maximize political independence of Moscow have been among the victims of Fedorchuk's crackdown.

Meanwhile, Nikitchenko was soon publicly listed as engaged in "leading work" in the USSR KGB, almost certainly in the Moscow Headquarters.*** This assignment, whose exact nature is unknown, smacks of a sop to Podgornyy and a retirement post for Nikitchenko, now 63.

*Besides the Ukraine's historic and economic importance, and the fact that a large percentage of the current top Party leadership have their roots in its complex and factional politics, the Ukraine's nationalist movement and various cultural digressions present a major and continuing challenge to central Party orthodoxy.

***1970 Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, signed to the press 20 October.

Whether Brezhnev may have profited from other Republic KGB Chairman changes is less certain. The KGB Chairman in Tadzhikistan has been replaced twice in the last three years, but the political meaning, if any, of these changes is unclear. In May 1968 Mikhail Mikaylovich Milyutin, Chairman since Tsvigun's departure for Azerbaydzhan five years earlier, left, possibly for KGB Headquarters.* Milyutin's replacement was Sergey Georgiyevich Sazanov, about whom nothing is known and who was replaced in turn in November 1970 by Vasiliy Tarasovich Shevchenko, another unknown. The latter, however, has sufficient political standing to have been elected a 24th Congress voting delegate.

Also uncertain is the political significance of the November 1969 replacement of the Uzbek KGB Chairman, Sergey Ivanovich Kiselev, a career security officer who had held this job since 1963. He was succeeded by General Lieutenant Aleksey Dmitriyevich Beschastnov, who appears to have come from Moscow. Beschastnov is, however, one of the seven republic KGB Chairmen elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1970, and thus has above average political standing.

The most recent Republic KGB Chairman shift, in Belorussia in August 1970, removed Vasiliy Ivanovich Petrov, a career intelligence officer who had held this post

*The November 1970 announcement of Milyutin's removal from the Republic Party posts he had held in connection with the KGB Chairmanship stated he had left the Republic.

since the 1959 Shelepin KGB reorganization. He was replaced by Yakov Prokopyevich Nikulkin, another career security officer who was KGB Chairman of the Bashkir ASSR as of 1961. Petrov is only 53. His removal may well be another weeding-out of a Shelepin-Semichastnyy holdover, but neither the precise circumstances of his departure from the Belorussian KGB Chairmanship nor his fate are known.

Six Pre-Brezhnev-Andropov Holdovers

At least as important for Party leadership power alignments as these Republic KGB changes, however, are the other Republics in which the incumbent KGB Chairmen have held their jobs for varying periods since as early as 1954. One of these is Georgiy Stepanovich Yevdokimenko, a Ukrainian and a career state security officer of considerable breadth of experience,* who has been the

*A counterintelligence officer before World War II, Yevdokimenko served after the war in Austria as Chief of the counterintelligence Second Department, responsible for CI activities against foreigners. In 1950-51 he was a state security adviser in Hungary, in 1951-52 Deputy MVD Chief in Khabarovsk Kray, and in 1952-53 Chief of the state security counterespionage section within Soviet Military Intelligence (the GRU). In 1953 he returned to the foreign intelligence directorate as Chief of the Austro-German section, and from 1955 to 1959 he returned to advisor work, this time with the Polish Intelligence and Security Service. As of 1961-62 Yevdokimenko was back in internal security and counterintelligence work, as KGB Chairman in Krasnodar Kray in the Caucasus.

Chairman in Kazakhstan since November 1963. His political affiliations, if any, are unknown. Yevdokimenko's political standing has remained good throughout Brezhnev's power consolidation, nevertheless; he was a delegate to both the 23rd and 24th Party Congresses and elected to the USSR Supreme Soviet in 1970.* Also unknown are the political patronage affiliations of Leonid Il'ich Korobov, Turkman KGB Chairman since February 1965, and apparently a career Second Chief Directorate officer.

The other four Republic KGB Chairmen whose tenure predates 1965 are in Republics characterized by especially strong local Party traditions of stubborn self-assertion, often contrary to the prevailing winds from Moscow. This is particularly the case in Georgia, which has the "dean" of Republic KGB Chairmen. Aleksey Nikolayevich Inauri has been Chairman in Georgia ever since the reorganization of state security organs into the present KGB in April 1954.*** Only slightly less durable is Georgiy Artashesovich Badamyants, who has been KGB Chairman in Armenia since October 1954. The KGB Chairmen of Estonia and Latvia, Avgust Petrovich Pork and Longin Ivanovich Avdyukevich, have held their jobs since June 1961 and January 1963 respectively, making them Shelepin-Semichastnyy era holdovers, although not necessarily current Shelepin supporters.

*Although Brezhnev was a former Party First Secretary in Kazakhstan, he is not the only leader with patronage there.

***Georgia also has the "dean" among Republic Party First Secretaries, Vasiliy Pavlovich Mzhavanadze.

The Administrative Organs Department

There is unforturnately much less information available on the political affiliations of key personnel in the Central Committee Administrative Organs Department, which helps supervise the KGB, than on key officials in the KGB itself. The obscurity of the political ties of the Administrative Organs Department Chief, Savinkin, were discussed in Chapter Two, as was the apparent association of one of the Deputies, Laputin, with Kirilenko.* About the time in July 1968 that Savinkin formally became Chief after four years as Acting Chief, Nikolay Petrovich Mal'shakov was brought from Penza Oblast, where he had been Chairman of its Executive Committee probably since late 1965, to become Savinkin's First Deputy Chief.** Little is known of Mal'shakov's career, and there is no real evidence as to who his patron in the leadership might be.***

*see p. 17.

**Mal'shakov was relieved of his Penza Oblast posts in July 1968; he was identified in the Soviet press as Administrative Organs First Deputy Chief in October.

***It is unusual to become an Oblast Executive Committee First Secretary without a visible Party background, as Mal'shakov did; it is also unusual that he published nothing while there in this prominent a Party post. Three of Brezhnev's closest supporters in the Central Committee apparatus and leadership have come from Penza Oblast, (Fedor Davidovich Kulakov, now a full Politburo member as well as a Party Secretary, who served there from 1938 to 1955;
(footnote continued on page 101)

(footnote continued from page 100)
Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko, now Chief of the Central Committee General Department, who served there from 1945 to 1948; Sergey Pavlovich Trapeznikov, Chief of the Central Committee Science and Educational Institutions Department, who served there from 1929 to 1944). There is no evidence, however, of Mal'shakov patronage ties to any of them or to Brezhnev directly.

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V. THE KGB'S INSTITUTIONAL POLICY INFLUENCE

The most important factors inhibiting the KGB today from pursuing policy tangents contrary to Brezhnev's wishes, either on its own or on behalf of a minority leadership faction, are Andropov's sensitivity to the political implications of KGB activities, and his loyalty to the Politburo consensus. All indications are that Andropov has taken any necessary steps to ensure that the risks of over-zealous KGB operations' embarrassing the Party are minimized.

Information on precisely what kinds of KGB operations and activities require specific, case by case approval by the Central Committee apparatus or the Secretariat is unfortunately fragmentary, however. [redacted] has reported that all peacetime operations conducted by the First Chief Directorate's Department "V" (Executive Action, sabotage, assassination and related missions) require Central Committee approval. [redacted] did not report on which Central Committee components might be involved, e.g., whether this includes the International Department or the Secretariat itself in addition to the Administrative Organs Department. The extreme political sensitivity of Executive Action operations makes Central Committee interest understandable. Central Committee approval is probably required for a number of other categories of politically sensitive or risky KGB activities, but specific information is not available. [redacted] also said that it is the KGB Chairman himself who obtains Central Committee clearance as needed.

While Andropov appears sensitive to the Party policy implications of KGB activities, however, it should also be said that the level of Andropov's Party standing does indirectly put the KGB's voice more forcefully before the highest levels of the Party leadership. While the KGB as an institution may not be more directly influential in policy making than it was under Semichastnyy, the fact that its current Chairman is influential in his own right almost certainly enhances its indirect influence, filtered of course through the important prism of the Chairman's strong Party instincts.

Moreover, there are some practical limitations on the control which Andropov, as the Party's principal and most direct agent, can exercise over the KGB. One is his lack of operational experience; in some matters he has presumably had to rely heavily on the professionals, although that necessity has probably also lessened with his own exposure to operational detail. Another is the sheer size of the KGB's empire, including some 450,000 staff employees worldwide. Also the Party demands on him that enhance the current Party-KGB relationship also cut into the time he has for running the KGB.

KGB Institutional Advantages for Influencing Policy

Moreover, there are several factors built into the KGB's institutional position and mission in Soviet society that either make the possibility of KGB policy influence more likely, or affect the probable nature of that influence.

First, of the various organizations involved in foreign affairs that feed information into the Central Committee apparatus and Politburo, the KGB's information is probably the most complete, current and accurate. The same is the case in certain security related, and hence



KGB Headquarters
Dzerzhinskiy Square, Moscow

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politically sensitive, areas of domestic affairs. The KGB thus has the potential advantage for subtle influence over events that accrues to a group dominating the information supply.

Second, the KGB enjoys a dominant position in all Soviet missions abroad because of the relative numbers and positioning of its personnel. True, a Soviet Ambassador is Chief of Mission in fact as well as name and nowadays he and the KGB Resident normally cooperate closely, and often also amicably.

has reported that any conflict between an Ambassador and a Resident not resolved between them in the field is referred to and settled by the Central Committee.

However, the KGB usually has more Embassy diplomatic slots in Soviet missions abroad than either the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or military intelligence (the GRU), and this diplomat category by the very nature of its access accounts for most of the significant political reporting reaching Moscow through the channels of the several agencies involved.*

KGB officers abroad often give the impression that they take the "senior" role of the KGB in foreign affairs as a matter of course and tend to equate general Soviet foreign policy interests with their own missions. Such an attitude may well from time to time create overall problems of perspective and balance in Soviet foreign policy. An illustration of this KGB attitude surfaced in a conversation during the 24th CPSU Congress

*While Soviet missions abroad as a whole are believed generally to be composed of about 50-60% of intelligence officers of both services, the percentages often run substantially higher for those mission slots carrying diplomatic rank and immunity. For a variety of historical reasons as well as its senior power position, the KGB controls the great majority of the already high percentage of diplomatic slots providing cover to the two services. All but a few diplomatic slots are in Embassies proper, rather than in other components of Soviet missions abroad. Most KGB officers under diplomatic cover contribute political or other reporting to their cover organization, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as to KGB Headquarters. However, their better political collection efforts tend to be in the KGB's behalf, and the many choice slots KGB officers occupy of course impinge on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' chances of maintaining its own strong teams overseas.

[redacted]

[redacted] Commenting on rumors in Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs circles that the Minister (Gromyko) and Defense Minister Grechko might become Politburo alternate members at the Congress, [redacted] noted that the foreign affairs community already had a voice in the Politburo in the person of KGB Chairman Andropov, and remarked jokingly that in the final analysis foreign affairs were largely a matter of "security" in the broad sense.

Third, the KGB's basic mission of control can easily breed an automatic and literal repressive or defensive mentality that affects reporting, recommendations, and even the execution of existing policy in a heavy handed manner sometimes itself producing policy embarrassment.

Finally, the Soviets have traditionally accepted more blurring of the line between intelligence collection and analysis, or espionage, and policy advice than would seem desirable in a Western context.

KGB Reporting Bias

One of the most basic ways in which KGB institutional influence may affect policy formation is through reporting bias. There is reason to believe that on occasions, some involving critical Soviet foreign policy

[redacted]

[redacted]

areas, KGB reporting has had its own slant, which has pointed toward a tougher or more defensive policy line than might otherwise have been suggested.

Czechoslovakia:

reported that during the spring of 1968 KGB advisors to Czech intelligence repeatedly forwarded to Moscow out-of-context excerpts from Czech Ministry of Interior reports in such a way as to stress a "worst case" impression of counter-revolutionary and anti-Soviet activities in the Ministry. While no solid information is available on the impact this reporting had on CPSU policy-makers, it probably fed the fears then already rife in the Soviet leadership that Czech Party control and effective Soviet influence were being eroded.**

Middle East:

told a that there then existed a sharp division of opinion within Soviet foreign policy circles on the

**This is particularly likely in view of two important additional factors. One was Chairman Andropov's own probable sensitization, given his Bloc Department background, to indications of anti-Soviet trends in Czechoslovakia. Also, both the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Chervonenko, and his Minister-Counselor, Ivan Ivanovich Udal'tsov, took alarmist positions in their reporting throughout the crisis.

advisability of reaching a peaceful solution in the Middle East. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said [redacted] was solidly behind Egyptian President Nasir's efforts to reach a political settlement with the Israelis, and its officials in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, had been "slanting" their reporting to Moscow to reflect only those factors strengthening the case for a political solution. [redacted] the Middle East, [redacted] had on the other hand gone to great pains to point out in their reporting the dangers which a fully implemented political settlement would pose for the massive Soviet investment and political interests in the area, allowing the Egyptians to re-establish a closer relationship with the West and thereby undermining Soviet gains made since 1967. [redacted] characterized the intelligence version as reporting the situation "accurately." Although there is no direct evidence, the difference of viewpoints [redacted] depicted may also have existed between his father and Foreign Minister Gromyko.

[redacted]

[redacted]

Finland: In addition, [redacted] have reported that there is no doubt [redacted] that the KGB, apparently both in the Helsinki Residency and in Moscow, is one of the powerful Soviet interest groups supporting the minority Stalinist faction of the Finnish Party, rather than the majority liberal faction. They have implied that some other Soviet official groups, particularly in the Central Committee apparatus, are by no means as strongly biased toward the Finnish Stalinists.

The United States: There are some indications that Fedor Ivanovich Vidyasov, the former Chief of the First Chief Directorate's First Service, has long had a dogmatic bias regarding the United States. The First Service is the KGB's foreign intelligence reports and analysis component. Under the guidance of the Chairman or his Secretariat, it disseminates KGB collected foreign intelligence to the Central Committee and other regime consumers. In 1944-45, when Soviet-American relations were relatively friendly, Vidyasov, then stationed at the Soviet Embassy in Paris, was quite openly hostile to the US, and seemed to enjoy making cutting remarks to and about Americans and criticizing US policy. That he retained this bias was strongly suggested in a March 1967 briefing he gave Soviet Bloc officials on the Soviet view of the Vietnam war. Vidyasov stated in this briefing that despite American efforts to convince the Soviets of their desire to maintain the status quo and seek a modus vivendi with the USSR, the major American aim remained the destruction of "international communism."

[redacted]

[redacted]

By late 1968, according [redacted] Vidyasov had become an advisor (capacity unknown) to Andropov, and had been replaced as Chief of Service Number One by Andrey Semenovich Smirnov, who still held this position as of early 1971. Smirnov's early KGB career gave him extensive operational experience against American targets, and included an official tour in the US and attendance at an American university. However, nothing is known of his substantive views, including his opinions or understanding of the US.**

(footnote continued from page 110)
[redacted] reported about this time a general impression that Vidyasov was rather phlegmatic, very quiet and polite, and slow and careful in reaching conclusions and making decisions.

**Smirnov was in the American Department of the state security foreign intelligence Directorate at the time of his 1944 arrival in New York, where he attended Columbia University and was simultaneously an employee of a Soviet trading organization. He left the US in 1946 to become Deputy Chief of Soviet intelligence's North American operations section. In 1947-48 Smirnov was in Karaganda, screening Japanese prisoners of war for state security agent material. From 1950 to at least January 1954 he was Chief of the state security foreign intelligence American Department. [redacted]

[redacted]

A Possible Antidote: Central Committee Men Abroad

In recent years an increasing number of representatives of the Central Committee International Department have been assigned to a regular tour in key Soviet missions abroad, with high diplomatic rank. One important reason for this trend is undoubtedly the apparatus' desire to strengthen its hold over all aspects of Soviet life. The placing of Party apparatus representatives in Soviet missions abroad, tasked among other things with reporting on foreign affairs independently and directly to the Central Committee, is thus a further extension of direct Party activity and influence in the foreign affairs field. In addition, however, the creation of this special network of representatives in the field implies Central Committee recognition of the hazards for its best foreign affairs interests that may be created by reporting bias in other subordinate institutions such as the KGB. Certainly one of the techniques the Soviets have traditionally employed to counteract possible reporting bias is a redundancy of reporting channels.*

*The description of the functions and status of Central Committee representation in one [redacted] Soviet mission abroad [redacted] provides detail on this extension of Party activity. [redacted] provides a more generalized view of the duties and prerogatives of Central Committee representatives abroad.

[redacted]

Cadre Interchange

Another potentially important, if indirect, factor in KGB policy influence is the presence of former career state security officers in key Party jobs. While new work does alter perspective, at least part of the outlook and personal ties of an earlier profession can often be expected to remain. A selective review of KGB officers transferring to significant Party and Government posts suggests that both in numbers, and in the level of influence the jobs carry, KGB movement into the Party and government is less significant than have been Party transfers into senior KGB ranks. Some KGB cadre movement into the Party is nevertheless demonstrable.

Aliyev: In recent years, the most important case of a career KGB officer receiving a first-level Party job occurred outside of Moscow. This involved the Party First Secretaryship in Azerbaydzhan, which in a July 1969 purge of an apparent Shelepin supporter went to the then Azerbaydzhan KGB Chairman G.A. Aliyev. Aliyev was a prominent Brezhnev supporter, and this political connection, rather than any KGB influence, was clearly responsible for his elevation. KGB service constitutes Aliyev's entire professional background, however, and can be expected to have had some influence on his approach to his new responsibilities.*

Bannikov: In those portions of the Party-government central apparatus concerned with Soviet domestic affairs, the most prominent example of a former high

*See also discussion of the Akhundov-Aliyev change on pp 93-4.

KGB official now in politically important work is S.G. Bannikov, a career state security officer who served as a KGB Deputy Chairman from 1962 until his transfer in the fall of 1967 to the USSR Supreme Court, where he has since been a Deputy Chairman.

Brezhnev presumably had strong personal reasons to wish Bannikov removed from the KGB, since he has been reported to have been one of Shelepin's most loyal KGB supporters, and since his removal would create a vacancy to which a Brezhnev client could be (and was) appointed. The leadership is also likely to have deemed it useful to have an experienced KGB professional in the higher judiciary ranks, particularly since the KGB from late 1965 on had been reacquiring through government decrees some of the investigative and other formal legal functions it had lost during Khrushchev's de-Stalinization. This factor may have provided Brezhnev a useful rationalization for Bannikov's removal from the KGB.

Sitnikov: One example of a KGB officer who went on to hold a Party foreign affairs position with significant policy influence is Vasiliy Romanovich Sitnikov. A KGB officer of rather broad First Chief Directorate experience, Sitnikov was reported to have served from 1965 until sometime prior to late 1968 as the chief of the Information Sector of the Central Committee's International Department.**

** Sitnikov's early career included 1946-50 service as Deputy Chief of the state security Residency in Berlin, and 1951-55 service in the same capacity in the Vienna Residency, with additional responsibility there for supervising Anglo-American

(footnote continued on page 115)

Little is known of this sector's function, but it has appeared to include preparation of analysis of CPSU positions for foreign Communist Parties, and the coordination of propaganda with other Communist Parties, rather than intelligence analysis for the International Department. Twice in 1965 Sitnikov, using the alias Sergeyev, served as a semi-official channel to convey substantive views intended to reach the highest levels of the US Government. The first occasion concerned Vietnam, the second disarmament. In late 1968,

Sitnikov returned to the KGB to become an advisor (capacity unknown) to Andropov.

In addition to any general problem of policy perspective that might result from the transfer of a KGB officer to an important Party Central Committee position, Sitnikov's career also illustrates a more specific source of possible difficulty. This involves the different outlooks required for positive intelligence analysis and for disinformation activities. (Disinformation, or mis-

(footnote continued from page 114)
operations. After service in an unknown capacity at KGB Headquarters, Sitnikov was posted to Bonn in January 1959 under Counselor of Embassy cover, (a rank suggesting he was the Bonn Resident or Deputy). Press exposure as a KGB officer apparently cut short his Bonn tour, and he returned to KGB Headquarters in July 1959. After serving in the early 1960s as Chief of the NATO Section of the First Chief Directorate's "Disinformation" Department, Sitnikov had become a Deputy Chief of the KGB First Chief Directorate's Service Number One (foreign intelligence reports and analysis).

information, is the KGB's term for operations of various sorts designed to confuse, mislead, deceive and thereby undermine foreign governments and intelligence services, and also on occasion foreign public opinion.) No information is available on how successfully Sitnikov made the mental transition from distortion to objectivity, but his case may be symptomatic of some overall fuzziness in the Soviet intelligence context between misinformation and information, as well as between operations and intelligence reporting and analysis, and between execution of Party policy and formation of that policy.

Rumyantsev: Another important policy official with a probable intelligence background is Vadim Petrovich Rumyantsev, whom [redacted] strongly suggests was an intelligence officer during a 1951-57 tour in Syria. Rumyantsev has served in the Party Central Committee apparatus on Middle Eastern Affairs since at least 1963, and as chief of the International Department's Middle Eastern affairs Sector since at least April 1967, or just prior to the June War. His influence on Soviet policy in an area in which the Soviets have a large political and economic stake has undoubtedly been particularly significant during his tenure as sector chief. Regarding his specific policy views, it is known only that Rumyantsev has been associated, [redacted] with a group of anti-Zionists in the CPSU apparatus, who are dedicated to the discreet removal of Jews and Jewish influence from the Party.

Vladimirov: The previously mentioned Central Committee representatives serving tours abroad are normally Party careerists. There is at least one current case, however, of one with a recent KGB past. Viktor Mikhaylovich Vladimirov, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy and Central Committee representative in Helsinki since September 1970, was a career KGB officer and was known to have retained this status as late as 1968. Available information on Central Committee representatives abroad does make clear that once in that status they report and are responsible to the Central Committee, however.

Policy Level Protection of KGB Interests

There is considerable evidence that the KGB considers it extremely important to be able to guarantee its officers abroad, and in some cases very important foreign agents, that if they are caught and imprisoned by a foreign government the KGB will sooner or later, in one way or another, get them back.** The probable

**The problem does not arise in the case of KGB officers caught in flagrant espionage who have cover positions involving diplomatic immunity. They are merely declared persona non grata, a basic reason diplomatic cover is prized. The problem can arise for KGB officers in Legal (i.e., under the cover of official Soviet government organizations) Residencies abroad who do not

(footnote continued on page 118)

condition attached to this promise is that the captured officer maintain relative silence to his captors during interrogations, trials and imprisonment. It has sometimes taken years, and the ultimately successful methods have varied, but the KGB has had a remarkably good record at retrieving captured officers.*

The politically important point, however, is the level of the Soviet Party and government leverage, both personal and policy, that has at times been brought to bear on foreign governments to release KGB officers.

(footnote continued from page 117)
have diplomatic immunity; these include most Soviet commercial representatives, as well as news correspondents and support officers assigned to diplomatic missions in service capacities (e.g., chauffeurs). Any KGB Illegal officer, (a KGB officer using the documentation, background and complete identity of a citizen of some country other than the USSR), arrested abroad also, of course, faces imprisonment.

*The most usual technique has been an exchange of prisoners, sometimes direct (e.g., KGB Illegal Resident in the US Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers, or the April 1964 exchange of KGB Illegal Resident in Britain Konon Trofimovich Molody, alias Gordon Lonsdale, for British businessman and intelligence support agent Greville Wynne), and sometimes indirect (e.g., Yuriy Loginov, a KGB Illegal held by the Government of South Africa, for a collection of West German citizens in a complicated three-government swap necessitated in part by the lack of Soviet-South African diplomatic relations).

Two cases, one involving the British, one the Americans, illustrate that retrieval of captured KGB officers is Politburo policy, and one, moreover, for which even top leaders are willing to go to considerable lengths.

The pawn in the British case was lecturer Gerald Brooke, arrested in the USSR in April 1965, tried, and sentenced to five years' imprisonment for the alleged dissemination of "anti-Soviet literature" within the Soviet Union. The KGB officers whom the Soviets wished to retrieve were John Peter and Helen Kroger, KGB Illegals supporting the Portland Naval Base spy ring; they were arrested with the rest of the ring in January 1961, convicted, and sentenced to 20 years in prison. The British government several times turned down the Soviet proposal that Brooke be swapped for the Krogers, on the grounds that the offenses involved were incomparable both in intent and gravity. Meanwhile, reports accumulated of various forms of ill treatment of Brooke in prison, each of which escalated outraged public opinion in Britain and the resultant pressures on the Government. The Soviets continued to hint through various channels that their handling of the Brooke case was dependent on exchange of the Krogers. Following a request by British Foreign Minister George Brown to Gromyko at the September 1967 United Nations General Assembly session that he again look into the Brooke case, Gromyko told the British Ambassador in Moscow in October that it was "part of a bigger problem," and he "had exhausted himself on the matter." In January 1968 Prime Minister Wilson, during his state visit to the USSR, raised the Brooke case with Podgornyy, who replied that Brooke had

been legally convicted and the Soviets wished to do nothing to imply otherwise. In the end the British Government succumbed to a 1969 semi-official Soviet threat to retry Brooke on "new evidence" involving more serious espionage charges, and in October 1969 exchanged the Krogers for Brooke. Reporting to the House of Commons, Foreign Minister Michael Stewart cited three reasons for the exchange: that there were humanitarian considerations involved, that the Krogers had by then served a substantial portion of their sentence (eight years), and that the exchange would remove an obstacle to improvement of relations with the USSR. The last was certainly not the least of the reasons.

The pawns in the American case were several; the KGB officer the Soviets wished to retrieve was Igor Aleksandrovich Ivanov, arrested while under cover as a Soviet trade organization chauffeur in New York in October 1963 in connection with his role in the case of John William Butenko, an American electronics engineer whose firm was supplying the US Air Force's Strategic Air Command with a global electronics control system. Butenko was subsequently convicted of espionage related charges. Ivanov also was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison, but was released on bail to the custody of the Soviet Mission in New York. He remained at the Mission's Long Island estate for years while his case was appealed. Various American citizens arrested in the USSR were, at one time or another,

offered in exchange for Ivanov.* At least twice the Soviets stated officially that the Ivanov case was a major obstacle to improved Soviet-American relations. In October 1967 a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs summoned US Ambassador to Moscow Lwellylan Thompson specifically to tell him that the case was an "additional element complicating Soviet-American relations, which anyway leave much to be desired." In November 1967 Soviet Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin, stressing he spoke "personally," told Undersecretary of State Foy Kohler that the case had an importance for Soviet-American relations far beyond its intrinsic importance, and whatever the "special services" might think of it, he was sure Ivanov's detention negatively influenced decisions in fields of real importance to the Soviet-American relationship. In January 1971 Ivanov's

*The first was Yale University Professor and Soviet affairs expert Frederick Barghoorn, arrested in the USSR in November 1963. In December 1964 the Soviets offered up an American citizen, Peter Landerman, serving a sentence in the USSR for vehicular manslaughter. No less a person than Podgornyy implied to Ambassador Foy Kohler in November 1966 at the latter's farewell call that two American students, Wortham and Gilmore, then being held in the USSR for stealing the statue of a bear and alleged currency speculation, could be exchanged for Ivanov. In November 1967 the East Germans entered the affair, and offered to release an American named Feinauer arrested in East Germany and accused of espionage. There were various other threats and blandishments.

bail was extended to permit him to visit his ailing parents in the USSR on condition that the Soviets guarantee his return to US legal jurisdiction when next required to do so.

Is the KGB Ever Out of Step with Politburo Policy?

A central aspect of the question of KGB influence on Soviet policy formation concerns instances in which KGB activities have appeared to be, or in fact were, at cross purposes with Party Politburo policy. Hard evidence in this area is sparse. Analysis is additionally considerably hampered by the fact that the KGB is frequently assigned tasks by the Party which appear to contradict official Soviet policy but which in fact reflect obverse facets of official policy with which the leadership may not wish to be associated publicly or officially.

The circumstances under which the KGB is most likely to act at cross purposes with Politburo policy in fact, rather than simply in appearance, involve periods of high instability in the ongoing leadership power struggle. One such period, of course, was the latter months of the Khrushchev era, when much of his power had been eroded and there was growing opposition among his colleagues to both his continued personal primacy and many of his policies.

A mustard gas attack on West German counteraudio technician Horst Schwirkmann during his 6 September 1964 tourist visit to a monastery outside Moscow was probably a KGB operation motivated mainly by a desire of Khrushchev's Party opponents to undermine his rapprochement policy toward the Federal Republic of Germany. Khrushchev's son-in-law Adzhubey had made a well-publicized goodwill tour to the Federal Republic in July, and Khrushchev himself was scheduled to travel to Bonn to meet with Chancellor Ludwig Erhard early in 1965. It is unlikely that the KGB acted on its own in disrupting the detente atmosphere with an action as

provocative as the operation against Schwirkmann. It is far more likely that the KGB acted at the behest of Khrushchev's now coalescing Politburo opposition, in which Brezhnev and Shelepin, the two members of the Secretariat charged with KGB supervision, were of course key figures. (Khrushchev was overthrown a little over a month later).

Khrushchev returned to Moscow only the night before the Schwirkmann incident, following a nine-day visit to Czechoslovakia. [redacted] reported that the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Andrey Andreyevich Smirnov, [redacted] was puzzled by the affair and could only conclude someone was trying to undermine Khrushchev's German policy. An about-face in Soviet public statements on the incident lent credence to this view. On 24 September Tass reported that the Soviet Government had handed the West Germans a written denial that the attack on Schwirkmann had occurred. A second official Soviet note, however, delivered to the West Germans on 10 October, expressed "regret" that any incident had occurred which threatened to harm Soviet-German relations. Ambassador Smirnov added orally that two West Germans held in the USSR on espionage charges would be released before Khrushchev's trip as a goodwill gesture. The course of the Soviet reaction

strongly suggests the incident had occurred without Khrushchev's knowledge or approval, and that he had even had difficulty afterward in arranging an official acknowledgment and apology.*

Cases of Unexpected Policy Consequences

A more common phenomenon in KGB activities which appear to work at cross purposes with leadership policy involves, however, not lack of KGB prior coordination with the appropriate level of Party authority, but rather both KGB and Party miscalculation of the likely level of policy consequences.

There have been a number of such cases of Party and KGB failure to anticipate the level of foreign response to KGB operations, but by far the most notable one to date resulted in the September 1971 expulsion of 105 Soviet officials from the United Kingdom for espionage. The British pointedly and publicly noted at the time that the insultingly flagrant level of Soviet intelligence activities in the UK was inconsistent with

*A rash of incidents, most notably the 28 September search of two American and one British Military Attaches in a Khabarovsk hotel room, appeared to demonstrate stepped-up KGB harassment of Western officials in the USSR in the summer and early fall of 1964. This harassment campaign could be interpreted to suggest that the Schwirkmann case was but the most notorious example of a pattern of KGB activity inspired by a desire of Khrushchev's Politburo opponents to curtail his bridge-building to Western Europe and North America. There is, however, no proof that such an explanation is correct.

Soviet policy professions of desire for European detente, and specifically for the European Security Conference sought by the USSR. The revelations of a defector from the London KGB Residency were the immediate catalyst; other evidence of especially blatant Soviet behavior had been accumulating for several years and two official policy-level protests had gone unanswered.

The KGB itself bears responsibility for any details of crass operational behavior that may have contributed to British outrage, as well as for failing to prevent the defection. But the Party, not the KGB, authorized such basic matters as the percentage of intelligence officers to be assigned to the Soviet mission to the UK, the general guidelines for their operational missions, and the decision to ignore the two British protests. It is not surprising that neither the Party nor the KGB anticipated anything approaching the magnitude and seriousness of the British action. Reactions of Western governments over the years to the discovery of even serious Soviet espionage efforts against them have been generally isolated and short-lived, and often also considerately discreet. Damage and embarrassment to the Soviets has seldom been grave. The Party had thus come to count on the KGB being able to maintain a relatively high level of worldwide espionage activity within acceptable limits of political risk, and the Party apparatus had authorized KGB activity accordingly.

Such cases of embarrassing but properly coordinated KGB activity can thus be ruled out as examples of KGB actions in violation of Politburo policy, leaving the Schwirkmann and Shelepin-boom cases of 1964 and 1965 as the only two examples of such actions identified with reasonable confidence. If similar examples were to be found during periods of relative stability in the leadership, this would be a more significant sign of

the existence of KGB power independent of Party control than such activities during periods of great leadership instability and conflicting signals to the KGB from their Party overseers. The overall picture does not suggest that the KGB has such independent power. Thus, in contrast to the period immediately before Khrushchev's ouster (the Schwirkmann case) and immediately after (the Shelepin boom), the period since 1967-1968 has been a relatively stable one in the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev and his supporters have continued to consolidate their power, apparently including establishing effective control over the top levels of the KGB. There is no available hard evidence during this recent period of KGB activities contradicting Politburo policy.* This apparent harmony even includes two areas abroad in which the KGB has displayed probable reporting bias, Czechoslovakia during the 1968 crisis, and the Middle East.**

*One possible exception concerns the apparent 1969 leak of an official transcript of the KGB's interrogation of a Soviet dissident.(See p 134.) While this may possibly indicate the existence of some dissident sympathy in the KGB, the evidence is not conclusive and in any case, would at most suggest isolated KGB officer disaffection instead of institutional flouting of Party policy.

**[redacted] gives fairly comprehensive reporting [redacted] on 1968 KGB activities there. The reporting suggests that the KGB engaged in ruthless but standard operations designed to maintain, and later restore, effective Soviet control over Czech Party policy and its extension into other parts of the power structure.
(footnote continued on page 127)

The Dissidents, the Leadership and the KGB

Nowhere is the KGB's relationship to policy formation as difficult to discern as in relation to the Soviet dissident movement, because in few areas of present Soviet political life are the anomalies greater. The overall trend since 1965 has been definitely in the direction of less intellectual and artistic freedom in the USSR than was generally the case under Khrushchev. Nevertheless, inconsistencies in official treatment continue to crop up.

(footnote continued from page 126)

In the Middle East, Soviet military intelligence (the GRU) is known, however, to have gotten out of step with Party policy on occasion. In September 1969 two GRU officers in Lebanon attempted to induce a Lebanese Air Force pilot to steal for them a Mirage III-E interceptor. During a Lebanese Communist Party delegation's visit to the USSR the following October Lebanese Party leaders told CPSU Secretary and International Department Chief Ponomarev that while they understood the need for intelligence work, episodes like the Mirage affair had unfavorable effects on the Party. Ponomarev replied that a "serious error" had been made in the Mirage incident, an inquiry into the affair was being held, and there would be no repetition.

The Politburo makes overall policy on handling intellectual disaffection and also decides key cases.* The KGB has probably the heaviest responsibility for executing this policy. Quite apart from any inconsistencies there may be in KGB execution, there are enough different, changing, and contradictory forces at work within the leadership and among the dissidents to account for the resulting maze of anomalies.

Among these forces are:

(1) The recognition by many Party leaders of the importance of the talents of the intelligentsia** in making Soviet society function effectively, hence a reluctance to risk their total suppression or alienation;

(2) A minority view in the Party hierarchy (more prevalent at the second and third levels than at the very top), that the Party must renew its own ideas to survive as the ruling elite;

(3) A contrasting majority Party apparatus view that Party orthodoxy and control must be maintained even at heavy repressive costs;

*[redacted] reported, for example, that every aspect of the Sinyavskiy-Daniel case (arrest, conduct of trial, verdict and sentence) of 1965-66 was discussed and decided at the Party Politburo level. [redacted]

**This of course applies much more to the technical than to the artistic intelligentsia.

(4) Some degree of reluctance, nevertheless, throughout the spectrum of opinion, to risk a return to the worst excesses of Stalinism;

(5) A related desire that the post-Stalin Party appear respectable, and hence an emphasis on legality of form if not always also of substance;

(6) The apparent willingness of some ambitious Party leaders to use the dissidents' causes where possible to embarrass their political opponents, with minimal commitment to dissident positions;

(7) Aspects of the dissident problem that challenge the ingenuity of the Party apparatus, (e.g., the uncompromising moral stature of a Solzhenitsyn or, in another sense, the sheer size of some minority populations agitating to emigrate);

(8) Leadership sensitivities to foreign public opinion on some issues, especially when foreign policy interests dictate conciliation;

(9) Great variations among the dissidents regarding their willingness to compromise with authority for limited artistic, professional or political gains; and

(10) The belief in many official quarters that a combination of repressive and permissive tactics furnish a lightning rod to what might become more serious protest, and allow the Party and KGB to monitor movements that, driven underground, might become more elusive and dangerous to authority.

There are many examples of the varied effects of these conflicting forces. [redacted] who reported on the Politburo's detailed involvement in the Sinyavskiy-Daniel case also reported that the leadership was divided on the advisability of a trial.* The 1969 USSR State Prizes for art and literature included a few controversial names as well as many orthodox figures. The abrupt downgrading and trailing off of the December 1970 trial of Leningrad Jews for attempted hijacking, and the subsequent steep increase in officially sanctioned Jewish emigration in 1971, probably involved leadership differences as well as sensitivity to the dimensions of the domestic problem and foreign opinion. [redacted] reported in early 1971 that the physicist and outspoken advocate of individual rights, Andrey Sakharov, is protected from direct punishment by the fact that thousands of his scientific colleagues have let it be known they would respond by simply ceasing to work. Adverse Western reaction to the 1970 confinement of geneticist Zhores Medvedev in a KGB mental hospital probably played an important role in his early release.***

[redacted] said specifically that Shelepin had been the strongest proponent of a trial, with Kosygin, Suslov, Secretary Ponomarev (the last citing the effect on foreign Parties), and originally Brezhnev opposed. Brezhnev was later won over to approval of the trial. Whether or not this tally of individual opinions is correct, the suggestion that differences existed probably is well founded.

[redacted]

***American Embassy Moscow A-1223, 17 July 1970 [redacted] Medvedev's brother Roy was finally granted a long-requested interview with a KGB officer after Zhores'

(footnote continued on page 131)

Against this background of cross-currents in the leadership on the dissident question, KGB tactics to cope with the dissident problem have included the standard mix of harassments, arrests, provocations, KGB agents' posing as dissidents or sympathizers, residence searches, confiscations, telephone taps and audio surveillance, misinformation, etc. Additional tactics have been especially tailored to the complicated and politically volatile nature of the problem. Some intellectuals have been rewarded with limited freedoms for submitting gracefully to regular reporting and generalized guidance. This practice predates the Brezhnev-Andropov era, and has been used by the Party as well as by the KGB. A KGB [redacted] reported having been told by the [redacted] for example, that in late 1962 or early 1963 Party Secretary Demichev was made "controller" for the poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko. This meant Yevtushenko was required to see Demichev regularly for a discussion of his activities. [redacted] said he learned f[redacted] that the poet Andrey Voznesenskiy had as his "controller" a KGB General who was an assistant to the Second Chief Directorate Chief.

Confinement to KGB-administered mental hospitals of dissidents against whom legal charges cannot easily be brought increased sharply beginning in 1969.**

(footnote continued from page 130)
release, and reported seeing the officer's desk covered with Russian translations of critical articles on the case from western media.

[redacted]

**A reasonably accurate, although conservative, late 1971 estimate listed 40 known cases of such confinement,
(footnote continued on page 132)

[redacted]

Mounting worldwide protest against this practice, however, caused the Soviets to become publicly defensive about it in late 1971.*

Another kind of official sensitivity to bad publicity occurred in connection with the 24th Party Congress in March 1971. The dissident Vladimir Bukovskiy told a Western newsman in Moscow that he had been approached by the KGB about discussing with Andropov a possible cessation of dissident activity until after the Congress, presumably to free the Party leaders of potential embarrassments from this quarter during a period in which they desired public harmony to enhance the Party image.**

(footnote continued from page 131)
together with probably several times that number unidentified, as compared to two known cases in 1969.

*Izvestiya, 23 October 1971; Za Rubezhom No. 48, November 1971.

**Amemb Moscow A244, 5 March 1971, Bukovskiy reportedly said the intermediary indicated Andropov desired primarily to propose a moratorium on dissidents' contacts with foreign newsmen until after the Congress. At the time, Bukovskiy went on, the dissidents were still seriously considering the idea but had agreed a set of counter-conditions should be presented Andropov if the meeting took place. (There is no indication that it did. Bukovskiy himself was arrested just before the Congress.)

In November 1970, [redacted] told a [redacted] that in recent months the KGB has been offering early release from prison and even the hope of emigration to imprisoned dissidents who will refrain from so-called "anti state activities" on their release. (Amembassy Moscow A-1279, 29 November 1971, [redacted]

Recent events in the Bukovskiy case have provided one of the more graphic illustrations of the KGB's tactical mix of shifting methods in response to internal and external political pressures. In September 1971 an American correspondent who had twice met Bukovskiy was interviewed by a Captain of the Moscow KGB's investigative component (under conditions strictly in accordance with provisions of the Soviet-American consular agreement.) After giving his own non-damaging testimony, the correspondent inquired after the status of the case, and the KGB captain readily replied that they had not yet discovered anything against Bukovskiy, adding "it depends on witnesses."* These exquisite legalities at the more visible level notwithstanding, Bukovskiy himself had meanwhile been transferred to the Serbskiy Institute of psychiatry near Moscow, and became another prominent symbol of Soviet abuse of psychiatric medicine. Widespread public protest of his prolonged investigative detention by family, friends, other dissidents, and foreigners was followed in November 1971 by Bukovskiy's return to prison preparatory to trial on charges of anti-Soviet activity.

A leadership decision was apparently taken to make an example of Bukovskiy's continuing uncompromising attitude toward authority, for on 5 January 1972 he received the first public trial in Moscow of a dissident since the show-trials of the mid-1960s. The long KGB search for appropriate witnesses alluded to in the September 1971 interview with the American correspondent seems to have been successful. Bukovskiy was charged with anti-Soviet foreign contacts and other activity aimed at undermining and weakening Soviet power under Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code. Convicted, he was

*Department of State Telegram Moscow 5019, 17 September 1971

sentenced to the maximum seven years prison and labor camp internment and five years of exile, likely in his case, in view of his very poor health, to amount to a death sentence. The Soviet press used the occasion for renewed warnings of the need for vigilance in foreign contacts, and official circles simply ignored domestic and foreign protests.

Shifting Party policy and tactics aside, however, there are at least two instances involving dissidents in which KGB activity appears to have been an embarrassment to Party policy. The instances have very different implications. One was the appearance in the December 1969 issue of Khronika No. 11, the most prominent of the samizdat (uncensored underground press) publications, of what appeared to be the actual transcript of the June 1969 KGB interrogation of a Soviet engineer in Tallin with the evident purpose of finding a justification for declaring him insane. Detailed reports of the KGB interrogations are not uncommon in samizdat literature, but the leakage of an actual verbatim transcript clearly damaging to the KGB's image would suggest the possibility of some dissident sympathy in the KGB itself.

The other instance is an example in the dissident field of a routine KGB operation, undoubtedly Party-approved in general terms, being suddenly escalated to a high policy level by unexpected complications. A friend of Solzhenitsyn surprised the KGB on 12 August 1971 in the act of a large scale search of the author's home. The search party reacted in standard low level KGB style, beat him severely, and threatened him with the loss of his job or imprisonment if he talked. The friend ignored the threat, and Solzhenitsyn wrote a strongly worded letter to Andropov and Kosygin, (the KGB's nominal supervisor), demanding a public explanation of the attack and punishment of the assailants for their illegal activities. Less than a week after the letter

was written, it surfaced in Western newspapers. Shortly thereafter a KGB colonel conveyed to Solzhenitsyn an unprecedented official backing-off in the form of an "explanation" that the attack had all been a misunderstanding on the part of local police, (not security personnel), who had been staking out the premises for a reported burglar and mistook Solzhenitsyn's friend for the suspect. Several miscalculations apparently snowballed in this episode in what is clearly an ongoing campaign to harass Solzhenitsyn while seeking a way effectively to neutralize him. One involved the search party's unimaginative reaction to a sudden turn of events. Another was the level and skill of Solzhenitsyn's response. A third was the speed with which the letter of protest surfaced in the West, facing the Soviets with a further escalation of the damages while they probably were still debating an appropriate response to the original embarrassment. The result was the transparent but face-saving gesture of the KGB's "explanation." The episode illustrates how delicately balanced is the ongoing Party-KGB-dissident struggle, a situation which will probably continue to give rise to occasional serious official embarrassments.

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VI. SHORT TERM PROGNOSIS: ANDROPOV, THE KGB AND THE LEADERSHIP POWER STRUGGLE

The current relationship between the Party hierarchy and the KGB reflects what appears to be the general balance of power in the Soviet leadership. Brezhnev's dominance has increased in the last few years -- in the KGB since 1967 as elsewhere -- but it is not total. First Deputy KGB Chairman Tsvigun and Deputy Chairmen Chebrikov and Tsinev are but the most prominent examples of new key KGB officials with patronage ties to the General Secretary. There remain, however, KGB components, albeit of somewhat less importance to Brezhnev's power position, in which his influence has been felt slowly or not at all. The First Chief Directorate and the Republic Chairmenships are examples. Brezhnev's strength in the KGB illustrates the preeminence which the General Secretary's colleagues in the Party leadership acknowledge as clearly his. But it is also reflective of limits which leadership independents, Brezhnev's opponents, and even many of his current allies, have apparently joined in imposing on Brezhnev's effort to pack the organs of power with his proteges.

Possible Limits to the Brezhnev-Andropov Alliance

The present KGB Chairman is himself an example of a junior Party leadership colleague of Brezhnev's whose continuing political support of the General Secretary is probable for the near term, but is also subject to lessening or even withdrawal in altered

political circumstances. There is no present evidence that Andropov is other than loyal to the General Secretary, and Brezhnev has certainly appeared to have confidence in Andropov and to include him among his close circle of advisors. Nonetheless, pragmatic and transient alliances are characteristic of the Kremlin world. Furthermore, there are specific factors in the Brezhnev-Andropov relationship suggesting some potential limitations.

Andropov's ties to Brezhnev do not, as we have seen, go back very far. The only promotion Andropov owes to the General Secretary is his last one, and even this is highly likely owed also to other Politburo members, among whom Andropov seems to have broad general support. The KGB job does carry with it considerable power. It also brought Andropov an alternate membership in the Politburo. On the other hand, the KGB Chairmanship is an exposed job, carrying with it great potential for politically dangerous embarrassment and for making political enemies. Andropov might have had a less risky career had he remained in the Secretariat and earned growing influence and an eventual Politburo seat in foreign affairs and Party ideology, perhaps in due course assuming some of Suslov's functions when Suslov died or retired. Whether Andropov welcomed the KGB responsibility is not known. What does seem clear is that although Brezhnev is his current boss, and Brezhnev could seek to relieve Andropov of the KGB post if displeased with him or unsure of his support, nevertheless Andropov's long-range political position is probably not totally dependent on the favor of the General Secretary. Andropov is probably more an ally, although a junior one, than a client of Brezhnev's, and that alliance is dependent on Brezhnev's continuing supremacy.

The two men seem to approach their work in quite different ways. Brezhnev appears to be thoroughly political, highly skilled in protracted and often oblique maneuvering for position by undercutting his rivals' personnel

support. On substantive policy matters, at least until recently, Brezhnev was often cautious, even at times indecisive to the point of seeming insecure. His positions appeared frequently to be dictated more by his colleagues' consensus or stalemates than by his own strong convictions. Since further consolidating his political power in 1970 and 1971, however, Brezhnev has taken firm substantive policy positions more authoritatively and personally than earlier, and he has preempted much of the platform of others in the leadership. Brezhnev apparently has a shrewd political intelligence, as many seem to have underestimated to their cost, but imagination and substantive expertise do not appear to be his strongest suits. His forte is the process rather than the content of politics. Andropov, on the other hand, seems significantly less political in the sense of ambition for personal power. He seems more substantively oriented than Brezhnev, and may well be more interested in having influence on the content of decisions, and on efficiency and effectiveness in carrying out given programs, than in the power struggle per se. Even in greatly changed power circumstances, Andropov would seem more likely to support another General Secretary candidate than build toward the top post himself. He may well be extremely ambitious for the kind of power that comes with behind the scenes influence and responsibility, but there is no available evidence that he is ambitious for the power of the General Secretaryship. His degree of career specialization in foreign affairs has also kept him out of the line of progression through the domestic Party apparatus, including especially cadres responsibilities, that has traditionally led to the top Party post.

In any case, the possibility that Andropov's support of Brezhnev might have limits is more likely to surface in any serious way in connection with future eventualities related to slippage in Brezhnev's power.

For the moment, that power seems relatively secure and Andropov appears content to keep his political loyalty largely with the General Secretary, while remaining on close working and personal terms with a broad spectrum of others in the leadership.

There are also at least two presently identifiable specific factors, however, which could affect the future of the Brezhnev-Andropov relationship. One involves the September 1971 embarrassment over the expulsion of 105 Soviet officials from the UK and the simultaneous British public linkage of Soviet intelligence activities to Soviet foreign policy aims. It has already been noted that the responsibility basically belonged to the Party leadership which had authorized the level and general nature of intelligence activity in Britain as elsewhere. Moreover, the level of British reaction was so inconsistent with universal Soviet postwar experience that the Party's or the KGB's failure to anticipate it is scarcely surprising. Nevertheless the damages, including risk to an important European detente tactic and embarrassment to Soviet prestige, were grave enough that the matter could be made an issue in leadership infighting.*

*Quite apart from the embarrassment of worldwide exposure of such massive and crass espionage, the Soviets suffered the humiliation of having the British block in advance all channels to effective Soviet retaliation by threatening to escalate their own reprisals still further as necessary. On the purely operational level, of course, KGB losses were also very serious. Operations against all English-speaking targets were at least indirectly affected as well as the major direct losses incurred in UK operations.

Should this happen, scapegoats could be sought with little regard to real responsibility. Andropov could conceivably be among the casulties, though all available evidence on his power position suggests this is unlikely. Demotion of Andropov, however, would signal a general and cumulative loss of political confidence in him on the part of Brezhnev and his close supporters, or a borad coalition of leadership independents and Brezhnev opponents. The British embarrassment would be but the visible excuse for an action taken from broader political power motives. Any such action would also suggest some generalized shift in the present leadership balance of power, of which Andropov's standing would be but a part.

The other factor which makes future projections of the close Brezhnev-Andropov relationship hazardous without continuing detailed reporting on it involves Brezhnev's own position. The very extent of Brezhnev's present power consolidation, which has been manifested in his increased confidence and prominence since the 24th Congress, now thrusts the General Secretary into another kind of potentially risky power situation. Khrushchev's experience suggests that the further the Party

The post 24th Party Congress Brezhnev: an October 1971 motorcade in Paris.

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leader is out in front of the collective leadership, the greater the likelihood that varying objections generated among the several and shifting groupings of Brezhnev's leadership colleagues might cause them to find common ground, either to curtail his independence or, in extreme circumstances, to challenge him openly.* In such a situation the attitude of any KGB Chairman would, of course, be crucial. A Chairman with Andropov's breadth of leadership relationships might be attracted -- sooner rather than later -- to a coalition of Brezhnev opponents representing a Politburo majority.

Brezhnev's Independent KGB Checks

Brezhnev has carefully taken out several additional insurance policies on Andropov's loyalty and support in the form of KGB Deputy Chairmen with independent patronage ties to the General Secretary.

The most senior is First Deputy Tsvigun, who has ties to Brezhnev of a sort different from Andropov's, and whose views appear to be far more simplistically "conservative." The phenomenon of the CPSU's most senior Secretary placing a deputy with strong and independent ties to him as a double check under an important official

*Brezhnev could of course remain sensitive to signs of incipient significant leadership opposition and take measures to head it off. He has to date shown a skillful sense of permissible power and policy limits. The point here is that as individual power increases this balance becomes harder to sustain.

who is also his own appointee is a time-honored Soviet practice. It has at least one KGB precedent in the Khrushchev era.*

Furthermore, Brezhnev seems to have at least two additional independent KGB supporters in Deputy Chairmen Chebrikov and Tsinev. Each seems to have ties to Brezhnev separate from the other's, and also separate from Andropov's and from Tsvigun's. The net result seems to be that Brezhnev has at least four direct, important, and mutually distinct channels of influence into the KGB.

After Brezhnev

The most likely short term successor to Brezhnev would seem to be Kirilenko, his general deputy and closest ally. Andropov's close relationship with Kirilenko suggests Kirilenko could count on the support of Andropov and the KGB if the succession occurred in a fairly orderly fashion. Kirilenko might possibly also be able to count on Andropov's support if, as seems less likely, Kirilenko's succession to the General Secretaryship were preceded by a break with Brezhnev.

*[redacted] reported that Khrushchev had arranged for General Konstantin Fedorovich Lunev to be the KGB's First Deputy Chairman in the 1954-58 period, partly as a check on Chairman Serov.

Kirilenko apart, Andropov's or the KGB's possible support of longer term potential Party chiefs is much less predictable. Shelepin's age, abilities, ambition, and past opportunities to garner broad Party support make him still a possible longer term candidate to become Party head. Shelepin might well distrust Andropov after the events of 1967, but their eventual realliance is by no means inconceivable. Furthermore, Shelepin appears to retain at least some measure of quiescent political support in the KGB itself. Its extent and significance is unfortunately not measureable, since neither the identities of many key middle management KGB officials (Directorate deputies and Department heads for example), nor their political ties are known.

Too little is known of Andropov's relationships with other possible eventual contenders -- the new senior Secretary Kulakov, for example -- to judge how Andropov or the KGB might line up in connection with a longer range power bid involving any of them. Most significant of all, the field of possible contenders will change as new faces are brought into the Party Secretariat and Politburo in the next few years. Any Party Secretary who shares some supervisory responsibility, under the Party head's direction, for the administrative organs obviously would have an inside track in lining up potential KGB support for his political ambitions.

Finally, it should be borne in mind that the KGB's present role in Soviet politics -- a marked but fairly responsible one -- is in important measure the product of personal factors: at the moment, Andropov the man, and his relationships with Brezhnev and other leaders. The mix of future KGB Chairmen and CPSU General Secretaries may well significantly change the KGB's style and influence -- a reminder that the personal equation persists even within the collective of Soviet bureaucracy.

APPENDIX

ANDROPOV'S EARLY CAREER

Born 15 June 1914 in the Nagutskaya railroad settlement of Stavropol Kray in the north Caucasus area, Andropov joined the Komsomol in 1930. After working two years as a telegraphist and apprentice film mechanic he attended the Rybinsk Technical School of Water Transportation in Yaroslavl Oblast, some 200 miles northeast of Moscow, graduating in 1936. For the next year or so Andropov worked as a Komsomol organizer and official in Rybinsk.

In 1937 he became Third Secretary of the Yaroslavl Oblast Komsomol Committee, and in 1938 the same Committee's First Secretary. He joined the CPSU in 1939. Following the 1940 formation of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, Andropov was named First Secretary of its Komsomol Central Committee. After the 1941 Nazi invasion he worked until 1944 as an organizer of partisan bands and an underground worker behind German lines. The locale was presumably along the Finnish frontier; [redacted] puts Andropov in Karelia, including Murmansk, during the war. He has the "Partisan of the Patriotic War, 1st Class" medal.

After serving from 1944 to January 1947 as Second Secretary of the Petrozavodsk City Party Committee in the Karelo-Finnish Republic, Andropov was made Second Secretary of the Republic Central Committee. He remained in this position until 1951, not only surviving but joining in a late 1949 and early 1950 purge in the Republic. Three weeks after a January 1950 Republic Central Committee Plenum removed G.N. Kupryanov,

Karelian First Secretary since 1938, Andropov led the criticism of Kupryanov's leadership at a Petrozavodsk City Party aktiv meeting, accusing Kupryanov of corruption and nepotism and of giving a false picture of the Republic's economy at the 1949 Party Congress. Production shortcomings appear to have been a real reason for the removal of Kupryanov and numerous other Republic officials, as subsequent press articles revealed serious underfulfillment in the 1949 fish and timber plans, although there also appears to have been some truth to the nepotism charges. Andropov additionally accused himself and his colleagues of acquiescing in Kupryanov's behavior. The purge was occasioned by an unpublished CPSU decree, and Kupryanov's removal was possibly presided over by a representative from the Central Committee apparatus, but the Moscow purger's identity and the purge's possible connection to the power struggle of Stalin's lieutenants remain unknown. Kupryanov's early career had been in the Leningrad Party and tied to Zhdanov, but Kupryanov's survival in office over a year following Zhdanov's August 1948 death suggests the Karelian purge may not have been connected with the Leningrad purge touched off by Zhdanov's death. Andropov has no apparent career ties with the Zhdanov group.

An early patron of Andropov's may have been Otto Vil'gel'movich Kuusinen, an "Old Bolshevik" and founder of the Finnish Communist Party who made the USSR his permanent home after 1921, serving as a Comintern Secretary until the Comintern's dissolution in 1939. During the entire existence of the Karelo-Finnish Republic, 1940-56, Kuusinen was the Chairman of its Council of Ministers and also a member of its Party Presidium and Bureau. In the latter positions he would have worked closely with the Second Secretary Andropov.

Andropov was transferred in July 1951 to Moscow to the Central Committee apparatus, serving as an instructor and then as head of a department sector. Which Central Committee Department is not known; his previous provincial experience as a Second Secretary, a position usually carrying cadres responsibilities, suggests it may have been the Cadres Department. Who in the Party Secretariat may have sponsored Andropov's transfer to Moscow is also not discernible. (Kuusinen did not become a Politburo member until 1952, and was dropped the next year following Stalin's death; he did not become a member of the Secretariat until his return to the Politburo, known then as the Presidium, in June 1957, a Khrushchev ally in the "anti-Party" crisis.)

While in Moscow, Andropov attended the Central Committee's Higher Party School, but his 1953 posting as Minister Counselor to the Soviet Embassy in Budapest prevented Andropov's completing his higher education. In July 1954 he took over as Ambassador in Budapest.

After Andropov returned from Hungary in 1957 to become Chief of the Central Committee Bloc Department, his work would have again involved some association with Kuusinen, in addition to considerable contact with Suslov. Beginning in 1960 Kuusinen was, within the limits imposed by his advanced age, a frequent Politburo-Secretariat spokesman in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Although he dealt primarily with international Parties on this issue, he had some Bloc Party responsibilities as well. In November 1962, for example, he led the Soviet delegation to the Hungarian Party Congress. To some extent Khrushchev appeared to use Kuusinen, more closely and consistently allied to him, as a counterweight to Suslov's influence in foreign party affairs.