

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

2003

~~SECRET~~
Security Information

C/R 29

CONTACT REPORT

1-1 Policy

DATE: 1515, 27 November 1953

PLACE: [] Office


PERSONS PRESENT: Col. King, []

COVER USED: None

DISCUSSION:

1. The meeting had been arranged by [] to discuss [] latest plan and to brief [] more their trip to New Orleans. It was intended as a discussion of details, not policy, and Col. King's presence had not been envisaged, nor had [] been previously informed that Col. King was coming. [] therefore asked Col. King whether he had anything special on his mind, which might have prompted his coming. Col. King replied in the negative and said that he had merely come to sit in, and asked [] to go ahead with his regular meeting.
2. [] before proceeding with the scheduled business, briefed Col. King on the progress made on the Miami office.
3. [] also reviewed with Col. King the general concept of approach to the PBSUCCESS problem. [] said that all the work was predicated on having to achieve the objective "the hard way". It was possible, of course, that a number of factors, such as disaffection of the Guatemalan Army, might break in our favor and simplify the task. On the other hand, even if Arbenz stepped down in favor of Diaz, or some similar thing occurred, this might be a mere front and the resulting situation in Guatemala even more adverse to US interests. [] therefore stated that he saw no short-cut to the problem, but felt the urgent need to build a systematic, disciplined pro-American organization, which could take power and maintain it. [] asked Col. King whether he still felt the same way. In reply, Col. King said "Yes!" He said that the job might have to be done faster than planned, because he foresaw the danger that the project might lose its priority; Col. King indicated that if there were a mild sort of upheaval in Guatemala, even though not controlled by the US, present US authorities might declare themselves satisfied with that much and withdraw support from the "hard way" plans. However, Col. King also felt that the project might take longer than presently planned.
4. [] asked again whether there was any special issue that Col. King wished to bring up at this time. [] said that there was indeed an urgent issue. The issue was whether [] would get the \$45,000 that had been "promised" to him.

~~SECRET~~
Security Information



1-1

5. [] replied that he was not at all ready to discuss the issue of money. Money was the last item to be discussed. The original meeting had been called to review in detail plans which [] had prepared, and which [] had studied, but he had not. He was expecting a briefing on the plan, as well as a detailed critique of it. He was in no position to discuss money, let alone make any commitments, until the merits and demerits of the plan had been carefully analyzed. Then, logically, it might appear appropriate to allocate more or less money than had been contemplated. [] expressed surprise that blanket commitments of cash should have been made without such detailed review of [] plans. He asked whether such commitments actually existed, and said that he had not seen them on paper.

6. [] then replied that the commitments did not exist on paper, but that [] had been given to understand that the current rate of subsidy would not be curtailed. Col. King quickly added that he had made a commitment, orally.

7. [] stressed that the project was currently going through the assessment stage and that he had to make a final assessment of assets before he could make commitments for which he had both operational and financial responsibility. There had to be an assessment of both [] and his assets. If [] turned out to be satisfactory, he would naturally get help; he might get less, he might get more; there would be detailed discussion with [] just what help would be best. [] pointed out that project personnel would win [] confidence and convince him of their sincerity much more readily by professional, hard-headed consultation, than if they merely handed over a batch of money. [] repeated his conviction that money should be discussed last of all, after operational details had been agreed and after there was a firm purpose to the spending.

8. It was agreed that [] would not take money with them.

Col. King left at this point.

9. A discussion then ensued about the meetings, next week, with [] asked that [] not press [] for details of his operations, that he not ask for the names of his lieutenants, etc. [] said it would be better to wait until [] was in Miami, and his confidence had been gained; [] claimed that [] had very little confidence in "us" because he had been let down so often. [] informed [] that [] could be asked for names and details without tactlessness and that, indeed, the best way to win [] confidence would be a scientific, professional approach to the problems.

10. A number of detailed questions to be put to [] were agreed on.

11. It was agreed that some 12 creative writing and propaganda personnel, preferably Guatemalans, would be needed in Miami, roughly divided as follows: five for radio, five for press and publications, two artists.

12. It was agreed that detailed information on RUFUS' secretary of propaganda would have to be secured, and that a PP case officer would have to be put in Honduras to work closely with the propaganda secretary. The qualifications of Eliot P. RAZMARA for this job were discussed, but no discussion was reached.

13. Since [] were not leaving until late Monday afternoon, it was decided to continue their briefing on Monday morning.

[]
29 November/2 Dec53