

PBSUCCESS

7 July 1954

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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF OF PROJECT

FROM :

[]

2003

SUBJECT :

Paramilitary Activities, PBSUCCESS, June, 1954

1. Departure from LINCOLN was made early in June with several purposes in mind to be accomplished upon arrival in Tegucigalpa. They were:

a. Bring the shock troops to a state of preparedness which would permit the initiation of the campaign at an early date and at the same time would permit supporting of a premature uprising which might be caused by any one of a number of actions within the target country.

b. Organize five man "Hornet" teams for the harassment of the enemy in localities far removed from the obvious area of activity.

c. Launch the remaining resident radio operators to their respective points.

d. Move all shock troop equipment to selected staging areas near the border.

e. Move by all possible methods, land, sea and air, arms to the inner organizations.

f. Bring sabotage plans to the final stages. Ready the sab leaders for launching to their areas.

g. Prepare [] (who turned out to be GUZMAN, not [] for launching to his targets.

h. Check the final military plans and modify them to suit the latest analysis of the situation.

2. Upon arrival and after meeting with ONTRICH and PIVALL as well as with all the leaders of the CALLIGERIS organization, it was obvious that much of the above would be very difficult to accomplish in the short time remaining. It was apparent that CALLIGERIS had very little knowledge

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of the numerical strength of his own organization. At various times he claimed to have from 300 to 500 men in Tegucigalpa. It was on the basis of these figures that the decision to form the five-man teams was made. During the attempts to form these groups CALLIGERIS made a number of excuses as to why this couldn't be done. It was finally apparent that he undoubtedly did not have the men that he claimed to have and a list of all men in Tegucigalpa was demanded by name. He submitted a list of men far below the number that we had hoped was present. The list contained 150 odd names. This not only did not permit the formation of the five-man teams, but it also did not furnish the required numbers for the shock troop organization. This information came only a week before the intended D-Day.

3. Upon the receipt of this information, my first inclination was to relay the shocking facts to LINCOLN with an urgent plea to postpone the initiation of the campaign. After much careful consideration, however, it was my decision that due to the possibility of gathering considerable sympathizers along the way, we could launch the campaign as planned. I felt that any relaying of such information would have the effect of detracting from and dampening the enthusiasm of the CALLIGERIS organization as well as having the effect of possibly postponing a campaign which might bog down hopelessly if not permitted to begin on schedule.

4. Much of the preparation for the campaign was made very difficult by the turn of events within the target country. The crack-down after the first leaflet drop made arms ingress almost impossible. Most of our methods broke down completely and we had to rely on such methods as [] and his plane delivering arms to his personal finca. We were able to send individuals across the line with arms in suitcases and bags. It is not known at this time how much of that was effective. We tried every method imaginable and we are confident that some of them worked. Even the launching of the radio operators was extremely difficult and hazardous for them. We are sure that a number of them were picked up and of those who did get to their respective areas only a few came on the air.

5. PIVALL had done a fine job of preparing the sabotage leaders and all were eager to get in and begin their work. There remained the problem of getting the proper equipment in for them to work with. Some was sent in by [] and some was taken in by hand. While mentioning PIVALL, it might be added that he had done wonders in organizing CALLIGERIS' staff into the proper sections. All hands had the utmost respect for PIVALL and his command presence as well as his language qualifications made him invaluable.

6. In looking over the final military plans, it struck me that the movement of our HANK troops by way of GUALAN would not only give the enemy adequate warning of the movement but the concentration of Communist personnel at GUALAN would hinder our advance to such a degree that the HANK enemy forces

FRSUCCEBS

~~SECRET~~

Page Three

might stage a successful counterattack. It appeared to me that a pincers movement on HANK would be more likely to succeed. A plan was worked out to bring an additional force from COPAN RUINAS down through CAMOTAN and JOCOTAN for an attack upon CHIQUIMULA and thence to HANK. The mission of this force was 1) to aid in the capture of HANK in the event that the HANK team experienced difficulty, and 2) if HANK fell to us early, to move rapidly through the JALAPA area to the capital. In the latter case, the HANK forces would protect the rear of this column. CALLIGERIS' staff took to this plan with alacrity and it was decided that the CP would be with this group.

7. Much of my time was taken up with interviews of personnel newly arrived from WSBURNT, both military and civilian. Upon the arrival of [] and following an interview with him, I recommended [] be placed in command of the HANK force, replacing [] I felt that as [] had been in command of the garrison of HANK at one time along with [] higher rank and greater experience he should be commander of this very important force.

Another arrival was [] I was very much impressed with his force and bearing and recommended him for some command. In this case it was command of the force which was to cross from NUEVA CCOTEPEQUE.

8. In the absence of the five-man teams for harassment, it was decided to utilize the talents of [] in this line. He had been most anxious to do something other than deliver arms to his finca and claimed to be able to perform bombing missions with his [] I was frankly skeptical about the accuracy of such bombing, but he convinced me that it was feasible. PIVALL constructed bombs of TNT blocks surrounding concussion grenades, armed so that they would detonate upon impact. [] took off on his initial flight of this type headed for SAN JOSE. He had with him two men, one for "bombardier." He flew in almost on the ground toward the gasoline tanks at SAN JOSE. As he approached the tanks, he pulled into a semi-stall and the bombardier threw the bomb. His first attempt was a direct hit and the tank burst into flame. He then flew to RETALUEHUE and did the same thing to the SHELL and ESSO tanks there. He ran out of bombs but "strafed" the PEMEX tanks with a Madsen gun, successfully puncturing them and then set them afire with grenades. [] flew another of these missions to BOND. His audacity was illustrated by his calling the field tower at BOND, saying that he was an air force plane wishing to land. The tower gave him the proper instructions and he came in to his bombing mission on the TEXACO tank. He received much AA fire as he tried to bomb an AT-6 on the runway of the field. In eluding the fire he dived into a group of trees and caught a branch of one of them in his control surfaces. He had to land at the first available field in WSHOOPS to remove it.

[] was very anxious to perform very hazardous missions at all times and was invaluable to our efforts.

~~SECRET~~

PBSUCCESS

Page Four

~~SECRET~~

9. Our safe house facilities in Tegucigalpa included a house where the CALLIGERIS staff could function as a unit. There we had maps, tables, conference rooms and briefing rooms. PIVALL and I met there every day early in the morning and worked there all day with the staff. PIVALL also worked in another safe house which served also as a storehouse for our supplies. He worked with his sabotage leaders there. The latter house was located high on the mountainside outside of the city. Upon the arrival of the FCP radio personnel, we activated another safe house about halfway between Tegucigalpa and TONCONTIN field. This house was ideal for the radio station as it was well into the suburbs and comings and goings were not noticed. After this house was opened, we spent much of our time there.

10. Upon the arrival of CADICK the final touches were put on the plans and very shortly after he came the campaign was initiated. It should be noted here that the entire CALLIGERIS organization had complete confidence in CADICK and in his leadership. So far as I could tell, none of his decisions were ever questioned and for that matter neither were any of mine, before he came. CALLIGERIS made the same plea for strong air attacks to CADICK that he had made to me previously and of course he was not given any assurance whatever that air support would be forthcoming other than air delivery of supplies, which we felt would be a sure thing. All of the personnel who came out of the country to us in Tegucigalpa were of the firm opinion that should powerful air blows be delivered on the city in the early phases, the campaign would not be a long one. The consensus was that if several bombs were dropped...one on the Guardia de Honor, one on the Aurora airfield, Base Militar, and possibly one other on a selected target, the Government would fall immediately. [] insisted that the Government almost fell with the first leaflet drop.

11. Just before the arrival of CADICK our BOND organizer returned to Tegucigalpa. He had been captured by several soldiers who recognized him from a former association in the army. He was tortured but escaped to return with valuable information. People were coming and going along the border at this time without interference, particularly in the BOND and HANK areas.

12. One of our big problems was movement of men and supplies through Salvador. We had cooperation with the [] in WSHOOPS to the extent of his agreeing to send a truckload of arms ~~in~~ the country as his personal effects. This did not work, however. We did send several loads of arms in specially constructed private automobiles with false compartments. We had no cooperation from the president.

13. Movement of shock troops to the staging areas began in small numbers. Receiving parties were sent ahead and when we got word that the areas were ready, we initiated the movement. The movement was very slow and in very small numbers. Finally, when time became short and D-Day approached, much speed was necessary and troops moved in larger and less

~~SECRET~~

Page Five

clandestine groups. This movement caused a flood of newspapermen to descend upon Tegucigalpa, making operations all the more difficult. Final movement of the shock troops brought the operation fully into the open, as it became necessary to move the troops by commercially chartered airplanes. This was in order to assemble them at the staging areas at the proper time for the attack.

14. Much difficulty was encountered in the plans for the seaborne operation for BOND in which we had purchased a boat at LA CEIBA on the North Coast of WSHOFS. The boat was loaded by means of delivery of equipment to LA CEIBA in cooperation with [] who incidentally was of tremendous help in many ways. He transported equipment in his WSHOFS airplanes for us to various points, into fields which were not well suited to his planes. A group was dispatched to LA CEIBA to man the boat, only to find that the boat was missing. It had presumably made a run to the islands for cover purposes. The team finally caught up with the boat and boarded it for the operation. It is not entirely clear at this date what developed from this operation. It is known that the boat was picked up but more than that is not known.

15. Communications were good with the exception that at night all contact was lost between SALAL and SHERWOOD, thereby causing a terrific pile-up of messages in the morning and bogging down of those messages. There was considerable time lag between the sending of messages from the field and their reception at SALAL. For this reason, it was decided to move the FCP (SALAL) back to SOMERSET in order to give more adequate service to the field. With regard to the answering of some messages which came in from the field, it was frequently impossible to gain contact with those stations for some hours. More urgent messages would follow and some of the original messages went unanswered.

16. With regard to security, it is obvious that much of the desirable security measures which would normally be employed in a truly clandestine operation were disregarded in this instance. In order to do the job, much of the clandestinity had to be abandoned. We had to move openly in the city of Tegucigalpa to and from safehouses, thereby undoubtedly identifying ourselves with the CALLIGENTS organization. It can be said that this movement was kept to the absolute minimum but some of it was absolutely necessary to accomplish the task. The safe house where the FCP was located was by far the best and kept the most clandestine.

17. After the movement to [] the FCP functioned much more efficiently and was able to offer the desired support to the field. The fact that PM Staff worked right with Air Ops facilitated this support, plus keeping everyone informed as to the situation in the field—which they had not been up to that time.

PBSUCCESS

~~SECRET~~

Page Six

18. Comments

Other than the numerous small lessons learned during the campaign, there are, in my opinion, two main lessons to be learned from the overall situation. First, at the very outset of the planning for an operation of this type, a decision should be made as to the importance of the success of the thing. Upon reaching this decision, the amount of power to be utilized and the method of employment of this power should also be decided. This power (and in this case it was air bombardment) should not be withheld. It should be utilized at the very beginning of the operation. It is my considered opinion that if the air power which was used in the final phases of the operation had been used on the first day in the same manner, the campaign would not have lasted 48 hours. Undoubtedly, a few lives would have been lost in the bombing, but many more lives could have been saved by shortening the campaign. This opinion is based upon both the reports of persons who came out of WSBURNT and my previous knowledge of the Latin people.

Secondly, I believe that the PP program could have been better coordinated with the PM program. By this I refer to the leaflet drops. The reaction to these drops was terrific. The results, however, were definitely detrimental to the PM effort, and the reaction of the CALLIGERIS staff in Tegucigalpa was one of defection. It was the opinion of all of us, including ONTRICH, that it would have been well if the field had been consulted before the decision to make the drop had been made. The leaflet drops caused a crackdown within WSBURNT which would have come eventually when the movement of our troops to the border was noticed, but it came at a time when we were still able to make delivery of arms, radio operators and sabotage personnel into the country. After the crackdown, it was virtually impossible to accomplish this. [] pleaded with us to permit no more leaflet drops as every one reduced the effectiveness of his air operations. The overall effect of such PP activity cannot be underestimated, but it is recommended that in the future they be coordinated with the PM activity so that they can be mutually supporting.

With regard to communications, as in operations in which I have been involved in the military service, much of the planning is based upon split second contact between units and command by radio. I have never seen this contact work out completely as planned, even with highly trained operators. In this case, with indigenous operators and difficult conditions, while the results were amazing, they did not work out as planned. Only in the final phases did the radio commo begin to work properly.

Finally, while an operation of this type is most difficult to keep clandestine, it would have been much more easily accomplished if the enemy had not been fully alerted some weeks before D-Day. Had not martial law been proclaimed and the curfews, police patrols, etc., not been in effect, our movement and sabotage plans would have been much more likely to succeed. It is ~~not~~ known at this time how much of our sabotage was completed, but so far not much of it has been reported.

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