

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

DATE : 26 JUNE 54

~~SECRET~~

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : GUATEMALA CITY

ACTION: WH (PBS) (1-3)

INFO : WH (4), DCI (5), D/DCI (6), DD/P (L) (7), SA/PC/DCI (8)

**CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED**

2003

[977 (IN 22610) 0314Z 27 JUNE 54 OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
PRECEDENCE

TO: OPIM SLINC

INFO: OPIM DIR

CITE: SQUAT

RYBAT PBSUCCESS

RE: GUAT 973 (IN 22611) PARA 1E.

1. AS SITUATION STANDS, STANDEL SEEMS DOMINATE ARMY FRIENDS AND OPPORTUNISTS AND PARALYZE ANTI-RED OFFICERS. DOUBTFUL REF PETITION, IF MATERIALIZES, WILL STIR ARMY LEADERS OR IMPRESS STANDEL.

2. ARMY CAPACITY TO ACT VS STANDEL MUCH DIMINISHED BY MOVE TO FIELD.

3. STANDEL APPARENTLY PLANNING HOLD OUT AT LEAST TILL ARMY DEFEATED, POSSIBLY LONGER. BUT INDICATIONS ARE GOOD PART OF ARMY WOULD QUIT FIGHTING IF NO LONGER BOUND BY STANDEL AUTHORITY.

4. IF FOREGOING TRUE, WOULD APPEAR LEAVE US TWO ALTERNATIVES:

A. DESTROY ARMY IN FIELD AND MARCH ON CAPITAL.

B. T

POSSIBLY FOLLOW UP WITH AIRBORNE INVASION OF CAPITAL WHILE ARMY AWAY.

5. DO NOT KNOW FRONT SITUATION OR CALLIGERIS CAPABILITIES, [

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26 JUNE 54

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C 1977 (IN 22610)

PAGE 2

262330Z.

END OF MESSAGE

CABLE SECRETARIAT COMMENT:

A TEMPO COPY OF THE ABOVE MESSAGE WAS ISSUED TO MR. WISNER'S
OFFICE AT 2315 26 JUNE 1954.

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